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Abstract: The thesis explores the concept of strategic culture and applies it to British grand 
strategy between 1945-1952. Strategic culture refers to the beliefs, attitudes and values held by a 
particular group regarding the use of force, and asserts that these are shaped by the group's 
distinctive historical experience, geographical setting and political organisation. The thesis first 
describes the origins of strategic culture, locates it within the strategic studies literature and 
argues that it should be investigated further. It proceeds to survey the strategic culture literature, 
showing in detail the uses to which strategic culture has been put, categorising the work done so 
far, and identifying its strengths and weaknesses and the areas needing refinement. The next 
stage is a survey of the literature on political culture, a concept with a familial resemblance to 
strategic culture, with the aim of developing understanding of how strategic culture can be used 
and studied. In the light of this the strategic culture literature is reassessed and a framework and 
methodology for the study of strategic culture is proposed. The framework is then used to draw 
up a profile of the salient aspects of British strategic culture. The beliefs, attitudes and values 
described are then applied to a case study with a view to determining what conclusions can be 
drawn about their effect on British strategic policy during the early post-war years. The 
conclusion summarises the argument, and assesses the utility of the concept of strategic culture. 
The conclusion also locates strategic culture within the wider intellectual frameworks of security 
studies, International Politics and the human sciences more generally, suggesting what it might 
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Introduction: Thesis Aims and Objectives 
 
 
The subject of this thesis is the concept of strategic culture. Strategic culture, a term coined by 
the political scientist Jack Snyder in 1977, refers to the values, beliefs and attitudes held within 
different groups regarding the use and threat of force.1 The concept involves three main 
propositions. The first is that different collectivities have distinct beliefs, attitudes and values 
regarding the use and threat of force. The second is that these beliefs, attitudes and values are 
shaped by the unique geographical setting and historical development of the group, especially in 
the strategic and political fields. The final proposition is that the strategic debates and behaviour 
of the group will be affected by its distinctive strategic culture.  
 
 
 What led Snyder to coin this new term was the concern that Western, and especially US, 
academic strategic studies had not always paid sufficient attention to national cultural variations. 
Specifically, he believed that US nuclear strategy was based on the assumption that strategists in 
the Soviet Union thought about nuclear weapons in the same way as strategists in the United 
States. If, however, because of the radically different histories and political cultures of the two 
countries, their defence decision-makers had arrived at quite different nuclear strategies, then US 
policy in a vital area was misguided.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations (Santa Monica: RAND 
Report R-2154-AF, 1977). 
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 Nor is Snyder alone in making such observations. The lack of comparative strategic 
studies and the neglect of area studies by strategists are weaknesses within the sub-field of 
strategic studies to which others have drawn attention.2 They complain that approaches which 
presuppose that 'rational strategic man' calculates the defence policies of states, or which waive 
altogether consideration of the intentions of policy-makers, preferring the more straightforward 
assessment of military capabilities, provide only limited understanding of activity in the strategic 
realm. This belief has prompted various scholars, prominent among whom are Ken Booth and 
Colin Gray, to take up the term 'strategic culture'.3 These scholars believe that comprehension of 
the distinctive strategic beliefs and values of a particular group will enhance our understanding of 
its strategic discourses and debates. It will also be of use in explaining the group's behaviour in 
the strategic realm.  
 
 Furthermore, advocates of the study of strategic culture argue that analysis of cultural 
variations in thinking about force sheds light on strategic behaviour in ways that analysis based 
on the neo-realist approach - dominant within the discipline of International Politics - does not. 
Neo-realists assume that the self-help nature of the anarchic international system imposes a 
universal logic of action upon the states which comprise it. The internal workings of the states do 
not significantly affect their behaviour. The strategic culture approach asserts, to the contrary, 
that the cultural outlooks of states and other units do matter. Different groups will view the 
strategic world in different ways and may therefore act differently. Even for analysts who 
continue to accept one of the central 
 
                                                 
2 On the lack of comparative strategic studies see Carol Leigh Rice, Comparative Strategic Culture and the Use of 
Force, Space and Time in International Relations: Chinese Foreign Policy as Protracted War (unpublished MA 
Thesis, University of Victoria, 1992), p. 33. On the neglect of area studies by strategists see Ken Booth, Strategy and 
Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979), especially pp. 147-52. 
3 See for instance Ken Booth, 'The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed', in Carl G. Jacobsen, (ed), Strategic 
Power: USA/USSR (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990); and Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style 
(Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986). A full list of works on strategic culture is included in the bibliography. 
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tenets of neo-realism - that conflict, sometimes leading to war, is inevitable in the anarchic 
system4 - the study of strategic culture can be important in preparing states to defend themselves 
and protect their interests. If war cannot be avoided, then knowing the enemy's idiosyncrasies in 
the use of force may be crucial to military success. If security is to be maintained and potential 
enemies are to be deterred from aggression, then understanding what hostile states fear and 
respect is important. 
 
 The strategic culture approach is also of interest to those who believe that, while conflicts 
of interest do arise between states, such conflicts need not always lead to war. Understanding the 
distinctive strategic preoccupations and fears of other states could be of use not only in prevailing 
against them, but in learning to live with them. If it is accepted that violent conflicts often result 
from, or are prolonged unnecessarily by, mutual misunderstanding of the parties involved, then 
comprehension of strategic cultures could contribute to the development of strategies for the 
peaceful settlement of disputes. Escaping security dilemmas and building security communities 
ought to be aided by sensitivity to the differing views on security and the particular concerns of 
different groups. If the root of the security dilemma is seen as the 'unresolvable uncertainty' in the 
minds of state leaders as to whether the intentions of other states are defensive or offensive, then 
an approach which focuses not on the military capabilities of states but on their strategic beliefs 






                                                 
4 See Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: a theoretical analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1959), p. 159. 
5 On security dilemmas and communities, see Nicholas J. Wheeler and Ken Booth, 'The Security Dilemma', in John 
Baylis and N.J. Rengger, (eds), Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992), especially pp. 30-34. 
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 However, investigation of strategic culture promises even more dramatic results. Implicit 
in the concept is the possibility that attitudes to the use of force are the products not of the nature 
of the international system, nor of the nature of human beings, but rather that they are shaped by 
specific historical experiences of peoples at particular times and in particular places. War is a 
cultural phenomenon. It is a learned activity and so it may be unlearned. Awareness of its cultural 
bases may be the first step in the process of unlearning it.6 Thus strategic culture holds out the 
possibility of change. 
 
 Hence the case for pursuing the study of strategic culture is that the strategic behaviour of 
states or other units cannot adequately be understood only by reference to the nature of the 
international system or to notions of a universal strategic rationality. It is necessary also to 
examine the unique cultural beliefs of the different units if we are to comprehend their behaviour. 
It has been argued, however, that the concept of strategic culture remains an immature one. How 
strategic culture is to be studied, and exactly what explanatory work it does, remain unclear. 
Moreover, the focus of empirical studies has been largely on the superpowers and China. The 
concept is therefore in need of both 'empirical flesh and theoretical shine'.7 The overarching aim 
of this thesis is to further the development of the concept by providing it with additional 
'empirical flesh and theoretical shine' and by embedding the concept in the wider academic 
literatures. This is achieved in a number of stages. Chapter One sets the scene by first introducing 
the concept of strategic culture and describing its origins in much greater depth than in this 
Introduction. It then investigates the extent to which culture has been ignored and the extent to 
which it has been included in the study of strategy, and locates strategic culture within the wider  
                                                 
6 On war as a cultural phenomenon, see Ken Booth, 'War, Security and Strategy: towards a doctrine for stable peace', 
in Ken Booth, (ed), New Thinking About Strategy and International Security (London: HarperCollins, 1991), pp. 
354-55. 
7 On strategic culture's need for 'empirical flesh and theoretical shine', see Booth, 'The Concept of Strategic Culture 
Affirmed', p. 126. 
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academic literature of strategic studies. This chapter provides a useful context for Chapter Two, 
which contains the most thorough and up-to-date survey of the literature on strategic culture yet 
undertaken. The objectives here are to gather together all that has been written on the subject and 
to compare the various approaches. As well as conveying the flavour of these approaches the 
chapter will make a preliminary assessment of their strengths and weaknesses and identify the 
outstanding issues raised by the study of cultural factors in strategy and the areas of the concept 
which require further work. Particularly important questions which emerge are: how can strategic 
culture be studied? Which methods should be employed? How should strategic culture be 
defined? In what ways does it affect strategic behaviour? 
 
 In order to refine the concept and add 'theoretical shine', the thesis turns to a survey of the 
literature on political culture. Reference is often made to political culture in writing about 
strategic culture. Political culture is a long-established concept in political science. Defined as the 
'values, beliefs, and emotions that give meaning to political behaviour', political culture is seen as 
a closely related concept to strategic culture.8 The methods by which it has been studied should 
thus yield lessons for strategic culture. However, strategic culture scholars have yet to bring the 
insights of political culture systematically to bear on their theorising about strategic culture. 
Chapter Three does so. 
 
 Chapter Four revisits the strategic culture literature in order to make a more thorough 
assessment of it in the light of the findings of the previous chapter. That accomplished, a 
framework and a methodology for proceeding with the study of strategic culture are outlined, 
drawing on the political culture literature. Within both the political culture and strategic culture 
literatures, there is a significant division between those who  
                                                 
8 Dennis Kavanagh, British Politics: Continuities and Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, second edition, 
1990), p. 49. 
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employ a positivist methodology and those who prefer a more interpretive one. The thesis opts 
for the latter in Chapter Four.  
 
 Attention then turns to the case study chapters. Chapter Five applies the concept of 
strategic culture in a concerted manner for the first time to the United Kingdom. The profile of 
British strategic culture drawn up in this chapter is the most comprehensive description of the 
key elements of British beliefs and values about the use of force yet attempted. Chapter Six then 
applies the concept of strategic culture to British strategic policy in the 1945-1952 period. This is 
a crucial period in British strategic history. It is framed at one end by the conclusion of the 
Second World War with the dropping of the first atomic weapons, and at the other by the 
completion of the British Global Strategy Paper, one of the most famous British defence 
documents of the post-war years.9 The Global Strategy Paper set out the British response to the 
advent of nuclear weapons and the ideas it contained continue to inform British defence policy 
today. The 1945-1952 period has yet to be subjected to a concerted and explicit strategic cultural 
analysis. It is therefore appropriate in the search for 'empirical flesh' to turn to this period.  
 
 The Conclusion sums up the findings of the thesis and assesses the value of strategic 
culture in the light of the case study chapters. What does strategic culture tell us about British 
grand strategy, and what does the case study of British grand strategy tell us about the utility of 
strategic culture? Research into strategic culture is located within the wider spheres of 
International Politics and the human sciences more broadly. Parallels are drawn with work in 
other areas, and suggestions are offered as to how strategic culture research might develop in the 
future. A recurrent theme in the thesis is the division  
 
                                                 
9 See John Baylis and Alan Macmillan, 'The British Global Strategy Paper of 1952', Journal of Strategic Studies, 
Vol. 16, No. 2 (June 1993), pp. 200-26. 
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between interpretivist and positivist approaches to the study of culture. The Conclusion relates 
this division to the wider post-positivist debate in International Politics. 
 
 By thoroughly surveying the strategic culture literature and embedding it within the wider 
literatures of strategic studies and International Politics, by developing the concept through 
establishing the link with political culture, by applying it to fresh empirical material and by 
enriching existing accounts of British post-war defence policy, it is hoped that the thesis 




Strategic culture is still a fairly new and underdeveloped concept. Various problems attend 
enquiries into such new areas. Sidney Verba notes 'an unfortunate tendency in the social sciences 
to oversell new concepts and to assume that the mere labeling of an old phenomenon with a new 
term represents a breakthrough in our understanding'.10 It is important to recognise that this is not 
so. Much work remains to be done, to demonstrate how and to what degree strategic culture is 
significant. It is important also not to overemphasise its importance relative to other variables. 
Nathan Leites writes of the 'frequent fallacy in the human sciences to believe that, if somebody at 
a certain moment talks about the importance of factor A, he is running down the importance of 
factors B, C...'.11 To investigate strategic culture on the grounds that it has sometimes been 
neglected and not always studied explicitly and wisely when interest has been shown, is not to 
argue that it is necessarily more important than other approaches.  
 
                                                 
10 Sidney Verba, 'Conclusion', in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, (eds), Political Culture and Political 
Development (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 515. 
11 Nathan Leites, 'Psychocultural Hypotheses about Political Acts', World Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (October 1948), p. 
107. 
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 As will be shown, when political culture appeared on the scene in the 1950s and 1960s, it 
was seized upon as the answer to a number of problems. It could explain why the governments of 
newly independent states were often unstable, although their political systems had often been 
copied from stable Western democracies: the political beliefs of the population differed from 
those of the West and could not support democracy. Political culture was even seen as potentially 
able to bridge the micro-macro gap: to reconcile the relationship of the attitudes of individuals 
and the operation of the political system as a whole. This was the Holy Grail of political science, 
equivalent in physics to reconciling the operation of quantum mechanics and relativity. There 
was profound disappointment when the Grail was not found. If we are careful not to ask too 
much of strategic culture, we can avoid disappointment when it does not deliver as much as we 
had hoped. 
 
 If there can be a tendency to see new concepts as the answer to all our questions, there 
can be an opposite and conservative tendency to find fault with the new, to highlight its 
weaknesses and to stick to familiar approaches. Familiarity breeds complacency, and we can 
forget about the weaknesses of existing approaches. Therefore the aim is not to overplay the 
weaknesses of strategic culture, but to attempt a balanced appreciation of its strengths and 
weaknesses, of what it can and cannot do. It does have weaknesses, and it does not promise all 
the answers, but it is unlikely that it will go away. No-one writing about German security policy 
would ignore the effect of the weight of history. If you want to understand German reluctance to 
commit armed forces during contemporary crises, you will look at German experience of war. 
Similarly, who would discuss Israeli security policy without reference to the Diaspora, the 
Holocaust, and earlier pogroms? Israeli attitudes to security are surely affected by the history of 
the Jews. Security from physical attack is bound to loom large in the calculations of a people so 
grievously sinned against in the past. For the Japanese, the only nation to have nuclear weapons  
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used in war against them, history also shapes attitudes towards the use of force. Acquiring 
nuclear weapons, well within Japan's technological grasp, is especially problematic for the 
Japanese. The use of force more generally raises difficulties for the Japanese also, as for the 
Germans. If you want to understand Kamikaze attacks by the Japanese during World War Two, 
you will look into their society and values. All these things are the stuff of strategic culture.  
 
 These are also factors which inhabit what Michael Howard calls the shadowy regions of 
international politics. Howard recounts the story of '...the drunk who lost his watch in a dark alley 
but was found looking for it under a lamp post because there was more light there'. He comments 
that  
 
the light provided by our knowledge of technological capabilities and our capacity for 
sophisticated strategic analysis is so dazzling as to be almost hypnotic; but it is in those 
shadowy regions of human understanding based on our knowledge of social development, 
cultural diversity and patterns of behaviour that we have to look for the answers.12 
 
Strategic behaviour may more easily be studied and apparently neatly explained in terms of 
action-reaction cycles or structural imperatives, but to leave culture out of the picture because its 
significance is held to be more difficult to prove or measure may be to forgo a potentially rich 
vein of analysis. 
 
 As will be shown, journalists, faced with lower standards of proof than academics, find 
the subject amenable. However, for academics it is all too easy to be disappointed with the 
results of the study of culture. It is appropriate to end this introduction with the words of Clifford 
Geertz, an anthropologist who has written widely on culture, which should temper over-
optimism: 
 
                                                 
12 Michael Howard, 'The Future of Deterrence', Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, Vol. 131, No. 2 (June 
1986), p. 10. 
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Cultural analysis is intrinsically incomplete. And, worse than that, the more deeply it goes 
the less complete it is. It is a strange science whose most telling assertions are its most 
tremulously based, in which to get somewhere with the matter at hand is to intensify the 
suspicion, both your own and that of others, that you are not quite getting it right.13 
 
 
This is not to argue, of course, that strategic culture research is not worth doing. 
                                                 





Chapter One: Culture and Strategy 
 
 
'Know your enemy and know yourself: in a hundred battles you will never be in peril'. This was 
the advice, more than 2000 years ago, of the Chinese military philosopher Sun Zi.1 In the West, 
that you should 'know your enemy' is also recognised as a cardinal military principle. It is a 
principle, however, that strategists have often failed to observe. This at least was the argument 
advanced by Jack Snyder, in the course of a RAND report published in 1977.2 Snyder's subject 
was the development by the United States of a strategy of limited nuclear operations. The 
objective of this strategic concept was to prevent the leadership of the United States from being 
forced into rapid escalation to all-out nuclear war in the event of nuclear deterrence breaking 
down. This was to be achieved by providing a wide range of pre-planned, limited nuclear strike 
options. Moreover, possession by the United States of a flexible range of nuclear attack options 
would serve to strengthen deterrence by assuring the Soviet Union that the United States could 
respond appropriately to any level of aggression which the Soviet Union might undertake. 
 
 To the government of the United States, this policy made sound strategic sense. The key 
question which Snyder addressed in his report, however, was whether the policy would make 
sense to the leadership of the Soviet Union. It was imperative that it did: the success of limited 
nuclear operations required the Soviet Union as well as the United States to exercise restraint in 
its use of nuclear weapons, should war break out. It would be futile for the United States to limit 
nuclear attacks if the Soviet Union 
 
                                                 
1 Samuel B. Griffith's translation of Sun Tzu's The Art of War (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 84. (Sun 
Zi is the more modern transliteration of Sun Tzu). 
2 Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations (Santa Monica: RAND 
Report R-2154-AF, 1977). 
 12 
did not do likewise, and dangerous to plan on the erroneous assumption that nuclear use could be 
initiated without precipitating holocaust. Yet ascertaining the exact nature of strategic  thinking 
and doctrine in a closed society like the Soviet Union was a complicated task. As a result, Snyder 
believed, strategists in the United States had tended to rely on calculations of what a generic, 
'rational strategic man' would do, rather than investigating what 'Soviet man' would do. Nuclear 
weapons, it was assumed, imposed a logic of action on those who possessed them. If strategists 
in the Soviet Union did not already share US thinking on nuclear deterrence and war-fighting, it 
could therefore be expected that they would come to do so as soon as they worked out the logic 
of the nuclear predicament. 
 
 Snyder challenged this expectation. 'Abstract, armchair strategy' could not, he argued, 
yield a full enough understanding of how the Soviet Union would respond to the onset of nuclear 
war to serve as a basis for policy.3 The attempt had to be made to discover what thinking among 
Soviet strategists actually was with regard to the use of nuclear weapons. Crucially, this was 
more than a matter merely of determining the essentials of Soviet policy. It involved digging 
deeper than that, because, Snyder wrote, 
 
Soviet and American doctrines have developed in different organizational, historical, and 
political contexts, and in response to different situational and technological constraints. 
As a result, the Soviets and Americans have asked somewhat different questions about 
the use of nuclear weapons and have developed answers that differ in significant 
respects.4 
 
For example, the experience of the United States in the Korean and Vietnam wars, and the 
dilemma which had confronted NATO over whether to initiate the use of nuclear weapons, given 
perceived conventional inferiority, had given US strategists incentives to consider issues of 
limitation in war. Their Soviet counterparts had no such incentives. The different circumstances 
and experiences of the USA and the USSR had shaped in each a distinctive 'set of general beliefs, 
attitudes and behavioral patterns with regard to nuclear 
                                                 
3 Ibid, p. 4. 
4 Ibid, p. v. 
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strategy'. Strategists in the United States and the Soviet Union were not 'culture-free, 
preconception-free game theorists', but were socialised into holding these distinctive beliefs, 
which thereby 'achieved a state of semi-permanence that places them on the level of "culture" 
rather than mere "policy"'.5  
 
 Lacking a label for this phenomenon, Snyder minted a new one: strategic culture. This he 
defined as 
 
the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior 
that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or 
imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy.6 
 
Snyder suggested that the section of his report elaborating this concept might be its 'most useful 
and durable part', and so it has proved. From the vantage point of the post-Cold War world, 
discussions of the limited nuclear war planning carried out in the Soviet Union and the United 
States provoke only historical interest. The concept of strategic culture, on the other hand, has 
exhibited a more enduring appeal. Since 1977 a small literature has accumulated around this 
concept and continues to grow. Strategic culture has been the subject of books, journal articles, 
and postgraduate theses.7 It has been discussed at academic workshops and conferences.8 That 
the major journal International Security should devote part of an issue in 1995 to the question, 
'Does Strategic Culture Matter?', both underlines and further enhances its increasingly high 
profile.9  
 
                                                 
5 Ibid, pp. v and 7. 
6 Ibid, p. 8. 
7 A full list can be found in the bibliography. Many of these works will be discussed below. 
8 These include a workshop on strategic culture organised by the American Academy of Sciences in May 1990; a 
workshop on 'Strategic Culture and China' held at the Contemporary History Institute, Ohio University, in March 
1992; and a workshop on 'Conflict Resolution and Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region', held at Langkawi 
Island, Malaysia, August 1994. 
9 International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995) contained the following articles under the heading 'Does 
Strategic Culture Matter?': Stephen Peter Rosen, 'Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters', pp. 5-31; Alastair 
Iain Johnston, 'Thinking About Strategic Culture', pp. 32-64; and Elizabeth Kier, 'Culture and Military Doctrine: 
France Between the Wars', pp. 65-93. 
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 Moreover, the term 'strategic culture' has seeped gradually into the vocabulary of strategic 
and security studies. Not only is more being written about strategic culture, with the result that 
producing a definitive bibliography is a more demanding task now than it was a few years ago; 
but the term is increasingly dropped casually into analysis, and employed as one among a number 
of approaches, whereas previously it was used more self-consciously, accompanied by much 
discussion of the concept and forming the main focus of the piece in which it appeared. Rough 
acquaintance with the concept is more likely to be assumed now than ten or even five years 
ago.10  
 
 Notwithstanding the increased attention paid to strategic culture, it is not familiar to all 
those who study war and peace. Seyom Brown illustrates this point in the second edition of his 
book The Causes and Prevention of War, when he writes that he has 'coined the term culture of 
war to denote how countries' belief systems affect their use of military force'.11 That Brown felt 
the need to coin a term to cover cultural factors underscores their importance. However, that he 
was unaware that the term 'strategic culture' exists and denotes the phenomenon he describes 
shows that this term is not yet as well known as it might be. Moreover, as will be argued in the 
following chapter, strategic culture remains an underdeveloped and contested concept. There is 
no consensus on how it should be studied, and there are differences of opinion on the value of 
studying it.  
 
 As noted in the Introduction, this thesis seeks to explore strategic culture and to build up 
its profile further. The aim is to add 'empirical flesh and theoretical shine' to the concept, and to 
assess its utility.12 However, it is worth questioning at the outset Jack 
                                                 
10 One example of the casual use of the term is by Ian Clark and Nicholas J. Wheeler, who refer to the 'British 
strategic nuclear culture', without elaborating on it, in The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy 1945-1955 
(Clarendon: Oxford, 1989), p. 176. An example of the employment of strategic culture as merely one analytical tool 
amongst others is Bates Gill, in 'North-East Asia and multilateral security institutions', in SIPRI Yearbook 1994 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 149-53. 
11 Seyom Brown, The Causes and Prevention of War (New York: St. Martin's Press, second edition, 1994), p. 100. 
12 On strategic culture's need for 'empirical flesh and theoretical shine', see Ken Booth, 'The Concept of Strategic 
Culture Affirmed', in Carl G. Jacobsen, (ed), Strategic Power: USA/USSR (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), p. 126. 
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Snyder's central premise: that history and culture had been left out of strategy. Colin Gray has 
commented that Snyder and others who initiated the study of strategic culture had discovered the 
obvious. Strategists had, deep down, known all along that culture and history shaped strategy, 
Gray wrote.13 Because the term itself was coined only in 1977 does not mean that the ideas which 
comprise strategic culture were not around long before. Is the development of strategic culture a 
case of pouring old wine into new bottles? The bulk of this introductory chapter will be given 
over to an examination of the place of culture in thinking about strategy and an attempt to locate 
strategic culture within the wider strategic literature. 
 
 As preparation for asking whether and to what extent strategic culture and its associated 
ideas were and continue to be ignored by strategic commentators, both during the Cold War and 
beyond it, let us recap briefly the nature of the concept. Definitions of strategic culture vary, but 
the literature on the concept is broadly in agreement that it involves three main propositions.14 
The first is that different groups possess distinct and enduring sets of beliefs, attitudes and values 
regarding the threat and use of force. The second is that this distinctiveness is shaped by the 
unique historical experience of the group in its particular geographic setting and given its 
particular internal political organisation. The final proposition is that these beliefs and attitudes 
in some way affect the strategic behaviour of the group. How far have these propositions guided 




Culture and Strategic Studies 
Prior to the Second World War, strategy was not widely taught at universities nor studied in an 
academic fashion. Though much was written about war, it tended to come from the pens of 
professional soldiers and to constitute either 'how to do it' guides for the efficient 
                                                 
13 Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986), pp. 33-34.   
14 This point will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter where the strategic culture literature is surveyed. 
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prosecution of combat, or histories of particular battles.15 Much of this writing, from Sun Zi and 
Machiavelli through to Clausewitz and Jomini, is still read today, but the bulk of the serious 
academic treatment of strategy dates from 1945.16 
 
 It was the advent of atomic and later thermonuclear weapons which took the study of 
strategy out of the hands of generals and onto the syllabuses of universities. The post-war period 
is the era of the civilian, academic strategist, grappling with the problems raised by nuclear 
weapons. Out of such grappling in the 1950s and early 1960s came a body of literature which set 
the framework for the study of nuclear strategy and which provided the conceptual apparatus and 
vocabulary still widely used at least until the end of the Cold War. Deterrence, crisis 
management, limited war and other phrases were coined and popularised by the likes of Bernard 
Brodie, Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn and Henry Kissinger, in what is often referred to as the 
'golden age' of strategic thinking.17  
 
 The mid-1960s witnessed a reaction against the 'golden age' literature. Among the best-
known critics of the civilian strategists in this period were Anatol Rapoport and Philip Green, 
who complained of serious shortcomings in the strategic studies literature.18 Often the 
backgrounds of the strategists themselves were at the root of the problem. Schelling and Kahn in 
particular were taken to task. Respectively an economist and a physicist, these strategists brought 
to bear on the problems of the nuclear age the analytical tools of their own disciplines. Especially 
important were game theory and systems analysis. Whatever insight these approaches generated - 
and some would argue they were very fruitful for the generation of theory19 - their drawbacks 
were spelled out by the critics. 
                                                 
15 The term 'how to do it' guide is taken from Bernard Brodie, 'Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?', Foreign 
Policy, No. 5 (Winter 1971-72), p. 151.  
16 See John Garnett, 'Strategic Studies and Its Assumptions', in John Baylis et al, Contemporary Strategy, Vol. 1, 
Theories and Concepts (London: Croom Helm, second, revised edition, 1987), p. 7.  
17 For more details see Ken Booth, 'The Evolution of Strategic Thinking', in ibid, pp. 44-53. 
18 See Philip Green, Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence (Ohio: Ohio State University, 1966); Anatol 
Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience (New York: Harper and Row, 1964); and Rapoport's Introduction to Carl von 
Clausewitz, On War (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968). 
19 For example, John Garnett defends the contribution of Schelling and Kahn, and also argues that the importance of 
game theory and systems analysis to their thinking was overstated by critics. See Garnett, pp. 14-27. 
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These included the abstract nature of the writing, the assumption of rationality in actors, and the 
neglect of history and politics. These strategists by and large had no training in or detailed 
knowledge of history, especially strategic history. Nor had they any expert understanding of the 
history and politics of different countries, and in particular the Soviet Union. They therefore left 
historical and national cultural factors out of their analysis, assuming instead that a universal and 
timeless rationality was at work. 
 
 The deficiencies highlighted by Snyder in his RAND report had therefore been observed 
many years earlier. Indeed the first to criticise the reliance in the strategic studies literature upon 
'rational strategic man' appears to have been Hedley Bull. As early as 1961, Bull noted the 
assumption in military studies of 'the "rational action" of a kind of "strategic man", a man who on 
further acquaintance reveals himself as a university professor of unusual intellectual subtlety'.20 
Ten years later, Bull again summed up the problem which Snyder would tackle in his RAND 
report. The flaw in much strategic writing, he wrote in an Adelphi Paper, was 
 
the attempt, in interpreting the actions of countries, to substitute the question 'what would 
it be rational for them to do?', as answered in terms of some hypothetical 'Strategic Man' 
(drawn from American experience, as 'Economic Man' in the classical economics was 
drawn from English experience), for the question 'what do they do?', answered in terms of 
historical and political observation.21 
 
 Snyder's recommendation that strategists should investigate the nature of 'Soviet strategic 
man' and his nuclear thinking had also been advanced earlier. To select but one instance, in 1971 
Lawrence Caldwell argued the need, rather than simply labelling it 'totalitarian', to see the Soviet 
Union as a functioning political system 'with its own history, separate political culture and 
particular structures': to see it in its own terms. If they did so, strategists in the West would be far 
better equipped to comprehend Soviet behaviour 
                                                 
20 Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961), p. 48. 
21 Hedley Bull, 'The Scope for Soviet-American Agreement', in Adelphi Paper No. 65, Soviet-American Relations 
and World Order: Arms Limitations and Policy (London: IISS, 1970), p. 13. 
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during the SALT process. Caldwell went on to stress that the perception one state had of another 
'depends heavily on its particular cultural and strategic outlook'.22  
 
 That it is possible to pick out instances of commentators making a point similar to 
Snyder's suggests an awareness of the need for consideration of culture, but also confirms that 
insufficient attention was paid to it. Dissatisfaction with the strategic studies literature in this 
regard appeared to be mounting during the 1970s. It was in this context that Snyder's paper 
appeared. But although Snyder coined the term strategic culture, he did not himself take it 
forward with enthusiasm. Indeed, he has written a notable critique of strategic culture and the 
uses to which it has been put by others.23 It is these others who have latched on to the term 
strategic culture and popularised it. One such is Colin Gray, whose work on strategic culture 
brought it to the attention of many other scholars.24 Snyder coined the term, then, and Gray 
publicised it. Intellectually, however, the term fits the work of another group of scholars who had 
been increasingly unhappy with the direction of Western academic strategic studies in the 1960s 
and 1970s. In particular, the work of scholars brought together by Mike MccGwire at Dalhousie 
University for a series of seminars on Soviet naval strategy in the early 1970s deserves mention. 
These scholars were concerned to understand how the Soviet Navy thought about the world and 
the use of naval force, in order to explain what was seen often in the West as irrational behaviour 
on the part of the Soviet Union.25  
 
 One of those scholars was Ken Booth, whose major examination of the culture-bound and 
the culture-blind nature of strategic studies was published in 1979.26 Strategy and Ethnocentrism 
has come to be seen as one of the most important books written on 
 
                                                 
22 Lawrence Caldwell, Adelphi Paper No. 75, Soviet Attitudes to SALT (London: IISS, 1971, pp. 1-2. 
23 Jack Snyder, 'The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor', in Jacobsen. 
24 In particular see Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style. 
25 On the MccGwire seminars see for example Michael MccGwire, (ed), Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and 
Context (New York: Praeger, 1973).  
26 Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979). 
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strategy.27 While Jack Snyder will always be associated with strategic culture, because he coined 
the term, his discussion of it occupied only a few pages. Written without knowledge of Snyder's 
work, Strategy and Ethnocentrism was a much more intensive investigation into the role of 
culture in strategy. The aim of the book was to breed greater awareness in present and more 
importantly future generations of strategists of the capacity of the 'fog of culture' to interfere in 
the making and the study of strategy. Specifically, Booth sought to raise consciousness of the 
danger of ethnocentrism: the tendency of societies to perceive others through their own frame of 
reference, leading to distorted views and often the feeling of superiority. Strategists, Booth 
argued, were especially guilty of the sins of ethnocentrism.28 His book catalogues occasions 
when ethnocentric thinking in one form or another resulted in poor strategy, practically and 
theoretically. With regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, for example, Booth argued that 
ethnocentrism contributed to Egypt's poor performance in the 1967 war. In particular, 'the Arab 
sense of superiority and the alien nature of Israel' hindered a proper appreciation of the enemy. 
By the 1973 war, some lessons had been learned by the Egyptians, who gave more thought to the 
type of enemy they confronted, and consequently fared better. They were helped by the 
ethnocentrism of the Israelis. 'Israeli feelings of superiority, the culture-bound character of Israeli 
thinking and the Israelis' habit of projecting their own assumptions on the Arabs' militated 
against accurate threat assessment. The Israelis themselves, had they been in the shoes of the 
Egyptians, would not have considered initiating hostilities, for the balance of forces was 
insufficient to guarantee success. They assumed therefore that Egypt would not attack them. 
However, the humiliation felt by the Egyptians after defeat in 1967 was a motivating factor in 




                                                 
27 For instance, Colin Gray described Strategy and Ethnocentrism as a path-breaking study 'which dignified and 
elevated insight to the level of principle'. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style, p. 34. 
28 Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism, especially pp. 9-21. 
29 Ibid, pp. 52-54. 
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 If they were to produce better strategy, Booth advised, strategists would need to think in 
terms of cultural relativism, to appreciate the existence of distinct cultures and seek to see the 
world through their eyes. They would need to avoid crude stereotypes. They would need to 
replace 'rational strategic man' with 'national strategic man', to avoid seeing peoples as 'driven by 
a universal political and strategic logic'.30 To do so a more interdisciplinary approach would be 
needed, with greater emphasis on history, culture, social psychology and area studies.31 Booth did 
not offer a theory of strategic culture, nor set an agenda for the study of the subject. What he did 
do, however, was to provide a much broader basis for the study of culture and strategy than 
Snyder. Thus between them Snyder and Booth came up with the name, impetus and intellectual 
justification for the study of strategic culture. What has given strategic culture its staying power 
is that it seemed to many strategists to express the concerns about the ahistorical and acultural 
nature of strategic studies scholarship which had been bubbling under and occasionally breaking 
the surface of the subject.  
 
 Those who have pressed for the study of strategic culture would not claim to have come 
up with a brand new set of ideas. However, to say that consideration of culture was not wholly 
absent from strategic studies is not to say that much concerted attention was paid to it either. 
Providing a label under which work on culture could be gathered presented the opportunity to 
raise its profile and focus more interest upon it. It has encouraged further work on the same 
theme and provided a heading under which related  ideas can be grouped. Let us now examine 
some of these related ideas. 
 
 
Strategic culture by other names 
Attention to cultural factors in strategy can frequently be found outside of the 'golden age' 
strategic studies literature. For example, Edward Mead Earle's classic work, Makers of  
                                                 
30 Ibid, p. 136. 
31 Ibid, pp. 139-42. 
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Modern Strategy, a collection of essays on strategic thinking from Machiavelli to Hitler, stressed 
the importance of national factors. In his introduction, Earle wrote that these 'frequently are the 
determining factors'. National differences could be traced to the different 'character and 
psychology of peoples'; to their different 'standards of value' and 'outlook on life'; and to their 
different 'political, social, and economic institutions'. But 'even more they are the political and 
military expression of geographical situation and national tradition. In any case, they are readily 
discernible'.32 A much more recent collection of essays charting strategic behaviour from the 
Peloponnesian wars through to the nuclear age similarly lays stress upon the role of geography, 
history, culture and political organisation in shaping the strategic thinking of different groups.33 
A further example would be Ian Clark and Nicholas Wheeler's study of British nuclear strategy in 
its formative years. The authors use the term 'strategic culture' only once, and then with no 
elaboration. But in arguing that there was a distinctive British approach to nuclear strategy, 
influenced in part by Britain's historical experience, they could be said to be operating within that 
spirit.34 
 
 However, some writers have tread ground even closer to strategic culture. One example 
comes in the form of an article written in 1985 by Gerald Segal on the subject of 'defence 
culture'.35 Inspired not by what had been written on strategic culture, but instead by the political 
culture literature, Segal examined the role of 'intangibles', or defence cultures, in Sino-Soviet 
military relations. He defined defence culture as 'the elite's perception of the fundamental and 
enduring components of defence policy', including the perception of the historical traditions of a 
state's defence policy. This perception was influenced by the state's human and physical 
geography and by the ideological stance 
                                                 
32 Edward Mead Earle, (ed), Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1941), p. x. 
33 See Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley, 'Introduction: On Strategy', in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox 
and Alvin Bernstein, (eds), The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994). 
34 Clark and Wheeler, especially chapter one. Strategic culture is referred to on p. 176. 
35 Gerald Segal, 'Defence Culture and Sino-Soviet Relations', Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 1985), 
pp. 180-98. 
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of the regime. Finally, perceptions were shaped by the bureaucratic positions of those making up 
the elite. Strategic issues, Segal argued, would be 'filtered and refracted' through the prism of 
these perceptions.36 
 
 An elite's defence culture could well contain contradictory elements, Segal warned, and it 
was not static: it could change as elites and generations changed, and as new events occurred. Yet 
if these points complicated the study of defence culture, they did not make it any less important. 
Too much strategic analysis, Segal felt, overemphasised hardware and capabilities. It was 
necessary, to do justice to Sino-Soviet relations at least, to shift the focus towards intentions, and 
to do this attention had to be paid to defence cultures. In the remainder of the article Segal tried 
to show how Sino-Soviet détente had been affected by the defence cultural predispositions of the 
two states, rooted in their particular historical and geographical contexts.37 For example, for 
détente to be achieved, each state needed to be confident that its military power was sufficient to 
secure its borders. Each state had a history of invasion and counter-invasion across long and 
vulnerable frontiers which affected the thinking of its elite on this issue: negotiation and 
compromise were believed possible only when substantial military power was present as 
insurance should the talks fail.38  
  
 Another tradition of strategic writing in apparently similar vein to defence culture and 
strategic culture dates back to the 1930s. This tradition, using the title 'way in warfare', is most 
closely associated with the British military commentator Captain Basil Liddell Hart. In 1931 
Liddell Hart put forward the idea that there 'has been a distinctively British practice of war, based 
on experience and proved by three centuries of success'.39 He referred to this as the British 'way 
in warfare'. This phrase has been taken up by a 
                                                 
36 Ibid, p. 180. 
37 Ibid, p. 181. 
38 Ibid, p. 182. 
39 Basil H. Liddell Hart, The British Way in Warfare: Adaptability and Mobility (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1935), p. 
v. 
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variety of writers discussing the Soviet Union, China, the United States and Britain.40 Studies of 
this sort can be categorised as strategic culture by another name, asserting as they do the 
existence of distinct national approaches to strategy. They are therefore worthy of some 
consideration. 
 
 Liddell Hart's argument was that the British way in warfare was an indirect one, making 
maximum use of the mobility and surprise which seapower could deliver. Naval forces were used 
to attack enemy overseas possessions and to blockade enemy ports, allowing Britain to triumph 
over its European competitors without committing ground troops to continental Europe. 
However, where strategic culture writing suggests that experience breeds enduring beliefs, 
Liddell Hart wrote that British experience in warfare had not led to strategic beliefs becoming 
ingrained in British minds. To the contrary, the British had ignored their own experience and 
opted instead for 'slavish imitation of Continental fashions'. The British decision to commit 
forces on a huge scale to the European mainland in World War One resulted from this 'slavish 
imitation' and led to disaster. In Liddell Hart's view, therefore, nations ought to be conscious of 
their histories, to know themselves, and to stick to what was 'natural' for them. Yet they could all 
too easily forget their pasts and be influenced by outside ideas. In this sense Liddell Hart was 
making the opposite point to many strategic culture scholars who stress the resistance to change 
of national ways of thinking.41  
      
 Liddell Hart has been criticised for misrepresenting British military history in order to 
support his argument that Britain should in future opt for a maritime strategy rather 
 
                                                 
40 See William P. Baxter, The Soviet Way of Warfare (London: Brassey's, 1986); Frank A. Kierman and John K. 
Fairbank, (eds), Chinese Ways in Warfare (Cambridge, MASS: Harvard University Press, 1974); Russell F. Weigley, 
The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York and London: 
Macmillan, 1973); Michael Howard, 'The British Way in Warfare: A Reappraisal', in Howard, The Causes of Wars 
(London: Unwin, 1984); David French, The British Way in Warfare 1688-2000 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990); 
Colin McInnes, Hot War, Cold War: The British Army's Way in Warfare 1945-95 (London: Brassey's, 1996); and 
Hew Strachan, 'The British Way in Warfare', in David Chandler, (ed), The Oxford Illustrated History of the British 
Army (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
41 Liddell Hart, The British Way in Warfare, pp. v and 12-30. 
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than a continental commitment. He was using the idea of a British way in warfare as a polemical 
device. Later writers have pointed to the limitations of sea power as a means of achieving British 
strategic objectives. While sea power and Britain's island status could save it from defeat and 
guarantee its survival, they could not bring about victory. In fact, Britain had, historically, always 
committed troops to Europe when possible, and had relied only on purely naval strategies when 
there was no other choice. For Michael Howard, if a British way in warfare existed, it 'was the 
outcome of a continuous dialectic' between the maritime and continental schools.42  
 
 This illustrates the difficulty of pinning down what constitutes a nation's strategic culture 
or way in warfare, in sorting out the important from the unimportant historical events. It also 
shows how the historical record can be manipulated to fabricate a traditional way in warfare in 
order to advocate a particular policy. More pertinently, Liddell Hart was writing soon after World 
War One, and reflected the concerns of many of his generation who had lived through that 
conflict. Determined to prevent a repeat of the slaughter of the trenches, he searched British 
history for evidence that the continental commitment was 'unnatural', and paid little heed to 
evidence to the contrary. If he was ahead of his time, therefore, in discussing strategic cultural 
factors, Liddell Hart's treatment of the British case exposes him as a child of his time. Likewise, 
Michael Howard has speculated on whether, in his criticisms of Liddell Hart, he does not himself 
reflect a generation influenced especially by World War Two and the Cold War, which saw a 
continental commitment as crucial.43  
 
 There are two points to emphasise here. First, what distinguishes British strategic 
thinking may be not that it favours either a continental commitment or a maritime strategy, but 
that the strategic debate is framed in terms of a choice between these two options. 
 
 
                                                 
42 Michael Howard, 'The British Way in Warfare: A Reappraisal', in Howard, The Causes of Wars, p. 193. 
43 Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment: The dilemma of British defence policy in the era of the two world 
wars (London: The Ashfield Press, 1989 paperback edition), pp. 7-8. 
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Strategists are often seen to belong to one or other of these schools. This argument will be 
developed further later in the thesis. Second, which option is preferred may depend in large 
measure on recent experience, with the historical record being searched for evidence which 
supports that option. Thus the concerns of the present have considerable impact on how the past 
is viewed, as well as the past exerting influence on present thinking. This too must be borne in 
mind. 
 
 Liddell Hart urged statesmen to familiarise themselves with their own country's historical 
practices in order better to be able to formulate policy in the present. Other writers who have 
picked up the phrase 'way in warfare' have stressed the need to understand other states. In the 
case of the Soviet Union, the point of the exercise has been to enable Western statesmen to 
formulate more appropriate policies to deal with that state in the context of the Cold War. The 
most recent such book, by William Baxter, sets out to show how the Soviet military mind works, 
and to dispel the stereotypes surrounding it. It takes into consideration the different 'cultural, 
philosophical, and historical experiences that shape the values and beliefs' of Soviet and Western 
societies. Though using the title 'way in warfare' rather than strategic culture, and making no 
reference to the work on strategic culture, the approach shares a concern with ingrained national 
outlooks but focuses on more narrowly military matters rather than the grand strategic level. The 
book is rather keener on elucidating what current Soviet thinking is on specific military issues 
than developing conceptual knowledge of how history and culture influence current policy.44 
 
 More sophisticated analysis of the Soviet way of warfare came from Raymond Garthoff. 
In spirit if not in name, much of Garthoff's work also concerns ways in warfare or strategic 
cultures. Writing in 1958, Garthoff raised many of the concerns which twenty years later led Jack 
Snyder to coin the term 'strategic culture'. To understand the 'alien military culture' of the Soviet 
Union, he argued that it was first necessary to 'escape the  
                                                 
44 Baxter, p. 5. 
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confines of one's own implicit and unconscious strategic concept'. Failure to do so would lead to 
distorted analysis, Garthoff wrote, and indeed much writing in the USA on Soviet strategy 
exhibited this fault. Garthoff tried to identify the key details of Soviet doctrine and strategic 
thought, relating them to 'geopolitical facts and historical tradition', as well as to resources and 
ideology. Garthoff also reflected upon the influence of foreign thinkers such as Clausewitz on 
Soviet strategic thought, and cautioned against assuming undue uniqueness in Soviet 
approaches.45 This point is reinforced by Nathan Leites, writing on the Soviet style in war, who 
argued the need for comparative studies to avoid assuming distinctiveness where none exists.46  
 
 Work has also been done on the Chinese way in warfare. The volume of essays edited by 
Kierman and Fairbank takes as its starting point the view that 'the imprint of a specific geography 
and history [has] produced in China specific habits of mind and action'. In what was mainly a 
historical survey of Chinese military experience, various elements of Chinese habits of mind and 
action were drawn out. While the authors were keen to avoid the 'sinological fallacy' of asserting 
uniqueness where none exists, they did identify certain elements in Chinese strategic thinking 
which they claimed were distinctive. Amongst these were the reluctance of the Chinese to use 
force, their tendency to see the resort to war as a failure of policy, and their belief in the need for 
civil control of the military. It may be that present day concerns led to an undue emphasis on 
certain features, however: in the nuclear age, where it was hoped that states would not resort to 
the use of force, it was comforting to find traditions in Chinese thinking which promoted the 
view that Chinese nuclear forces were in safe hands.47 Indeed, more recently Alastair Johnston 
has written that much of the literature on Chinese strategic policy posits the existence of a 
distinctively Chinese approach to the use of force, rooted in Chinese history and culture.48  
                                                 
45 Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (London: Atlantic/Stevens, 1958), pp. xi and 11. 
46 Nathan Leites, Soviet Style in War (New York: Crane Russak, 1982), p. xv. 
47 Kierman and Fairbank, especially pp. 1 and 25-26. 
48 For an overview of the literature, see Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand 
Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 22-27. 
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Johnston finds this distinctiveness overdrawn. Analysts have, he believes, committed the 
'sinological fallacy', ignoring the similarities between Chinese strategic thinking and that of other 
states, and stressing instead the differences.49 
 
 The concept of national 'ways of war' has also been applied to the United States by 
Russell Weigley. Weigley provides a detailed history of the military experience of the United 
States in the belief that 'the relatively remote past' plays an important part in shaping current 
attitudes and actions. It may be at least as influential as the recent past, for it may be less well 
understood and less clearly recalled yet still have cut 'deeper grooves of custom in our minds'. 
This raises the question of the relative significance of recent and less recent history; above, it was 
suggested that in the British case, the influence of World War One on the thinking of those who 
experienced it was hugely important, whereas those born later whose main experience of war was 
the 1939-45 conflict learned rather different lessons.50 This is an interesting question for strategic 
culture analysts, and one which will be discussed later in the thesis. 
 
 Weigley's book is one of a number criticised by Ken Booth in an essay which draws 
attention to what he regards as the many myths and misconceptions about the nature of US 
thinking about peace and war. Such myths, which result from lack of awareness about US 
history, unsophisticated strategic understanding and the activities of self-interested myth-makers, 
pervade the literature on strategic studies. Booth argues not that 'American strategic man' does 
not exist, but that he is more complicated than is often realised. There should be no single image, 
but rather several images, of 'American strategic man'. Booth also makes the point that 
comparative studies are important to bring out what all states share and avoid giving improper 
emphasis to US cultural distinctiveness. The essay therefore contains important cautions over the 
'way in warfare' approach. Another point which Booth hints at but might have made more 
strongly, however, is that the image 
                                                 
49 Ibid, p. xi. 
50 Weigley, p. xx. 
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which America holds of itself, however inaccurate it may be, can be seen as an important part of 
its strategic culture.51  
 
 The work on defence culture and national ways in warfare has much in common with the 
strategic culture approach. From this brief look at some of that work various points emerge. One 
is that it is possible to give unwarranted emphasis to the cultural characteristics of nations. A 
comparative approach is recommended by many writers as a way to insure against this. A second 
point is that history can be used selectively and manipulated to manufacture an artificial 'way in 
warfare' which supports the policy preference of the writer. A third point is that this type of 
analysis, like any, can be done badly. A fourth is that culture can become a site of political 
debate, as writers advocate that states should behave in ways alleged to be consonant with their 
culture. A fifth is that the influence of foreign ideas can be important; though foreign writers may 
be interpreted through the filter of national concerns, and it may be of significance which foreign 
thinkers 'catch on' in particular states, and why. Other points which emerge are that the relative 
importance of different periods in history should be investigated, and that present concerns may 
influence how history is interpreted.  
 
 Overall, while there is interesting work on defence culture and national ways of warfare, 
it is often intuitive. There is little conceptual writing on how national ways of warfare develop, or 
on how precisely historical experience affects current thinking and action. In this sense strategic 
culture can be seen as a more sophisticated version of the 'way in warfare' approach, a revival or 
reassertion of an older tradition which aspires to a more rigorous examination of some of the 
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Culture and 'common sense' 
There is arguably an intuitive or 'common sense' appeal to the concept of strategic culture.52 It is 
unremarkable to observe that the place of women in society is regarded differently across 
cultures, even that styles of football vary in different countries. Why then should issues of peace 
and war not be seen differently by different cultures? The intuitive appeal of strategic culture 
means that, even if not flagged explicitly as such, much analysis can found which shares its 
preoccupations. This is the case both in academic and journalistic discourses. A reading of recent 
newspapers yields several examples. One concerns the fighting between Russian armed forces 
and Chechen rebels initiated by President Boris Yeltsin in December of 1994. This was seen as 
another episode in the long and bitter Chechen struggle for independence from Russia and the 
Soviet Union. Stalin's mass deportation of Chechens to Siberia was but one instance in centuries 
of oppression, which had been fiercely resisted by the Chechen people. Alexander Solzhenitsyn 
famously wrote in his Gulag Archipelago that the Chechens alone 'refused to accept the 
psychology of submission'.53 Here, it is suggested, is a nation whose distinctive history and 
experience has left it determined to achieve independence from Russia and willing to fight and to 
sustain high losses in the process. Had the Russians taken fully into account the nature of their 
foe, would they have expected to achieve a rapid and decisive military victory? Would they, 
indeed, have approached 'the Chechen problem' in a different manner altogether? 
 
 Another newspaper article on Japanese kamikaze pilots supports the contention that 
different peoples may well approach the use of military force and the manipulation of military 
power in quite different ways. British pilots might, during World War Two, have been sent on 
bombing missions in which very high attrition rates were expected, but they had a chance of 
returning. Japanese Tokkotai pilots were, however, despatched on kamikaze missions from 
which, barring accidents, there was no chance of returning. 
 
                                                 
52 Common sense, however, is likened to a cultural system by Clifford Geertz. See Local Knowledge: Further Essays 
in Interpretive Anthropology (London: Fontana, 1993), chapter 4.  
53 See Steve Crawshaw, 'Who are these people?', The Independent, 18 January 1996. 
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Moreover, this was only one of a range of ways in which Japanese citizens were expected to lay 
down their own lives towards the end of the war. 'I felt perfectly happy to die for the emperor', 
recalls Kako Senda, who commanded a unit of the Japanese equivalent of the Home Guard, and 
whose task in the event of a US invasion of mainland Japan was to stand in a concealed hole with 
a bomb and detonate it when a tank passed above. 'If I had been summoned to the Kamikaze 
Corps itself I would have gone cheerfully. I believed it would be an honour to die for my 
emperor. All young men felt the same way'.54 This willingness to countenance self-sacrifice sets 
Japan apart from most other nations and demands explanation. Is there something in the nature of 
Japanese society, perhaps in the subordination of the needs of the individual to those of the 
community, or in the perceived shame of surrender, which produced or permitted the 
phenomenon of kamikaze pilots? 
 
 Reports of reactions to a speech given in February 1996 by the German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl suggest that the same stimulus does not always produce the same response from 
within different cultures. Kohl described the issue of European integration as 'in reality a 
question of war and peace in the 21st century'. His point was that if the process of integration in 
Europe was not maintained, the continent could witness a return to the infighting and violent 
competition between states which had characterised previous centuries, and, most destructively, 
the first half of the twentieth century. If this message was overly dramatic, it nevertheless seemed 
reasonable to many continental Europeans for whom the success of the European Union has 
indeed always been linked to the need to avoid renewed warfare. But in Britain the speech was 
received rather differently. Some newspapers and Members of Parliament interpreted it as a 
threat rather than a warning, drawing from it the inference that if Chancellor Kohl did not get his 
way on monetary union through persuasion, he would resort to force. Kohl was warmongering, 
therefore, rather than scare-mongering.55  
 
                                                 
54 See Peter Popham, 'Kamikaze Nation', The Independent Saturday Magazine, 5 August 1995.  
55 On the reaction to Kohl's speech, see Imre Karacs, 'Why Kohl could be Britain's best friend in Europe', The 
Independent on Sunday, 11 February 1996; and Andrew Marr, 'Why we should listen to the Panzer's rumble', The 
Independent, 6 February 1996. 
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 While it would be imprudent to attach too much significance to the excesses of the 
tabloid press and the views of a handful of 'Eurosceptic' Conservative MPs, it must be 
acknowledged that they represent at least a section of public opinion in Britain. Further articles 
record similar incidents. When England lost a crucial football World Cup qualifying tie in 1993, 
one English player accused the referee, a German, of making decisions which favoured the 
Netherlands. His alleged motive was to obtain revenge for his country's defeat by Britain in two 
world wars. This remark, which Germans would find both absurd and offensive, went 
unpunished by a Football Association usually keen to crack down on players seen to be bringing 
the game into disrepute. Indeed it went little remarked.56 Similar attitudes were on display also at 
an exhibition of Anglo-German cartoons at the Goethe Institute in London during 1994. German 
cartoons portrayed Britons in genteel fashion, while British cartoons, in significant contrast, 
frequently depicted Germans as goose-stepping Nazis.57 A distinctively British approach to 
Germany emerges: a nation, or at least part of one, still at war with Germany in its psyche. 
 
 While the term 'strategic culture' itself may not be employed often, examples of articles in 
the same spirit as the above are legion.58 Journalists often invoke cultural difference as an 
important analytical tool, and the daily press furnishes ample instances of supposed national 
differences of approach in the strategic realm. This is not to say that strategic culture should 
therefore necessarily be a tool employed often in academic discourse. However, it is to suggest 







                                                 
56 See Kenan Malik, 'A Britain Still at War with Germany', The Independent, 6 June 1994. 
57 See Steve Crawshaw, 'Still exhibiting the same old prejudices', The Independent, 9 February 1994. 
58 The only instance I have seen of strategic culture appearing in a newspaper is by Bryan Appleyard, in 'Defeated in 
war, victorious in therapy', The Independent, 12 April 1995. 
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Conclusion 
Many scholars have written about military culture, defence culture, or national ways in warfare. 
The term 'security culture' has also been employed.59 Many others, drawn from the ranks of 
academic scholars and also more casual, journalistic commentators, have implicitly undertaken 
the same type of analysis without employing these terms. There is, therefore, some weight to 
Colin Gray's observation that Jack Snyder, in discussing strategic culture, had discovered the 
obvious. However, Gray added that discovery of the obvious can be important.60 Even if cultural 
factors have not always been ignored, neither have they always been studied systematically or 
explicitly, nor given the attention they deserve. Strategic culture seems to have captured the 
imaginations of a number of scholars as a felicitous turn of phrase which neatly encapsulates 
certain important aspects of strategic thinking and behaviour. It provides a heading under which 
these aspects may be grouped and studied more explicitly. If the ideas comprising strategic 
culture are not new, nevertheless they are 'a set of ideas...whose intellectual time [has] finally 
come'.61 The following chapters provide detailed analysis of why more concerted effort should be 
applied to the study of strategic culture and its associated ideas, and why it can be said that their 
time has come. In the first instance, Chapter Two surveys the literature which directly addresses 
the subject of strategic culture. 
                                                 
59 The term 'security culture' is used by Nicholas J. Wheeler and Ken Booth, in 'The Security Dilemma', in John 
Baylis and N.J. Rengger, (eds), Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 38. 
60 Gray, p. 33. 









Since the first recorded use of the term 'strategic culture', in Jack Snyder's 1977 RAND Report, a 
small literature has coalesced around the term. Work has been published on the strategic cultures 
of China, the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, Germany and the states of North-East and 
South-East Asia.1 Proliferation in usage of the term is not, however, necessarily accompanied by 
consensus on its meaning and importance, nor on how to study it. The fact that strategic culture is 
a more and more visible term in the literature does not require that all those who write about it 
understand it to mean the same thing. Indeed, the likelihood that the label strategic culture will be 
understood, applied and valued differently is strong, given the notoriously nebulous nature of 
culture, a slippery term which can bear numerous distinct definitions.2 That the list of those who 
have tackled strategic culture includes some strange bedfellows in Colin Gray, Ken Booth, 
Charles Kupchan and Bradley Klein, further suggests that differences will emerge in the uses to 
which strategic culture has been put and the ways in which it has been approached.  
 
 The task which this chapter sets itself, therefore, is essentially that of stock-taking.  The 
chapter will survey the literature on strategic culture, bringing together as much as possible of the 
work which goes under that heading. The survey will at first be chronological. The aim will be to 
describe the uses to which strategic culture has been put, and the methods by which it has been 
applied, and also to give more of a flavour of the  
                                                          
1 A full list of works on strategic culture is included in the bibliography. Many of them are discussed in this chapter. 
2 Culture has been described as 'one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language'. See R.B.J. 
Walker, 'The Concept of Culture in the Theory of International Relations', in Jongsuk Chay, (ed), Culture and 
International Relations (New York: Praeger, 1990), p. 4. 
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nature of the concept. The conclusion will then seek to distinguish between different types of use 
of the concept, to assess how closely the strategic culture analyses so far undertaken are related to 
each other, and to identify areas which need further consideration and refinement. Particular 
attention will be paid to the following areas: the definitions of strategic culture advanced by the 
different scholars; their views of the origins of strategic cultures and how they are formed and 
reproduced; their ideas on how strategic cultures impinge upon strategic behaviour; their 





Jack Snyder's analysis of strategic culture was described in Chapter One of the thesis. To recap 
briefly, he argued that the Soviet Union, and by extension other states, had a distinctive strategic 
culture, defined as  
 
the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior 
that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or 
imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy.3 
  
Formed by the unique historical experience of the state, its geographical location, and political 
culture, this strategic culture impinged on policy by acting as a perceptual lens through which 
strategic issues were viewed, and guiding the thinking of the elite about them. It set the 
vocabulary and conceptual parameters of debate. It influenced, though did not determine, the 
behaviour of states. Change would occur in the culture, but it would be gradual, and it was 
possible that strategic ideas would outlive the circumstances which had originally brought them 
about.  
 
 In the case of the Soviet Union, for instance, recent experience of war had significantly 
contributed to the shaping of strategic attitudes. The Soviet Union had  
                                                          
3 Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations (Santa Monica: RAND 
R-2154-AF, 1977), p. 8. 
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experienced war on its own territory, and war of a devastating nature, while the United States had 
not. Nazi Germany had abided by few rules of war on the Eastern front. This militated against the 
adoption by Soviet leaders of a co-operative strategy such as limited nuclear operations, because 
the lesson many had drawn from Soviet experience was that self-reliance was the key to security. 
The Soviet Union ought to keep its fate in its own hands as far as possible, rather than relying on 
the actions of others.4 Additionally, the internal organisation of the Soviet Union in the defence 
field favoured war-winning strategies. The pre-eminent position of the military in developing 
doctrine led to a downplaying of political and diplomatic factors, and a stress on fighting and 
winning wars, not intrawar deterrence.5  
 
 Snyder's conclusion was that distinctive US and Soviet strategic cultures which affected 
the behaviour of the two states could be discerned. Therefore 'it would be dangerous to assume 
that Soviet crisis decision-makers will be willing to tailor their behavior to American notions of 
strategic rationality'.6 The study of strategic culture was crucial if the United States was to 
formulate a nuclear strategy which would deter the Soviet Union or, failing that, wage war 
without destroying the world.  
 
 Snyder sounded a note of caution when he advised that his conclusions about Soviet 
strategic culture, based as they were on indirect evidence rather than direct access to the thoughts 
of decision-makers, should be 'viewed with a large dose of circumspection'.7 Nevertheless, in 
1977 he had introduced the term 'strategic culture' to the vocabulary of strategic studies with a 
plea to strategists to pay more attention to national peculiarities in the use of force, or risk the 
consequences. Yet by 1990, he had moved from counselling caution in utilising strategic culture 
to advising against using it altogether. He condemned culture-based explanations as being 'of last 
resort', and  
                                                          
4 Ibid, p. 28. 
5 Ibid, pp. 30-31. 
6 Ibid, p. 39. 
7 Ibid, p. 16. 
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disclaimed responsibility for the approach which he himself had pioneered.8 The writers who 
have taken up the phrase since have used it in ways which Snyder said he had not envisioned and 
which he found inappropriate. Like Baron Frankenstein, Snyder beheld 'the miserable monster 




Strategic culture: the pre-theory stage 
Others have taken up the study of strategic culture with enthusiasm, however. The first to build 
on the 'path-breaking' work of Jack Snyder and Ken Booth was Colin Gray. Gray has often 
written about strategic culture, but his most important contributions came in an early article 
written in 1981 and then in 1986 in a full-length book.10 Gray acknowledged that strategic culture 
was an underdeveloped concept which had not yet been established as a profitable field of 
enquiry. In 1986, he wrote that strategic culture remained at a 'rudimentary, or pretheory, stage'. 
Scholars appreciated the fact of its importance, he thought, but they had not yet determined the 
extent of its importance.11  
 
 In his article, Gray proceeded from the assumption that there were such things as strategic 
cultures, or 'modes of thought and action with respect to force'. He identified a distinctive US 
strategic culture, and highlighted certain of its 'endemic' features. He traced the roots of these 
features in such factors as US historical experience, political culture, geography, way of life and 
'aspiration for self-characterization'. The strategic culture led to a particular US national style in 
strategy. It formed 'the milieu within which strategic ideas and defense policy decisions are 
debated and decided'. Studying strategic culture would  
                                                          
8 Jack Snyder, 'The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor', in Carl G. Jacobsen, (ed), Strategic Power: 
USA/USSR (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), p. 4. 
9 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein (London: Penguin, 1994), pp. 57, 195 and 131.  
10 Colin Gray explored strategic culture in 'National Style in Strategy: The American Example', International 
Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1981), pp. 21-47. The phrase 'path-breaking' comes from p. 21 of this article, which 
later became part of his book Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986). 
11 Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style, p. xii. 
 37 
therefore aid the academic in understanding the actions of US policy-makers. It would also help 
policy-makers to know themselves and other cultures better, and to communicate with others, 
and so to make better policy and put it into effect. It could help both academics and policy-
makers, given that the culture was enduring, to predict the policy of other states in the future.12 
 
 In 1986 Gray published a book which gave an extended treatment to these themes. His 
argument, grounded in the assumption that the United States and the Soviet Union exhibited 
different styles of nuclear policy-making, was that the US had chosen the wrong nuclear strategy. 
They had done so 'through incomprehension of [their] own and Soviet strategic culture and 
national style'.13 Gray highlighted what he considered to be the main features of Soviet and US 
strategic culture. US decision-makers exhibited a 'managerial approach' to the use of force, as 
opposed to a strategic one, for instance. Their stress was on managing men and resources rather 
than directing armed forces in battle. The enormous resources available to the United States 
encouraged the view that mobilising resources was more important than developing tactics and 
strategy, while the security provided by geographic isolation, and a history of fighting mainly 
weaker opponents, obviated the need for detailed strategic thinking.14 On the basis of his analysis 
of the Soviet and US strategic cultures, Gray concluded that the danger existed that should war 
break out, NATO would be fighting to limit the conflict, and to control escalation, while the 
USSR would be fighting to win, placing the latter at an advantage. He therefore suggested a 
strategy for the United States which he believed was more appropriate in the light of his analysis 
of the Soviet and US national styles in nuclear strategy, involving a war-fighting emphasis.15  
 
 Though he remained convinced of the value of a strategic cultural approach, and  
 
 
                                                          
12 Gray, 'National Style in Strategy', pp. 21-23. 
13 Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style, pp. ix-xii. 
14 Ibid, pp. 40-44.  
15 Ibid, pp. 311-19. 
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criticised the neglect in strategic studies of 'the perspectives of history and cultural anthropology', 
Gray also recognised various pitfalls and limitations to this approach and stressed the need to 
maintain a sceptical attitude towards it.16 In particular he argued against a deterministic approach, 
or a reductionist one. Strategic culture produced tendencies but did not determine behaviour, he 
emphasised. States might therefore act wholly out of accord with their cultures at times, when 
other factors - for example structural pressures - were especially strong. These other factors 
constantly had to be borne in mind, as to overstress strategic culture at their expense would 
produce distorted analysis.17 Another danger was that if you looked hard enough for cultural 
distinctiveness you would find it, and you could then, if you were not careful, see it as the cause 
of any behaviour. Strategic culture could be 'misapplied so as to explain, even rationalize, 
anything and everything. The theory becomes tautological, and in seeking to explain everything, 
in fact it explains nothing'.18  
 
 So strategic culture was not to be seen as a direct cause of behaviour or as the sole cause. 
Gray also warned against insensitivity to change in strategic cultures and to divisions within 
them. Although he expected that, in the absence of any dramatic event, they would change only 
slowly, change had still to be taken into account.19 In addition, the existence of sub-cultures 
which might be quite different from the dominant culture had to be catered for.20 Finally Gray 
argued that strategic cultures could contain contradictory elements. Given his caveat that states 
might act at times in ways wholly out of accord with their cultures, instances of exceptional 
behaviour would always be found which could be used to 'disprove' the strategic culture thesis: to 
show that it did not produce particular outcomes.21 Nevertheless, provided that these pitfalls were 
recognised and that strategic culture was not seen as the sole explanation of strategic behaviour 
or the only worthwhile 
                                                          
16 Ibid, p. xiv. 
17 Ibid, pp. 34-35. 
18 Ibid, p. xiii. 
19 Ibid, p. 37. 
20 Ibid, p. 35. 
21 Ibid, pp. 35 and 56.  
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approach, Gray felt it could enhance understanding of military behaviour and lead to better 
policy. 
 
 Gray made a number of other noteworthy points about how to study strategic culture. 
Echoing a point made by Ken Booth in Strategy and Ethnocentrism, he argued for an 
interdisciplinary approach to the subject.22 The strategic culture of a country was, he wrote, 
'comprehensible through an appropriate combination of historical, geographical, anthropological, 
psychological, and sociological study'.23 He noted too that it was a direct descendant of the 
concept of political culture. Gray then described his own approach as 'inductive-empirical', 
seeking through observation of Soviet and US strategic behaviour to infer different cultural 
predispositions.24 Gray, like Snyder and Booth, proposed no theoretical framework for the study 
of strategic culture. 
 
 US strategic culture was also the focus of an article published in 1985 by Carnes Lord.25 
Lord built explicitly on the work of Booth and Gray, as well as studies of the history of military 
thinking by Weigley and Kierman.26 His article asked whether a unique US 'way of war' could be 
identified, and, if so, what its roots were and what help it could be in understanding the strategic 
problems currently confronting the United States. Lord argued that it was clear that states in the 
past had waged war in distinctive ways, due at least in part to 'changing material circumstances'. 
He believed that it 'made sense' to think of different national ways of war as a result also of 'the 
social, political and ideological characteristics that are centrally constitutive of a state'. The 
enormous political significance of war meant that the political classes of the nation were in 
charge of its prosecution, and so military activity was influenced by the nation's political culture. 
                                                          
22 Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979), p. 139. 
23 Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style, p. 33. 
24 Ibid, p. 34. 
25 Carnes Lord, 'American Strategic Culture', Comparative Strategy, Vol. 5, No. 3 (July-September 1985), pp. 269-
93. 
26 See Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New 
York and London: Macmillan, 1973); and Frank A. Kierman, Jr., and John K. Fairbank, (eds), Chinese Ways in 
Warfare (Cambridge, MASS: Harvard University Press, 1974). 
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'Military culture' or 'way of war' were phrases too narrow to use to describe this phenomenon. 
'Strategic culture' on the other hand captured the political aspects also. It was defined by Lord as 
'the traditional practices and habits of thought by which military force is organized and employed 
by a society in the service of its political goals'.27  
 
 Lord took the lack of investigation of strategic cultures thus far as evidence of their 
potency: strategists had been so dominated by their own strategic cultures that they had failed to 
recognise fully that others came from different cultures or that cultural differences could be 
significant.28 Having satisfied himself that the study of strategic culture was worth pursuing, he 
went on to identify six basic sources of a strategic culture. These would vary in importance 
depending on which state was under examination. There was the geopolitical setting of a state; 
the nature of its international relationships; its political culture and ideology; its military history, 
traditions and education; the relationship between its civil and military sectors and its 
bureaucratic set-up; and finally the military technology available to it. All of these factors could 
influence strategic culture, Lord held.29  
 
 The article then turned to look at various aspects of US military policy in an attempt to 
gauge the importance of strategic culture. Lord argued that there was indeed a US strategic 
culture and that it exerted some influence over policy. For instance, the fact that the United States 
has generally been far superior to its enemies in resources, allied to the liberal view that war 
constituted a failure of politics rather than, in Clausewitzian terms, a continuation of it, led to a 
US style of war favouring military annihilation of the enemy rather than intrawar political 
bargaining or a strategy of attrition.30 Concluding, Lord raised the question of how stable and 
enduring strategic cultures were, and whether they were 'susceptible to alteration by conscious 
design', though he did not attempt to  
 
                                                          
27 Lord, pp. 270-71. 
28 Ibid, pp. 269-70. 
29 Ibid, pp. 272-74. 
30 Ibid, pp. 278-79. 
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answer the questions.31 
 
 Lord therefore provided a case study and some insight, but once more offered little in the 
way of theoretical elaboration. Nor did Bradley Klein, in an article published in 1988.32 Klein 
came at strategic culture from a completely different direction to previous writers. Though he 
made brief references to Carnes Lord and Colin Gray, this was only to dismiss them as 'quasi-
caesarists'.33 Though these writers were themselves criticising strategic studies in their 
elaboration of the strategic culture approach, to Klein they were still operating essentially within 
the mainstream of strategy. They accepted the realist assumptions on which strategic studies were 
based: in particular, taking states for granted as the primary and legitimate actors in the strategic 
realm. Klein's chief inspiration was therefore not any previous writer on strategic culture, but 
rather Antonio Gramsci. While for realists, hegemony concerned the dominance of one state over 
international society, for Gramsci it had to do with the legitimacy of the ruling classes of states. 
Instead of taking states as timeless givens, Klein was interested in how regime legitimacy had 
been historically achieved, and in 'the power relations of particular regimes and classes which are 
able to generate ideas and practices that gain the normalizing status of common currency'.34 
 
 Where did strategic culture enter into this? Part of Klein's description of strategic culture 
is familiar: it 'embodies the state's war-making style, understood in terms of its military 
institutions and its accumulated strategic traditions of air, land and naval power'.35 However, 
Klein also wrote that 'the point of the concept of strategic culture is to historicize what has lain 
implicit in realist theories of hegemony; the point, too, is to render palpable the political 
production of hegemony articulated at a theoretical level by 
                                                          
31 Ibid, p. 288. 
32 Bradley S. Klein, 'Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics', 
Review of International Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2 (April 1988), pp. 133-48. 
33 Ibid, p. 139. Though clearly not complimentary, it is unclear exactly what Klein means by the term 'quasi-
caesarists'. 
34 Ibid, pp. 134-35. 
35 Ibid, p. 136. 
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the Gramscian conception of hegemony'.36 He wanted to examine how state governments could 
legitimise the use of force, to trace the occasions on which the population would regard the use 
of force as acceptable. His 'critical account of strategic culture' therefore 'displaces attention from 
the anarchic world of a Hobbesian state system to the terms of relations between the state and 
civil society'.37 Thus Klein's is a radically different approach from that adopted by earlier writers 
on strategic culture, and an approach with different objectives in mind. His discussion of how 
strategic culture could be used in this enterprise reflected some of the thinking of earlier writers 
but in most respects represented a departure.  
 
 On US strategic culture, Klein appears to describe a mixture of conscious manipulation of 
strategic ideas by elites to achieve popular support for strategy, and the shaping of elite views by 
the mingling of history and geography. So, nuclear deterrence, a militarily offensive strategy 
which envisions bringing enormous destruction to bear on enemies, is rendered acceptable 
through emphasising its politically defensive objectives and discussing it in abstract, aseptic 
terms which conceal the real nature of nuclear war-fighting. In this the ruling class maintains its 
legitimacy. At the same time, the lack of direct US experience of fighting and bombardment 
produces this abstract thinking, and the legacy of thinkers such as Mahan is to enable US citizens 
to accept offensive military strategies aimed at achieving politically defensive ends.38 It is unclear 
how from Klein’s analysis how far elites are manipulating ideas, and how far they are being 
manipulated by the cultural milieu to which they belong. 
 
 Klein's piece is best understood not as an examination of strategic culture as it is 
understood by most writers on the subject, but rather as a wide-reaching critique, informed by 
critical theory, of strategic studies.  He makes certain insightful remarks about US strategic 
practice and culture, alerting us, for instance, to the growth of peace 
                                                          
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid, pp. 137-39. 
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movements with alternative strategic cultures, which challenges the legitimacy of the discourse 
of the dominant classes.39 He examines some of the key assumptions of Western strategic 
thought. Yet Klein appears to be engaged in a different enterprise from others in the strategic 
culture debate. 
 
 Subsequent writers on strategic culture have failed to pick up on the themes developed by 
Bradley Klein. They apparently agree that his is a different enterprise. Indeed, the next writer to 
take up strategic culture, in a doctoral thesis and two journal articles, has little in common with 
Bradley Klein beyond a shared surname.40 Yitzhak Klein did, unlike Bradley Klein, number 
among his references Snyder and Booth, as well as Gray, yet like his namesake, also came up 
with quite a different approach. Noting the lack of theoretical and conceptual work on strategic 
culture, Yitzhak Klein claimed to advance a theory of strategic culture and to test it against the 
case study of Soviet strategic culture 1917-1965. This case study occupies the bulk of his thesis. 
 
 Yitzhak Klein defined strategic culture as 'the set of attitudes and beliefs held within a 
military establishment concerning the political objective of war and the most effective strategy 
and operational method of achieving it'.41 His was a much more limited definition than that of 
earlier commentators. In terms of the referent group, it was limited to the military establishment, 
excluding the political leadership and the rest of the nation. In terms of the sources of the 
strategic culture, Yitzhak Klein distanced himself from those who looked at the influence of the 
general culture of a nation, its political culture, and its historical experience, on its strategy. He 
preferred to examine something narrower and closer to the institutional culture of the armed 
forces. 
 
 It is also clear from Yitzhak Klein's work that he does not see the strategic culture 
                                                          
39 Ibid, pp. 143-44. 
40 Ira J. Klein, Soviet Strategic Culture, 1917-1965 (PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 1988); Yitzhak Klein, 
'The Sources of Soviet Strategic Culture', The Journal of Soviet Military Studies, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December 1989), pp. 
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41 Klein, Soviet Strategic Culture, p. 37. 
 44 
as a milieu in which policy is created, as a force operating often without their realising it on the 
minds of decision-makers. Rather he sees it as a framework consciously created by decision-
makers to aid the analysis of problems and the formulation of policy. He calls it an 'indispensable 
but subjective guide to the planner's decisions', and describes the strategic culture as a synthetic 
analytic framework.42 Klein looks for strategic culture in the writings of leading military figures, 
in the Soviet military journals, and he seeks not their unstated but their explicitly stated 
assumptions.43 He examines the way that the Soviet military has used the precepts of Marxism-
Leninism as the basis of its strategy.44 He talks of how the Second World War reflected upon the 
reputation of the Soviet strategic culture and refers to officers subscribing to its tenets.45 He asks 
at one point what need Soviet strategists have of a strategic culture.46  
 
 All these statements suggest that strategic culture is a set of rules drawn up to guide 
action rather than Snyder's 'conditioned emotional responses' or Lord's 'habits of thought'. Klein's 
strategic culture was a tangible thing, produced by conscious design and not conditioning. Where 
others would have been interested in the effect of Russian history, political or general culture on 
strategy, Klein was not. Overall the reader is left wondering whether, if the phrase strategic 
culture was replaced with military doctrine, it would significantly affect Klein's argument. His 
work was not then about strategic culture as understood by earlier writers, but was rather closer 
to the work of Barry Posen, whom he cites, on sources of military doctrine.47  
 
 Klein did nevertheless make some interesting points which could have relevance for the 
study of strategic culture. He argued, for instance, that the geography of a state was not as 
important to the formation of strategic culture as how decision-makers 
 
                                                          
42 Ibid, pp. 43-45 and 49. 
43 Ibid, p. 9.  
44 Ibid, p. 82. 
45 Ibid, pp. 125 and 133. 
46 Ibid, p. 43. 
47 See Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982). 
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interpreted its implications. This at least refined the idea of other commentators that the 
geographic setting in which a state exists influences its strategic culture.48 Klein also commented 
that the operation of strategic culture might best be observed when it led a state to behave in a 
counterproductive fashion. That is, the strategic culture may lead a state to go on thinking about 
security in ways no longer pertinent to new circumstances.49 A final interesting aspect of his work 
is the concluding remark that the comparative study of strategic culture was important, though he 
does not develop this point in detail.50 
 
 In a book on Chinese nuclear strategy, Chong-Pin Lin also picked up the strategic culture 
theme in 1988.51 Pin's aim was to show that there existed a distinctively Chinese nuclear strategy 
'which, even while evolving, manifests certain persistent strategic principles found in Chinese 
traditional culture'. He hoped to do so by examining Chinese nuclear strategy comparatively, 'in 
telltale contradistinction with the approaches of other major nuclear powers'.52 As a result of a 
long history in relative isolation, Pin wrote, the Chinese had become a history conscious people. 
However, if this made for continuity with the past, the import of the Western technology of 
nuclear weapons, Soviet military training, and a foreign ideology with an anti-traditional bias, 
could all press for discontinuity. If, in spite of all these factors, a distinctively Chinese strategic 
culture persisted in the nuclear age, it was surely a significant factor.53 Lin's view was that it had 
done. Among the distinctive features of Chinese strategic culture which he singled out was a 
reliance on ambiguity. This continued into the nuclear age with the Chinese shrouding in 
ambiguity their capabilities and strategic nuclear intentions. There was also a traditional 
emphasis on extra-military and extra-combative features, including placing morale and 
psychological factors ahead of technology. This too continued into the nuclear era, despite the 
power of nuclear weapons. The Chinese did not elevate military force above political 
 
                                                          
48 Klein, Soviet Strategic Culture, p. 4. 
49 Ibid, pp. 66 and 284. 
50 Ibid, p. 377. 
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and economic factors. 
 
 
Strategic culture: towards a coming of age?  
Towards the end of 1980s and into the 1990s, the strategic culture literature showed some signs 
of growing in sophistication, though much of the work being done was still lacking in 
refinement. In a 1989 review article, David Twining characterised strategic culture as the 
'missing dimension' in Western intelligence analysis of the Soviet Union.54 Understanding the 
Soviet strategic culture - described as 'those fundamental attitudes, values, and beliefs pertaining 
to the preparation for and conduct of war' - was a path to inferring correctly the strategic 
intentions of the Soviet Union from the available intelligence materials, always a problematic 
endeavour for Western intelligence agencies.55 While intelligence experts had failed to take 
adequate account of the cultural specificity of the Soviet Union, area studies specialists had, 
Twining asserted, contented themselves with descriptive work and ad hoc explanations, but 
lacked 'sufficient boldness' to look for more systematic comprehension of Soviet behaviour.56 In 
search of such comprehension, Twining briefly examined the concept of political culture and 
then turned to strategic culture, which he regarded as a subset of political culture. The power of 
strategic culture, Twining argued, drawing on Booth, lies in its ability to take analysts out of their 
own cultures and into the cultures of others. However, whether an objective, 'apolitical, unbiased, 
scholarly analysis of the military balance' will ever be possible, with or without strategic culture 
being brought into the equation, Twining regarded as doubtful.57 
 
 Twining also sees strategic culture as a parsimonious approach, though it is not clear how 
he means this, especially since he writes that 'to understand Soviet strategic culture calls for the 
talents of the area specialist, historian, anthropologist, sociologist and 
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political scientist'.58 This suggests that a lot of ground needs to be covered. Building on the work 
of Snyder and Gray, he suggests certain core attributes of operational Soviet strategic culture, 
which is distinct from the official culture of the regime. These include an insatiable search for 
security, influenced crucially by the Soviet experience of World War Two; the need for a strong 
state; a desire not to rely on others for security; a belief in the political utility of military power; 
and a tendency, derived from Russian history, to see world affairs as a permanent struggle for 
power. In the context of these beliefs, Twining argued, events such as the 1983 shooting down of 
the KAL airliner are more fully comprehensible. What appears an excessive use of force is easier 
to understand when it is appreciated to what extent Soviet leaders see themselves as engaged in 
permanent struggle. More work was needed on the rudimentary concept of strategic culture, 
Twining concluded, but without understanding of Soviet strategic culture, accurate assessment of 
the Soviet threat would be impossible, and greater mutual understanding hindered.  
 
 Another 1990 publication which claimed to employ strategic culture as a key concept was 
a book by Stephen Szabo dealing with German security thinking.59 Szabo referred to Booth, 
Snyder and Gray, and to a 1979 Foreign Affairs article by Michael Howard which described the 
social dimension of military power as having been forgotten by most strategists, and especially 
nuclear strategists. However, Szabo had nothing to say on the concept itself or on how it might 
be studied. An initial profile of German strategic culture briefly mentioned the weight of the past, 
and especially the Nazi period, as a constraining factor which made both Germans and other 
Europeans wary of a politically and militarily strong Germany. Other aspects of German strategic 
culture were mentioned also, but it was not clear how they were derived. Strategic culture then 
flitted in and out of the analysis, which looked at the role of public opinion and political parties 
in shaping security policy. Overall, the same book could have been written without mention of 
strategic culture, which was also seen as very changeable. Different generations, of the 
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Weimar years, the Nazi period, of the post-war reconstruction era, were likely to have quite 
different views, it was argued, and the events of the 1980s, such as the cruise and Pershing 
deployment, led to further change in attitudes.  
  
 One barrier to entering into the culture of others, of course, can be language. The famous 
remark that Britain and the United States are divided by a common language cautions that mutual 
culture blindness can afflict even those who share a language; it may be that a common language 
leads to the incorrect presumption of a common culture. However, where a language barrier 
needs to be crossed the problem may be more obvious but no less difficult. This literature survey, 
claiming to be comprehensive, has been of English language sources. Has the concept of strategic 
culture spread further? Is there an equivalent in other languages? The only non-English language 
piece in the literature survey undertaken in this chapter appeared in 1990. This was an article by 
Jean Barrea, entitled 'Cultures Politico-Stratégiques de "Conviction" et de "Responsabilité", in 
the journal Stratégique.60 
 
 Barrea noted that during the SALT negotiations in the 1970s US strategists discovered 
that the tendency for states to acquire the same technology had not led to convergence of their 
strategic thinking: 'l'uniformisation technique du monde n'entraîne pas à sa suite, en matière 
stratégique y compris, une homogénéisation culturelle'.61 Soviet strategists had not, as their US 
counterparts had ethnocentrically thought, adopted the same strategy as the United States. 
Quoting no particular source, Barrea wrote that the literature had developed the concept of 
'culture stratégique' to embrace this differentiation. He used the Weberian distinction between an 
ethic of conviction and an ethic of responsibility to characterise the different US and Soviet 
strategic nuclear cultures. The strategy of massive retaliation and the preference for mutual 
assured destruction fitted into this ethic of conviction, involving an unwillingness on the part of 
US decision-makers to 
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take responsibility for the consequences of their actions and to transfer that responsibility to 
others: if another party initiated nuclear war, massive destruction would follow. The Soviet 
Union on the other hand belonged to an opposing culture of responsibility, which accepted 
responsibility for its actions. Taking account of the frailties of humankind, the Soviets sought a 
strategy which would enable them to defend themselves through a pre-emptive, counterforce 
disarming first strike on an enemy. 
 
 Barrea saw two causes of this divergence of strategic culture. First was a society's 
experience of imperialism, and second its type of political system. The United States had a 
tradition of imperialism in which other peoples were destroyed, and this corresponds to a nuclear 
strategy which threatens all-out destruction. The Soviet Union's way in imperialism was to seek 
political domination of others, corresponding to a strategy of war prevention and disarming the 
enemy. With regard to political systems, only the open system in the United States could 
contemplate a strategy which could lead to its destruction. The freedom of the people was 
paramount, and where this is true, it is possible to choose destruction. For the Soviet Union, a 
closed system of which the leaders were managers rather than free agents, the system itself had to 
be preserved as it was the product of the inevitable progress of history. This deterministic 
position therefore envisaged that neither could the Soviet Union have adopted the strategic 
nuclear posture of the United States, nor vice versa.     
 
 However, Barrea continued, with the advent of the Reagan administration, an unusually 
right-wing government for the United States, things did change. To punish the Soviet Union for 
its invasion of Afghanistan, and to exploit a window of opportunity due to the latter's economic 
weakness, Reagan began a massive arms build up, mixing defence and offence and ending up 
with a strategy closer to that of the Soviet Union. Already the steps initiated by the United States 
under the Schlesinger doctrine in the mid-1970s had taken the USA in this direction, in order to 
avert a suicide or surrender scenario. The Soviet Union, unable to match this spending, found 
itself relying on an assured destruction 
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posture like that of the United States. The adoption by each state of a military posture in keeping 
with the other's strategic culture, but not its own, creates a tension for each between military 
security and ideological stability. Barrea provided an interesting illustrative argument, describing 
differences of strategic thinking between the superpowers. However, it was not an especially 
probing analysis of strategic culture. He had little to say about the concept itself and how it could 
be studied. 
 
 1990 also saw the publication of a major volume, edited by Carl Jacobsen, comparing US 
and Soviet strategic cultures, and including chapters by Jack Snyder and Ken Booth, the first 
highly critical of strategic culture, the second affirming its value.62 The book was based on the 
belief that US strategic writing had neglected history and culture, and aimed to raise 
consciousness about the need to include history and culture in strategic analysis. Over forty-four 
chapters it compared Soviet and US strategic policies, with most of the contributors concluding 
that strategic culture was important to understanding these policies. There were sections on 
Soviet and US attitudes to strategic concepts such as deterrence, limited war and arms control, as 
well as sections on the processes by which each reached strategic decisions, and their views on 
the use of force more generally. A criticism levelled at the book, however, is that its organisation, 
with one chapter on Soviet values followed by one on US values on a particular aspect of 
strategy, did not offer direct comparison.63 Moreover there was no conclusion to bring out more 
directly and explicitly the contrasts and comparisons, nor really a rigid and commonly adhered to 
framework for analysis. 
 
 The first section of the book devoted some attention to the concept of strategic culture 
itself, though without adding much theoretical sophistication. Here there were descriptions of 
Soviet and US strategic cultures, as well as the discussions by Snyder and Booth. Snyder began 
by rehearsing the arguments of his original RAND Report, but went  
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on to cast doubt on the utility of the strategic culture work done thus far. He was critical of the 
literature on the 'alleged contrasts' between Soviet and US strategic thinking, believing himself 
that these were less stark than was argued and that often these states had behaved exactly as 
Schelling's generic strategic man would have done. The strategic culture approach tended to 
exaggerate differences, Snyder thought.64 
 
 Moreover, this approach was not particularly good at explaining such differences as did 
exist. Snyder had not himself in his RAND Report brought general cultural traits into the 
argument and did not feel it would be useful to do so. Explanations based on culture were vague, 
he felt, with causes remote from consequences. Culture often became an explanation of 'last 
resort', used to explain what could not be explained by other means.65 Another problem with 
cultural approaches was that they understated the possibility of change. Given also that these 
approaches had been shown empirically to fail, as they had produced wrong predictions, Snyder's 
conclusion was that other approaches were preferable. Most differences in strategic behaviour 
could be explained perfectly well by different internal and external circumstances of states. It was 
only appropriate to speak of culture in the limited sense of institutional inertia, the way in which 
policy could become ingrained through training and socialisation.66 
 
 Having discussed in his earlier work the importance of cultural factors in strategy, Ken 
Booth focused squarely on strategic culture and defended it against Snyder's criticisms.67 He 
began by describing what he understood strategic culture to be and how it affected policy. For 
Booth strategic culture concerned  
 
a nation's traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behaviour, habits, symbols, 
achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems 
with respect to the threat or use of force.  
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Of specific interest was the aggregation of attitudes of 'the most influential voices' of the nation, 
which could be 'the political elite, the military establishment and/or public opinion'. As the 
sources of strategic culture Booth picked out history, geography and political culture.68  
 
 Strategic culture operated, Booth hypothesised, not by determining policy; other 
explanatory factors - such as technological push - had a part to play in deciding which course of 
action was chosen. Rather, the strategic culture could help to shape behaviour and define 'a set of 
patterns of and for a nation's behaviour on war and peace issues'. Continuity of behaviour 
permitted discussion of a 'particular national "style"' in strategy.69 Continuity was therefore 
assumed. A strategic culture was likely to change only slowly, except in the event of dramatic 
changes in circumstances, such as a revolution in technology. Booth nevertheless shared Snyder's 
concern that strategic culture studies tended to be insensitive to the possibility of change. He 
stressed the need to avoid such insensitivity, for change would occur. However, he pointed out 
also that other approaches could commit the same error. They too could come up with wrong 
predictions through insensitivity to change. To point out difficulties in this new approach can be 
to ignore the difficulties faced by established approaches.70 
 
 Booth accepted that Snyder had sounded some useful warnings about the uses and 
misuses of strategic culture. However, he was not convinced by all of Snyder's arguments nor by 
his basic thesis that strategic culture was an approach of little value. In particular he criticised 
Snyder's concentration on nuclear strategy, for nuclear weapons were likely to impose far more 
constraints on national cultures than conventional. Even so, Booth believed that strategic culture 
did help explain some of the differences in approach to nuclear strategy of the two superpowers. 
Booth also argued that Snyder failed to take into account that the organisations he described 
operated within particular cultural 
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environments, and that, indeed, the strategic culture approach did not 'exclude other "useful" 
explanations and that those other explanations may well themselves contain a cultural 
dimension'. Finally he rejected Snyder's charge that 'internal and external realities' were more 
important influences on policy, on the grounds that such 'realities' were subjectively perceived; 
they were 'in part culturally constructed as well as culturally perpetuated'.71  
 
 Booth also criticised the assumptions underlying Snyder's critique. These were 
assumptions typical of political science, emphasising immediate causes, uneasy about less 
immediate, cultural ones. Analysts from the humanities might well feel more at home with 
cultural causes, Booth believed, but social scientists needed also to find a place for them in their 
theories. If they sacrificed some rigour from their theories, then these theories could yet become 
richer. Booth acknowledged that the study of cultural factors would not be easy, as their 
importance was not quantifiable. But ignoring them carried its own dangers: of falling victim to 
ethnocentrism; of not understanding the enemy adequately; of leaving history out of the analysis; 
of assuming states acted in much the same ways; of poor communication based on lack of 
understanding; and of poor threat assessment.72  
 
 Two other key chapters of the book were general pieces on Soviet and US strategic 
cultures. Neither had much to say on the theoretical side of strategic culture but each raised some 
useful points. The chapter by David Jones on Soviet strategic culture contrasts with Yitzhak 
Klein's work on the same subject.73 Jones stressed the importance of Russian imperial history and 
its legacy from Soviet strategic culture, which Klein had not. He was keen to avoid taking a 
deterministic line with regard to the geography of the Soviet Union, but did argue that the setting 
of this state meant there were certain 'permanently operating factors' on Soviet strategy.74 In 
particular, the lack of natural  
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borders and a history of invasion and destructive wars fought in Russia and the Soviet Union 
contributed to an inability to achieve a sense of security. Expansion in order to attain some 
degree of security was reasonable behaviour when seen in this light.75 
 
 William Kincade's chapter was based on the work of Booth and others in its approach to 
strategic culture but offered some fresh insight also.76 Kincade discussed how America's geo-
strategic situation, resources, history, military experience and political beliefs all influenced its 
strategy and shaped its strategic culture. He cautioned against viewing strategic cultures as overly 
consistent or homogeneous, and, on the relationship between culture and behaviour, suggested 
that part of a strategic culture could even be a mismatch between beliefs and behaviour. In the 
case of the strategic culture of the United States, various 'dualisms and dilemmas' could be 
detected due to differing perceptions of US strategic experience and situation. There were 
differences of outlook also between politicians and the military and within the military, on 
service lines. It was necessary to be sensitive to these differences 'while seeking regularities or 
commonalities traceable to the larger determinants of a nation's approach to war and peace'.77  
      
 Just after the publication of the volume edited by Jacobsen a doctoral thesis was produced 
which incorporated work on strategic culture. Kang Choi assessed the prospects for arms control 
in North-East Asia, asking whether the different defence and strategic cultures in the region 
explained in part the lack of progress there in arms control, compared to progress in Europe and 
between the superpowers, and whether different approaches to arms control were necessary in 
this region to suit the distinct strategic cultures of the states involved.78 As well as differences of 
context, Kang Choi argued that cultural differences were significant. His conclusion was that 
culture did influence behaviour, with, for example, Chinese-Soviet arms control exhibiting a 
preference for  
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informal and effective cuts in distinction to the Western predilection for formal treaties which 
might be of symbolic importance.79 Culture might be difficult to study but it was necessary for an 
understanding of arms control. However, there was very little theoretical discussion of strategic 
culture in the thesis, and it was not structured in such a way as to bring out clearly the relative 
importance of strategic cultural factors.  
 
 In 1992 two further works on strategic culture appeared, which, while they made some 
interesting observations, did little to advance our understanding of the concept itself. A book by 
Shu Guang Zhang on Chinese-US relations in the early post-war period argued that the two states 
differed in significant respects in their outlooks on strategy and deterrence.80 Zhang found that the 
different outlooks of the states owed much to their different historical experiences, geopolitical 
settings and cultures. He analysed the different approach of each side to confrontations with the 
other, and the way in which, often, neither comprehended the motives and aims of the other, as a 
result of insensitivity to strategic culture. Even though Mao stressed Sun Zi's principle that if you 
'know the enemy and know yourself' you can avoid defeat in a hundred battles, Chinese leaders 
were as guilty as US leaders of misperceiving the intentions and approaches of their adversary. 
Defence planners in the United States, for instance, failed to realise that a history of invasion by 
foreigners had left a deep mark on Chinese thinking. The Chinese were determined to stand up to 
foreign interference.81 However insightful, Zhang's conception of strategic culture seems to have 
been based mainly on Ken Booth's Strategy and Ethnocentrism, ignoring more recent work and 
adding little of interest on the theoretical side of strategic culture. 
 
 The same comment applies to an article in 1992 by George Tanham, who added to the 
strategic culture literature with an investigation of Indian strategic culture, moving 
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away from the work on the Soviet Union, China and the United States.82 Tanham advanced some 
interesting points about Indian strategic policy, which he argued was influenced by Indian 
perceptions of history, geography and culture. These were very general points. For example, 
Tanham argued that tendencies in Indian culture towards fatalism and towards seeing the future 
as unpredictable militated against forward planning, as did the Indian view of time as cyclical 
rather than linear.83 Tanham made no direct reference to the earlier work on strategic culture, and 
offered neither theoretical elaboration of the concept nor discussion of his methodological 
approach. 
 
 In 1993 Desmond Ball contributed to the strategic culture literature with an article on 
strategic culture in the Asia-Pacific region.84 Taking as his cue the volume edited by Jacobsen, 
his premise was that  
 
the concept of strategic culture holds that different countries and regions approach the key 
issues of war, peace and strategy from perspectives that are both quite distinctive and 
deeply rooted, reflecting their different geostrategic situations, resources, military 
experience and political beliefs. These factors profoundly influence how a country 
perceives, protects and promotes its interests and values with respect to the threat or use 
of force.85 
 
Ball noted that hitherto, strategic culture research had focused on states, and mainly the United 
States and the Soviet Union. Little had been written about other states or regions of the world. 
His own focus was on the Asia-Pacific region, which had been the focus of much work on 
'political culture' and 'economic culture' but little on strategic culture. He intended to correct this 
oversight.86 In doing so he considered the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, rather than individual 
states within the region. He believed that while national differences existed, broad regional 
cultural traits could also be identified. In this he was  
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breaking new ground in terms of the strategic culture literature. 
 
  Ball's essay identified a number of principal elements of Asia-Pacific strategic culture, 
though it was unclear how and why he had singled these out. Evidence supporting them was 
drawn from the behaviour of states, statements of officials and ancient texts. The sources of these 
elements of strategic culture were the internal political organisation of the states of the region, 
the traditions and historical experience of the region, and their wider cultural values. Defining the 
strategic culture of the region largely in opposition to that of the West, Ball argued that Asians 
tend to think in longer time frames than Westerners; that their politics are characterised more by 
informality; that they believe much more strongly in the principle of non-intervention; that they 
favour bilateral international relations over multilateral; that they define security in broader terms 
than the West; that they prefer to operate with consensus; that they are more pragmatic than 
idealistic; and that they approach the use of force with more emphasis on achieving political 
objectives than military victories. 
    
 
The state of the art 
Over the last few years more impressive work has been done on strategic culture. In 1994, a 
major project was launched to examine 'Strategic Culture and Conflict Resolution in the Asia-
Pacific Region'.87 This project centred on a workshop at which papers were presented on the 
concept of strategic culture, and on the strategic cultures of most states of the region. These 
papers are to be published in book form.88 The project had various aims. One was to provide a 
systematic comparative study of strategic culture. To this end, contributors were circulated with a 
framework for analysis on which to base their studies of particular countries. It was hoped that 
applying the framework would yield insight into  
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the strategic behaviour of the countries, and that refinement of the concept of strategic culture 
would also result. A second aim of the project was to investigate the prospects for peace in a 
region with potential for conflict. Nuclear tensions centring on North Korea and territorial 
disputes involving the Spratly Islands could escalate, while the existence of two Chinas and two 
Koreas occasions further instability. Would understanding of the strategic cultures of the states of 
the region assist the promotion of peaceful conflict resolution? 
 The final stage of the project has yet to be completed. This involves the publication of a 
book containing all the papers, revised in the light of the workshop discussions, as well as a 
section in which contrasts and comparisons are drawn and conclusions arrived at regarding 
security in the region. Provisionally, on the basis of the initial draft papers, it might be said that 
the project demonstrates some of the drawbacks of comparative research. The authors of the 
country studies all possessed expertise of the country they were to examine, but came from 
different academic backgrounds (as well as different cultural ones). Few were well acquainted 
with strategic culture, and, although supplied with a paper outlining the concept and its 
development, were working on it for the first time. Although each was enthusiastic about the 
significance of strategic culture, each also brought their own approaches to bear and set about the 
task in different ways.  
 The framework for analysis, never intended to become a strait-jacket which would 
prevent researchers from developing their own ideas and approaches peculiar to their own 
country of study, was applied more or less rigorously by different writers. This reflected in part 
the difficulty of getting a large number of academics to toe the same line, and in part the 
difficulty of devising a framework relevant to the circumstances, and indeed cultures, of various 
different states. Comparability was therefore to an extent compromised. It is also worth noting 
the authors of the framework were British, and it may therefore reflect cultural biases making it 
less applicable to the Asia-Pacific region. An important point to note about the framework, 
however, was that, while it pointed to some of the areas in which authors might look for material 
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regarding strategic culture, it provided little methodological guidance, leaving authors to make 
their own way.89 
 The framework represented a comprehensive approach to strategic culture, asking 
contributors initially to contemplate the sources of strategic culture. Three categories were 
suggested in which to search for sources. First, had the geography and resources of states shaped 
defence thinking? For instance, did the state enjoy secure, natural borders? Was it self-reliant in 
terms of strategically important resources? What were the implications of such factors for 
strategic thinking? Second, what effect had historical experiences had on strategic beliefs? What, 
for instance, were the key historical memories, and indeed which events were forgotten? What 
historical symbols could be identified, such as words like Munich, or Dunkirk, which conjured 
up particular understandings of past experience? Third, how had political structures, and in 
particular the defence organisation of a state, affected thinking? Was there a centralised or 
decentralised polity? What was the relationship between armed forces and government? Was 
there a militaristic society? 
 On the basis of such questions, contributors were asked to develop a profile of the 
strategic culture of their country, identifying its main characteristics, before linking this to 
contemporary policy on a number of issues: nuclear, conventional and unconventional strategy, 
arms control and disarmament. Also they were asked to probe the relationship between strategic 
culture and views of security, as well as processes of defence decision-making. Finally 
contributors were asked to look at the prospects for change in strategic cultures in the direction of 
peaceful conflict resolution and the delegitimisation of force, to the extent that existing cultures 
were not compatible with these notions. 
 
 The papers raised some interesting points for the study of strategic culture. Space permits 
only that a couple of examples may be picked out. In the case of Japan, World 
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War Two represented the first major defeat for the country in war, and of course also featured the 
only use of nuclear weapons.90 Defeat was then followed by occupation and the attempted 
imposition of external values by the occupying forces. The paper provided an introductory 
discussion of the effect of these events on Japanese strategic culture, and focused on how change 
could occur in strategic culture in the light of shattering events and outside interference. These 
are issues that could profitably be pursued in greater depth. The paper on Australia, meanwhile, 
focused on the strategic culture of white Australia, taking the view that the aboriginal population 
had quite different views on the use of force, and also saw the white Australian strategic culture 
as dominated by masculine values. Along with a distinct aboriginal culture, therefore, a culture 
informed by feminine values coexisted with the dominant strategic culture.91 This suggests some 
lines of enquiry which might be pursued into sub-cultures. 
 
 Ultimately, the project offered a starting point for the comparative study of the strategic 
cultures of the region, and put more 'empirical flesh' on the concept of strategic culture. It 
provided a systematic framework suggesting features of a country's history, geography and 
political culture at which strategic culture analysts might look in an attempt to identify the key 
sources and elements of its strategic culture. It did not, however, propose any methodological 
approach to strategic culture. 
 
 1994 also saw the publication of Charles Kupchan's The Vulnerability of Empire, in 
which strategic culture - understood as 'deeply embedded conceptions and notions of national 
security that take root among elites and public alike' - was again a key concept.92 The concern of 
the study was with how great powers engage in self-defeating behaviour, 
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becoming either too competitive - as with Japan in the late 1930s and early 1940s - or too co-
operative - as with Britain and France in the 1930s. Neo-realist analysis, the dominant mode of 
international politics, could not account for such behaviour. It tended to focus on how power 
ought to be understood and acquired, not on how state governments and their citizens actually 
thought about power. The latter was the stuff of strategic culture, which shaped grand strategy, 
the setting of strategic preferences, and the acceptability of behaviour. As an unwieldy concept, 
strategic culture was often left out of the analysis by neo-realists. By looking at strategic cultures, 
Kupchan hoped to modify the neo-realist model by accounting for how states failed to adjust 
properly to new alignments in the balance of power, how they misperceived their new status.93 
Although concerned with attitudes and beliefs, and how culture affects perception of reality, 
Kupchan was looking more for a universal process through which misperception occurred in 
particular circumstances than he was at national variation, which is the usual aim of strategic 
culture research. However, he did note the importance of historical events in shaping beliefs. 
British and French strategic cultures, for example, were influenced by experience of World War 
One in their reaction to threats in the interwar period to their security, preferring co-operative to 
competitive behaviour. 
 
 Kupchan noted the difficulties known to attend research into culture. It was often a 
residual variable, turned to when other modes of explanation had failed. Culture was difficult to 
define: in particular, it was important to separate in the definition behaviour from the beliefs 
supposed to explain it, or else tautology resulted. Culture was also difficult to measure and faced 
methodological problems which 'threaten to mire any cultural argument in intractable dispute 
over conceptual and evidentiary issues'.94 If cultures changed slowly, then their effect tended to 
be non-falsifiable, since it is impossible to test a counterfactual - whether behaviour would have 
been different if a different culture had been in place. Kupchan proposed a narrow definition of 
culture to make  
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matters easier. Snyder's definition was so broad as to be untestable. Kupchan therefore focused 
on the 'images and symbols that shape how a polity conceives of the relationship between empire 
and national security'.95 The hope was that this would maximise the 'tradeoff between rigor and 
richness'.96 His conclusion was that intuitively strategic culture seemed an important variable. It 
had however been 'sorely understudied', partly because of the difficulty of doing so. The paradox 
was that 'what makes the notion of strategic culture problematic and unwieldy - its focus on 
deeply embedded assumptions and collective self-images - is precisely what makes it 
appealing'.97 
 
 In 1995 Eric Herring brought strategic culture into his analysis of the crisis behaviour of 
the United States and the Soviet Union, in a doctoral dissertation now published in book form.98 
Herring wanted to bring in both strategic culture and psychological factors to complicate the 
unproblematic assumption of rationality in crisis decision-makers in the early part of his book. A 
strategic culture would provide decision-makers with a simplified image of the complex world 
they faced. Acting on the basis of that image, decision-makers might be blind to some of the 
complexities of the world and so behave in ways 'rational' in terms of their image of the world 
but 'non-rational' in terms of the reality. On some occasions, the distorting effect of a strategic 
culture could actually alter outcomes. On other occasions it might merely 'warp the processes 
leading to the same outcome'.99 
 
 Analysis of crises tended, Herring argued, to assume rationality. Perfect rationality was 
unattainable, but the assumption might be a reasonable one in many cases. In some it would not 
be, both where psychological processes operated regardless of culture, and where culture affected 
the ends desired and the means employed by decision-makers. In 
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addition, ethnocentrism could lead to incomprehension of the cultures of others and so affect 
outcomes: either because other states, through a mirror-imaging process, were assumed to be the 
same as the decision-maker's own, or, more often, because other states were caricatured and 
demonised. Sensitivity to strategic cultures could protect against these errors, though it could also 
lead to insensitivity to the potential for change - witness Colin Gray's unequivocal view, 
undermined by Gorbachev's reforms, that change in the Soviet strategic culture was unthinkable. 
 
 Herring argued that studies of strategic culture could take two forms. First was an 
essentially descriptive search for understanding of a group's attitudes to the use of force. Second 
was a more analytical search for explanation, in the social science tradition. Without dismissing 
the importance of the former, and aware that the line between the two was not hard and fast, 
Herring placed himself within the second tradition. He saw strategic culture as possessing 
explanatory utility in a number of respects. Acting as a prism to the world, it could shape 
perceptions of it and affect the setting of strategic preferences. It could make certain courses of 
action more acceptable or thinkable than others. Or, as a legitimizing discourse, it could justify 
behaviour based on unrelated motivations. However, new generations of decision-makers, if 
socialised into this discourse, could come to believe in it and act accordingly.  
 
 While some social scientists preferred to see cultural explanations as lacking in research 
economy and therefore residual categories to be fallen back on when others failed to explain 
events, Herring wanted to make strategic culture a central part of his analysis. As an example of 
its role he cited kamikaze attacks. Unthinkable in terms of US strategic culture, they were 
therefore not predicted in the United States; thinkable in the Japanese culture, they were carried 
out, though only when the military situation reached a certain point. Culture then was only part of 
the explanation. And since the Japanese ultimately surrendered, too much should not be made of 
the cultural predisposition against surrender. Herring was at pains to stress that the role of 
strategic culture should not be exaggerated. 
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He found that strategic concepts such as crisis management and deterrence were not understood 
significantly differently in the West and in China and the Soviet Union. To exaggerate the 
differences, as the literature tended to do, could undermine the usefulness of the strategic culture 
approach. 
 
 In his conclusions, strategic culture formed one factor, but not a central one, in explaining 
crises. The strength of the motivation of the parties involved in a crisis was a critical factor in 
determining whether deterrence of compellence could succeed. All parties, not just, as the 
strategic culture literature suggests, those from the West, attempted nuanced crisis signalling. 
However, signals were not always interpreted accurately. The military balance was significant, 
but more important was the extent to which parties to crises were averse to war. The less averse 
to war parties were, the less likely they were to be concerned by a military balance not in their 
favour. Strategic culture could play a part in determining the degree of war aversion, as in the 
case of increasing aversion to casualties in the United States since the Vietnam War. Strategic 
culture was also linked to the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, which constrained 
decision-makers during crises, even where they themselves did not share the belief that nuclear 
use should be avoided. However, an argument against referring to the taboo as a strategic cultural 
factor is that it was not country specific. Strategic culture was again a factor in the analogies 
employed by different states. Misunderstanding arose when governments reasoned on the basis of 
different analogies, so that good crisis behaviour could be helped by mutual strategic cultural 
understanding of the analogies employed. However, strategic culture could not be used to predict 
behaviour since it worked in interaction with the context. In different contexts, the same strategic 
culture could produce different behaviour. 
 
 The most recent work on strategic culture is also, thus far, the most thorough and 
methodologically sophisticated. This has been carried out by Alastair Iain Johnston.100  
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Johnston's book makes a useful last stop in this literature survey, not only because of the depth of 
its treatment, but also because he provides an overview of the literature. Johnston classified 
strategic culture writing as belonging to one of three generations. The first, which included the 
likes of Snyder and Gray, occurred in the early 1980s in the context of the Soviet-US strategic 
competition. It looked at differences in the strategies of these states and ascribed them to political 
culture, geography, historical experiences and other factors. This was a methodologically messy 
generation, with numerous dependent and independent variables for analysis. It was unable to 
measure the effect of culture on behaviour, relative to other variables. Authors tended to see one 
set of beliefs resulting from one set of experiences and producing one set of behaviour. This was 
also a determinist generation, Johnston argued, with the exception of Snyder. It produced 
'overdetermined, hence analytically useless, explanations of behavior'.101 Too many elements 
went into strategic culture, which could be separated out into distinct variables, and too much 
was determined by it. Nothing was left out so it could not be falsified. Finally, the first generation 
was criticised by Johnston for being unclear on the sources of strategic culture. Which historical 
periods should be examined? Which sorts of sources - official documents, popular artefacts - 
should be consulted? How is the culture transmitted, and how does it change? How is the 
strategic culture related to culture more generally? The first generation of literature did not 
adequately answer such questions.102  
 
 The second generation, a prominent member of which was Bradley Klein, operated in the 
mid-1980s in a more Gramscian tradition, differentiating between a symbolic strategic culture 
and an operational one, the former being used to confirm the legitimacy of elites and their 
strategic preferences. Strategic culture here was a tool of hegemony, or perhaps it could be seen 
as setting the language of debate. Johnston made two main criticisms of this literature. First, it 
assumed that all elites behaved similarly, and in a realpolitik fashion. It did not look for cross-
national differences. Second, it ignored the 
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extent to which elites could be socialised into the hegemonic culture and be influenced by it 
rather than manipulating it.103  
 
 The third generation, including writers not using the term 'strategic culture' itself, has 
been emerging in the 1990s. One representative was Charles Kupchan. This generation looked at 
a wider range of cases and focused more narrowly on dependent variables such as particular 
decisions so as to permit more useful empirical testing of the concept. It sought to explain 
choices not explained by neo-realist thinking. In order to preserve the analytical distinction 
between dependent and independent variables, this generation's definition of strategic culture 
omitted any mention of behaviour, the dependent variable to be explained. In general, the sources 
of strategic culture are regarded more as recent experience than deeper history. Relevant beliefs 
concern the nature of war and of international politics, views on technology, on the relationship 
of the state, the military establishment and society. Some writers are more influenced by post-
modern or constructivist approaches, others prefer positivistic methods. All try to test the effect 
of strategic culture against other variables.  
 
 The problems identified by Johnston with this generation were, first, that it ignored the 
effect of more deeply rooted historical factors in shaping strategic beliefs, in preference for recent 
experiences. Second, testing strategic culture against neo-realism is problematic, because neo-
realism does not suggest particular outcomes. Thirdly, this generation omits consideration of the 
possibility of distinct operational and symbolic strategic cultures. Fourth, it appears closer to 
belief systems in seeing culture as quick to change. Fifth, seeing culture as a lens, as setting the 
range of choices, leaves the need for an intervening variable to explain particular outcomes. 
Finally, there is more room in this less deterministic approach for individuals not wholly 
socialised into the culture to operate in ways at variance with it, weakening the utility of the 
concept and leaving strategic culture  
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as more of a contextual than an explanatory variable.104 
 
 Overall, he argued that strategic culture writing had been less than rigorous. It had left the 
concept of strategic culture 'remarkably undefined'.105 Broadly, strategic culture was seen as being 
concerned with patterns in the strategic behaviour of states, influenced by unique sets of 
preferences, themselves the product of early formative experiences of the state and their cultural, 
political and philosophical characteristics as they had developed over time. Other variables were 
given meaning only when seen through the lens of strategic culture, which constrained state 
action. Change in the strategic culture was slow and lagged behind 'objective' conditions. 
Incompatible with the idea of universal rationality, strategic culture was compatible with ideas of 
limited or bounded rationality in which beliefs set the parameters of debate and historical 
analogies and metaphors guided thinking.106  
 
 If strategic culture was compatible with notions of bounded rationality, it did however 
pose a challenge to the neo-realist paradigm, which dominates the discipline of international 
relations. Neo-realism regarded states as 'functionally undifferentiated units' seeking to optimize 
their utility. This acultural and ahistorical approach has been modified by some to allow for 
universal processes of misperception, organisational politics and decision-making, but these were 
'auxiliary' theories plugging gaps in the neo-realist paradigm and not fundamentally challenging 
it. Strategic culture did challenge structural or neo-realists to explain variations in strategic 
behaviour. For strategic culturalists, the corollary obtained: they need to explain similarities in 
the behaviour of culturally different states.107  
 
 Turning to the literature on Chinese strategic thinking and policy, Johnston noted 
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that it paid considerable attention to the effect of history. Even if few writers referred explicitly 
to strategic culture, many invoked the concept. There was general agreement that there existed a 
Chinese strategic culture, the key features of which were preferences for the strategic defensive 
and for limited war, and a belief that the use of force was of limited utility. These features were 
often identified with the writing of Sun Zi, and with Mao, with continuity between the two 
assumed; and they were contrasted with Western preferences for offensive war and reliance on 
technology and massive firepower. Johnston complained that, as with the first generation 
strategic culture literature, this work was plagued by methodological flaws. It concentrated 
almost exclusively on Sun Zi, and then only a selective reading of his work; it did not show the 
link between his and later thinking, nor between beliefs and behaviour. Finally it did not account 
for the empirical evidence that China had fought in many wars for a state allegedly reluctant to 
use force.108  
 
 Having surveyed the existing literatures on strategic culture in general and the Chinese 
case in particular, Johnston proposed that it made sense to pursue the question of Chinese 
strategic culture further. Given that the influence of strategic culture in China had been so often 
asserted but so rarely demonstrated, there was a clear gap to fill. China, moreover, with its 
relative isolation and continuity of history, was a good case because if no persistent Chinese 
strategic culture could be shown to exist, then the prospects of discerning one in other states were 
poor. So the concept of strategic culture could be refined also through an examination of the 
Chinese case.109  
  
  Johnston initially set out his own approach to the study of strategic culture, which is, he 
recognises, a methodologically awkward undertaking. He hoped to avoid the pitfalls uncovered 
by strategic culture analysis: definitions of culture which are tautological; deterministic ideas 
about the effect of culture; and flawed research designs which do not separate culture and 
structure. Instead he seeks a falsifiable notion of strategic culture, the 
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formation and development of which can be followed empirically and the impact of which can be 
assessed relative to other factors. His approach is to begin with the key strategic texts from a 
formative period of strategic culture, looking for the existence of consistent beliefs. Next it is 
necessary to show that many decision-makers share these beliefs, and that strategic action is 
consistent with them.110  
 
 For Johnston, strategic culture consists of two basic elements. First is a 'central paradigm' 
of beliefs about the nature of conflict, the nature of enemies and the efficacy of violence. 
Secondly, derived from this paradigm should be 'a ranked set of strategic preferences' which are 
'collectively shared by decision-makers'. Tracing these preferences back to the historical 
experience of the state, and forward to their influence on strategic behaviour, is the aim of his 
work. He set out to determine to what extent a consistent and persistent Chinese strategic culture 
can be identified, and to what extent it has affected Chinese use of force.111 More expansively, he 
saw strategic culture as 
 
...an integrated system of symbols (i.e., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, 
metaphors, etc.) that acts to establish pervasive and long-standing grand strategic 
preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate 
political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the 
strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.112 
 
 Johnston hoped to devise an empirically testable conception of strategic culture and to 
isolate its effects. The first step was to establish that a strategic culture exists over time, and is 
shared by enough actors, for it to be considered a major factor. To show the influence of strategic 
culture on behaviour, Johnston wanted to trace it from its sources through a socialization process 
to the values and assumptions of decision-makers. With regard to the first stage, identifying 
beliefs, Johnston chose the Ming period, 1368-1644, because decision-makers then were heirs to 
a particular philosophical and textual tradition  
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at a relatively insulated period of time. Various strategic objects were possible in which to 
observe the strategic culture: documents, writings, images, military ceremonies to name some. In 
the Chinese case, the documents he used for analysis were the Seven Military Classics, an 
obvious starting point as the repository of strategic knowledge and a basis for transmitting 
ideas.113 These were examined for their principal assumptions about the role of war, the nature of 
conflict with the enemy and the efficacy of violence. Also he used symbols: words, names, 
events which had meanings, though these could change over time. It was therefore important to 
triangulate, to corroborate beliefs from different sources. 
 
 Beliefs having been identified, the next stage is to test their effect on behaviour. Johnston 
identified various possible ways in which the two might be related. It could be, at one extreme, 
that strategic culture pointed to one particular option only, so that no other factors were needed to 
explain choices. At the other extreme, strategic culture could merely be instrumental, used to 
justify policy caused by other factors. A modified version of this approach sees strategic culture, 
although beginning life as an instrument used by elites to justify their actions, eventually 
entrapping them as new generations come to believe in the culture or masses require action in 
accordance with it. Between these extremes, the strategic culture might set a limited range of 
available options, with other variables required to explain which particular option is selected. Or 
the strategic culture might produce a ranked set of preferences which form a prism through which 
other factors are perceived. This option was the one Johnston intended to pursue, testing it 
against non-cultural factors, especially structural, to see if it gives different results. A final 
possibility, however, was that strategic culture affected the decision-making process itself: it 
affected how decisions were taken, rather than which decisions were taken.114 
 
 The question then was whether decision-makers operated according to a ranked set of 
preferences, consistent across different objects of analysis. If not, no strategic 
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culture could be identified. Noting that a comparative study would be helpful, Johnston argued 
that in the first instance it was necessary to demonstrate consistency in beliefs over time in one 
country.115 His findings were interesting. They were that there were two Chinese strategic 
cultures, a Confucian-Mencian culture exhibiting the features often claimed for Chinese strategic 
culture; and a parabellum culture, resembling the Western realpolitik model.116 The parabellum 
culture, downplayed by analysts, was the dominant strain. This raises a difficulty for Johnston, 
because the Chinese parabellum strategic culture leads to precisely the behaviour expected by 
structural realists. Thus testing strategic culture against structural realism is not possible, Chinese 
distinctiveness is challenged and the value of strategic culture severely compromised. Indeed, 
structural realists would say that Johnston's findings confirm the critical importance of structures 
and the marginal importance of unit level factors. However, while Johnston accepts that his 
findings pose difficulties for strategic culturalists in that they diminish cross-cultural difference, 
nevertheless he sees value in the strategic culture approach and difficulties for neo-realists also. 
Johnston did discern a deeply rooted set of cultural beliefs in China, transmitted to new 
generations. These beliefs were not therefore 'natural', but rather learned, and this opened up the 
possibility at least that they could be unlearned or that it had not been learned in other countries. 
Neo-realists just assumed the existence of realpolitik beliefs. Johnston's work showed them being 




This survey of the strategic culture literature shows that, since its coinage in 1977, the term 
strategic culture has been taken up by a variety of writers. They have conceived of strategic 
culture in quite different ways. There is common ground in the general sense that all writers are 
concerned with the set of values and beliefs held by groups about the 
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strategic realm, and the relevance of these to their behaviour in that realm. However, often those 
who have employed the term have not built on previous work, simply proceeding on the basis of 
their own understanding of what strategic culture should mean. Utilisation of the term strategic 
culture has not united the different writers around any one view of what exactly strategic culture 
is, how it is formed, how it operates, and how and why it should be studied. To study strategic 
culture no more commits the scholar to any particular definition, methodology or purpose than to 
study such subjects as revolution, war or trade. 
 
 Alastair Johnston's division of the literature into three categories captures some of the 
differences in approach between early, and on the whole unsophisticated work, and later, more 
refined studies. However, the literature can also be divided along other lines which give an 
indication of the similarities and contrasts between different writers. Two principal fissures in the 
literature emerge when we ask why strategic culture should be studied, and how it should be 
studied. Writers like Colin Gray and Yitzhak Klein operate broadly within the traditional realist 
paradigm of strategic studies, the 'how-to-do-it' guide.118 With conflict inevitable given the nature 
of humankind and/or the anarchic international system, states must act to secure themselves 
against possible aggressors. Understanding their own strategic culture as well as the strategic 
cultures of potential enemies enables more effective defence planning. These writers are critical 
of the realist tendency towards black-boxing states, that is, assuming that their internal 
organisation and historical experience do not significantly affect their behaviour. They are critical 
of assumptions that a useful strategic rationality exists which governs the behaviour of all state 
decision-makers. However, these writers do not see strategic culture as posing a fundamental 
challenge to realist thinking. They do not question realist and neo-realist assumptions that the 
state is the central actor on the international stage, that the international system is essentially 
conflictual, or that states must maximise power to ensure their security. States may remain 
undifferentiated functionally, but vary in how they carry 
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out their function of achieving security through maximising military power in an anarchic world. 
Charles Kupchan more explicitly uses strategic culture not as a replacement for realism in the 
analysis of state behaviour, but rather a refinement of it.  
 
 Ken Booth offers a differing view of why strategic culture should be studied in his work 
with the other participants in the 'Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific' project. That project 
linked culture explicitly with conflict resolution. The aim was to assess the extent to which 
understanding of strategic cultures could improve prospects for peaceful settlement of disputes, 
rather than effective prosecution of hostilities. Here the potential for change in strategic culture is 
a crucial consideration. Studying strategic culture has the potential to show that particular beliefs 
about the use of force are not natural or inevitable, but the product of specific times, places and 
circumstances. If some cultures have managed to live more peacefully than others, then lessons 
could be learned. If people are alerted to the possibility that their core values about the use of 
force derive from particular historical experiences, then change, in more peaceful directions, can 
become conceivable. Strategic culture here does not shore up the realist project, it undermines it. 
Progress may be facilitated from strategic cultures, understood here as mindsets in which war is 
seen as inevitable and force as a legitimate instrument of policy, to pacific cultures, understood 
as mindsets in which force has no legitimacy. 
 
 There is a distinction which can be drawn, therefore, between strategic culture 
minimalists and maximalists.119 The minimalists work largely within neo-realism but do not 
believe that examination of the system level will answer all our questions. They drop their sights 
down to units within the system, challenging some of neo-realism's tenets, but still looking to 
prepare their states to cope with the menace of the anarchical system. Minimalists-plus, or 
'sophisticated realists', meanwhile, may still broadly accept the logic of anarchy, but hope to use 
understanding of strategic cultures minimise conflict within the 
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international system.120 Improved, mutual cultural understanding may avert wars resulting from 
misperception. It may facilitate the peaceful settlement of disputes. It may offer greater chances 
to mitigate the security dilemma and to construct security regimes. Strategic culture maximalists, 
however, go further. War is seen as a cultural phenomenon, one which can be unlearned.121 
Security dilemmas can be transcended and security communities can be constructed. The 'logic of 
anarchy' can be overcome and states can live peacefully even within anarchy. To use slightly 
different language, it could be argued that some writers are interested in military culture, or the 
ways in which armed forces and ministries of defence think about using force, while not 
questioning that the use and threat of force are necessary. Others examine defence or strategic 
cultures, broadening out to the level of grand strategy and the views of the civilian government, 
rather than just military specialists, and asking about how to avoid wars and settle disputes 
peacefully.  Security culture looks at notions of what constitutes security and whether states and 
people can unlearn the use and threat of force. In all these cases, however, those interested in 
culture challenge narrow views that the nature of the system determines the actions of its units, 
and that all the units behave in accordance with the same rationality. Culture allows for greater 
variety of motivation and behaviour than crude neo-realist or rational choice philosophies. 
 
 Bradley Klein also employs strategic culture as part of an explicit critique of realism. He 
is keen to historicise the implicit assumptions of realist thinking, to show that states have not 
always been regarded as the legitimate or primary actors in the international system, nor need 
they always be so regarded. Strategic culture here becomes the vehicle through which state elites 
sustain legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens. If the realist thinking embodied in US strategic 
culture is exposed as a cultural construct rather than the only rational response to the external 
environment, then alternative constructs are 
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possible. On related lines, Alastair Johnston, although finding that Chinese strategic culture 
closely resembles the sort of realpolitik approach with which realists would be comfortable, 
nevertheless argues that the roots of Chinese strategic culture can be traced to particular times 
and places. Rather than simply assuming that states will behave in realpolitik fashion, Johnston 
believes that the strategic culture approach shows how they got to that point, and implies both 
that different circumstances could have produced other outcomes and that learning of new 
thinking is possible. Klein and Johnston, therefore, also challenge neo-realist thinking. 
 
 Writers are divided, therefore, on why strategic culture should be studied. On the question 
of methods, or how to study strategic culture, there are also a variety of approaches. Some writers 
pay little or no attention to methodology. In the case of Stephen Szabo's work on German 
strategic culture, for instance, the suspicion lurks that strategic culture merely provides a 
reasonably fashionable label for work which might otherwise appear run-of-the-mill. His work is 
not anchored in the literature nor is it characterised by any concerted investigation of what is 
meant by strategic culture. The term 'strategic culture' may well be borrowed to lend dignity and 
suggest sophistication to work which is essentially impressionistic and concerned with diverse 
subjects. The nebulous nature of culture renders it attractive to such borrowing. 
 
 Other writers exhibit greater awareness of the methodological difficulties inherent in 
cultural analysis. If a culture is intangible, if its effects are indirect, how can you establish its 
existence, origins and operation? Earlier writers on the subject, as might be expected, were more 
concerned with outlining the general themes of the strategic culture approach and establishing the 
need for such an approach than with laying down precise rules for its study. However, as strategic 
culture gained acceptance as a valid and valuable concept, refinement was necessary. Colin Gray 
led the way in pointing out some pitfalls awaiting strategic culture. Gray's own approach, which 
he calls an empirical-inductive one, sought to derive general statements about Soviet and US 
strategic cultures from  
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observation of their behaviour.122 However, he did not develop this in any detail. The Asia-
Pacific project organisers set out to develop a comparative approach, but recommended little in 
the way of methodology. 
 
 Johnston is critical of much strategic culture writing because of its lack of attention to 
methods. For Johnston, if it is to be useful, strategic culture must be falsifiable, its effects 
susceptible to proof and measurement relative to other factors. While later writers like Kupchan 
and Herring might try to build strategic culture into explanations of strategic behaviour involving 
other factors, much of the first generation fails the test. Johnston's is a fiercely positivistic 
method rooted in social science positivistic traditions. If strategic cultural explanations cannot be 
falsified, they are of little value in this view of methodology. Snyder is critical of much strategic 
culture work for similar reasons.  
 
 Here a fracture appears in the strategic culture work. Both Gray and Booth are critical in 
their work of such 'rigorous' approaches. Gray anticipates that there will be those in what he 
terms the 'republic of social science' who will quickly point out the methodological sins 
committed by cultural analysts, while Booth, as noted, sees a trade-off between rigour and 
richness in theory.123 It may be argued that such non-quantifiable phenomena as cultures are not 
amenable to social scientific study, that scientific standards of proof are inappropriate. Strategic 
culture studies must then constitute more of an art than a science. Thus strategic culture analysts 
can be found at both ends of a methodological axis which cuts through international relations 
scholarship: from an extreme positivism at one end, to a hermeneutic, interpretive method at the 
other.124 
 
 Two important areas for further research emerge from the above analysis. The first 
concerns the methodology by which strategic culture can be studied. In particular, can a  
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positivist methodology accommodate cultural analysis, or is a more interpretive approach 
required? The second concerns the relationship between cultural explanations and explanations 
based on the effects of structures or rational calculations of interest. This area involves a further 
series of questions also regarding how strategic cultures operate. What do they explain? There is 
widespread consensus that strategic cultures do not determine policy. Rather they produce 
tendencies and predispositions; they form a perceptual lens or prism through which strategic 
issues are seen; they set the bounds of debate; they affect which questions will be asked as much 
as which answers will be reached. But to explain any policy, other factors must be taken into 
consideration. Strategic culture alone is insufficient. Strategic culture can be seen as different in 
kind from other modes of explanation, a more basic factor. For example, the bureaucratic politics 
approach can help explain policy, but organisations function within cultural contexts; and the 
impact of 'technological push' will depend upon cultural attitudes towards technology. Exactly 
how strategic cultures operate remains open to question. Further discussion of these issues is 
necessary.  
 
 A number of other questions arise from this survey of the strategic culture literature. First 
there is the question of whose culture is to be studied. One approach focuses narrowly on the 
'military establishment' of a state, while others broaden out to the 'national strategic community', 
to the political as well as the military elite. Other writers have considered the culture of the 
nation as a whole. Which is the most appropriate level on which to focus? Also to be taken into 
account here is the possibility that distinct sub-cultures may exist, differing in important respects 
from the dominant culture of a national group.  
 
 A second question asks what 'culture' means. Included in the various definitions are 
values, attitudes, ideas and perceptions, all rather different entities. But how exactly are they 
distinct from, and how related to, each other? And in what ways are these entities distinct from, 
and related to, emotional responses, habits, patterns of behaviour, and  
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modes of thought, which also feature in some definitions? In particular, inclusion of behaviour in 
definitions of culture has been criticised for mixing up what is to be explained with what does the 
explaining. Further, is the culture merely the aggregate of these entities among the group under 
study, or is it greater than the sum of its parts? Does it exist only in human minds, or should it be 
conceptualised as an almost autonomous force? For some, the use of the term culture signifies 
little more than that policy can outlive the circumstances and reasoning which gave rise to it 
within institutions, while others refer to culture to indicate that strategy is formed within and 
gives expression to the broader cultural attributes of a society.  
 
 Another issue regards the content of strategic cultures. Which beliefs and attitudes is it 
important to identify? Some writers take strategic culture to be about attitudes to the use of force, 
or threat thereof. Others argue that it concerns attitudes towards the fundamental and enduring 
components of defence policy, or the political objectives which the use of force is supposed to 
serve, or how to achieve these objectives. Others focus more broadly on the overall security 
policy of states. In part, this reflects some of the concerns discussed above. Realist strategic 
culturalists who assume the inevitability of conflict deal with a narrower range of beliefs, 
excluding those about the nature of international politics and security. Their work might be 
described as strategic culture, rather than security culture, because of the narrowness of their 
focus. The term security culture is more appropriate for the work of those who open up for 
investigation beliefs about other dimensions of security - environmental, economic, societal and 
so on.125 
 
 Further crucial questions ask: what are the origins of strategic cultures? How are habits 
and attitudes formed? Various sources of strategic culture are identified in the literature. A state's 
history, especially its military history and experience, its culture, especially its political culture, 
its international relationships, its resources and the 
                                                          
125 The best known discussion of the various dimensions of security is Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An 
Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (New York and London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
second edition, 1991). 
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technology available to it, and the organisation of its strategic decision-making apparatus have all 
been cited as roots of strategic culture. But do these factors determine strategic cultures, the 
attitudes, behaviour, and values of elites? Do new generations come to hold similar attitudes 
through rational consideration of the same factors? Do they perceive afresh the implications of 
these factors, or are they socialised into old holding perceptions? Questions surround how the 
relevant attitudes are formed, if and how they are sustained and transmitted require more thought. 
 
 This point brings in the issue of change in strategic cultures. Most writers believe that 
cultures do change, but only gradually, except where some dramatic event intervenes. A criticism 
levelled at the strategic culture approach is that it may be too insensitive to change, overstressing 
coherence and consistency. Another open question here is whether regimes may consciously 
manipulate strategic cultural beliefs in order to persuade their populations of the authority of the 
regime itself or the legitimacy of the policies it pursues. Overall, there are several unresolved 
issues regarding how cultures persist and how change can occur. 
 
 The above questions indicate the main areas of the concept of strategic culture which 
require theoretical refinement. In seeking such refinement, some commentators have stressed the 
need for an interdisciplinary approach. Few have done much to follow this through. Yet to ignore 
other disciplines and subjects which could offer valuable insights may be to waste time 
generating the same insights, or to fall unnecessarily into the same traps. Strategic culture 
analysts could end up reinventing the wheel, and perhaps even a less efficient version of it. The 
obvious starting point in the search for insights from other disciplines is with political culture, a 
concept with a long history within political science and a large literature attached to it. Political 
culture is referred to often by writers on strategic culture, who see it as a related enterprise. The 
political culture literature draws on the disciplines of sociology, psychology and anthropology, 
and so may provide short cuts to the concerns of these disciplines, which, as it has been argued 
below, are  
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relevant for strategic culture. Chapter Three therefore examines the literature on political culture, 





Chapter Three: Political Culture 
 
 
Serious academic study of the subject of political culture began in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
Around this time several important studies of the concept were produced, and political culture 
went on to become a key concept within the discipline of political science.1 By the mid-1970s, 
however, interest in the subject had waned and criticism of it began to mount. It is indicative of 
the state of thinking on political culture that few major book length studies of the concept were 
written between then and the late 1980s. A significant exception to this generalisation is to be 
found in the literature on Communist states, where the concept was taken up and developed 
further by a number of scholars in the 1970s and early 1980s.2 Communist studies aside, during 
this period work on political culture often took the form of journal articles lamenting the failure 
of the concept to live up to its early promise and suggesting less ambitious ways in which it 
might be studied which would lead to its rehabilitation.3 By the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
however, interest in political culture had revived, with the publication of new books leading 
some commentators to talk of the return to political culture.4 
 
                                                          
1 Among the most important were Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and 
Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963); and Lucian W. Pye and Sidney 
Verba, (eds), Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965). 
2 See Archie Brown and Jack Gray, (eds), Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States (London: 
Macmillan, second edition, 1979); Archie Brown, (ed), Political Culture and Communist Studies (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1984); and Stephen White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1979). 
 3 For instance, see David J. Elkins and Richard E.B. Simeon, 'A Cause in Search of its Effect, or What Does 
Political Culture Explain?', Comparative Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2 (January 1979), pp. 127-45; David D. Laitin and 
Aaron Wildavsky, 'Political Culture and Political Preferences', American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 2 
(June 1988), pp. 589-96; and Lowell Dittmer, 'Political Culture and Political Symbolism: Toward a Theoretical 
Synthesis', World Politics, Vol. 29, No. 1 (October 1976), pp. 552-83. 
4 New books include John R. Gibbins, (ed), Contemporary Political Culture: Politics in a Postmodern Age (London: 
Sage, 1989); and Stephen Welch, The Concept of Political Culture (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993). Gabriel 
Almond comments on the recent resurgence of interest in political culture, in 'The Return to Political Culture', 
foreword to Larry Diamond, (ed), Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder and London: 
Lynne Rienner, 1993).  
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 That strategic culture emerged and was promoted at a time when scholars were turning 
their backs on political culture perhaps implies a lack of awareness of the fate of political culture. 
Just as those scholars who advocate the strategic culture approach criticise other strategists for 
failing to take adequate account of other disciplines such as history, so they could be criticised 
for not taking sufficient note of what was going on in the discipline of political science. 
Assuming, as many writers have, that political culture is a concept closely related to strategic 
culture (though the exact nature of that relationship still needs to be made clear), it makes much 
sense to consider the development of political culture before going any further with the study of 
strategic culture.  
 
 There are indeed many parallels between strategic culture and political culture. Each is 
concerned with subjective orientations: values, beliefs, attitudes. Each regards national or group 
experiences and history as having a role in the formation of these beliefs. And each looks at the 
impact of these beliefs and values on behaviour. What can students of strategic culture learn from 
the political culture experience? The aim of this chapter is to identify in the political culture 
literature the insights, approaches and cautions relevant to the study of strategic culture. The 
chapter will first briefly introduce the concept of political culture. It will then describe and 
account for the rise, fall and recent resurgence of the concept. The chapter will next return to the 
questions identified in the previous chapter which scholars of strategic culture are grappling with, 
and ask whether scholars of political culture have faced similar questions, and if so whether and 











Prior to examining the nature of the work done on political culture, it is important to consider 
how the concept has been defined and understood. Unfortunately, the political culture literature 
has failed to produce any universally or even widely accepted definition of political culture. 
While this is not an unusual state of affairs in the social sciences, the great number and diversity 
of definitions of political culture which have been advanced represent a major difficulty for 
students of the subject.5 This difficulty will be discussed in detail later. For the moment it is 
sufficient to offer a few examples of definitions of the concept which show roughly the ground 
which political culture covers and delineate the main features of the approach.  
 
 Two of the shortest and most straightforward definitions of political culture are offered by 
Dennis Kavanagh and Stephen White. For the former, it is 'a shorthand expression to denote the 
emotional and attitudinal environment within which the political system operates'.6 For the latter, 
political culture is 'the attitudinal and behavioural matrix within which the political system is 
located'.7 Archie Brown more expansively refers to political culture as 'the subjective perception 
of history and politics, the fundamental beliefs and values, the foci of identification and loyalty, 
and the political knowledge and expectations which are the product of the specific historical 
experience of nations and groups'.8 Lucian Pye observes that different national communities will 
produce their own 'distinctive and persisting style, manner, and substantive forms of politics'.9 
Finally, Kavanagh has elsewhere written that 'every political system is embedded in a political 
culture', which consisted of the 'values, beliefs, and emotions that give meaning to political 
behaviour'.10 
 
                                                          
5 See Ruth Lane, 'Political Culture: Residual Category or General Theory?', Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 25, 
No. 3 (October 1992), pp. 362-63. 
6 Dennis Kavanagh, Political Culture (London: Macmillan, 1972), p. 10. 
7 White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, p. 1. 
8 Brown and Gray, p. 1. 
9 Lucian W. Pye, 'Introduction', in Pye and Verba, p. 3. 
10 Dennis Kavanagh, British Politics: Continuities and Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, second edition, 
1990), p. 49. 
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 These definitions give a flavour of how the concept is understood. Though there are 
differences of wording and emphasis, political culture loosely covers the ideas, values, feelings, 
beliefs, emotions and attitudes of citizens concerning their political system. The political culture 
approach asserts that to understand a political system and its operation it is necessary, but not 
sufficient, to know about the constitution on which it is based and the institutions which 
comprise it. It is necessary, but again not sufficient, to identify the interests of the actors within 
the system. It is also crucial to comprehend the beliefs and values held by the people whom the 
system encompasses in order to understand their behaviour. It is generally assumed that there will 
be differences between the values and beliefs of populations of different states, and some 
common ground within states; though it is acknowledged that certain groups within a state may 
differ in their beliefs from others, leading to the existence of sub-cultures, or that a state's 
political culture may be fragmented. Also there may be commonalities in the political cultures of 
states with different political systems. Studies in political culture also deal with how the attitudes 
of populations are formed. A process of socialisation is described here, in which attitudes and 
beliefs are passed on to new generations of citizens. 
 
 
Political Culture: origins of the concept  
When and why did political scientists initiate the study of political culture? It should first be 
noted that, just as it is not argued that strategic culture is a new idea, so it is the case that the role 
of values, beliefs, attitudes and ways of thinking about politics was a part of writing about 
politics long before the term itself was coined and before interest in it began to snowball. Indeed, 
writers on political culture have argued that political culture and its associated concepts - sub-
cultures, elites, socialisation - are present at least implicitly in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. 
For Plato it was important, for example, that young men should be inculcated with the values 






 More recent political writings which it is argued focus attention on the role of attitudes 
and values include those of Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Rousseau and de Tocqueville. The last-
named regarded the 'moral and intellectual condition of a people' as a significant factor for study. 
The maintenance of democracy in the United States could not simply be explained by the quality 
of the institutions established there, de Tocqueville wrote, but owed much in addition to the 
habits, the notions, the opinions and character of the population.12 Though none of these political 
thinkers actually used the term 'political culture', all were concerned with matters which would 
today be regarded as aspects of political culture. It appears, in fact, that the first use of the term 
'political culture' dates back to the late eighteenth century, when it was employed by Herder, who 
also emphasised the importance of values and attitudes as political variables.13 However, it was 
not until the late 1950s and early 1960s that the study of political culture became widespread and 
fashionable on a major scale. What accounts for the growth of interest in the political culture 
approach at that time?  
 
 The initial impetus given to the study of political culture was an article published by 
Gabriel Almond in 1956, in which he identified the concept of political culture as one of a 
number derived from sociology and anthropology which could usefully be applied to the 
comparative study of political systems.14 However, it was the publication in 1963 of The Civic 
Culture, by Almond and Sidney Verba, which was the first major step towards establishing the 
political culture approach as part of 'the conceptual vocabulary' and 'the 
                                                          
11 Gabriel A. Almond, A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science (London: Sage, 1990), p. 138. 
12 Ibid, pp. 139-40. For a more detailed discussion of de Tocqueville and political culture see James Ceaser, 'Alexis 
de Tocqueville on Political Science, Political Culture and the Role of the Intellectual', American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 79, No. 3 (September 1985), pp. 656-72. 
13 See Archie Brown, 'Introduction' to Brown, p. 1; and see also F.M. Barnard, 'Culture and Political Development: 
Herder's Suggestive Insights', American Political Science Review, Vol. 63, No. 2 (June 1969), pp. 378-97. 
14 Gabriel A. Almond, 'Comparative Political Systems', The Journal of Politics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (August 1956), pp. 
391-409. 
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explanatory strategy of political science' and encouraging the production of a substantial 
literature on the subject.15 
 
 Three main reasons have been identified by Gabriel Almond for the growth of interest in 
political culture.16 The first was that this approach seemed to have the potential to explain 
problems which were at that time occupying the attention and exercising the minds of political 
scientists. Prior to World War Two, Western political scientists concerned themselves with little 
beyond North America and Europe. After the war, however, the process of decolonisation was 
increasing the number of states in the world to which attention had to be paid. It was also 
increasing the number of unstable governments in the world. Although newly independent states 
often copied the political systems of Western democracies, they did not seem to be able to make 
democracy flourish and stability prevail as happened in the West. Political scientists wanted to 
know why this was and what would make democracy take hold in the new states, and this 
required that they investigate more than just the institutions of government which seemed to 
provide democracy in one state but not in another. It appeared that the attitudes and values of the 
peoples involved, the political cultures within which institutions operated, also had to be 
examined.  
 
 Moreover, the difficulties facing newly emerging states in the 1950s and 1960s fitted into 
a wider historical context. The enlightenment had given rise to the belief among liberals, echoing 
theories of evolution, that progress was inevitable towards prosperous, democratic states with 
rational governments. Populations would be well educated and looked after by the state and 
would participate in their political systems. During the nineteenth century it seemed that the 
experience of the United States and Britain 
                                                          
15 See Almond, 'The Study of Political Culture', chapter six of his A Discipline Divided, p. 142. That chapter 
provides a summary of the development of the concept of political culture, from the man most closely associated 
with it. 
16 See Almond, A Discipline Divided, pp. 140-42; see also Almond, 'The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture 
Concept', in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, (eds), The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston and Toronto: Little, 
Brown & Company, 1980), pp. 6-16. 
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confirmed this belief, as political and social reform followed the industrial revolution. However, 
events in the first half of the twentieth century contradicted the enlightenment view. Two 
immensely destructive world wars and the rise of authoritarian fascism and communism 
undermined the complacent notion of steady progress towards participant, stable democracies. 
The question of what had gone wrong was one with which North American political scientists 
after 1945 began to grapple.  
 
 These then were the research problems to which the political culture approach offered 
answers. But why should this approach in particular be adopted? The second reason for the rise 
of political culture studies was the input to political science from other disciplines which was 
occurring at that time. Almond regards three other disciplines as contributing to the development 
of a political culture approach. First there was the sociological tradition represented by writers 
such as Max Weber, Emile Durkheim and Talcott Parsons; then the social psychological 
tradition, represented by, among others, Graham Wallas, Walter Lippman and Paul Lazarsfeld; 
and finally the psycho-cultural tradition of Freud, Theodor Adorno and others.17  
 
 Sociologists in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries emphasised the importance of 
ideas and values in explaining the working of institutions. Durkheim, for example, employed the 
phrase 'conscience collective', referring to a set of values and beliefs shared by members of a 
society. Weber is well known for linking the rise of capitalism to the Protestant work ethic, and 
Talcott Parsons, building on Weber's work, similarly believed that values, feelings and beliefs 
had to be taken into account when explaining social action.18  
 
 Social psychologists also were examining instincts, sentiments and attitudes in trying to 
explain the rise of fascism and aggression by states such as Germany and Japan  
 
                                                          
17 Almond, A Discipline Divided, p. 142. 
18 Almond, 'The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept', in Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture 
Revisited, pp. 11-12. 
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which resulted in the outbreak of World War Two. Of particular concern was how the attitudes 
and behaviour of individuals were influenced by those around them in the wider society of which 
they were a part. Finally, there were anthropologists adapting the work of Freud to the study of 
groups rather than individuals, and trying to explain the attitudes of these groups 'by childhood 
socialization patterns, unconscious motivation, and psychological mechanisms'.19 
 
 In the 1950s and 1960s, therefore, the time when the political culture approach was being 
nurtured, the study of attitudes, beliefs and values had wide currency within the social sciences, 
and contributed to the development of this new political science approach. The emphasis on 
values and attitudes was seen as a useful way to explain some of the problems confronting 
political scientists at that time.  
 
 The third reason for the rise of the political culture approach had to do with its viability. 
While those who asserted the importance of cultural variables acknowledged that others before 
them had done so, they were critical of the nature of much of the work done in this area and 
doubtful of its value, and called for a new approach to the study of political culture. It is 
important to stress at this point that the study of political culture developed as part of the 
behavioural revolution in the social sciences. As well as involving a move away from the study 
of formal institutions to informal patterns of behaviour and belief, behaviouralism also aspired to 
a much more scientific and positivistic approach to the study of social phenomena. What modern 
political scientists disliked about the treatment of political culture in older writings was that it 
was insufficiently analytical. They regarded previous work on political culture or national 
character, however insightful it may have been, as too reliant on impressions backed up by 
anecdotes. From their positivistic standpoint they desired to generate hypotheses and to test them 
against 'evidence which has been collected and analyzed according to accepted canons of 
scientific 
 
                                                          




 Developments in survey methods seemed to have made this possible. Before it had been 
impossible to identify with any certainty the attitudes of groups as large as national populations. 
With the precise sampling methods being devised after the war, representative data for large 
groups could be generated, while the reliability of the data could be enhanced through the 
employment of modern interview techniques. In addition, advances in statistical techniques 
helped with the analysis of the data. If the collection of quantifiable data on the attitudes, beliefs 
and values of national populations was possible, then the political culture approach could be 
accommodated within the behavioural political science methodology. 
 
 
Development of the political culture approach 
The first major landmark in the political culture literature, Almond and Verba's The Civic 
Culture, reflected many of the themes discussed above. Sub-titled Political Attitudes and 
Democracy in Five Nations, this book contributed to the discussion of why democracy flourished 
in some but not in other states. It did so by using extensive survey data to identify the main 
political attitudes and beliefs of the populations of five democratic states: Britain, the United 
States, Germany, Mexico and Italy.  
 
 The authors divided political attitudes into three categories. There were cognitive 
attitudes, concerned with the knowledge possessed by citizens of the political system; affective 
attitudes, covering people's feelings about the system; and finally evaluative attitudes, the 
judgements made by people about their political systems. Then three main types of political 
culture were identified. In a parochial culture, people were believed to have little knowledge of 
or expectations about their political system. In a subject culture, while people were expected to 
know a good deal about the system and make judgements 
                                                          
20 Kavanagh, Political Culture, p. 9.  
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about it, they would not participate actively in it. Lastly, in a participant political culture, citizens 
would be well-informed about and actively involved in the system. These were ideal types of 
culture; most states would probably contain a mix of two or more. The main conclusion reached 
in the book was that Britain and the United States possessed a civic culture, or 'a pattern of 
political attitudes and an underlying set of social attitudes that is supportive of a stable 
democratic process'.21 By implication at least, if these attitudes could be reproduced in other 
states, stable democracy could take root there. 
 
 Other work on political culture at this time also took as a central theme political 
development towards democratic status. Subsequently, the work of Almond, Pye, Verba and 
others came under fire. There were a number of criticisms on methodological grounds which will 
be dealt with later. Two complaints should be raised immediately, however. The first was that the 
civic culture work was based too squarely on a British-United States conception of democracy, 
and on the notion of development; there was an assumption that all other states ought to be 
aiming to reproduce the institutions and political culture of the United States and Britain. The 
association of political culture with ethnocentric views of development and democracy did 
considerable harm to its reputation.22 The second criticism encountered by the civic culture 
writers was that the attitudes which they had identified as most appropriate for stable democracy, 
began to look rather transient. Although Almond and Verba had cautioned that 'our study is but a 
snapshot in a rapidly changing world', they nevertheless seemed to assume them to be fairly 
permanent.23 Later studies of British and American political attitudes found far lower levels of 
deference, trust and participation and other values which had been identified by the likes of the 
Almond and Verba study as central pillars of the civic culture. The civic culture approach no 
longer seemed to explain what was happening in Britain and the USA, further weakening its 
appeal.24  
                                                          
21 Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, p. vii. 
22 See for instance Jerzy J. Wiatr, 'The Civic Culture from a Marxist-Sociological Perspective', in Almond and 
Verba, The Civic Culture Revisited, p. 105; and Gibbins, p. 7. 
23 Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, p. vii. 
24 The authors admitted this themselves - see Sidney Verba, 'On Revisiting the Civic Culture: A Personal Postscript', 
in Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture Revisited, pp. 399-400. See also Gibbins, p. 8. 
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 A new approach was developed to explain those changes. The work of Inglehart in 
particular tried to account for new attitudes by bringing generational change into the equation.25 
A new post-material age had arisen, Inglehart argued: a new generation had experienced nothing 
but peace and prosperity, and valued education, a healthy environment and good quality life-style 
more highly than security and wealth, the goals of older generations. This new model, according 
to Gibbins, attracted much less interest than the civic culture one, and not even much negative 
comment.26 The political culture approach by the 1980s had gone out of fashion, with no 
agreement on its value or how to study it. The difficulties which had beset it will be outlined 
presently. First, however, our attention turns to the realm of Communist studies, where political 
culture continued to be studied in spite of its wider decline. 
 
 
Political culture and communist states 
There were a number of reasons why, especially with regard to the Soviet Union, investigating 
political cultures was still seen as a fruitful activity. One reason was that many scholars of 
Communist states were dissatisfied with the work being produced, which was often based on the 
assumption that Communist systems could be understood through the examination of the 
institutions which had been established by the Communist Party and the Marxist-Leninist 
ideology which it embraced.27 The political culture approach brought into focus the neglected 
areas of popular beliefs which were seen as an important variable.  
 
 This approach also combated 'what looked like a frightened retreat from history and 
geography in English-speaking education'.28 For Stephen White, this was a key concern. He 
regretted the 'lack of an historical perspective' in the literature on Soviet  
                                                          
25 Gibbins, pp. 9-10. 
26 Ibid. 
27 White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, p. ix. 
28 John Miller, 'Political Culture - Some Perennial Questions Reopened', in Brown, p. 41. 
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government, and saw the political culture approach as a means to 'redress some of this imbalance 
by allowing a greater degree of attention to be paid to the historical and national specifity of 
Soviet politics as well as to the similarities it shares with political systems elsewhere'.29 There are 
parallels here with the concerns of the originators of the strategic culture approach, who, it was 
argued above, similarly felt that the historical and national roots of strategic policies were being 
unduly neglected. 
 
 Thus for those seeking to understand Communist states, political culture looked like a 
promising approach. For advocates of the political culture approach, studying Communist states 
was also attractive, as these states offered the best testing ground available in the 'laboratory of 
history' for examining the links between the political system and popular attitudes. As Brian 
Barry had written, the 'naturally-occurring "crucial experiment" is, of course, a change in 
régime'.30 In the case of the Soviet Union, the new revolutionary regime had fashioned a new 
system and set about consciously and vigorously trying to change the beliefs and values of its 
people, to create the new Soviet man. If old beliefs and values persisted even as a government 
with control of the media and education tried to inculcate new ones, then the importance of 
political culture would be demonstrated; but if the regime could rapidly, perhaps within a 
generation, change the basic beliefs of the population, then political culture would be shown to 
be 'a weak variable at best'.31 
 
 The work of White and others has provided support for the view that popular attitudes 
change slowly, resisting even concerted attempts by governments to alter them.32 White found 
that, while there had been changes in the political culture inherited by the Bolsheviks, 
nevertheless much remained the same.33 On the other hand, Richard Fagen's work on Cuba 
suggests that more change can be achieved by a determined regime, while a 
                                                          
29 White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, p. ix. 
30 Brian Barry, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1970), p. 52. 
31 Almond, A Discipline Divided, p. 158. 
32 Ibid, p. 168. 
33 White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, p. 166. 
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recent article on the former Soviet Union takes issue with the often argued position that the 
traditional Russian political culture is antithetical to democracy.34 Jeffrey Hahn argues that 
today's popular attitudes in Russia are in line with the new democratic system being erected.35 
Nevertheless, there does seem to be some measure of agreement among scholars of Communist 
states that political culture is an important variable, and political culture advocates believe that 
their approach has been vindicated by the work done on Communist states. 
 
 
Political culture revived 
The resurgence which the concept of political culture has enjoyed since the late 1980s is 
explained by Gabriel Almond as a consequence of the retreat of competing theories.36 The first of 
these was Marxism, which tended to dismiss political culture as capitalist ideology, but which 
has been in disarray following the collapse of the Soviet empire. The second, and more 
significant, is rational choice theory. At the same time that political culture was emerging as a 
major political science concept, influenced by ideas from sociology and other disciplines, so too 
ideas from economics were spreading into political science. These ideas included the view that 
decision-makers should be seen as rational maximisers. This theory, it was claimed, yielded 
powerful explanations without the need for wasteful analysis of cultural contexts. Strategic 
culture developed as a reaction to such notions of universal rationality; political culture, it 
appears, was pushed into the margins of political science by these notions. Now, however, 
rational choice theorists are 'seeking to escape from the reductionist microrational quandary into 
which they had dug themselves', allowing political culture to stage a comeback.37 
 
  
                                                          
34 Richard R. Fagen, The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba (Stanford, CAL: Stanford University Press, 
1969), pp. 150-60. 
35 Jeffrey W. Hahn, 'Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture', British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 
21, Part 4 (October 1991), pp. 393-421. 
36 Almond, 'The Return to Political Culture', in Diamond, pp. ix-xii. 
37 Ibid, p. xi. 
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 Other work from the late 1980s onwards on political culture suggests that the concept is 
more at home now with recent moves in social and political theory. Gibbins investigates whether 
the political cultures of modern industrial societies have undergone transformation in the post-
modern age. The finding of his edited volume is that profound cultural change is underway and 
needs to be investigated - and already had been, by many outside mainstream political science. In 
particular, old values and belief systems are fragmenting. Gibbins suggests no one way forward 
methodologically with the study of political culture, recommending only eclecticism in methods, 
in keeping perhaps with the post-modern theme of fragmentation.38 For Welch, progress in 
political culture may be possible through utilising methods drawn from other approaches, such as 
phenomenology, social constructivism and the work of anthropologist Clifford Geertz.39 Just as 
political culture was boosted initially by influences from other branches of social theory, so it 




Issues in Political Culture 
Various problems arose in the course of the development of the political culture approach which 
undermined its viability, and which account for its fall from grace in the 1970s. Many of these 
mirror the problems encountered by strategic culture scholars and identified in the previous 
chapter. It is therefore of interest to see how these problems have been tackled in the political 
culture literature. This section will pick out and discuss the most important of these problems. 
The two most important noted in the previous chapter are first, the relationship between culture 
and other types of explanations, especially explanations based on structure or rational calculation 
of interest; and second, the methods by which culture may best be studied. It is with these 
problems that this section begins. What answers have political culture scholars come up with? 
 
 
                                                          
38 Gibbins, pp. 12-24. 
39 Welch, pp. 104-17. 
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Culture and explanation 
The split between positivistic and interpretivist approaches to the study of strategic culture also 
finds expression in the political culture literature. Indeed, this fissure in the political culture 
literature between humanist and scientific approaches offers a view of political science in 
microcosm.40 As Lucian Pye has written,  
 
Some of our subfields - some of us - are convinced that true knowledge can be found only 
in the rigorous search for invariances, for the regularities we expect to find in nature. In 
this spirit we like to think of man and society having the lawlike qualities we associate 
with the physical universe. For other subfields - and others of us - knowledge is the 
search for meaning, for understanding and interpretation, that is, for what is human in the 
blending of mind and spirit.41 
 
Some of those studying political culture have taken a positivistic, scientific and quantitative line, 
searching for causal explanation, while others, citing the anthropologist Clifford Geertz's view 
that 'man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun', have set out to 
understand these webs, which are composed of attitudes, beliefs and values which give meaning 
to political acts.42 
 
 Whether scholars position themselves on one or other side of this divide will determine 
their view of what work political culture does. Initially the search was for explanation. In The 
Civic Culture, the dependent variable was taken to be a stable political system, and political 
culture was seen as the independent variable responsible for the stability of the system. Political 
culture caused certain outcomes, it was supposed. However, critics pointed out that although a 
correlation was shown between the existence of certain values and attitudes on the one hand, and 
stability on the other, causation was 
                                                          
40 See Welch, p. 2. Welch also argues that this is something of a false distinction, as all quantitative data has a 
qualitative dimension. 
41 Lucian W. Pye, 'Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism', American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, 
No. 1 (March 1990), p. 4. 
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not proven in the study.43 Nor, even supposing a causal relationship did obtain between the two, 
was it clear in which direction it ran. Did these attitudes and values produce stability, or did 
stability produce these attitudes and values? This point will be taken up again below.  
 
 Whatever its weaknesses, Almond and Verba's conception of political culture held that it 
did a lot of explanatory work. At the other end of the determinist spectrum, there are those who 
see culture as doing very little explanatory work. For one analyst, it may be most useful as a 
teaching aid. In teaching, the argument runs, it is important to come up with coherent accounts of 
politics, which may involve discussion of areas where little research is done or 'where rigorous 
research conclusions may seem impracticable or in principle impossible'.44 In this spirit, perhaps, 
text books on political systems will often include an introductory chapter on the political culture 
of the state in question, or something similar, but then proceed to explain events without much 
reference back to the political culture section.45 As Robert Tucker puts it,  
 
Might not the central importance of a concept like that of political culture be that it assists 
us to take our bearings in the study of the political life of a society, to focus on what is 
happening or not happening, to describe and analyse and order many significant data, and 
to raise fruitful questions for thought and research - without explaining anything?46 
 
Political culture could then be no more than an important background factor which enriches 
understanding rather than enhancing explanation. It can describe the assumptions of decision-
makers without relating them to behaviour.47 
 
 Somewhere in between these extremes, political culture can be seen as a non- 
 
 
                                                          
43 For example, see Barry, pp. 48-50. 
44 Miller, p. 42. 
45 See Welch, pp. 72-73. 
46 Robert C. Tucker, 'Culture, Political Culture, and Communist Society', Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 2 
(June 1973), p. 179. 
47 See Elkins and Simeon, p. 129. 
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independent variable, an intervening factor of some explanatory power when linked to other 
variables.48 The situation in which people find themselves, and calculations of interest, may 
determine behaviour more than the values they hold. It is not always possible to act in accordance 
with values. The importance of interests and structure is acknowledged, the question being where 
the culture fits in between them. Why then single out cultural factors? Partly because of the 
feeling that they have been neglected, partly for heuristic reasons, as focusing on one factor may 
enhance understanding of its importance.49 Also it is believed that cultural factors are highly 
significant. Sensitivity to them adds 'depth and richness to our appreciation of political events'.50 
To adopt this approach will yield certain insights, it is hoped, which will complement those 
offered by other approaches.  
 
 If the political culture does not directly determine behaviour, what role does it play? 
Many writers argue that it operates by creating predispositions to action, or that it sets boundaries 
and defines the context in which people operate politically. It will influence how people express 
themselves. It will also influence what sorts of behaviour will be seen as acceptable, and, 
operating more instrumentally, it may provide justifications for action.51 What the culture does 
not do is to determine how people will act. It may predispose people towards certain types of 
action, but it does not require a particular course of action. Other factors will determine which 
course is taken. Prediction is therefore unlikely to be possible on the basis of understanding the 
culture. 
 
 The political culture ought to have some part to play in all behaviour, though it will vary 
from case to case. This ought to be stressed because political culture has tended to become a 
residual variable, used for explaining behaviour which cannot be accounted for in any other 
way.52 The role of political culture should be investigated in all decisions 
                                                          
48 See for instance Kavanagh, Political Culture, p. 13. 
49 Ibid, p. 12. 
50 Walter Rosenbaum, Political Culture (London: Nelson, 1975), p. 5. 
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and behaviour, not just in behaviour which cannot satisfactorily be accounted for by other means. 
Moreover, if for example the bureaucratic politics model is being used, it should be borne in 
mind that bureaucracies are more than just sets of rules and procedures. They too operate within 
cultural contexts, so that the political culture may be an important factor in influencing how 
organisations work.  
 
 
Structure and culture 
In strategic culture writing, a major issue is whether the structure of the international system 
shapes state attitudes or whether national cultures do. A similar issue arises in political culture, 
where the question of whether political structures determine beliefs is crucial. If they do, then the 
value of political culture is much diminished, and the structures themselves become the more 
important area of study. What started people thinking in terms of political cultures was that it 
seemed that a democratic political structure could not be erected unless certain values were 
already in place in the population. But Almond and Verba are often accused of ignoring the 
extent to which structures can determine values.53 They are accused of assuming that the attitudes 
of a population lead the system to operate in a particular manner, and paying insufficient 
attention to the possibility that the system leads to the creation of these attitudes. Did stable 
democracy in Britain and the USA result from the existence of the civic culture, or did the civic 
culture come into being because of the creation of a stable democratic system? 
 
 Almond and Verba's original civic culture study had surprisingly little to say about this, 
simply observing that certain values existed which were consistent with stable democracy. The 
implication of the work however was that unless these values were present stable democracy 
could not prosper. In later work, Almond argued that the political culture approach did not 
assume that causality ran only in one direction, from 
                                                          
53 See for example Wiatr, p. 105; and Carole Pateman, 'The Civic Culture: A Philosophical Critique', in Almond and 
Verba, The Civic Culture Revisited, p. 80. 
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attitudes to systems. He accepted that causality worked both ways, that political and social 
structures have some part in creating values, but that structures were not the sole determinants of 
these values: 'the causal arrows between culture and structure and performance go both ways'.54 
Structuralists, however, for example Marxists, would argue that the political culture is 
determined by structures - in this case, class structures - and has no autonomous existence or 
influence. It is reduced to the status of an epiphenomenon, with no explanatory power of its own, 
becoming just one link in the chain of causation running from structure to behaviour. However, 
even if culture is seen only as 'the last link in the chain of causation before behaviour itself', it 
still has some value as an explanation. If I'm late because I missed my train, that is still an 
explanation even if there are other explanations of why I missed the train.55 
 
 The relationship between structures and cultures is a complex one. One of the initial 
claims of the political culturalists was that political culture could bridge the micro-macro gap 
which dogs political science. Micro-politics, the attitudes of individuals, proceeded on one plane, 
while macro-politics, the study of the structure of the whole political system, proceeded on 
another. It was hoped that political culture might be the link which would somehow facilitate the 
study of the relationship between the two levels. It was not clear how this could be achieved and 
indeed it would seem to have been abandoned.56 Certainly many questions remain unanswered on 
the link between these two levels.  
 
 One question is whether, even accepting that structures can determine attitudes, they take 
some time to do so. Thus there may be a time lag between the adoption of new structures and the 
development of appropriate attitudes; or it may be that attitudes appropriate to old structures 
inhibit or even prevent the establishment of new ones. In the 
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55 See Barry, pp. 96-97. 
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cases of newly emerging states, the problem could be not that the new structures could not 
produce new values and attitudes, but that the values and attitudes produced by the old structures 
took on a life of their own and proved resistant to change. Even if attitudes and values resulted 
from structures originally, then, they may become independent causal factors in their own right. 
Then again, structures may enforce certain behaviour on people, though they believe it is wrong 
or against their interests. 
 
 Another question, begged by Almond and Verba, is how the civic culture attitudes came 
into being in the first place. There is a chicken and egg question here. If structures have created 
attitudes, how were these structures themselves created? Was human agency the force which 
initially erected the structures, and so did attitudes in part determine them? Is there any way to 
tell? And if cultures do enjoy autonomous status once created, and then influence structures, is 
there any way to separate the two, to establish in which direction causation flows? Is all that can 
be said that political cultures are both influenced by and influence structures, that causation runs 
both ways? For Kavanagh, 'the actual relationship between structures and values is likely to be 
one of mutual reinforcement over time, and the fact that they interact in this way makes it well 
nigh impossible to separate the values from the performance of the political structure'.57 
 
 
Interests and political culture 
The impetus for the growth of strategic culture studies lay in a reaction against the assumption of 
a 'rational strategic man' in strategic studies. Likewise in political culture rational choice theory 
offers a competing view of human motivation. If, as rational choice theory suggests, the political 
values and attitudes held by people are determined solely or mostly by rational calculations of 
interest, then the political culture approach has little or no contribution to make. Political 
behaviour can be explained and predicted without reference to national specificity. Scholars of 
political culture obviously challenge this view.  
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Almond argues that political behaviour is not 'reducible to rational choice individualism', that 
rational choice theory simplifies to too great a degree what goes on in the minds of citizens.58 Of 
course calculations of material interest will be made, but patriotism, instincts, habits, pride, 
group loyalty and other factors would be omitted from rational choice theories, although they are 
important motivating factors.59 Because they do not examine what are often implicit beliefs, 
because emotions can be so strong, people will often behave in ways which are out of line with 
the courses of action suggested by short-term material interest calculations.  
 
 Rationality and culture need not be set in opposition to each other, however. There is 
room in rational choice theory to accommodate culture, and vice versa. Some rational choice 
theorists use the assumption of rationality as a heuristic device to generate hypotheses, then allow 
complications such as culture into the equation. Others use rational choice theory in conjunction 
with other models.60 The complaint of political culture scholars is against the neglect of culture, 
just as strategic culture advocates reacted to the assumption of a universal strategic rationality 
and the neglect of culture in strategic studies. Political culture analysts stress that there is no 
universal rationality, and that rationality is itself a cultural concept.61 What appears rational to 
one culture will not to another; how people define their interests will vary from culture to culture. 
So the political culture objection to rational choice theory is not necessarily to the notion that 
people try rationally to calculate their interests, but to the idea that people everywhere will make 




The second main question facing strategic culture is how it should be studied. Above, it 
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was observed that the split between positivists and interpretivists affects how political culture's 
role in explanation is conceived. This split also affects how political culture is studied. Indeed, 
methodological issues have also dogged the study of political culture. The initial impetus given 
to the study of political culture came from the belief that it could be pursued 'according to 
accepted canons of scientific research'.62 A positivistic approach was desired, in other words, and 
new survey methods seemed to permit this to be achieved. Surveys would, in a systematic and 
reliable fashion, produce a great deal of quantifiable, hard data on popular values. However, 
problems have emerged in the use of survey data which complicate this picture. One problem is 
that many relevant beliefs may exist at a less than conscious level in the minds of citizens. What 
are known as 'primitive beliefs', unstated beliefs which are taken for granted and assumed to be 
held by everyone else, may not be easy to get at in surveys.63 Certainly the questionnaires would 
have to be cleverly constructed to elicit them, and interviewers skilled and perceptive. 
 
 Another difficulty is whether the culture can simply be considered as the aggregate of 
political attitudes, or whether it is more than, or just different from, the sum of its parts. Lurking 
here is the individualistic fallacy, where the characteristics of a group are inferred wrongly from 
the aggregated features of the individuals who make up the group.64 Culture is a property 
belonging to a group, whereas attitudes and beliefs belong only to individuals. The attributes of 
individual members of the group need not be shared by the group as a whole, and nor need the 
attributes of the group be found in the individuals - to assume this may be to commit the 
ecological fallacy, the reverse of the individualistic fallacy, that individuals will share the 
characteristics of the culture to which they belong.65 The culture should therefore be seen as 
possessing the property of supramembership: that is, it must be more than just the sum of 
individual attitudes. Thus the work of Almond and Verba is criticised for not being about 
political culture at all, as it 'identifies political 
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culture with the aggregate characteristics of individuals'.66 This line of argument suggests that the 
political culture has a life of its own, is almost an autonomous actor, a controversial point.67 
 
 If it is accepted that the political culture is more than just the sum of individual attitudes, 
then the value of survey methods is questioned. It could be argued, nevertheless, that surveys still 
provide many clues about the nature of the culture. But survey methods cannot in any case 
always be utilised. In Communist states, for example, or where historical periods are under 
examination, other sources need to be found. When dealing with historical studies, Communist 
states and elites, content analysis of speeches and documents may be the best course. Problems 
can arise, however, where data derived from content analysis for a historical period are compared 
with data from surveys for the contemporary period. This may not be comparing like with like.68 
Where possible comparable sources should be used. 
 
 One methodological point on which there is widespread agreement is that a comparative 
approach is required. If the argument is that different states will have distinctive political cultures 
which will cause their political systems to operate in different manners, then this can only really 
be shown in a comparative framework. It would be possible to describe the political culture of a 
single nation by looking at it alone, but not to say which parts of it were unique to that state and 
therefore particularly significant. Single country studies are often therefore stepping stones on the 
way to wider comparative projects.69 Moreover, where issues of causation are being investigated, 
comparing two or more states brings you closer to a controlled experiment. If two states have 
similar constitutions and political institutions, for example, yet their political actors behave in  
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markedly different ways, this would suggest that cultural differences could be playing an 
important part in influencing behaviour.  
 
 The difficulty which can occur here is that of equivalence, however. It is necessary to 
compare like with like, but in the messy 'real world' there will not be two states where most 
conditions are identical, allowing them to be controlled out. Welch also argues that the more 
detailed your study of any particular nation-state, the more awkward comparison becomes with 
any other.70 In addition, conducting cross-national surveys also raises problems of equivalence. 
The questions asked need to be faithfully translated, while interview situations must be similar. 
Surveys should be conducted in the different states at the same time, but it could be that events in 
one state of only short-term significance will influence the answers there at the time of the 
survey. A further problem is that people might have different attitudes to interviews and surveys 
in different states.71 Content analysis could also face equivalence issues. As well as the obvious 
language difficulty, there may exist different styles of writing official documents or making 
speeches. Similar problems can also be expected where comparison is being made within one 
state but across different time periods. This is an important approach to show whether attitudes 
endure or change rapidly, but the meaning of language can change over time, as could the style of 
recording official meetings.72 These may not be insurmountable obstacles, and they are shared 
with other comparative politics approaches. However, they inject a degree of awkwardness into 
the analysis and must be taken on board.  
 
 Another source often used to identify political attitudes is actual political behaviour. In 
the Communist states, where open sources are hard to come by, behaviour is often drawn upon. 
Many analysts have however pointed to a serious potential problem with this approach. The 
danger is to engage in circular reasoning, to infer from behaviour certain values and then to use 
those values to explain the same behaviour. To argue that 
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the stability of the British political system results from a popular consensus on certain key values, 
and then to produce as evidence of this consensus the stability of the system, is to argue 
tautologically.73 If behaviour is the only source being used, moreover, to explain other behaviour, 
why bring political culture into the explanation at all? Why not simply point to regularities in 
behaviour and use these to predict further regularities, without bothering to infer beliefs 
supposedly motivating them?74 One way round these difficulties is first to use sources other than 
behaviour, where possible, and then to be careful to infer beliefs from various different types of 
behaviour and not use the inferred beliefs to explain similar types.75  
 
 A final methodological issue concerns the danger of selectivity. The temptation is to seek 
out previous behaviour, speeches, or whatever, which suggest the existence of beliefs which still 
persist in the contemporary period, and to ignore behaviour or speeches indicative of contrary 
beliefs. This is a criticism made by Mary McAuley of Stephen White's work.76 This is not a 
problem unique to political culture research, of course, but may be no less serious for that. Some 
discipline is needed to ensure that all political attitudes, and not just those which seem to explain 
current behaviour best, are described. 
 
 In conclusion, although commentators often note that many propositions about different 
states possessing distinctive political cultures are intuitively plausible, there are many problems 
to be encountered in proving the existence and establishing the importance of political cultures.77 
For many political scientists, these difficulties have helped to discredit political culture. Pye's 
description of the division that runs through political scientists between behaviouralists and those 
favouring interpretive approaches is relevant here. Political culture, allied to survey techniques, 
initially appealed to behaviouralists  
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because it appeared to be susceptible to quantification and measurement. These hopes have 
receded, though many recent articles on political culture begin by looking for a new, improved 
theoretical formulation which will overcome the methodological problems it has met and bring it 
within the fold of behavioural political science. 
 
 But if behaviouralists have despaired of political culture, interpretivists may still find it a 
useful approach. Indeed, it is possible that your response to the proposition that 'what is 
important to study cannot be measured and what can be measured is not important to study' will 
determine how you regard political culture.78 For interpretivists, it is possible to abandon the 
search for a rigorous, testable theory of political culture and accept that in the grey areas of 
human motives and activity scientific precision is unattainable. Political culture can then be used 
for 'heuristic argument rather than systematic and causal reasoning'.79 This is not to say that proof 
should not be sought as far as possible, but that political culture need not be disregarded where 
insufficient evidence is available. 
 
 
Referent groups: cultures, sub-cultures, nations and states 
One of the questions facing strategic culture is: whose culture should be studied? Throughout the 
foregoing analysis of the political culture literature it has been assumed for the most part that 
nation-states have distinctive cultures. A number of points should now be made about the 
relationship between states, nations and cultures. The first is that the state may not be the best 
unit of analysis for cultural factors. States may be composed of various nations with distinct 
cultures, for example. Is there enough common ground among them to warrant discussion of the 
culture of the state, or does it need to be broken down into national cultures? Another point is 
that there may be various sub-cultures within a state, based not on nationality but on socio-
economic status or religion. Questions have to be asked about whether there is a unified political 
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culture within a state, or a dominant one but various sub-cultures, or a fragmented one with none 
able to dominate.80 
 
 Sub-cultures may also result from the roles held by people.81 Soldiers, bureaucrats and 
politicians, for example, may develop different outlooks on life. Of particular importance is the 
distinction between elites and the mass of the population, between those with the power and 
responsibility of decision-making and those without it. Attention needs to be focused on the 
differences and similarities between the two, on whether separate socialisation processes exist, as 
well as on how unified each is. It may be that different methods are appropriate to the study of 
each, with surveys for the mass and content analysis for the elites. This throws up another set of 
issues, about how to identify elites, which could require study of the literature on elites. 
 
 As well as looking at culture at levels below the nation-state, there is also the question of 
whether the appropriate unit for analysis transcends the nation-state.82 A final issue in this section 
is therefore that there will be pressure from the modernising world culture on national cultures, 
especially in the age of the small world brought about by technological advances. What effects 
will cultural imperialism have on smaller countries? Is there for instance a Western devised 
diplomatic culture which influences diplomats in all countries more than their own domestic 
political culture? It seems likely that there will be tension between domestic and emerging world 




Another issue in the strategic culture literature concerned the meanings of the various terms 
employed. Definitions have also been problematical for political culture. As was noted in the 
introduction, defining culture with any precision, in any context, is 
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troublesome. In broad terms it can be said that political culture concerns the attitudes, values, 
beliefs and feelings of its people towards their political system. These attitudes, values and so on 
may well be unique to a particular group due to its distinctive historical experience. They form 
the environment, context, or matrix within which political activity occurs. The political culture 
gives meaning to political activity and exerts some influence over political behaviour. This 
shows the broad area which political culture covers. 
 
 This sort of broad description of political culture is suitable as a 'label for an area of 
scholarly emphasis or focus'.83 But does it indicate a discrete and identifiable entity? A major 
problem faced by scholars of political culture is that, in the multitude of definitions which exist, 
political culture has come to include 'virtually everything'.84 Debate surrounds what to include 
and what to exclude from political culture. One question is to go beyond the vague formulation 
'attitudes regarding the political system' or to politics to specify which attitudes about which 
aspects of the political system are worthy of investigation: incumbents, policies, institutions, 
decisions, and so on. Which attitudes shape behaviour? Which are most relevant to 
understanding the operation of the political system?85 Thus can the concept can be narrowed 
down. 
 
 In his work on operational codes, discussed below, Alexander George proposes ten 
questions, the answers to which should constitute the most important political beliefs. The 
questions are intended to elicit responses on two types of beliefs: instrumental and philosophical 
beliefs. Philosophical beliefs concern the nature of political life, the place of conflict, the nature 
of opponents, the predictability of the future, the control one has over events, and the role of 
chance in politics. Instrumental beliefs concern how goals should be selected and pursued 
effectively, how risks can be assessed and minimised, how action can best be timed, and which 
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means of achieving goals would be most effective.86 George's ten questions were later refined by 
Sjöblom. He called for more specific questions on the actor's views of conflict - was it believed 
to be permanent, could it be ameliorated or eradicated? What are believed to be the sources of 
conflict? What are the costs of conflict believed to be? Is it worth these costs? How are 
economic, political, military, technological strength ranked in importance? How are the 
capabilities of other actors perceived? In addition to asking how opponents are perceived, 
Sjöblom asks how the self is perceived.87 
 
 Further narrowing and categorising is possible by distinguishing between attitudes, which 
tend to refer to transient views on specific situations, beliefs, which may be more deeply rooted 
empirical views, and values, which indicate normative and fundamental propositions on specific 
issues.88 Political culture analysts are more interested in beliefs, though attitudes on current 
policy may be useful indicators of more profound beliefs. This distinction can also be expressed 
by differentiating fundamental or basic beliefs from secondary beliefs of less importance, as is 
done in some writing on belief systems.89 Also distinctions can be made, as noted above, between 
cognitive, affective and evaluative beliefs: respectively knowledge of, emotional disposition 
towards, and judgements about, politics.90 Finally, as shown below, primitive or unstated beliefs 
are identified. These are beliefs held at a less than conscious level. 
 
 Some writers have also included notions of political styles or operational codes under 
political culture. These refer to ways of thinking and acting in the political arena.91 Others pay 
less or no attention to styles. The early work on operational codes upon which 
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other scholars have built was carried out by Nathan Leites.92 His studies in the early 1950s of the 
operational code of the leaders of the Soviet Union was subsequently taken up and given an 
explicit framework by Alexander George, and a number of case studies have since been based on 
his framework. George was uneasy with the term 'operational code', which suggested 'a set of 
recipes or repertoires for political action that an elite applies mechanically in its decision-
making'. This was not what he had in mind. Rather, his interest was in the beliefs of elites 
regarding 'fundamental issues of history' and 'central questions of politics'. These beliefs would 
operate as 'a prism that influences the actor's perceptions and diagnoses of the flow of political 
events, his definitions and estimates of particular situations'. They would influence, though not 
determine, the behaviour of the elite, by setting guidelines and standards and producing 
behavioural norms.93 
 
 Further areas of debate concern the importance of language and symbols and the 
relationship between the political culture and the broader culture of a state. Language is not often 
mentioned, yet in looking at how people construct their images of reality, it can be argued that 
language is an essential consideration.94 Indeed, given the problems encountered by political 
culture analysts in using words such as democracy and development, which were later argued to 
be highly value-laden, more attention ought to have been paid to language. As the means which 
people have of expressing themselves and comprehending their worlds, language may shed much 
light on political attitudes. Symbols have received more attention in the literature, with one writer 
even promoting them as the essence of a political culture.95 Flags, monuments, events, even 
people, may all enjoy symbolic importance, conveying high levels of meaning to one population 
but not another.96 So both language and symbols, it can be argued, are of prime importance. But 
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should they be seen as part of the political culture, or independent factors in their own right? Or 
are they better viewed as means to achieve an understanding of the political culture? 
 
 One other important area of debate has been whether to include behaviour in political 
culture. Stephen White's definition of political culture is 'the attitudinal and behavioural matrix 
within which the political system is located', yet others deliberately exclude behaviour from their 
definitions, restricting it to attitudes and values.97 What is clear is that an important question in 
political culture is: how do attitudes influence behaviour? Those who would separate the two 
argue that to do so maintains an important analytical distinction. Certainly this distinction must 
be borne in mind, and serious problems exist, which will be discussed shortly, in inferring 
attitudes from behaviour and vice versa. On the other hand, some have argued that patterns of 
behaviour, or customs and habits, as opposed to discrete acts, ought to be included in political 
culture.98 Perhaps it does not matter greatly whether behaviour is included in any definition of 
political culture, as Almond himself believes, so long as the distinction between behaviour and 
attitudes is kept clear and the relationship between them is investigated.99 
 
 Another question over the boundaries of political culture asks how it is related to the 
broader culture of a state. It is generally believed that the political culture is a small part, or sub-
set, of the broader culture.100 Many general attitudes on life will be relevant to political attitudes. 
If there exists a tendency towards fatalism in the population at large, for instance, then this is 
likely to affect the expectations held by the population about the performance of the political 
system.101 On the other hand, it is possible that political attitudes may stand in contradiction to 
more general views. The line between political and these other attitudes may therefore not be 
easy to draw.  
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 Overall, therefore, deciding what actually constitutes a political culture is problematic. Is 
it to be seen as a catch-all term doing no more than indicating a general area of study? If so, 
should various sub-terms be used to preserve its analytical precision?102 Or should a narrower 
definition be sought, with matters such as language, which might warrant study in their own 
right, being excluded? Breaking down the global concept of culture could make it 'a more 
parsimonious tool for explanation', Kavanagh believes.103 The difficulty of finding agreement on 
the content of political culture contributed to its decline as a field of study. 
 
 
Origins of political cultures 
A key issue in strategic culture is what are the sources of strategic beliefs? This issue too has 
been raised in the political culture literature. A criticism of the original Civic Culture study was 
that it failed to investigate the historical roots of the civic culture.104 Other commentators do 
however stress the need for a historical dimension in political culture studies, because 'eventually 
we have to go back and explain how the political culture came to be formed and expressed the 
way that it is'.105 In this context Inglehart writes, with regard to Weber's linking of the Protestant 
work ethic and capitalism, that there is no immutable relationship between Protestantism and 
economic achievement. Rather Weber was observing a specific historical experience which gave 
rise to the relationship.106 But which experiences should be investigated, and in what time frame - 
recent experiences, or those more distant in time? McAuley recommends looking at present 
beliefs and asking which can be understood only with reference to past experience.107 Those 
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than current structures shape beliefs.  
 
 It is also important to examine what people know about and how they interpret the 
histories of their nations. Beliefs about the past may be politically important ones. Which 
historical events are seen as politically significant? Which shape orientations? Perhaps those 
affecting 'the great masses of people directly, profoundly, and tangibly', such as depressions, or 
rampant inflation, or war, will have most impact.108 What part does the Tsarist period play in 
Russian political culture? Even in people who did not live through this period, how is it 
regarded? Which are the most important events living on in people's minds, and how do these 
affect their contemporary thinking and attitudes? Or, how do contemporary thinking and attitudes 
affect how the past is read? Can governments manipulate the historical record to support 
particular policies? It is possible that events may become myths also, so that objective history can 
be less important than how it is perceived? There are therefore many crucial questions involving 
the role of a state's history in the formation of its political culture. 
 
 Concern with the ways in which elites view and use the past is the subject of other 
commentators such as Ernest May and Richard Neustadt, and also Yuen Foong Khong. Though 
not working centrally within political culture, they have examined related concerns. They ask 
how decision-makers are influenced by their knowledge - or lack of knowledge - of past events, 
and in particular how, in reasoning by analogy with past events, they may arrive at decisions 
inappropriate to the circumstances they face.109 Neustadt and May often found that history was 
trawled for analogies, sometimes to make the present more familiar, sometimes to find support 
for a particular policy, sometimes as a substitute for new, difficult thinking. These analogies were 
not always accurate nor closely examined, though in the case of Cuba efforts were made to 
scrutinise them. The 
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uncritical use of analogies often contributed, however, to poor decision-making. What is 
interesting is which historical events serve as analogies. For example, President Harry Truman, 
during the early stages of the Korean War, was influenced by the events of the 1930s, though he 
gave little consideration to why these events in particular sprang to mind nor whether they were 
appropriate.110 The selection of particular analogies for use in political debate could be an 
important aspect of a political culture. 
 
 
Change and continuity 
A recurrent theme in the political culture literature, as in that of strategic culture, focuses on 
change and continuity. As has been noted, the importance of political culture depends to some 
degree on its persistence. If attitudes and values change rapidly in response to current events, 
their explanatory power is diminished. Culture can then be seen as a conservative force, 
maintaining the status quo. The potential for change is often neglected.111 It is a criticism of the 
early work of Almond and Verba that it underestimated the extent to which the values identified 
with stable democracy were transient. They noted that their study was but 'a snapshot in a rapidly 
changing world', but Verba later admitted that events seemed to have more impact on basic 
values than they had earlier believed.112 Inglehart later tried to account for change, using his 
generational approach to suggest a plasticity in political culture. On the other hand, the work on 
political cultures and change in Communist states suggests that values tend to persist even when 
concerted attempts are made to alter them. There is contradictory evidence therefore on the 
endurance of values, and the question of change remains an open and important one. It is crucial 
to see the dynamic potential of political culture.  
 
 Among the questions to be asked about change and political culture are the 
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following: first, how are values passed on to new generations? Political culture writing stresses 
the importance of socialisation here, the process by which people are inducted into the culture. 
Some accounts focus on what is learned by children in their contact with schools and family; 
others lay more emphasis on the contact and experience people have with the system itself in 
adult life. For those in governmental elites, there may be a further socialisation process. Learning 
may be both explicit and implicit, and some regimes may make strenuous efforts to inculcate 
certain values in young people. Indeed, socialisation into the political culture may be desirable 
for elites and governments to maintain the legitimacy of the system and their position within it.113  
 
 Various issues need to be tackled with regard to socialisation. How important relatively 
are the childhood and adult phases? In some psycho-cultural work the tendency is to stress 
childhood experience, even in such matters as toilet-training. For most political scientists the 
stress is however more on the values passed on by schools and families. It is important to identify 
the key socialising institutions, and to see which values they convey. It is also important to 
examine how adult experience with the system affects values, and how successful efforts 
deliberately to inculcate values are. Generational change also has to be considered. The ways in 
which new generations may reject aspects of the culture of older generations  poses problems for 
the socialisation process. Finally a pitfall which needs to be avoided is to look at the political 
system and make inferences from it about the nature of socialisation, and then use socialisation to 
explain the system.  
 
 It is important actually to demonstrate that values are transmitted from generation to 
generation, not just to assert this. As Barrington Moore has written, inertia should not just be 
assumed, because culture and social continuity  
 
both have to be recreated anew in each generation, often with great pain and suffering. To 
maintain and transmit a value system, human beings are punched, 
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bullied, sent to jail, thrown into concentration camps, cajoled, bribed, made into heroes, 
encouraged to read newspapers, stood up against a wall and shot, and sometimes even 
taught sociology.114  
 
Even if the socialisation process is rarely so harsh, it still has to be shown. This is not easy, and 
indeed one analyst questions whether it is possible to establish empirically all the linkages across 
time.115 On the other hand, account needs to be taken of the danger of identifying certain values in 
a state at different time periods and assuming that they have been passed on and have been in 
continuous existence.116 Yet it may be that different generations have simply made the same 
calculations based on their interests, and come to the same conclusions; or been forced by the 
political structure into holding certain attitudes. 
 
 If socialisation processes maintain beliefs, what does the political culture literature have 
to say about forces for change? As noted, change is likely to occur gradually as generations 
change and new events occur. Exposure to other cultures, through increased speed of travel and 
effectiveness of communication, is one possible force for slow change. More dramatic change 
may be brought about through certain traumatic experiences. War, and in particular 
comprehensive defeat in war, may lead to rethinking of old beliefs. So too might enemy 
occupation, or political revolution.117 Overall, account must be taken of change. Gradual change 




Conclusion: political culture and strategic culture 
Quite apart from the methodological and conceptual guidance which strategic culture analysts 
can draw from the intellectually linked concept of political culture, the latter's rise, 
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fall and recent resurgence offer a cautionary tale. New ideas and methods entering political 
science in the 1950s and 1960s encouraged the development of a concept which offered means of 
resolving some pressing research problems of the moment. Political culture gripped the 
imaginations of many political scientists and came to be seen as an immensely powerful research 
tool, capable moreover of linking micro and macro analysis in a way that had not been done 
before. As difficulties started to emerge in the application of the concept, and then to multiply, 
mighty disillusion set in. The moral is that it would be dangerous to claim too much for strategic 
culture, so that expectations will not be disappointed. The Introduction to the thesis cited Sidney 
Verba's warning about 'an unfortunate tendency in the social sciences to oversell new concepts 
and to assume that the mere labeling of an old phenomenon with a new term represents a 
breakthrough in our understanding'.118 A balanced appreciation which makes clear at the outset 
the strengths and weaknesses of the concept should avoid the swings of fortune endured by 
political culture. 
 
 One encouraging aspect which emerges from this study of political culture, however, is 
that the concept refuses to go away. In spite of the critiques it has faced and the popularity of 
other approaches which have pushed it to the margins, it continues to command the interest of 
academics, journalists and politicians. This indicates that it provides a means of referring to 
forces thought important, even though no agreed means of studying the concept can be found. 
Whether it has therefore 'reached the stage of conceptual maturity, where debates over definition 
are no longer prominent, and it is routinely invoked as if there were no question as to its meaning 
or usefulness', is a moot point. It could equally be 'the ultimate indignity, demonstrating only the 
concept's extreme vagueness and malleability'.119 As Elkins and Simeon observe, 'political culture 
is one of the most popular and seductive concepts in political science; it is also one of the most 
controversial and confused'.120 Political culture has always been with us, since the 
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beginning of thinking about politics, if we accept that the concept was implicit in the work of 
Plato and Aristotle on the importance of values and socialisation. The Greeks did not have a 
word for it: the term itself did not emerge until centuries later. However, if the term 'political 
culture' had not been coined by Herder, someone else would have needed to coin it.  
 
 Journalists and politicians can, of course, employ such terms about without concerning 
themselves with the methodological and epistemological questions they raise. For academic 
analysts, these questions cannot be ignored. More specifically, then, what does this examination 
of the political culture literature suggest for the study of strategic culture? On the pessimistic side 
it must be acknowledged that serious problems have been encountered in studying political 
culture, problems which have led to its decline in importance as an explanatory approach among 
political scientists. Some of these problems are not relevant to the study of strategic culture. For 
instance, the linkage of political culture to understandings of development and democracy 
particular to the West, which discredited political culture, need not apply to strategic culture. 
Indeed, the point of studying culture is surely to increase sensitivity to other ways of seeing the 
world and other ways of doing things than our own. That political culture fell prey to insensitivity 
to other possibilities is indeed a major flaw that should be avoided in the study of strategic 
culture. Given the involvement of Western states in brutal wars, it would be insupportably 
arrogant for those in the West to seek to impose their own strategic cultures on others. 
 
 On the other hand, some of the methodological issues uncovered in the political culture 
literature pose problems also in the study of strategic culture. It is interesting that, mutatis 
mutandis, the problems which have arisen in strategic culture have also dogged political culture. 
The danger of circular reasoning certainly needs to be guarded against, as do the problems of 
equivalence in comparative studies, and selectivity in historical analysis. However, these 
problems are not insurmountable, while other methodological issues which beset political culture 
research need not apply to strategic culture. The study 
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of strategic culture could involve asking about the orientations of the population as a whole 
towards the use of force, but would probably concentrate upon the decision-making elite. Thus 
the various problems of survey research need not come into play, as content analysis might be the 
preferred approach (though of course it would entail problems of its own). On the whole, the 
difficulties with which political culture research has been fraught are not so severe as 
immediately to spell defeat for the strategic culture approach.  
 
 A key problem in political culture research has been to find a way to study political 
culture according to established social science methods. It is instructive to consider this point 
especially, since Alastair Johnston, in the most sophisticated treatment of strategic culture, also 
attempts to develop a positivistic methodology.121 Yet political culture scholars have encountered 
formidable methodological difficulties in demonstrating the explanatory role of political culture. 
However, the quantitative, positivistic behavioural approach which led to the widespread study 
of political culture was only a short phase in thinking about politics. More recent political culture 
work has been less positivistic in outlook. The lesson might be that strategic culture should be 
seen as a potentially valuable approach, but that more relaxed standards of proof should be 
accepted, and a less rigorous and scientific methodology adopted. Where possible empirical 
evidence should be sought, and impressionistic national character analyses avoided. However, 
the absence of hard supporting data need not necessitate abandoning strategic culture. In short, a 
more interpretive approach may be the most fruitful - a return in some respects to the way 
political culture was studied before the behavioural revolution. For sure, interpretivism entails 
risks, with the possibility that it tells more about the interpreter than the object of interpretation. 
But if political culture is regarded as important, and cannot be studied under strict positivistic 
standards, should we discard political culture or positivism? For some, it may be where hard 
evidence cannot be found, social scientists should not tread. For others, it may be possible 
through an interpretive approach to crystallise 'the essence 
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of a culture of a society in a way that piecemeal, hypothesis-testing, analytical methods never 
can'.122 
 
 Chapter Four now revisits the strategic culture literature and builds the points discussed 
above into a critique of the strategic culture literature. It then offers a way forward with the study 
of strategic culture, including a definition, a methodology and a framework for analysis. 
                                                          





Chapter Four: Strategic Culture Revisited 
 
 
The introduction to, and the first two chapters of, this thesis took stock of the development of the 
concept of strategic culture and made the case for pursuing its study further. Chapter One 
outlined broadly the origins and concerns of the concept and went on to locate it within the 
academic literature of strategic studies, as well as more general discussions of the use of force. It 
was argued that there is a 'common sense' appeal to the concept of strategic culture, which 
underlies its use by some journalists and scholars, even if they were or are unaware of the term. 
Some of this unwitting work on strategic culture has treated it cursorily. That which has taken 
more serious account of strategic cultural factors has not always done so in a systematic and 
explicit fashion, and has sometimes overemphasised their importance. Overall, while work along 
strategic cultural lines can be found in the strategic studies literature, there is little guidance 
regarding how culture can be incorporated into strategic analysis. More work was required.  
 
 The small but growing literature explicitly centred on the subject of strategic culture has 
begun to address directly the neglect of national specifity in strategic studies. Chapter Two 
surveyed this literature, with the aim of gathering together all that has been written on it, showing 
the different approaches taken and pointing to some of its strengths and weaknesses. One aspect 
highlighted was the non-cumulative nature of the literature. Many of those who have written 
about the subject have done so without reading and building upon the work of others, either those 
explicitly using the term 'strategic culture' or those who, using different terms, pursue similar 
lines of enquiry. Surveying the whole literature and describing its principal features, the points of 
convergence and departure, was therefore important.  
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 While more recent writing on the subject displays greater sophistication than earlier work, 
attention was drawn to another feature of the literature, particularly in the early stages of its 
development: its lack of conceptual development of strategic culture. It was argued that writers 
on strategic culture, as well as failing to read all that had been written on the subject itself and 
related areas within strategic studies, had ignored other related areas of study. One obvious area 
identified was political culture. Chapter Three therefore cast the net wider, seeking to address the 
lack of theoretical coherence within strategic culture studies by examining the literature of 
political culture. The point was to see how that subject was related to strategic culture and then to 
draw lessons from it for the study of strategic culture. How could it assist the development of the 
concept of strategic culture? What pitfalls did it suggest needed to be avoided?   
 
 This chapter aims to highlight those aspects of the political culture perspective which can 
illuminate strategic culture. It is interesting to note initially that there are similarities in the 
origins of the strategic culture and political culture perspectives. Strategic culture advocates 
assert that the different geographical setting and historical experiences of states lead to the 
formation of distinct attitudes towards the use and threat to use force, which in turn influence 
strategic behaviour. The study of strategic culture began in part as a challenge to analyses which 
held that a state's strategic behaviour could be explained on the basis of rational calculations of 
means and ends; and in part as a challenge to realist and neo-realist writing which had little room 
for differences in the outlooks of state decision-makers. Strategic culture seeks to bring history 
and geography back into consideration.  
 
 Political culture, defined as 'a shorthand expression to denote the emotional and 
attitudinal environment within which the political system operates', emerged as a subject of 




were required to sustain democracy.1 These were not present in the populations of all states, 
however. The history and development of political communities would affect the attitudes and 
beliefs of their citizens. The new political culture approach was a reaction against studies of 
political systems which went no further than examining the constitutions and political institutions 
of states. Political culture was taken up enthusiastically by a number of scholars of Communist 
states because in this area the concentration on institutions was especially marked. These 
scholars, like strategic culturalists, sought to reintroduce history and geography to analysis, to 
examine the national historical contexts in which Communist systems operated. They focused on 
the ways in which the beliefs of the peoples of Communist states, developed over centuries, 
affected the working of the systems. 
 
 Both perspectives therefore hold that actors in the same situation might behave 
differently. They need not perceive the situation in the same way, and the different values and 
beliefs which they possess may lead them to favour different courses of action. Each perspective 
is critical of the views that behaviour can be explained merely through the study of institutions or 
through rational calculations of interest. The political culture approach developed as part of the 
behavioural revolution. It was hoped during that revolution in the 1950s and 1960s that beliefs 
and values might be measured and quantified. The point to note here is that scholars of political 
culture and strategic culture have reached a similar conclusion: that to attempt to understand and 
explain the operation of political systems and political decision-makers principally on the basis 
of structural imperatives or assumptions of universal rationality is to omit an important 
dimension. Human beings, as bearers of perceptions, beliefs and attitudes, will think and act in 
ways significantly out of kilter with the expectations of neo-realists, constitutional experts and 
rational choice theorists. 
 
 It is interesting to note also that similar problems have arisen in the study of 
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political culture to those which have emerged in writing on strategic culture and which were 
identified in Chapter Two. A methodological problem shared may not be a problem halved, but it 
is useful to know that the problems facing strategic culture are not unique. They apply to political 
culture also. Even though solutions acceptable to all have not been found to the problems facing 
political culture, that concept continues to be employed by political scientists.  
 
 This chapter now goes on to apply the insights gained from the survey of political culture 
and revisits the strategic culture literature in the light of them. This will be done under three 
headings, relating to the three propositions which comprise the strategic culture approach. First, 
that groups share distinctive sets of beliefs, values and attitudes regarding the threat and use of 
force. Second, that these sets of beliefs are shaped by the geographical setting, the historical 
experience and the political organisation of the group. Third, that comprehension of these beliefs 
aids understanding of the behaviour of the group. The chapter then goes on to offer a definition 




Identifying strategic cultures 
The first proposition of the strategic culture perspective is that distinct strategic cultures can be 
identified. In Chapter Two, various issues involved in identifying strategic cultures were 
highlighted, and in Chapter Three the political culture literature was explored to see whether 
similar issues had arisen there. The first of these issues focused on which referent group was 
appropriate. The second concerned definitions of the terms involved in analysing culture. The 








Which should be the referent group for students of strategic culture? Most strategic culture 
analyses focus on the defence decision-making elite of a state, or its 'national strategic 
community'.2 Some, such as Yitzhak Klein, look narrowly at the armed forces or the 'military 
establishment' of a state.3 Most look more broadly to the political and military leadership who 
together shape defence policy. There is little discussion of mass beliefs or opinion. George 
Tanham and Desmond Ball speak in very general terms of cultural beliefs shared respectively by 
Indians and South East Asians rather than simply state decision-making groups.4 Bradley Klein 
refers to peace movements as bearers of strategic beliefs quite different from their governments.5 
Overall, however, it is state decision-makers who form the principal focus of attention of 
strategic culture writers. 
 
 The point to make here is that various different, and overlapping, cultures can be 
identified. In certain respects elites in different states will share experiences and socialisation. 
They are all involved in the exercise of power, for instance, which may well breed distinct 
attitudes. Officers of foreign armies are educated at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, 
which presumably serves to spread British military values. NATO's Partnership for Peace scheme 
similarly brings members of the armed forces of states of the former Warsaw Pact into contact 
with NATO officers. States in alliance will share experiences and learn from each other. Many 
states will share cultural values, as may be the case in South East Asia or the West.  
 
 Some studies under the heading of political culture deal with elite groups. Many 
concentrate on mass opinion, however. They do note that within states also there may be  
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different cultures. Elites experiences and socialisation will be different in some respects to the 
bulk of the population, but they will also share experiences with members of the wider culture of 
which they too are a part. Political culture students ask whether, within a state, there is a 
dominant culture, or whether the political culture is fragmented with no section dominant.6 
Strategic culture might also adopt this language, rather than tending just to assume cohesion.  
 
 Some strategic culture studies give little consideration to the existence of sub-cultures. 
Others recognise, as political culture analysts do, the existence of sub-cultures, or groups holding 
views different in some respects from the dominant culture. Snyder, for instance, underlines the 
importance of this issue, discussing whether sub-cultures can be identified which are grouped 
round one or other of the poles in the deterrence or war-fighting debate, both in the United States 
and the Soviet Union.7 In this strategic culture has already borrowed from other subjects and in 
particular political culture. However, are these sub-cultures based around organisations, issues or 
cultural groups? This could be made clearer. The strategic culture approach will benefit from 
asking about the organisation of sub-cultures. The political culture literature suggests that sub-
cultures may result from the roles held by people.8 Soldiers, bureaucrats and politicians, for 
example, may be socialised into different outlooks on life. There are also possible religious and 
gender sub-divisions to take into account. 
 
 It is, therefore, too simple to assume that states or nations have distinctive and cohesive 
strategic cultures. There is room for difference between elite and mass and other groups within 
states: ethnic, national, or functional. There is room for commonality as well as difference 
between states. The argument is not then that people within states all share the same strategic 
beliefs or that there is no overlap between states. Various referent 
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groups are possible objects of study for those interested in strategic culture. However, given that 
force is usually exercised legitimately in the international system by states, it is reasonable to 
focus primarily on the level of strategic decision-makers within states and their beliefs and 
values, bearing in mind the possibility of different cultures or sub-cultures within the state and 





The main issue which emerges in defining political culture itself is whether to include behaviour 
in the definition. Stephen White is one writer who does, referring to political culture as the 'the 
attitudinal and behavioural matrix within which the political system is located'.9 However, most 
writers take the view that since behaviour is what political culture is meant to explain, it is better 
not to include behaviour in the definition of political culture. On the other hand, some have 
argued that patterns of behaviour, or customs and habits, as opposed to discrete acts, ought to be 
included in definitions of political culture.10 The crucial point as far as Gabriel Almond was 
concerned was that, however you define political culture, the distinction is made between 
behaviour and attitudes and the relationship between them is investigated.11  
 
 Some strategic culture definitions do separate beliefs and behaviour. Others do not, 
however. Carnes Lord's definition includes the 'traditional practices' of states.12 Colin Gray looks 
at 'modes of action' with respect to force, as well as modes of thought about force.13 Ken Booth 
includes both habits and patterns of behaviour in his definition of 
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strategic culture.14 While it is reasonable to consider habits and patterns of behaviour as shedding 
light on or even constituting culture, a sensible definition ought to make clear that the 
relationship between behaviour and beliefs is a central issue in the study of strategic culture. 
 
 Most definitions of both political culture and strategic culture include some or all of 
beliefs, attitudes and values. It is worth bearing in mind the distinction made earlier between 
attitudes (transient views on specific situations), beliefs (more deeply rooted empirical views) 
and values (normative and fundamental propositions on specific issues).15 Writers on political 
culture also distinguish different types of beliefs. The language employed varies from one writer 
to another. However, some analysts separate core, or basic, beliefs about how the world works, 
from secondary, rather less important ones.16 Core beliefs about how the world works may 
determine more specific beliefs on particular issues. Beliefs may be more or less strongly held, 
with the core beliefs likely to be held more strongly. There is also a distinction according to how 
consciously the beliefs are held. Primitive beliefs are those which are held least consciously, 
which are unstated and unexamined and are apparently confirmed by experience. Often they are 
very widely shared by the group to which individuals belong.17  
 
 How useful are these concepts for strategic culture? Most strategic culture writers do not 
make much effort to separate beliefs into core or secondary or to classify beliefs according to 
their importance or degree of articulation. Nor is there much discussion of the distinction 
between conscious and unconscious beliefs. Johnston is one writer who does, however, see a 
paradigm of beliefs, a set of ranked preferences at the grand strategic 
                                                          
14 Ken Booth, 'The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed', in Carl G. Jacobsen, (ed), Strategic Power: USA/USSR 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), p. 121. 
15 See Samuel Beer and Adam B. Ulam, (eds), Patterns of Government: The Major Political Systems of Europe 
(New York: Random House, 1958), p. 20; and Brown, 'Conclusions', in Brown, p. 161. 
16 The belief systems literature also develops this point. See James Goddard, Policy as the Implementation of Belief 
Systems: Crime and Human Nature, 1964-1970 (PhD Thesis, University of East Anglia, 1993), pp. 65-66. 
17 See Sidney Verba, 'Conclusion', in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, (eds), Political Culture and Political 
Development (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 518. 
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level, as the core of Chinese strategic culture.18 It makes a great deal of sense to distinguish core 
beliefs, on fundamental matters such as the nature of international politics, from secondary 
beliefs, for example on whether offensive or defensive strategies were preferable. However, 
whether there exists within a culture a set of ranked preferences which persist over time is 
problematic. Can a group share such a rigid structure of beliefs, or is a culture a rather more 
shapeless mix of conscious and unconscious assumptions and beliefs? Notwithstanding this 
concern, there are likely to be differences in importance of beliefs, and views on core matters 
may well shape lower level beliefs: how you view the international system may shape whether 
you want offensive forces or defensive ones. Strategic culture studies thus far have not made 
much of the differences between conscious and unconscious beliefs. Future studies might benefit 
from asking how well articulated beliefs are, how self-consciously held they are.  
 
 
Content of beliefs systems 
A key question in political culture research as in strategic culture is: which are the important 
beliefs to research? These may be the most primitive, the core beliefs and those which are stable 
over time. At another level, we need to know what subjects are important for strategic behaviour. 
There may be a problem in defining such areas in advance rather than letting them emerge from 
documentary analysis: we may be fitting the beliefs of others into our own categories. Equally, 
however, to believe that we can analyse documents free from preconceptions is a myth, and it is 
better perhaps to be clear at the outset what we are looking for.  
 
 Some clues can be found in the political culture literature, though of course the focus 
there is on a different subject matter. However, the work of Alexander George deals with 
international politics.19 The image which strategic communities hold of their states 
                                                          
18 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1995), especially pp. 37-38.   
19 Alexander L. George, 'The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and 
Decision-Making', International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June 1969), pp. 201-26. See also Gunnar 
Sjöblom, 'Some Problems of the Operational Code Approach', in Christer Jönsson, (ed), Cognitive Dynamics and 
International Politics (London: Pinter, 1982), pp. 60-64. 
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may influence action. Also the images of other states, whether considered friends or enemies, 
will be important. Basic beliefs about human nature, about ethics and about the role of fate and 
chance will be significant. For strategic culture, beliefs about conflict will be especially 
important. Is conflict inevitable, can it be avoided or ameliorated, what are its sources, what are 
its costs, and is it worth such costs? Also causal beliefs about which means are best to achieve 
which goals, about how to select goals, and about minimising and assessing risks will be 
important. In regard to the latter, how are military, political, economic and technological 
capabilities ranked?  
  
 How far have strategic culture analyses covered these points? Alastair Johnston 
conceptualises a 'central paradigm' of beliefs about the nature of conflict, the nature of enemies 
and the efficacy of violence.20 But few others spell out the categories of beliefs which are of most 
significance, so that it is not clear why some and not other beliefs are singled out for comment. 
The framework developed for the Langkawi conference spells out a large number of beliefs 
which are considered to be of significance.21 If widely used, this would yield better comparative 
data than individual analyses selecting only certain beliefs, and avoid rather idiosyncratic 
analyses. It would prevent important beliefs being omitted. 
 
 At present, many analyses leave out a number of what might be considered core beliefs: 
about human nature, the nature of history, or the nature of international politics. The assumption 
may be that these are universal. In the case of those identified as strategic culture minimalists, the 
assumption would be that many of these core beliefs are dictated by the nature of the anarchical 
international system. Instead the focus is on narrower, military beliefs, about the cult of the 
offensive, for instance. It would be helpful to identify 
 
                                                          
20 Ibid, p. ix. 
21 See Ken Booth and Alan Macmillan, 'Strategic Culture: Framework for Analysis', paper prepared for a conference 
on 'Strategic Culture and Conflict Resolution in the Asia-Pacific Region', Langkawi Island, Malaysia, 14-17 August 
1994. The 'Framework' is reproduced as an appendix to the thesis. 
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and investigate more fundamental beliefs which could have an impact upon the narrower 
strategic ones. Also it seems important to ask more questions about the self-image of the referent 
group. Booth examines the myths about American strategic culture, but might ask how important 
these myths are for the self-image of the group, and how, even if it is removed from reality, the 




Identifying the beliefs and values which constitute a strategic culture is obviously of central 
importance. The crucial point here is that, since beliefs, values and attitudes cannot be observed 
directly, their existence must be inferred from other sources. Many political culture studies, 
interested largely in the beliefs and attitudes of the public at large, use surveys and interviews to 
identify relevant political beliefs and values. Others, looking at elite views, have tended more 
towards content analysis of official documents, memoirs and public statements.23 The latter 
would be more useful for strategic culture, to the extent that it also tends to focus on the 
decision-making elite, though surveys of the views of, and interviews with, decision-makers, 
could in some cases be possible and useful. Other possible sources of strategic beliefs are 
strategic behaviour and symbols. However, various problems attend the use of these sources as 
indicators of beliefs. These problems are discussed in the literature of political culture. 
 
 The use of behaviour carries the risk first of all of circularity: of inferring beliefs from 
behaviour, then using these same posited beliefs to explain that behaviour. Thus tautological 
explanations can be fashioned with no evidence to support them. It is possible to infer the 
existence of sets of beliefs which appear plausible bases for the behaviour under investigation but 
which may or may not exist. There is a question mark against explanations which begin with 
regularities in behaviour and infer beliefs which explain  
                                                          
22 See Ken Booth, 'American Strategy: The Myths Revisited', in Ken Booth and Moorhead Wright, (eds), American 
Thinking About Peace and War (Sussex: Harvester, 1978). 
23 See Kavanagh, Political Culture, pp. 50-51. 
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these regularities, then predict, on the basis of these beliefs, continued regularity. Is there 
independent evidence of the existence of these beliefs? And why not simply argue that if 
behaviour is regular it is likely to continue? The main problem here is that factors other than 
beliefs influence behaviour. Alliance commitments, for example, may force a state to act in ways 
which do not accord with its strategic culture. As will be discussed, the relationship between 
behaviour and beliefs is a problematic one, so that to assume that behaviour is a reflection of 
beliefs is dangerous. The danger can be reduced by looking at behaviour in various areas and at 
various times to see if there is consistency which would suggest the application of similar 
reasoning. The use of as many sources as possible as indicators of beliefs is advisable to confirm 
their existence. However, the fundamental problem remains that beliefs and values cannot be 
directly observed and so statements about them are based on inference, and that inference could 
be misleading.   
 
 Symbols may also be very useful. Flags, words, music and other symbols can powerfully 
convey meanings. However, great care needs to be taken with such sources, the meaning of 
which is never obvious, need not be shared by all of the group, and may be subject to change. 
Documentary and oral evidence, in the form of official papers, speeches, interviews or surveys, 
remain probably the most useful sources for getting at the beliefs of decision-makers. These 
sources are not without problems, as the political culture literature shows. Sources from 
individuals, for instance, may yield insight into the views of the wider group of which they are 
members, but the political culture literature warns against the ecological fallacy of inferring the 
beliefs of a group from those of individual members of it. The whole may be greater than the sum 
of the parts. In addition, some things may be so obvious that they are not put into words. 
Fundamental, shared beliefs will rarely be on the agenda for discussion. Another problem is that 
documents may be intended to justify action, and may not reveal its true motivation - even if the 
writer knows what that was, for decision-makers may not be aware of all their motivations. It 
should be stressed here that an important part of the strategic culture is the language of 
justification. What are considered powerful and legitimate reasons for undertaking certain 
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actions? Those seeking to understand the defence decision-making scene ought to be interested in 
how action is justified as well as its motivations. This is discussed further below. 
 
 There is little discussion in the strategic culture literature of the reliability and utility of 
different sources. Some writers use documentary evidence, some infer beliefs from behaviour, 
some from very general discussions of the wider cultural values of the country. Few identify the 
problems discussed above. One of the more methodologically reflexive writers is Jack Snyder. In 
his 1977 RAND Report, Snyder wanted to provide an empirical analysis, yet 'reliable data' on 
Soviet strategy was often impossible to acquire, he noted. What writings could be seen were 
produced partly with propaganda in mind, so had to be treated with caution. This left the actions 
of the Soviets as the best 'valid indicators' of beliefs, though these could be ambiguous and had to 
be interpreted. His conclusions on Soviet attitudes were therefore tentative, as the evidence was 
indirect.24  
 
 Other analysts making use of documentary evidence are Yitzhak Klein and Shu Guang 
Zhang. Klein tends to take at face value books, reports and lectures by Soviet officials, as well as 
looking at policy to discover strategic culture. He does not heed the warnings of Snyder about the 
propaganda element of Soviet writings on strategy.25 Zhang gained unprecedented though 
incomplete access to Chinese records for his work, making for an insightful discussion of what 
the Chinese were thinking.26 Of course, this depended on his reading of the documents. Other 
work is more impressionistic. Choi Kang, for instance, asserts the existence of certain strategic 
cultural beliefs in his work on NorthEast Asia, without making clear how he discovered them or 
proving they were held.27 Carnes Lord also tends to assert the existence of certain beliefs, 
'proving' this by citing behaviour 
                                                          
24 Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, pp. 4-8. 
25 See Ira J. Klein, Soviet Strategic Culture, 1917-1965; Yitzhak Klein, 'The Sources of Soviet Strategic Culture', 
The Journal of Soviet Military Studies, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December 1989), pp. 453-90; and Yitzhak Klein, 'A Theory of 
Strategic Culture', Comparative Strategy, Vol. 10, No. 1 (January-March 1991), pp. 3-23.  
26 Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958 (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1992). 
27 Kang Choi, The Prospect of Arms Control in NorthEast Asia: A Contextual, Procedural, and Perceptual 
Approach (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Ohio State University, 1991). 
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which seems to support the beliefs.28 Yet the dangers of selectivity and of circularity lurk here. 
Other instances of behaviour could possibly be found which contradict the beliefs asserted. In 
addition, it may be that these beliefs could equally have led to other actions. Therefore evidence 
for the existence of beliefs and their effect on behaviour remains inconclusive.  
 
 Colin Gray and George Tanham explicitly seek to infer beliefs from patterns of 
behaviour, but this too requires a causal connection between the two.29 Also, depending on which 
pieces of behaviour are selected, different beliefs will be produced, leaving room for rather 
incomplete or indeed biased conclusions. Furthermore, Gray pays little heed to Snyder's warning 
about the ambiguity of behaviour. His conclusions that the Soviet leaders believe war to be 
winnable, see international politics as a permanent struggle for power and are engaged on 'an 
insatiable quest for national security' represent only one possible interpretation of the beliefs 
underlying Soviet policy, and perhaps say more about Gray than the Soviet Union.30 Where 
ambiguous indicators are used, they may indeed function like Rorschach blots, telling more about 
the observer than the observed. As long as the link between beliefs and behaviour remains 
problematic, to infer behaviour from beliefs or to seek to prove their existence by reference to 
behaviour is prey to many difficulties. Most importantly, it does seem to lead into tautologies, 
where behaviour is used to infer the existence of beliefs and then explained by those beliefs. It is 
unclear what role the alleged beliefs play. Again, why not simply argue that a country has 
traditionally behaved in a certain way and so is likely to continue to behave in that way?  
      
 Nor does more recent work offer any solution to the problem of identifying beliefs. Eric 
Herring, for example, has much to say about the role of strategic culture as a tool for 
understanding and explaining strategic behaviour, but little to say on how cultural beliefs 
                                                          
28 Lord, pp. 269-93. 
29 Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986); and George Tanham, 
pp. 129-42. 
30 Gray, pp. 312-13. 
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are to be divined.31 Charles Kupchan uses a variety of sources from public opinion data through 
to film and literature.32 Alastair Johnson takes strategic writings and documents and subjects 
them to content analysis to determine the key beliefs.33 Whichever sources are used, inferring 
beliefs remains a difficult task, and there is no foolproof method for doing so. The judgement of 
the analyst and the application of interpretive skills come into play. The sources available vary 
from case to case. The best solution is to use as many different sources as time and resources 
allow. The more they tend to confirm each other, the more reliance may be placed upon the 
findings. Behaviour seems a weak source, and as it is behaviour which we are trying to explain, it 
is unwise to rely on it alone to infer beliefs, which in turn are used to explain the behaviour. 
Ultimately, getting at beliefs is a difficult endeavour and unequivocal proof of their existence is 
unlikely to be found. A degree of speculation and impressionism is unavoidable, but this should 
not be used as an excuse not to bother with evidence at all. As many documentary sources as 
possible should be advanced in support of the existence of certain beliefs. Finally, an awareness 





Origins, change and continuity of strategic culture 
The second strategic culture proposition is that strategic cultures are shaped by the distinct 
historical experience and location of the group. This proposition also entails the view that 
strategic cultures persist over time. Yet this continuity must be demonstrated as far as possible, 




                                                          
31 Eric Herring, Danger and Opportunity: Explaining International Crisis Outcomes (Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press, 1995). 
32 Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 29. 
33 Johnston, Cultural Realism, pp. 40-60. 
 136 
Tracing origins 
Scholars of political culture look for the roots of important, persistent beliefs in the basic 
geography, historical political development and national culture of the group. Taking their cue 
from this, strategic culture analysts have identified three main sources of strategic beliefs: the 
geographical location of the group, its history, and its political culture. Yitzhak Klein is alone in 
rejecting the attempt to trace origins in these factors.34 Yet exactly how these factors produce 
beliefs which persist is not made clear by the writers.  
 
 One problem is to identify how these sources give rise to beliefs which are sustained, 
another to identify the relationship between the sources. Some writers identify geography as the 
most important factor, setting various constraints and creating certain opportunities. There is, 
however, a danger of being overly deterministic here. Colin Gray, in his writing on geopolitics 
and strategic culture, arguably falls into this trap, regarding the Soviet Union and the United 
States as engaged in an inevitable conflict given their geopolitical positions.35 States with long 
coastlines do not necessarily become great maritime powers: witness the separate developments 
of Spain and Italy. What is more, changes in technology can affect the implications of geography, 
so that they are not timeless. How those implications are perceived is the crucial point, and that 
may change. The link between geography and attitudes is therefore problematic. Also included 
under geography are the resources possessed by the state. These may change, and as with 
geography, their implications may be seen in different ways, which are subject to change. 
Nevertheless, it may be possible to link attitudes to geography and resources, even if only 
tentatively.  
 
 The historical experience of the referent group is also identified as an important source of 
beliefs, especially its military experience. Again this is problematic. One issue is, which 
experience? No clear answer emerges from the political culture literature, beyond 
                                                          
34 See Yitzhak Klein, 'A Theory of Strategic Culture', p. 9.  
35 In addition to his strategic culture works, see Colin S. Gray, The Geopolitics of Superpower (Lexington, Kentucky: 
University of Kentucky Press, 1988), p. 1. 
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that events significantly affecting the population as a whole are likely to be important.36 While it 
seems an obvious point that unique experiences of war will give rise to distinctive attitudes 
towards it, it must also be noted that views of history are subject to change and may well be 
inaccurate. Myths develop about the past, or are developed deliberately to encourage certain 
beliefs by regimes. Furthermore, developments in the present influence our understanding of the 
past, as historiography shows. There is therefore no clear and easy relationship between past 
events and current attitudes. It is important to try to trace the formation of beliefs and their 
continued existence, rather than just to assert that certain events centuries ago caused certain 
attitudes which still exist today.  
 
 Beliefs about the past are seen as important in political culture. It is worth examining 
whether a nation refers often to its past. Does history play a large part in the culture? And is 
reference to national history a respectable mode of argument? History is often used in debate, as 
analogies are searched for, and more or less apt ones discovered.37 History can also be used to 
legitimise or justify certain actions. Dramatic events - often wars or revolutions - can be overused 
and misused in this process. History also contributes to national self-images. In Langkawi 
framework the attempt is made to relate history and beliefs, but this remains a tentative exercise 
because of the difficulties discussed above. 
 
 Political culture as a source of strategic culture also is problematic, and here there is little 
help from the political culture literature. What exactly is the relationship between the two? Is 
strategic culture merely a subset of political culture, different in only some respects? Or has the 
military experience of the group led to quite different beliefs about internal and international life? 
It may be that states with much experience of war will develop distinctive political systems, 
which enable the state to wage war effectively. So centralised, authoritarian systems with highly 
martial values could develop. Thus political 
                                                          
36 Walter Rosenbaum, Political Culture (London: Nelson, 1975), pp. 16-17. 
37 See Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers (New York: 
The Free Press, 1986); and Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam 
Decisions of 1965 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992). 
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cultures may be shaped by military factors. Or, democratic ideals may affect the conduct of 
defence policy. This will vary from state to state. If there exists a literature on the political culture 
of a group under study, this would however be a valuable resource. Further empirical work is 
necessary to pin down the relationship of political and strategic culture. The Langkawi 
framework identifies the link between them as an important area for exploration.. 
      
 The final point to make here concerns the relationship between all the variables 
identified. What is important is the interplay between all of them. As the group develops, the 
implications of its geographical setting and resources can change with events. The key is to see a 
dynamic process where change takes place, not to search for coherence and be overly 
deterministic. 
 
 Alastair Johnston stresses the importance of starting as far back as possible to identify 
beliefs and trace their passage forwards through time, rather than starting with current beliefs and 
looking backwards in time for evidence of prior existence.38 The temptation in the latter case is to 
be selective in the search. However, in the Chinese case, the seven military classics offer a 
convenient starting point. But this is not always so. Where does one start to examine British, or 
French, strategic culture? Analysis has to start somewhere, and the starting point may be 




Change and continuity 
The question of change was identified as a crucial one for strategic culture. How do beliefs 
change? How do changes in beliefs affect the behaviour of states, and therefore perhaps their 
operational environments, and how do changes in the these operational environments affect 
beliefs? It is argued in the political culture literature that core beliefs 
                                                          
38 Johnston, Cultural Realism, p. 40. 
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are most resistant to change. Further, new information will likely be assimilated to old. Change 
will be incremental except where dramatic events occur.  
 
 Continuity is stressed in cultural analyses. There are internal psychological processes 
which cause people to seek to maintain consistency in beliefs, distorting new information if 
necessary. And there are socialisation processes by which beliefs are passed on to new 
generations of decision-makers. Both these factors maintain continuity. In addition, bureaucracies 
play a part in sustaining beliefs. Standard operating procedures and institutional inertia will 
militate against changing basic assumptions. Yet change cannot be discounted. How has strategic 
culture dealt with these issues? 
 
 The consensus here is that change will occur, though only gradually, except where 
dramatic events intervene.39 There is little discussion of how change does and has occurred, 
however, and perhaps too much emphasis on the importance of continuity. Gray, for instance, 
writing in 1988, saw the Soviet Union as certain to remain the most pressing source of danger to 
the West in general and the USA in particular 'for as far into the future as can be claimed 
contemporarily relevant'.40 Conceivably he could yet be proved right, in that Russia could emerge 
once more as a significant threat; and he was surely not alone in failing to foresee the collapse of 
the Warsaw Pact. But the temptation has been to give too much weight to continuity. It may be 
also that in looking back at the past of the group under study, too much attention is given to 
events suggesting continuity, and those striking discordant notes are ignored. Bradley Klein notes 
a similarity between the strategy of Mahan and modern nuclear war-fighting ideas in US strategic 
thinking, assuming that since Mahan these ideas have been in currency.41 But he does not prove 
that Mahan's ideas lasted through the century; similar ideas could have been developed in the 
second half of the twentieth century for quite different reasons. Continuity is then problematic.  
 
                                                          
39 Kavanagh, Political Culture, pp. 37-46. 
40 Gray, The Geopolitics of Superpower, p. 1. 
41 Bradley Klein, p. 138. 
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 Future work on strategic culture ought to try to look more precisely at how change occurs 
and at how things stay the same, than has hitherto been managed. Can socialisation processes be 
identified which maintain beliefs? Can we see what sort of beliefs change most, what causes 
change, whether there are lags between changes in circumstances and in ideas? 
 
 
The utility of strategic culture 
If a distinctive strategic culture can be identified, and linked to particular national circumstances 
and development, can it then be linked to strategic behaviour? In other words, what explanatory 
work does it do? Similar questions are posed in the political culture literature. One response is 
that culture has very little utility, for political culture is shaped by political structures. In this case 
culture is an epiphenomenon. It forms only one link in a longer causal chain. It is something to be 
explained rather than something which does explain. The political culture literature suggests a 
number of counter arguments. In the first place, even if it is granted that culture does represent an 
epiphenomenon, it could still be of use as it would be part of the explanation, if not the whole 
explanation. That other factors need to be brought into the analysis may diminish but does not 
demolish the significance of culture. In addition, the political culture literature points out that 
whatever gives life to beliefs in the first place, if passed down to new generations they can 
outlive the immediate circumstances from which they originated. Beliefs encouraged by a 
governmental elite and inculcated into the population for self-serving purposes at one time may 
come to shape the thinking of the next generation of decision-makers, unaware of why they were 
nurtured initially. Political culture studies began from the observation that stable political 
systems transferred to newly independent states often failed to reproduce stability in their 
changed settings. The existing political culture, which may have been shaped by older political 
structures, undermined the new political structures. A final point to note here is that some 
political culture writers - notably those like Stephen White who 
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have investigated political culture in Communist states - attempt to account for the origins of 
beliefs in historical experience and other factors.42 They therefore ask what explains strategic 
culture as well as what it explains.  
 
 Overall, the political culture literature shows the relationship between cultures and 
structures to be a complicated one. Each interacts with the other over time. Their relative 
importance and causal relationship are very difficult to ascertain. This mirrors the wider social 
science debate on structure versus agency. What this implies for strategic culture is that the 
relationship between strategic cultures and structures will be similarly complicated. There is 
support for the view that new governments may not be able to change quickly the beliefs and 
values of the populations they govern. Old beliefs may persist. The political culture literature 
therefore offers support to Alastair Johnston’s argument that regimes may become controlled by 
cultural beliefs which earlier elites encouraged into being.43 The above analysis also shows that it 
is worth pursuing the study of strategic culture, as it cannot merely be assumed that analysis of 
structures yields all the answers.  
 
 Extended to the international realm, this analysis suggests that reliance upon a particular 
notion of how the structure of the international system operates to explain the strategic behaviour 
of states is also too simple. Neo-realist accounts privilege structural over cultural explanations, 
believing that the anarchical nature of the international system implies a self-help logic which 
state leaders must recognise. However, current state leaders could be facing not an immutable 
structure but rather a cultural phenomenon. The beliefs of previous leaders, shaped by their own 
particular experiences of war and insecurity, could continue to imprison their successors. This 
offers encouragement to writers like Bradley Klein who see utility in strategic culture as a means 
of historicising the assumptions of neo-realism.44 It also suggests that the position of strategic 
culturalists, 
                                                          
42 See for instance White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics. 
43 Johnston, Cultural Realism, p. 18. 
44 Bradley Klein, p. 136. 
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who hold that states may act in ways out of line with the claimed demands of the structure of the 
international system, has some mileage in it. Both strategic culture minimalists and maximalists 
have their positions strengthened by the finding that structures leave room for the operation of 
cultural influences. 
 
 A number of questions can usefully be asked, therefore, when investigating the strategic 
cultures of states, and some will be pursued in the case study chapters. To what extent is the 
strategic culture imposed by the elite, and to what extent is the elite itself influenced or 
imprisoned by the culture? To what extent are neo-realist notions of the nature of the 
international system supported by strategic cultures, in the present and the past? Do beliefs vary 
across cultures, undermining notions of a global logic of anarchy? Do beliefs vary across time, 
suggesting that change is possible? Do neo-realist views of the logic of anarchy seem to be 
rooted in the experiences of states in particular times and places?  
 
 Another criticism of political culture is that rational choice theory is a more efficient 
vehicle for explaining the behaviour of political actors than culture. Proponents of political 
culture however have made the case that rational choice alone is insufficient to explain 
behaviour. They buttress strategic culture writers in the view that rationality is at least tempered 
by deep-seated beliefs and values, and that assumptions of a universal rationality guiding 
behaviour will produce misleading analysis. This too is a question which should be pursued in 
the case study chapters. To what extent can strategic behaviour be said to be 'rational' only in 
terms of the beliefs and values of a particular culture? 
 
 If strategic culture can play a part in explaining particular decisions, how important a 
part? Alastair Johnston provides a sophisticated discussion of the range of possibilities.45 At one 
extreme culture can determine particular policy outcomes. At the other it may 
 
                                                          
45 Johnston, pp. 53-54. 
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merely provide justification for action, or fulfil an instrumental role. Arguments need to be 
framed in language which is acceptable to the group whose culture is under investigation if they 
are to be taken seriously. Whatever the motives of actors, they must be sensitive to culturally 
approved ways of advancing arguments and culturally approved bases for action. In between 
these extremes, Johnston sees culture as creating predispositions to certain actions or types of 
action, closing off some possibilities and limiting the range of choice open to decision-makers. It 
provides a set of ranked preferences. The key difficulty, he believes, in determining the influence 
of strategic culture is to isolate its effects from those of other, non-cultural variables. This must 
be done if the relative importance of strategic culture is to be assessed. Yet separating cultural 
from non-cultural variables is far from straightforward. Different cultures may put different spins 
on structural factors, or the importance of technology. Bureaucratic politics may vary in different 
national cultures.46 The distinction between cultural and non-cultural variables is difficult to 
draw. Comparative studies could help to factor our non-cultural variables, but the previous 
chapter shows there are difficulties with these also. If states operating in the same system, with 
similar capabilities and interests, formulate different solutions to the same problem, then the 
importance of beliefs and values appears much more stark. Against that, in comparative studies 
there are problems of equivalence to guard against. Are the states under consideration really 
facing equivalent problems, in equivalent situations? Are equivalent sources being used? These 
are among the awkward questions in need of answers. Nevertheless, rigorous comparative 
studies, which have yet to be carried out on strategic culture, should be of importance in showing 
how much similarity in beliefs exists across cultures and giving a more accurate view of how 
much difference strategic culture makes. 
 
 The consensus in the strategic culture literature is that strategic culture sets the terms of 
debate, it acts as a prism through which the world is perceived, it rules out certain options for 
consideration, it creates pre-dispositions towards certain courses of 
                                                          
46 See Booth, 'The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed', p. 124. 
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action. In this strategic culture follows on from much political culture writing. There emerges, 
however, no cast iron means of detecting and isolating the effect of culture or beliefs on 
behaviour.  
 
 Another approach sees culture as being of value more for producing a general 
understanding of the context of decision-making than for directly explaining particular actions. 
So textbooks on politics often contain an introductory section on the political culture of the state 
under investigation, even if it is not used directly to account for political behaviour. Nevertheless, 
a rich understanding of political activity, it is argued, requires comprehension of the webs of 
beliefs and values in which decision-makers are suspended. Taken slightly further, culture is 
useful not so much in providing links between cause and effect, but in illuminating the meaning 
which behaviour has to political actors. In the words of Lucian Pye, political culture 'gives 
meaning, predictability and form to the political process'.47 The point of this interpretive form of 
explanation is to try to connect 'action to its sense rather than behaviour to its determinants'.48  
 
 There are, therefore, various possible ways in which strategic culture may affect strategic 
behaviour. In the political culture and the strategic culture literatures these possibilities are 
discussed, but no consensus emerges on the best way to proceed. In the case study sections the 
task thus becomes to ask in which ways the operation of strategic culture can be detected.  
 
 
Definition and methodology  
Let us now offer a definition of strategic culture. Strategic culture refers to the values, beliefs and 
attitudes held within different groups regarding the use or threat to use force. These values, 
beliefs and attitudes are affected by the unique circumstances and historical  
 
                                                          
47 Lucian Pye, 'Introduction', in Pye and Verba, p. 7. 
48 Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (London: Fontana, 1993), p. 34. 
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development of the state and are reflected in symbols, customs, habits, and patterns of strategic 
behaviour. Strategic culture involves the propositions already discussed. The first proposition is 
that different collectivities have distinct beliefs, attitudes and ways of thinking about the use of 
force. The second is that these beliefs, attitudes and ways of thinking are shaped by the unique 
geographical setting and historical development of the group, especially in the strategic and 
political fields. The final proposition is that the strategic debate and behaviour of the group will 
be affected by its distinctive strategic culture. The study of strategic culture will therefore help 
with understanding of the discourses and debates on strategy held within the group, and with 
explaining its behaviour in the strategic realm. Finally, although continuity is stressed, change is 
also accepted as taking place, and sensitivity to change is crucial. 
 
 The above analysis ended with a more interpretive approach to understanding the effect 
of culture, and this leads into the question of methodology. How can we study culture and its 
effects? On the one hand there are those who favour a highly positivist approach. Alastair 
Johnson falls into this category through his insistence that claims of knowledge about strategic 
culture must be falsifiable through empirical investigation, and that this knowledge must be in a 
form which allows the effects of strategic culture to be tested against other modes of explanation. 
Knowledge which fails these tests is worthless.49 Likewise, the study of political culture gained 
impetus through the belief that survey methods could yield hard empirical data about culture.  
 
 Others, however, have found such methods of limited utility in tackling such a slippery 
subject as culture. Can culture be measured or quantified? Can useful falsifiable statements be 
derived about the nebulous subject of culture, or is it a factor the influence of which cannot be 
pinned down? The case is made, therefore, for a more interpretive approach, trading rigour for 
richness. Accepting that any statement about culture could probably be falsified as its influence is 
so varied, such an approach would relax the 
 
                                                          
49 Johnston, Cultural Realism, p. 29. 
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standards of proof for the effects of culture. Critics from the positivist position would argue that, 
as well as not yielding comparative and falsifiable data, this type of approach risks inferring the 
existence of beliefs and values, and making claims about their effects, with no foundation. It 
could involve constructing a plausible and coherent account of strategic behaviour on the basis of 
beliefs which may not exist or affect action. Within both the political culture and belief systems 
literatures this divide exists between more and less positivistic approaches. 
 
 Where you stand on these methodological issues, as well as on the issue of the utility of 
strategic culture, will determine how and indeed whether you proceed with the study of strategic 
culture. For a neo-realist scholar, the study of strategic culture may appear not to be worthwhile. 
It involves expending a great deal of effort for meagre returns in terms of explanatory power. For 
a strong positivist, producing falsifiable statements and so worthwhile knowledge about cultures 
may appear impossible, while more interpretivist scholars will be more optimistic about 
producing useful knowledge.  The neo-realist who pursues the study of strategic culture is likely 
to interested not in beliefs about the nature of international politics, as the system determines 
these, but in lower level beliefs about when and how force should be used. Opponents of neo-
realism will see all beliefs as up for investigation and look to how they are formed rather than 
assuming some to be inevitable.  
  
 The approach adopted in the remainder of the thesis is a more interpretive one, and one 
which seeks to question the assumptions of neo-realism. To identify the existence of a group's 
strategic culture, to link the key beliefs within it to historical experience and the other factors 
outlined above, and to isolate the effect of the culture upon strategic behaviour, are tasks fraught 
with methodological difficulties. If cultures change, albeit slowly, like glaciers the movement of 
which is undetectable except over long time periods, then any description of the content of a 
culture is a snapshot in time, and is always open to challenge at another time. If cultures create 
predispositions to action but do not determine 
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it, then prediction is impossible. If individuals within the group vary then exceptions will always 
be found to any generalisation. The contention here is, therefore, that the study of strategic 
culture must remain an interpretive pursuit, backed by what evidence can be found in order to 
minimise the risks of flights of fancy. It is useful also to enquire about the existence and origins 
of beliefs which neo-realists would argue are imposed by the anarchic nature of the international 
system. Can these be seen to have roots in particular historical experiences of a group? 
 
 Ultimately, to show the importance of specifically national factors on strategy, 
comparative studies are required to help factor out variables acting on all states. For comparative 
data to be generated, a common research framework is needed. That provided for the participants 
in the Asia-Pacific strategic culture project is a useful basis for investigation, signalling the key 
areas which ought to be of interest, and suggesting ways in which strategic culture may operate. 
It is therefore reproduced here, slightly modified, as a guide to the operation of strategic culture 
and a rough basis for the following analysis of British strategic culture.50 Given cultural variety, 
not all of it will be useful for all states or groups. However, it offers a starting point for analysis. 
 
 Before turning to the framework, a few points about its use should be made. Rather than 
begin with current attitudes and work back, looking for evidence of their existence in the past, it 
is better to begin as far back in history as possible and work forward. Then the temptation to look 
only for evidence that current attitudes already existed before, and ignore evidence of other 
attitudes, may be avoided. It is necessary to be sensitive to discontinuities as well as continuity, 
to show whether some beliefs have died out. The point in looking at the past will be to establish 
whether continuity does exist. This is the first stage in the strategic culture argument. If 
continuity in attitudes can be shown, then the next step is to relate them to specifically national 
features. This is the most speculative, interpretive part of the exercise, for documents and other 
sources will be rarer the deeper in time you go.  
 
                                                          
50 The original framework is included in an appendix to the thesis. 
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 In the contemporary period, more detailed sources may be available and better evidence 
of attitudes should be found. Using documentary and whatever other sources may be available, 
the key strategic beliefs need to be pinned down and their continuity with the past established. A 
profile of the strategic culture of the group should be drawn up, asking what are the key beliefs, 
but also how widely shared they are, how stable, how coherent. Any other salient characteristics 
of the culture could be spelled out.  
 
 
Strategic Culture: Framework For Analysis 
The framework seeks to facilitate research into whether, for the referent group in question, 
particular conditions have indeed given rise to or shaped distinctive beliefs about the use of force 
which have been sustained over time and continue to the present day.  
 
 
(A) Sources of strategic culture 
The three elements below do not exhaust sources of explanation of strategic culture, but they do 
appear to be the most significant. Other sources could be embraced by them. Nor are they wholly 
separate categories. Rather it is the interaction of geography, history and political systems which 
is of interest. The implications of geography may change over time as technologies progress, for 
instance, and alliances may shift, resources may dwindle and revolutions occur. Moreover, and a 
related point, how these factors are viewed by contemporaries is subject to change: historical 
events can disappear from the national consciousness or be re-interpreted, as could the 
implications of geography. Current events and attitudes will also influence how the implications 
of historical experience, geography and so on are interpreted. There is a continuous process of 
feedback in which self-conscious leaders will think again about these factors, jettison some old 




 Finally, it is not being argued here is that the position of a state, the resources available to 
it and its historical development suggest only one future course for it. Geopolitics is not seen as 
determining defence policy, for example. States with long coastlines need not necessarily become 
strong maritime powers. Different options will be available, but what these are will be shaped by 
the factors below. Which option is selected may also be shaped by these factors. And even as 
geographic or technological conditions change, old attitudes may persist.  
                                               
 
1. Geography and resources 
Geography is obviously a key factor in any country's thinking about its security. 'Geography is the 
bones of strategy', said Theodore Ropp.51 In examining a group's strategic culture, the salient 
points of its geographic setting need to be identified and their possible strategic implications 
considered. All states are uniquely situated, of course, so the framework cannot cover all 
possibilities, but at least a few basic questions which ought to be asked can be specified. Others 
may be needed for particular states.  
 
 An obvious place to start with is the borders of the state. Does it have natural barriers 
around it - mountains, seas, deserts or rivers? Groups lacking such barriers, with no secure 
borders, are vulnerable to invasion and may well have experienced many interventions and 
invasions in their histories, with important effects on their attitudes to security. The Soviet 
Union, for instance, and imperial Russia before it, have often been invaded, which could be 
argued to have engendered a sense of insecurity leading to high and constant defence 
preparations. On the other side of the coin, such states may find it easier to expand, and perhaps 
equate security with possession of territory. States which have secure natural borders could on 
the other hand develop a false sense of security, or  
                                                          
51 Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World (London and New York: Collier-Macmillan, new revised edition, 
1959), p. 5. 
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simply a relaxed attitude towards security, with periods of low defence spending increasing when 
specific threats emerge. Such states may find it harder then to prepare to meet threats over longer 
periods of time. 
 
 The location of the state may have a considerable effect upon its outlook on the world. 
Those who are cut off, whether by mountains or sea, and are self-sufficient, could develop into 
isolationists, seeking to limit contact with the outside world; or they could become expansive 
nations, seeking contact with others. They could also develop, as is alleged with the USA and 
China, feelings of exceptionalism from and possibly superiority over others. They are then less 
likely to be influenced by foreign thought.  
 
 The presence of largely hostile or friendly neighbours can exacerbate the effects of the 
possession or lack of secure borders. Russia and the Soviet Union have often faced hostile states 
to the West, for instance. The United States, by contrast, as well as being blessed with oceans on 
its western and eastern borders, has neighbours to the south and north which have never posed 
much threat to it. Whereas Russia and the Soviet Union have tended therefore to fight on their 
own territory, the USA has tended to fight on other people's territory, its own being relatively 
invulnerable. States which avoid seeing the horrors of war at first hand may well be less inhibited 
about using force than those who have seen much fighting (at least until extensive media 
coverage of wars); the latter may well become determined, as arguably the Soviets did, to strike 
the first blow in a war so as to avoid fighting again on their own ground.  
 
 Although enemies may become friends and vice versa over time, intense and bitter 
rivalries will not disappear quickly, and will likely persist beyond the immediate disputes that 
created them. Feelings of having suffered at the hands of another and the need for revenge may 
take generations to wane. It is therefore important to look at the traditional friendships and 
rivalries which exist. 
 
 151 
 The location of a state may also be important for the development of its armed forces. 
States with long coastlines may well develop large navies as a first line of defence, while those 
with little coastline may develop armies as the senior service. This can set patterns of interservice 
competition for the future, even should sea power become more, or less, important. 
 
 The size of territory of a state also is likely to be significant, as small states can afford to 
lose less territory, while larger states can absorb attacks. On the other hand, small states have 
shorter borders to defend and can reinforce weak points rapidly, while larger states may need 
greater forces in position at all times to repel surprise attacks. Even as circumstances change, 
these basic geographic factors may leave in place peculiar attitudes towards security and the use 
of force. 
 
 The resources available to a state will also be important in constraining its actions, and 
again, even when changes take place in these, old attitudes may persist. Poor internal 
communications compound the problems referred to above for large states, while good 
communications ameliorate them. The size and distribution of a state's population are also likely 
to be significant. States with limited populations may need to develop strategies maximising the 
use of technology and devote more time to training and tactics, and seek to avoid long attritional 
wars, while those with ample manpower may develop less in these directions. Military styles may 
then develop which outlast changes in populations. Where populations are concentrated also 
different strategies may need to be developed for their protection than where they are widespread. 
So geographical and resource conditions could lead to predispositions towards offensive or 
defensive strategies, forward or deep defence. 
 
 The effect on strategy of the presence or absence of other strategically-relevant resources 
will also be important. Dependence on others for resources may lead to a history of appeasement, 
though it could equally lead to one of conquest. Self-sufficiency also is likely to affect a state's 
attitude to allies. As with population, the ability to produce 
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adequate weaponry - or lack thereof - will affect strategy, tactics and training. In particular, states 
leading the way in technology may develop strategies to match. The United States is often, for 
example, held to prefer to expend vast resources rather than suffer casualties, to seek 
technological solutions to problems. Once more, the effect of these factors may outlive the 
circumstances which produced them. 
 
  
2. History and experience 
To narrow down a huge category, initial questions might be: which have been the most important 
periods and events in the group's history? Can what might be called 'formative years' be 
identified? Which have been the most important historical events? What are the most significant 
historical memories? And where are areas of amnesia to be found? Are there any apparently 
notable events which are forgotten? 
 
 In particular of course the historical experiences of states on matters of war and peace are 
going to be important. Has the state much experience of war? Has it gone into battle frequently 
or rarely? What sort of experience has it had? Has the group more often been the aggressor, or 
the attacked? Has it on the whole been successful in war, or more often lost out, or is its 
experience mixed? Have the costs of war - human, material, territorial - been large or small? 
Have the spoils been significant? Has fighting taken place on the territory of other groups or the 
referent group itself? Has the civilian sector of the group suffered directly at the hands of the 
enemy, or only indirectly, through siege for example? These sorts of experiences could shape 
various beliefs about war: about whether war is a natural state, or whether peace is; about 
whether war is inevitable, or can be avoided; about whether the military instrument should be 
employed only in the last resort, or whether it remains an effective Clausewitzian instrument of 
policy, to be used where appropriate; about whether or not war is hell. Those with successful 
military experience at low cost, for example, may be inclined to view the use of force as more 
acceptable than others. 
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 Experience of war need not lead in any particular direction. Those with mainly terrible 
experiences may seek to avoid war, but could also maintain and bear very high levels of 
preparation in case of future war, or try to ensure that future wars, if necessary, were won, or 
fought on the territory of others. The Soviet Union, for example, often invaded, is said to have 
adopted an offensive strategy to ensure that it would not be forced again into long defensive wars 
on its own territory with huge losses before the invader could be expelled. But military 
experience is likely to affect how threats are perceived and assessed. Those with bad experiences 
are likely to be more paranoid, more likely to overinsure and take no chances in security. Those 
whose experiences are less daunting may be more relaxed, or complacent, about threats. 
 
 The experience of states in specific areas will be likely to affect attitudes towards those 
areas. For instance, states with, or lacking, experience of limited wars may hold distinctive 
attitudes to limited wars reflecting that experience. Experience of crises short of war may also be 
important in shaping how future crises are handled, whether confrontation is sought or avoided. 
Experiences of alliance will be important also for shaping attitudes. Have allies been reliable in 
the past or not? Has the group been let down by allies? Has it been drawn into unwanted conflicts 
on their behalf? This sort of experience may shape whether the group is happy to see security as 
interdependent or seeks absolute independence in security. Again, successful experience of arms 
control negotiations will likely foster the belief that this is a profitable enterprise, whereas those 
who have failed to reach agreements or seen them flouted will probably be less impressed. 
 
 It is important to identify the major symbolic events and people for each state, and the 
myths surrounding them. What are the most significant historical memories and oversights about 
war and peace? How is strategic history perceived, and which events are given most meaning? In 
the case of Britain, for example, 'Hitler', 'Munich', 'Appeasement', 'Dunkirk' and 'Churchill' and 




Recent scholarship might show that during the Blitz there was not a united, defiant, classless 
society in London; yet the Blitz nevertheless conjures up the image of British pluck in the face of 
adversity, of the whole nation pulling together.52 Similarly, though Dunkirk may appear to the 
outsider to have been a near disastrous rout and retreat for the British, which could have been a 
calamitous defeat had the German pressed home their advantage to the full, the word Dunkirk 
conveys the sense of tenacious fighting spirit. To understand the discourse of British security 
policy it is crucial to identify the experiences perceived to be crucial, invoked in discussion in 
support of arguments.  
 
 Another important area to examine is the history of the group's strategic thinking. Is there 
a tradition of thinking about strategic issues? Is there a body of writing on the group's strategic 
situation? Who have been the influential sources of strategic thought?  Were they soldiers, 
political leaders, or civilians? Did they come from within or outside the country? Have other 
thinkers been forced on the group or adopted by choice? Why has one been chosen over others - 
to fit in with existing beliefs? What did they say? Were they more concerned with tactical or 
grand strategic matters? Were they interested in moral dimensions? Whose ideas are still thought 
relevant? Why? Have others faded away?  Have there been distinctive strategic sub-cultures - 
ethnic, class, military etc.? 
  
 And what generalisations can be made about the country's strategic doctrine (its plans and 
execution regarding the threat and use of force)? Is it possible to talk about a distinctive national 
style? Was there any distinctive and repeated behaviour: for example, a tendency to act 
unilaterally versus a tendency to be 'alliance-prone'? Or a pattern of military complacency and 
unpreparedness? Or a history of deference to big neighbours? Or a readiness to use the military 
instrument? Or a predisposition to over-insurance in military terms? What has been the 
relationship between thought and doctrine? Has the former prompted the other or been ignored? 
  
                                                          
52 See Angus Calder, The Myth of the Blitz (London: Pimlico, 1991). 
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 What of the history of the referent group itself? Has it always formed one state? Has it 
merged with others, or been taken over, or taken over others? What ethnic mixes are involved? 
What foreign influence has there been over the state - through invasion, colonisation, alliances, 
or inclusion in another state's sphere of influence? Has the group a history of empire-building or 
foreign domination? Which groups dominate the current state? Have they always done so? Do 
other groups form coherent subcultures? How much of an effort has there been at times to 
manufacture or control history? Has the elite sought to portray the group's history in a certain 
light to gain support for its policies? Has this led to certain events being overlooked or 
overemphasised? Has coherence in history been manufactured in the educational system or by 
politicians?  
 
 Has the group been a great power or a small power in the past? If it is a former great 
power, now in decline, is there an attempt to maintain the attributes of a great power? Is there a 
struggle to safeguard old commitments? Is great power status seen as important? Is the need for 
continued global influence felt? Is there a mood of pessimism about continued decline in the 
future? Dean Acheson famously said of Britain that it had lost an empire and not yet found a role. 
Are outlooks shaped by past glories? Or has the group for some time been gaining in strategic 
power and does it hold a more optimistic outlook for the future? Are there legacies of past 
poverty or riches: in the case of the former, strategic thinking may be based on deception and 
manoeuvre rather than confrontation, whereas the latter may seek decisive battles. 
 
 
3. Political structure and defence organisation 
What traditionally have been the most important features of the country's political system? Has it 
been liberal-democratic, fascist or communist, centralised or decentralised, open or closed, 
pluralist or dominated by narrow elites? Is there a tradition of stability or instability? Has the 
system undergone any radical change or revolution? Can any generalisations be made about the 
type of polity and its military behaviour? Has the nature  
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of the polity or official ideology affected the attitudes towards the use of force and security 
policy? Have political leaders attempted to apply the principles on which the domestic system is 
based to foreign and defence policy? Or have external conditions shaped internal political 
development: for instance, have Russian and Soviet absolutism been influenced by the hostile 
strategic environment in which those states operated? 
 
 The political culture approach assumes that these factors and many others result in the 
formation of a distinctive political culture in the state which affects the operation of the political 
system. It may give rise to a style of policy: in the case of Britain, it is argued, with its unwritten 
constitution and reliance on precedent rather than rules, a pragmatic, muddling through sort of 
style has evolved.53 One of the most difficult questions faced by students of strategic culture is its 
relationship with the concept of political culture. How do the two interrelate? Should we regard 
strategic culture as a branch, or subset, of political culture? Do the same factors shape both 
strategic and political culture? Or have the factors shaping the strategic culture been different, 
resulting in a distinctive set of beliefs and decision-making style? Perhaps the question to ask of 
each state is how closely these two cultures are related. It may be that in more martial states with 
long histories of conflict the political culture has been shaped by strategic factors, and that in 
more peaceful states, the reverse obtains: domestic political development shapes military policy. 
 
 In any case, work done on political culture will be a valuable resource in thinking about 
strategic culture. What have been the main features of the country's political culture? What are 
the main factors shaping the political culture? How does the political culture shape the making 
and execution of the country's strategic policy? For example, to what extent does ideology affect 
the pattern of allies and enemies? Going deeper into cultural values in society, is there an 
identifiable militarist tradition? If so, how does it manifest itself, for instance in relation to issues 
like conscription or the use of force? What are the sources of militarism? What impact do ethical, 
religious and gender factors have on 
                                                          
53 This point is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. 
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strategic culture? What value do people place on human life, for instance? How do they see 
martyrdom? Do particular societies or groups have exaggerated notions of masculinity and 
violence? Do such attitudes affect the prospects for using force, or working for conflict 
resolution? 
 
 Has public opinion had much of a role to play in policy-making? Is there any tradition of 
pacifism, of anti-war protests or peace movements? Has it been successful? Are there important 
military pressure groups, like military-industrial complexes? Have civilian strategists had much 
input into policy? Or has military strategy been the preserve of the elite?  
 
 In particular, what have been the main features of the country's defence decision-making 
organisation, in war and in peace? How is it organised? Which are the key ministries? How is 
policy made? Are there separate foreign and defence ministries, and how do they co-ordinate - 
are foreign policy commitments and defence forces well-matched? Are the tasks of 
understanding other countries and assessing their interests and intentions divorced from, or 
closely linked to, the tasks of preparing forces to counter threats? How powerful are military 
personnel within the defence ministry? Who makes defence policy: civilians or the military 
establishment? Is there much crossover between the military and civilian sectors? Have the 
armed forces involved themselves in politics? What has been the division of labour between 
military and civilians officials in defence policy? Is there a tradition of effective political control 
over the armed forces, or intervention by politicians in military planning, or a tradition of the 
armed forces intervening in politics? Is there a co-operative or an adversarial relationship 
between the two groups? Are their views distinct or similar? Is there much trust between the 
two? Have powerful leaders dictated military policy? The answers to these questions will 





 Within the military establishment, what type of planning goes on? It is claimed that the 
USA engages in war planning not strategy, that it is concerned more with the management of its 
armed forces, logistics and administration, than with devising strategy and tactics.54 Are there 
similar blind spots or biases in other countries? Is there traditionally much interservice rivalry? Is 
any one service dominant, or traditionally senior? How is rivalry between services managed? 
Who adjudicates in disputes? Has there more often  been a professional or a conscript army? 
What effect have these factors had on the strategic culture of the country? Is it easier to 
contemplate the use of force with a well-trained professional army than with a conscript army? 
Are certain types of operations or strategies made easier or more difficult depending on the 
composition of the armed forces? Are certain types of mission or force preserved by the 
institutional power of one service even if no longer appropriate? 
 
 
(B) Traditional Content of Strategic Culture 
Having posed some questions about the sources of strategic culture, the next stage is to draw up a 
profile of the country's traditional strategic culture. This will involve relating the sources to the 
formation of particular strategic beliefs and to patterns of strategic behaviour. Can strong and 
distinctive beliefs about the use and role of force be discerned, and have these beliefs led to 
distinctive patterns of behaviour in the strategic realm? In this essentially historical section 
surveys of traditional thought and behaviour should be provided, before turning to contemporary 
beliefs. (It is necessary to be flexible about the dividing line between 'traditional' and 
'contemporary': for some countries 1945 might be the significant turning point, for others it might 
be the date of national independence or the date of the founding of a new political system.)  
  
 To begin with, what conclusions can be drawn about the core beliefs of the culture which 
impinge upon strategy? These core beliefs are the most fundamental of the culture, 
 
                                                          
54 See for instance Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style, pp. 40-44.  
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the most deeply held and persistent. They give rise to other, lower level, or secondary beliefs 
discussed below. At the same time as looking at these beliefs themselves, it is interesting to note 
how well articulated they are, or how far they are unconscious; whether behaviour is openly 
based upon them, or whether these beliefs in the form of unstated assumptions guide action. Core 
beliefs are more likely than secondary ones to be unstated and unexamined, regarded perhaps as 
'natural' and obvious. 
  
 Various core belief areas can be identified. Which are most relevant for each country, 
how they are prioritised, will vary from country to country. The following seem likely to have 
most universal relevance. They are not mutually exclusive and will overlap. Nor need there be 
total consistency among them. It is possible that tensions exist between different beliefs and 
values, and indeed such tensions may characterise and distinguish the group from others.  
 
 It is important at this point also to raise questions of continuity and change. Obviously 
what is being stressed by strategic culture studies is continuity. The proposition is that old habits 
die hard, that there is considerable continuity over time of basic beliefs. However, change clearly 
occurs, and that needs to be taken into account. Is it possible to discern processes of evolutionary 
change at work? Have beliefs gradually altered over time, towards the use of force, for example? 
Have there been sudden changes caused by dramatic events, for instance? Has change been 
linked to new developments, new technologies? Have new regimes attempted to manufacture 
change, and with what success? How does change occur? Is there a lag between new 
developments and changes in beliefs? Are there discernible trends of change in beliefs? 
 
 It is important also to look at what sustains beliefs. How are strategic beliefs passed on? 
Within the defence organisation, are there conscious socialisation processes at work? How are 
officers educated and soldiers trained? What military academies exist? What military manuals 
and codes of behaviour exist? Have there been periods when beliefs 
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have outlived their relevance? Can it be shown that beliefs are passed on to new generations, 




Core beliefs and values 
 
1. The nature of war 
How are war and the use of force seen by the group? Is war regarded as inevitable, or avoidable? 
Is it regarded as a rational policy instrument to be used when it will be effective, or as a horrific 
event to be countenanced only as a last resort? What sort of objectives is the use of force 
believed to serve? How high a priority is given to outright victory, how much to victory denial, 
negotiated settlements? What is the relationship between war, politics and strategy - does strategy 
take over once war starts, or does politics continue to be supreme and determine the character of 
the conflict? How is strategy defined? 
 
2. The nature of history  
Is there a sense of history as an important variable? Is the history of the group seen as offering a 
guide to future action? Have there been many appeals to history to justify policy? Is there a deep 
sense of tradition and the importance of maintaining it? Or is there a more forward-looking 
attitude, more accepting of change and innovation? 
 
3. The nature of international politics  
Is the international political arena seen as a conflictual one, a self-help system under which the 
state must protect its own interests? Or is there room for co-operation? Are there notions of 
détente or peaceful coexistence? Is the state seen as the crucial actor? Is power seen as a crucial 
factor, and the balancing of power as important? Or does the state seek a preponderance of 
power? How is power defined - largely in military terms? How are interests calculated?  
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4. The role of alliances 
On a related matter, are alliances seen in a positive or a negative light? Does the group regard 
self-reliance as a virtue and a priority, or is the forming of alliances, and membership of 
international institutions, seen as important? 
 
5. Self-image 
How does the group see itself? What sort of state does it think of itself as - honourable, self-
reliant, brave, good at fighting, morally right, supportive of good causes, cautious, a good ally? 
What are the chief characteristics of the self-image? Is there guilt about past actions or pride? Is 
there confidence or not? Is there optimism about the future? Is the self-image accepted or 
challenged by other states? Is it a distortion of the 'objective' reality? Is it a deliberate distortion - 
manipulated by politicians? What have historians and writers on strategy had to say about their 
own state? Assuming these scholars  are part of the strategic culture, what is their view of their 
state? Historiography must form part of the self-image.  
 
6. The nature of security  
Is the group insecure, or confident about its security? Could it be characterised as paranoid, or as 
complacent? How is security defined: in largely military terms? Or do economic, political, social, 
environmental security concerns figure? Is interdependence in security acceptable, or is 
independence sought? What threats are perceived, and how are they evaluated? Are enemy 
intentions or capabilities more the basis of threat assessment? Is the security of the group itself 
all that matters, or are the needs of allies, or spheres of interest, taken into account?  
 
7. Human nature 





peoples seen in the same light, or are distinctions made about the nature of human kind according 
to race, nationality? Are some nations seen in particularly poor lights? Is there a Manichean view 
of the world as divided between good and bad peoples, struggling with each other? Is there a 
belief that lessons can be learned from other cultures, or a desire to avoid contact with them? 
 
8. Morality 
What is the importance attached to notions of morality? What is distinctive about the moral code 
of the group? How important is individual human life? How important is the good of the 
community as a whole, in relation to individual life? How is martyrdom viewed? How is war 
seen morally - is there a tradition of just war thinking, for example? Is international law to be 
respected or flouted? In war, are the principles of proportionality and discrimination to be 
upheld? 
 
9. The role of armed forces 
Are the armed forces regarded with respect or fear? As a necessary evil, a proud and courageous 
guarantor of security, a force which could get out of hand? Is there a martial tradition in society? 




Secondary beliefs and behaviour 
At a rather lower level, secondary beliefs exist. These are less firmly held than the core beliefs, 
more open to question and examination, and more closely linked to actual behaviour. They 
concern much more specific policy areas. Below are listed some of what are likely to be 
important secondary belief areas. As well as describing these beliefs it will be useful to note 
patterns of behaviour which reflect them. 
 
1. What type of strategy has the state preferred? Have offensive or defensive strategies  
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traditionally been favoured? Is there a tradition of deception and manoeuvre, or of seeking 
decisive battles? Have short wars been preferred, or long, attritional conflicts? Are land, sea or 
air forces favoured? 
 
2. Have international agreements been favoured as a means of attaining security? Have arms 
control treaties been sought and adhered to, or less formal agreements? 
 
3. Have international institutions been used for security? Are they regarded as legitimate actors in 
security, to be supported? 
 
4. Has technology been seen as vital to warfare? Has the state sought to acquire the most up-to-
date technology, engaged in technological arms races? Or has it relied on quantity, or tactical 
ability instead? 
 
5. Is it accepted that high levels of defence spending in peacetime are a necessary price of 
security? Is there a high level of military preparedness? 
 
6. How are crises seen - as opportunities to be exploited or as dangers to be managed? Is there 
any tradition of brinkmanship, or of backing down in crises? Is there a distinctive crisis style?  
 
7. Are there traditional enemies or allies who are believed to be likely to continue to be threats or 
friends in the future?  
 
8. Is there a tradition of power projection, a belief that it is important to be able to operate 
militarily abroad? Is there a tradition of intervention in other states? 
 
9. Is there an identifiable decision-making style, a belief in certain ways of managing defence? Is 
there a tradition of secrecy or openness? Have some groups had more say in 
 164 
defence planning than others? Is the say of some groups believed to be more legitimate than of 
others? 
 
10. What can be said of relations between the services? Is one dominant, are there ways of 
managing disputes between the services? Is there a tradition of wrangling, or bitterness? Are 
decisions the result of compromise? 
 
 
 A final important question is: how widely shared are these beliefs? Is there a main, 
dominant culture? Or is the culture very fragmented? Are there important sub-cultures? How are 
they organised - along bureaucratic lines? Have the different services, for example, as a result of 
different traditional interests and experience, developed beliefs which are significantly different 
from the main culture? Are there pacifist sub-cultures? Or are there sub-cultures on particular 
issues, groups from across organisational lines who share beliefs on certain issues?  
 
 
(C) Contemporary Strategic Culture 
The country's contemporary strategic beliefs and attitudes can now be examined. The critical 
issue here is how far these contemporary beliefs are in line with or deviate from the traditional 
beliefs identified above. Have changes in technology or situation or resources led to wholesale 
breaks with previous beliefs, or have older beliefs merely been modified to take into account new 
situations? Have beliefs on nuclear strategy, for example, drawn upon older beliefs, or rejected 
them? Can continuity be demonstrated with the past? The strategic beliefs and values of the 
group should be examined in the same categories as below with a view to determining the degree 
of match. To what extent can contemporary policy be explained in terms of continued adherence 
to traditional beliefs about the use of force? To what extent might it and has it been better 
explained in other ways? What is the relationship between different explanatory systems? If 
policy can be explained in terms of  
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calculations of interest, does that depend upon interests being defined according to peculiar 
national beliefs and values? If bureaucratic politics explains policy, are the bureaucracies 
involved nonetheless rooted in the strategic culture of the state? If the strategic culture approach 
seems to offer no real explanatory power, then that should be made clear: there is nothing to be 
gained from trying to make more of strategic culture than the evidence allows.   
 
 We have now entered a post-Cold War strategic environment. How has the country 
reacted to this? Are traditional and very recent attitudes and policies still operating? Has there 
been any change in them? Has any 'new thinking' on security taken place, as in Gorbachev's 
strategic cultural revolution in the mid-1980s? It is interesting to consider whether attitudes and 
beliefs and policy have changed as the environment has over the past five years, or remained the 
same. 
  
 Different types of strategic behaviour will be important for different states, but the policy 
areas below are important for most states. 
 
 
1. Nuclear strategy 
What are the characteristics of the country's attitudes towards nuclear war, nuclear deterrence, 
limited war and escalation, strategic defence and nuclear blackmail and coercion? Comments on 
'nuclear strategy', even for countries which do not have nuclear weapons themselves, would be 
useful: all countries are targetable. How are nuclear weapons themselves viewed: as military 
weapons, or as political bargaining counters? What is distinctive about the country's nuclear 
beliefs, and what has it in common with other states? Does the country's policy on nuclear 
weapons accord with these beliefs? Is there evidence of divergence between beliefs and policy? 
Is policy adopted although it does not fit in with beliefs and values? Or is policy in line with 




2. Conventional strategy 
Is there anything distinctive about the country's attitudes policies towards conventional military 
strategy? What are the main characteristics of beliefs about the use of conventional forces? What 
objectives would be served by it? Are offensive or defensive strategies believed best? Is there 
emphasis on deception and manoeuvre, or on seeking decisive battles? Are short wars preferred, 
or long, attritional conflicts? Are land, sea or air forces favoured? Is intervention believed to be 
acceptable? Is there any belief in non-offensive defence? Where, how and why has force been 
used in the recent past? What are the main characteristics of the doctrine of the armed forces? 
Does the use of force - or threat to use it - contradict strategic cultural beliefs? Do other factors 
seem to have caused the state to 'go against its grain'? Or has it been in accord with traditional 
beliefs? To what extent can conventional strategic policy and doctrine be said to have been 
determined by strategic culture? 
 
 
3. Disarmament and arms control 
What have been the country's views on the major questions of disarmament and arms control? 
Has there been a 'peace movement' pressing for disarmament? Have arms control or disarmament 
been taken seriously as means to security? Has the country taken any initiatives? Is the 
government content to follow others on these matters? Has any serious thought gone into 
confidence-building measures or other aspects of arms control? Have any agreements been 
reached, and have they been honoured? 
 
 
4. Unconventional strategy 
Does the country have any distinctive attitudes with respect to revolutionary strategies, guerrilla 




dishonourable or honourable, or justifiable? Should they be waged in any particular ways? Has 
the country been involved either in waging or in combating unconventional warfare? Has its 
policy and strategy been in line with beliefs and values? Has it been significantly determined by 




Does the country believe it can best look after its security interests on its own?  What is its 
attitude to associates and alliances? Has there been any thinking about 'common security', 
'security communities', 'security regimes' or 'collective security'? Is the future seen in a unilateral 
or multilateral framework? Has policy sought to provide independence, or to link the country's 
security to that of others? Has this been because of the country's attitudes, or because no 
alternative can be seen - in an increasingly interdependent world, has independence become an 
unattainable goal? Or is interdependence in security genuinely desired? 
 
 
6. Approaches to security 
How is security approached - in a narrow military sense or in a broader sense, as in 
'comprehensive security'? What place in security policy is accorded to political, social, economic 
or environmental security?  
 
 
(D) Culture and behaviour 
Having identified the key features of the group's strategic culture, its impact on debate and 
behaviour needs to be tackled. How far is it possible to use strategic culture as a tool for 
explaining specific decisions? To answer this question a case study approach could be employed, 
looking at important decisions on issues such as whether or not to acquire nuclear weapons, to 
join in alliances or security organisations. The importance of strategic 
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culture may well vary from case to case, but through various case studies its role could be 
assessed. In various ways the influence of strategic culture may be looked for. First, does it play a 
part in the determination of which options should be placed on, and which left off, the agenda for 
consideration? Does it set preferences among these options, making some more and some less 
attractive? Second, what role has strategic culture in determining which option is finally 
selected? How far are beliefs and values translated into decisions? And how important are other 
explanatory factors?  
 
 Next, does strategic culture have an instrumental role? Does it affect how arguments are 
framed? Is there a language in which proposals must be rendered for them to be considered 
legitimate? Do appeals have to be made to beliefs and values for proposals to be considered? Do 
options have to be tailored so as to fit in with existing beliefs? Whether or not strategic culture 
affects policy and decisions, and is useful in explaining such, it may well be of use in 
understanding the debates which take place. Why are some issues subject to fierce debate, why 
are some considered non-controversial? Where does the burden of proof lie in particular debates? 
How are cases best presented? Which analogies are used often, which historical events and 
people are brought in to support arguments? What meaning is attached to these people and 
events? Those seeking to understand strategic debate will need to know about the nation's past, 
its traditions, its practices, its symbols, its meanings. Empirical analysis of individual case 
studies will show whether comprehension of the strategic culture is necessary fully to grasp the 
meaning of debate.  
 
 Here it is important also to ask about the decision-making apparatus of the state. How 
debates are conducted and decisions made will also be affected by the institutions involved, and 
their own specific cultures. Is it possible to identify decision-making styles, traditional patterns of 
decision-making which carry on in modern times? Are there coalitions of departments or interest 
groups which share beliefs? Obviously it is important to ask who has power within the decision-
making structure, and what interests different  
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groups have, but they may also have distinctive beliefs and values. And why certain ministries 
have more say in decisions may be rooted in historical approaches to defence and security: the 
'senior' service, if there is one, may retain influence due to its glorious history, old regiments may 
be impossible to cut for sentimental reasons. Can 'cultural' reasons be found for the relative 
influence of different services, or treasuries, foreign offices, defence ministries? For the 




The political culture literature offers some additional theoretical shine to the concept of strategic 
culture. However, it also reveals that key issues in strategic culture exist also within political 
culture and have no widely accepted solution. The relationship of culture and structure, and the 
methods by which culture may be studied, for instance, are complicated and contentious. 
Therefore a number of questions about the utility of cultural analysis remain open. In the case 
study chapters, some answers to these questions will be offered.  
 
 The framework for analysis offers a starting point for further analysis. It is a 
comprehensive approach to the subject. Not all of its parts will be relevant for a particular group. 
In the Chapter Five, an analysis is attempted of traditional British strategic culture, drawing on 
those aspects of the framework which seem to be most relevant. The aim is to produce a profile 
of British strategic culture which captures as far as possible the essence of a British approach, 
before Chapter Six examines some key strategic decisions in the immediate post-war period to 










The previous chapters have discussed the development of approaches to strategic culture  
and located them within the literature of strategic studies. The related approach of 
political culture has been examined and ideas that can aid the further development of 
strategic culture have been borrowed from it. A way forward with the study of strategic 
culture was then suggested and a framework proposed through which to study the 
strategic culture of any particular group. Turning now to the case study sections of the 
thesis, the attempt is made to test the utility of strategic culture, as it has been defined 
above, in a systematic fashion. The aim will be to provide a general understanding of 
British strategic culture which will enhance our understanding of British strategy and 
defence policy in the 1945-52 period. It is also hoped that focusing in depth on the case 
study will demonstrate the usefulness of the research framework in particular and 
strategic culture in general. 
 
 The reasons for studying Britain during this period are, first, that 1945 saw the 
end of World War Two and the start of the nuclear age, two events of enormous 
significance in British strategic history. Times of great change in external circumstances 
are useful in searching for the operation of strategic culture. Old attitudes may be raised 
to a more conscious level and discussed more openly as they are shown to be outdated. 
On the other hand, it may be that existing attitudes continue to hold and that new 
developments are interpreted in their light, leading to distinctive national solutions, 
perhaps inappropriate ones, to new problems. It has been argued that the foundations of 
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post-war British strategy, especially nuclear, were laid in the early post-war period.1 An 
especially significant landmark occurred in 1952 with the preparation by the British 
Chiefs of Staff of their famous report on Defence Policy and Global Strategy. The Global 
Strategy Paper, as it is usually known, has variously been described as a 'classic among 
military documents' and one of the 'most significant' government defence papers of the 
post-war era.2 Churchill himself called it a 'state paper of the greatest importance'.3  Its 
claimed significance lay in its having 'set out the bases of British strategic ideas in the 
nuclear age'.4 1952 therefore marks the end of an important passage of British strategic 
planning. It is worth investigating whether strategic culture helped shape British grand 
strategy during this time of change and uncertainty. 
 
 This period has also yet to be subjected to a systematic, explicit strategic culture 
examination. Some analyses implicitly adopt similar approaches, but none has done so 
explicitly.5 We can therefore compare an account of the period derived from this approach 
with others applying different perspectives. A more practical reason for studying this 
period is that considerable documentary evidence now exists covering this period. Under 
the thirty year rule governing the release of official papers, records from the period have 
gradually been made public, though much documentation of interest was kept classified. 
Recent loosening of secrecy rules as part of the Waldegrave Initiative on Open 
Government has, however, allowed even more material into the public realm, notably 
including the 1952 Global Strategy Paper itself, as well as its 1950 equivalent.6 These 
                                                          
1 See John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy 1945-1964 (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1995), p. 1. 
2 See Andrew J. Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force 
1939-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 87; and Eric J. Grove, Vanguard to Trident: 
British Naval Policy Since World War Two (London: Bodley Head, 1987), p. 83.   
3 Cited in Richard N. Rosecrance, Defence of the Realm: British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch (New York 
and London: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 164. 
4 Ian Clark and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy 1945-1955 (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1989), p. 170.  
5 For example, Clark and Wheeler, pp. 17-42, discuss Britain's strategic legacy, or the historical baggage 
account of which decision-makers had to take. 
6 For a detailed discussion of the 1952 Global Strategy Paper, see John Baylis and Alan Macmillan, 'The 
British Global Strategy Paper of 1952', Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2 (June 1993), pp. 200-
26. A full version of the paper is contained in Alan Macmillan and John Baylis, A Reassessment of the 
British Global Strategy Paper of 1952, International Politics Research Paper No. 13 (Department of 
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documents can be analysed with a view to deriving from them evidence of the beliefs and 
values which might have informed debate and decisions on strategic policy. British grand 
strategy during the early post-war years therefore represents a convenient, interesting and 
manageable case study. 
 
 A number of authors have already made use of the newly available documentation 
to construct detailed histories of British strategy during the early post-war period.7 Their 
work contrasts with previous studies based on interview and other secondary sources 
(excepting the work of Margaret Gowing, the official historian of the British atomic 
energy commission, who had full access to government papers).8 Whereas the earlier 
work focused on the political rationales for British acquisition of atomic weapons, such as 
their importance for the maintenance of British great power status and the so-called 
'Anglo-American special relationship', the later work has concentrated more attention on 
the strategic side. It has sought to show, using the newly available documents, that much 
debate went on within the government around the role and utility of atomic weapons.9 It is 
perhaps inevitable that scholars digging into the archives will find much new evidence of 
strategic debate, for once decisions have been made to develop nuclear weapons, the 
armed forces must discuss their utility. How significant their discussions are in the 
decision to acquire the weapons is another matter. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, in association with the Nuclear History Program, 
1993). The 1950 Global Strategy Paper, DO (50) 45, Report by the Chiefs of Staff on 'Defence Policy and 
Global Strategy', 7 June 1950, was published in H.J. Yasamee and K.A. Hamilton, (eds), Documents on 
British Policy Overseas, Series II, Vol. IV, Korea: June 1950-April 1951 (London: HMSO, 1991), pp. 411-
31. 
7 In addition to Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, and Clark and Wheeler, see for instance Ian Clark, 
Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America, 1957-1962 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994); Martin S. Navias, Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning 1955-1958 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1991); and G. Wyn Rees, Anglo-American Approaches to Alliance Security, 1955-60 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of 
Southampton, 1996). 
8 Margaret Gowing's official history is Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-
1952 Vol. I, Policy Making (London: Macmillan, 1974). Other earlier works include Pierre; Rosecrance; 
and A.J.R. Groom, British Thinking About Nuclear Weapons (London: Pinter, 1974). On the two waves of 
writing, see Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, pp. 1-3. 
9 See Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, pp. 1-3. 
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 It may also be the case that the recent works are by younger academics, such as 
Clark and Wheeler, from a new generation which is more resigned to Britain being a 
power of the second rank, and who therefore are less convinced that Great Power status 
was so significant. In other words, it may be that older scholars like Gowing were part of 
the strategic culture of the time. Their analysis could then have used knowledge of 
prevailing beliefs and values to fill in the gaps left by missing documents, thereby 
employing a strategic culture approach in spirit if not in name. Part of the point of this 
case study section is then be to see whether a strategic culture approach yields an 
explanation closer to one or other view of British grand strategy.  
 
 There are other reasons also why the strategic culture approach might differ from 
recent scholarship. That scholarship is grounded in the assumption that with more 
documents now available, the story of the development of British nuclear strategy can 
more completely be told and the key decisions better understood. Certainly the documents 
shed new light on a number of areas of British strategy. However, there are two respects 
in which a strategic culture approach might come to different conclusions. First, strategic 
culture is concerned with shared values and beliefs, which are often held implicitly or 
taken for granted. It is concerned with things which go without saying. These 'unspoken 
assumptions' are not always written down, because there is no need to do so.10 The 
documents do not always yield evidence of important beliefs, and only give a partial 
account of the past. Even if all the documents of the period were available, they would 
not tell us everything. Strategic culture attempts to fill in the blanks in the thinking of 
decision-makers by suggesting which beliefs and values underscored decisions. 
 
 Secondly, for some historians, the job of writing history is to let the facts, as 
contained in the documents, 'speak for themselves'.11 Others believe that this is an 
                                                          
10 For a discussion of the need for historians to comprehend the 'unspoken assumptions' of decision-makers, 
see James Joll, '1914: The Unspoken Assumptions', in H.W. Koch, (ed), The Origins of the First World 
War: Great Power Rivalry and German War Aims (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 309-
12. 
11 See E.H. Carr, What is History? (London: Penguin, second edition, edited by R.W.Davies, 1987), p. 11. 
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impossible task and that documents on their own have no meaning.12 In order to 
understand the debates revealed in the documents you need to comprehend the prism of 
beliefs and values through which decision-makers see the world. Only then can the 
meaning of the documents be more fully revealed. Strategic culture tries to provide the 
means for interpreting the documents. This interpretive approach therefore has the 
potential to provide an understanding of the period lacking in documentary histories 
which are concerned only implicitly with beliefs and values, or not at all. 
 
 The aim of the case study chapters is therefore to use the framework to analyse 
British grand strategy between 1945-52 to see whether a new understanding can be forged 
of the period, and to see where it differs from and agrees with existing studies. The first 
stage in the application of the framework involves attempting to identify the main 
features of British strategic culture prior to 1945, its key distinctive beliefs and values, 
and establishing their enduring nature over a long period of time. If it cannot be shown 
that distinctive British strategic beliefs have existed over time, then one of the main 
planks of the strategic culture approach can be dismissed. The attempt will also be made 
to link these beliefs to the geographic situation, historical experience and political culture 
of the nation. That it is national specifity that shapes distinctive strategic belief is also an 
important plank of the strategic culture approach.  
 
 To isolate what is distinctive in the British strategic culture, a comparative 
approach involving a number of different states would be no doubt be preferable. To 
study only one state is to risk identifying as unique to one culture beliefs which are to be 
found more widely. Indeed, it is argued that British history is 'commonly taught separately 
and with very little cross reference to that of the rest of Europe', ignoring the 
developments shared by Britain and its European neighbours.13 That this is so stems from 
                                                          
12 For a provocative recent discussion of these issues see Keith Jenkins, Re-Thinking History (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1991). 
13 See Jeremy Black, Convergence or Divergence? Britain and the Continent (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1994), pp. 1-2. 
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a perception of Britain as unique. This then becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, for if 
Britain alone is considered then comparisons with other countries go unseen. Therefore 
the risk arises that by pre-supposing a unique British way in war and studying only 
Britain to find it, we confirm tautologically our original belief. Comparative studies, and 
the more the better, would lessen this risk. Yet, as the size of the framework shows, there 
is little research economy in the study of strategic culture. It requires considerable effort, 
and space does not allow for additional case studies. Moreover, comparative studies are 
not without considerable difficulties themselves. Given the diversity of countries, finding 
rough equivalents is not easy. Where possible, comparison and contrast will be made, 
however, with other countries, and especially those which have already been the subject 
of strategic culture studies. This is not an entirely satisfactory approach. Nevertheless, as 
a first stage it is necessary to discern whether enduring strategic beliefs exist. Further 
comparative studies in the future can confirm - or deny - their uniqueness.   
 
 What follows is a first attempt at isolating the beliefs central to British strategic 
culture. The aim is to provide a comprehensive survey, though there will be aspects of 
British strategic thinking and experience which will not be covered. To aim for breadth is, 
to some degree, to sacrifice depth. More could be said than there is space for here. 
Nevertheless, the intention is to cover as much ground as possible. With regard to sources 
from which to infer beliefs, the approach is eclectic. As a product in part of that culture, 
the author's own insights will be one source. The areas picked out as important sources of 
strategic culture in previous chapters were geography and resources, historical 
experience, and political organisation and culture, especially with regard to the machinery 
of defence policy making. These can now be considered, though as noted in the previous 






Framework for Analysis 
 
1. Geography and resources 
A couple of preliminary points need to be made. First, the implications of the geography 
of a state and its natural resources vary over time. The military importance of coal as a 
resource, for instance, has waxed and waned over the past couple of centuries as warships 
moved from sail to coal and then oil fired engines. In the mid-1990s, with the Channel 
Tunnel built, it is possible to travel by train from London to Paris or Brussels in less time 
than to Glasgow or Aberystwyth, so that for many people in Britain a day trip 'abroad' 
may become much less remarkable than when it entailed flying or sailing. Technology 
therefore can affect the implications of geography. It is necessary to regard geography, 
resources and technology not as fixed entities, but as subject to change.  
 
 The second point is that geography and resources necessarily determine little. 
People can interpret the implications of geographical position in different ways. So the 
Atlantic Ocean is often characterised in post-war Britain as 'the pond', across which we 
might hop to the United States, whereas the English Channel, notwithstanding the 
Chunnel, is still seen by some as a moat or barrier. Attitudes as opposed to geographical 
'facts' lead a 3000 mile stretch of water to be regarded by some as less of a barrier than a 
channel little more than twenty miles across at its narrowest point. Contemporary debates 
on British involvement in the European Union show this ambivalence. Some see Britain 
as essentially European, some as quite separate from Europe. The position of Britain, an 
island moored close to continental Europe, could support either view. It is important, in 
short, to avoid the determinism which has in the past characterised geopolitical analysis 
which, it is argued, has led to states rationalising expansionist policies on the grounds of 
the dictates of geography.14 (It might be added that beliefs about geopolitics could 
constitute an important part of a group's strategic culture.) 
                                                          
14 See for instance G.R. Sloan, Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy, 1890-1987 (Brighton: 
Wheatsheaf, 1988), p. 234. 
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 The point of this section, therefore, is not to point to unchanging geographical 
features as determining beliefs or behaviour. However, a state's geographic setting and 
features clearly open up some possibilities and close off others. Britain, as an island not 
far from continental Europe, has had opportunities both to involve itself in the affairs of, 
and to distance itself from, other European countries. The Channel could serve either as a 
moat or as a highway. Similarly, British people could take to the seas to develop links 
with other areas and continents overseas, or opt for isolation. Changes in transport 
technology, with faster ships and the development of air power, obviously affected 
Britain's position, making contact with other areas easier, though this could produce both 
new risks and opportunities. 
 
 With regard to resources, as an island relatively poor in raw materials, Britain has 
had an incentive to develop commercial links with other areas of the globe. Indeed, 
Britain has imported much of its food.15 Another important aspect of British resources 
concerns industry. During the period under consideration the Industrial Revolution took 
place in Britain and other European states, though at different paces in different states. 
The changing absolute and relative significance of British industrial strength will be 
considered under history and experience. 
 
 
2. History and experience 
Two major problems emerge when considering the enormous subject of the history and 
experience of a nation with a view to tracing the development of strategic culture beliefs. 
First, where to start? In his work on Chinese strategic culture, Alastair Johnston goes 
back to the eleventh century and earlier, indeed as far back as 500BC, to inspect classic 
military texts which he argues form the core of Chinese strategic thought.16 Writing about 
                                                          
15 Philip Norton, The British Polity (New York and London: Longman, third edition, 1994), p. 7. 
16 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 40. 
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Soviet strategic culture, Yitzhak Klein begins with the revolution in 1917, ignoring 
Russian history before that date.17 
 
 Where to start will vary from culture to culture. In the case of Britain, it would be 
possible to delve deep into history, to the history of England over many centuries. Some 
reference may be made to earlier times, but the focus here will be on the modern period, 
from the start of the eighteenth century. In 1707 the union between Scotland and Wales 
and England took place, creating in essence the modern British state, and during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries British national identity was forged.18 Britain also 
rose to great power status during this time in the modern state system. More emphasis 
will be given also to more recent events, which generally are fresher in people's minds 
and more influential upon them. British history, then, begins with the formation of 
Britain. Writing the history of Britain also serves no doubt to confirm the existence of 
Britain as an entity or community, as a common past links people together.  
 
 A second problem is to select within this period what is relevant to study. It is not 
possible to inspect government documents over the whole period, nor obviously to 
conduct interviews. To consider such a long historical period we are forced to use 
secondary works of history. Of these there are plenty, for history itself is taken seriously 
in British culture.19 The past is generally regarded as glorious, and a source of pride, 
unlike in Germany, for example, where recent history is a source of shame and guilt.20 
Some writers see this as nostalgia, as Britons living in the past rather than trying to 
understand it and draw lessons from it for the future. In any case, much has been written 
about British history. The historians who have done the writing have selected what they 
believe to be important and omitted what they see as irrelevant. In doing so they reflect 
                                                          
17 Ira J. Klein, Soviet Strategic Culture, 1917-1965 (PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 1988); and 
Yitzhak Klein, Sources of Soviet Strategic Culture', The Journal of Soviet Military Studies, Vol. 2, No. 4 
(December 1989), pp. 453-90. (Yitzhak and Ira Klein are the same person). 
18 For an excellent recent study of this period, see Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 
(London: Pimlico, 1992). 
19 See the 'Introduction' to Roy Porter, (ed), Myths of the English (Cambridge: Polity, 1992), p. 2. 
20 See Ian Buruma, The Wages of Guilt (London: Cape, 1994).  
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contemporary concerns. Yet these historians will very often be part of British culture, and 
moreover of its elite. Their works provide the basis of the modern elite's understanding of 
the past. For that reason they are of interest, for our concern is not with history as an 
objective entity, but with how certain events and actors are perceived and which are 
entered onto the historical record.  
 
 What is of interest therefore is which events remain, partly through the writing of 
historical accounts, in the collective consciousness, and which are allowed to fade. If 
national history can be likened to personal memory, which has been described as selective 
amnesia, we are interested in what is remembered clearly, but also what is forgotten or 
repressed. Indeed, events which are forgotten may well be more significant in what they 
tell us about beliefs and attitudes than remembered events. If some episode in history is 
painful because it challenges the way Britons think of themselves, for instance, it may be 
repressed. What is painful may change over time. As the idea of empire becomes 
unacceptable, some aspects of British imperial history may be forgotten. As generations 
change also, they may look to the past for clues to their identity, choosing to search 
different periods of their history from those previous generations have selected. Of 
course, events which are repressed or ignored are more difficult to study, as they may 
receive little attention in the historical literature. Nevertheless, the attempt will be made 
to examine aspects of British history about which less is said as well as those about which 
much is said. 
 
 A third issue which follows from this is that our interest is with the perception of 
events rather than the actuality. This suggests that an important focus of study is on myths 
- representations of the past which although they may be based on real events are 
distortions of the past, not rooted in fact. Myths are ways in which people simplify the 
past in order to understand it or to give meaning to it. Contemporary beliefs may 
influence the creation of myths or the 'invention' of traditions which bring the past into 
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line with the present.21 Myths can also have the function of sustaining traditional values. 
In interpreting society and understanding its beliefs and values, the study of myths may be 
as important, indeed more so, than the actual events of history. Historians are often 
uninterested in myths, for these cannot be studied through documents and records. To the 
extent that they are interested in myths, they often counterpose them to reality, and seek 
to 'explode' myths, to expose them as historical untruths by uncovering what 'really' 
occurred.22 Strategic culture on the other hand therefore must pay attention to myth, as it 
is interested mainly in what people believe to be true. Academic debates may rage over 
whether or not Field Marshal Douglas Haig and other World War One military leaders 
were incompetent fools or victims of circumstances they could do little to influence, but 
they are often popularly seen as the former.23  
 
 Moreover, myths can often exert an extremely powerful hold on people's minds, if 
they appear to make sense of the past or the present. They have the functions often of 
legitimising values or institutions, of sanctifying them, of establishing cohesion and 
maintaining loyalty. All of this underlines their importance. Related to myths in this 
regard, fulfilling similar functions, are symbols, which can include language, rituals, 
traditions and customs. Some of these will be referred also to during this chapter.  
 
 Our interest therefore is in myth as much as reality. In the post-modern age, 
however, there is widespread suspicion of all narratives. Various recent books have set 
about exposing how much of what passes for historical reality is merely myth. Further 
than that, some post-modern historians argue that all historical accounts are 'ideological 
constructs', mere representations of the past.24 Different historians will construct their 
                                                          
21 On the invention of traditions, see Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, (eds), The Invention of Tradition 
(Canto edition, 1992; first published by Cambridge University Press, 1983), who define (p. 1) an invented 
tradition as 'a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or 
symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which 
automatically implies continuity with the past'. 
22 Porter, p. 2.  
23 A recent contribution to the academic debate is Gerald DeGroot, 'He had hatred thrust upon him', Times 
Higher, 26 July 1996, p. 18. 
24 See Jenkins, p. 17. 
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historical narratives differently, with different purposes and emphases. No construction, 
in this view, is more or less accurate than any other, and myths are just other 
constructions. The dichotomy of myth and reality is therefore questioned by those who 
ask whether they can ever be distinguished from one another. Notions of reality, and of 
'exact historical knowledge', are questioned, and ultimately those who believe in these 
things are seen as operating on the basis of rationalistic realism: a myth of our Western 
culture.  
 
 In examining British history and experience, therefore, it can be argued that we 
are looking not at some objective series of events but at cultural constructions of what is 
important about the past. We are looking at how ideas about the past, whether true or 
false, have been constructed and developed over time, at which ideas have an enduring 
existence.25 How 'true' these constructions are matters less at one level than how widely 
held and persuasive they are. However, where the 'facts', or what are considered 
authoritative historical accounts, differ substantially from popular beliefs, will be 
significant areas, showing perhaps some need on the part of elites and/or populations to 
avoid the 'truth' or construct different versions of events more in line with existing beliefs 
or needs. During wartime, for example, myths may be generated, deliberately or 
otherwise. These are mythogenetic times, for social cohesion and morale need to be 
sustained.  
 
Experience of war  
Britain's island status has conferred upon it the privilege of relative invulnerability to 
attack. Few other states can claim that they were last successfully invaded as long ago as 
1066 (excepting the occupation during World War Two of the Channel Islands, which is 
often forgotten. Perhaps this is simply because they are not part of mainland Britain, and 
not seen as an important part of the United Kingdom: perhaps also it does not fit in with 
                                                          
25 For more detail on 'constructivism', see Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: the social 
construction of power politics', International Organisation, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425. 
182 
the account of British history which stresses Britain's invulnerability to invasion over 
many centuries). The security provided by the moat of the English Channel has allowed 
Britain to defend itself largely through the strength of the Royal Navy. Large standing 
land armies, and conscription, have not been necessary to defend the British Isles 
themselves, for much of the history of the British state. Nor have extensive land 
fortifications been required. The nation's protectors have been inconspicuous, often at sea, 
and based in harbour towns.  
 
 When Britain has been involved in wars, they have generally been abroad, on 
someone else's territory. The last battle to be fought on English soil was in 1715, 
according to one source.26 This is partly a matter of semantics, for skirmishes have taken 
place since, and of course Britain was shelled from sea and bombed from the air during 
this century. Nevertheless, Britain has most often been some distance from actual 
hostilities. It has not suffered, until this century, the damage to land and civilians which 
other European countries have, and it has not witnessed at first hand the reality of 
fighting. Even though subjected to air attack in World War Two, Britain still did not 
suffer anything like the civilian losses and damage of the Soviet Union or other European 
combatants on both the 'winning' and 'losing' 'sides'.  
 
 Britain has, however, been involved in many wars over the past three centuries. 
By one count, between 1688 and 1945 Britain waged twelve wars with other great 
powers.27 This is reflected in the teaching of British history, international history and 
indeed international relations more generally. These subjects have often been conceived 
as dealing largely with war: the lead up to it, its conduct, and its consequences.28 The 
                                                          
26 Oliver Gillie, 'New Register of English battlefields aims to set record straight', The Independent, 7 
September 1994. 
27 David French, The British Way in Warfare 1688-2000 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), p. xii. 
28 On this point see Ken Booth, '75 Years On: rewriting the subject’s past - reinventing its future', in Steve 
Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, (eds), International Theory: positivism and beyond (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 329-30. A recent work on international history which illustrates the 
point is Michael Dockrill and Brian McKercher, (eds), Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British 
Foreign Policy, 1890-1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).   
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twentieth century is divided in our thinking into the pre-war, inter-war and post-war or 
Cold War periods, plus the wars themselves. This emphasis on war reflects its importance 
and frequency in British history, though it also perhaps reflects a judgement about the 
importance of war made by  the men who have written history. War has been a fact of life 
for much of British history, however. In common with other states, people in Britain have 
seen war as a normal or inevitable state of affairs.29 The stress accorded to war in works 
of history may well serve to reinforce this perception. 
 
 Britain's wars have been fought on the continent of Europe and further afield 
where the overseas colonies of European states were fought over. The Royal Navy has 
also had the role of preventing invading forces from reaching Britain and maintaining its 
sea links with overseas colonies and trading partners on which Britain depended for its 
survival. The significance of the Royal Navy’s role is symbolised in Rule Britannia. The 
flip side of island security is being cut off from others, and Britain, lacking essential raw 
materials, has had to maintain foreign contact. When involved in continental wars Britain 
has needed allies to supply land forces, sometimes paying mercenaries to do the fighting 
on its behalf.  
 
 Britain's experience of war has then been distinct from other Europeans. Wars 
have happened frequently but usually elsewhere, British casualties have been relatively 
low, the armed forces have been small and remote. Britain has generally emerged on the 
winning side but loss has not meant great damage to the homeland itself. Britain has 
considerable experience of war but not, relatively speaking, much terrible experience. 
This ended in the First World War, when Britain committed large numbers of troops to 
the continent. The security of the British homeland was threatened by sea attack to some 
extent, though invasion was not a fear. On the continent of Europe, however, Britain, like 
other states, suffered huge, unprecedented losses, and by 1916 was sending conscripts to 
                                                          
29 On this point see John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: 
Basic Books, paperback edition, 1990), especially p. 46. 
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the front. No longer was a professional army taking the brunt of the fighting, but the 
nation itself. Also, a people shielded from the worst effects of war in the past got more 
insight into the horrors, if only later from returning soldiers and from war poetry. The 
impact was substantial, with a reaction against war itself which led, amongst other things, 
to the establishment of the academic study of international politics (at Aberystwyth), and 
of the League of Nations, both concerned heavily with the prevention of war. There was a 
reaction also against the generals, characterised, or caricatured, as 'donkeys' sending men 
pointlessly to their deaths.30 There is an ambiguity here, with war itself on the one hand 
seen as the problem, but on the other, the way the war was conducted to blame for the 
suffering. 
 
 The Second World War is perceived differently, as a war conducted far more 
competently by military leaders. British losses were far lower, and Britain won victories 
in a way that was not true of the First War. The Somme and other 'battles' of World War 
One involving British forces are rarely thought of as victories, whereas histories of 
decisive battles of the Second World War - much more numerous than books about 
decisive battles of the Great War - record many involving Britain: Alamein, the Battle of 
Britain, the Battle of the Atlantic.31 Moreover, the enemy here was Hitler and fascism, 
which had to be defeated if freedom was to be preserved. Indeed, Britain believed it was 
fighting not only for its own freedom but for that of the world, and for Christian 
civilisation as a whole. Discoveries of the Holocaust after the war confirmed the necessity 
of victory. As Churchill expressed it in one of his noted wartime speeches, 'we will not 
                                                          
30 John Terraine carries out a typically vigorous debunking of what he sees as the myth of British soldiers in 
World War One as lions led by donkeys. See The Smoke and the Fire: Myths and Anti-Myths of War 1861-
1945 (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1980), pp. 170-81. 
31 Examples of books of decisive battles which feature the Battles of Britain, the Atlantic and El Alamein 
include Geoffrey Regan, The Guinness Book of Decisive Battles (Enfield: Guinness, 1992), which covers 
fifty decisive battles from world history, including five from World War Two: the Battles of Alamein, 
Britain, Sedan, Midway and Stalingrad; Peter Young, (ed), Decisive Battles of the Second World War: An 
Anthology (London Barker, 1967), which includes fourteen battles, among them the Battles of Britain, the 
Atlantic and El Alamein; as does Noble Frankland and Christopher Dowling, (eds), Decisive Battles of the 
20th Century: land-sea-air (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1976); and so too does Anthony Preston, (ed), 
Decisive Battles of Hitler’s War (London: Hamlyn, 1977). 
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fail mankind'.32 This was a war worth fighting and sacrificing for, and one better run than 
the first. 
 
 Much of this perception may be based on ethnocentric misunderstanding. That 
Britain emerged with relatively small losses was due, arguably, to poor judgement on the 
part of the enemy, as well as to luck. By being pushed off the continent straight away 
Britain may have been spared a war similar to the 1914-18 conflict, when after a fluid 
opening, static trench warfare set in. Forced to retreat to the island fortress, and perhaps 
let off the hook by German failure to press their advantage to the full, Britain then 
enjoyed a respite. The Battle of Britain was won in part through misjudgements and 
inadequate resources on the part of the enemy, in part through skill and effective fighting 
by the British and allied forces.33 The Battle of the Atlantic, in which the enemy attempted 
to starve the British of supplies, was a close run thing, with British ingenuity and US aid 
important contributors to victory.34 Meanwhile, however, a savage war was being fought 
on the Eastern Front, resembling at times the worst static warfare of World War One.35 
With the luxury of waiting until 1944 to open the second front, Britain was once again 
able to secure victory through the sacrifice of others. 
 
 Notwithstanding the point that British perceptions about the war may be at odds 
with the 'reality', those perceptions are important. Much anti-war poetry and literature was 
produced after World War One, the dominant tone of which, it is argued, was irony: the 
innocence of British troops shattered by the slaughter of the trenches.36 Examples are 
legion. One which refers directly to irony is Frederic Manning’s Grotesque: 
 
                                                          
32 Quoted in Robert Rhodes James, (ed), Winston S. Churchill, His Complete Speeches 1897-1963, Vol. VI, 
1935-1942 (New York and London: Chelsea House/Bowker, 1974), p. 6329. 
33 See for instance R.J. Overy, The Air War 1939-1945 (London: Macmillan, paperback edition, 1987), pp. 
31-34. 
34 See Basil H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (London: Pan, 1973), pp. 386-411. 
35 The best account of the war on the eastern front is John Erickson's two volumes The Road to Stalingrad 
(London: Panther, 1985); and The Road to Berlin (London: Grafton, 1985).  
36 Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), especially 
chapter one. 
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These are the damned circles Dante trod, 
Terrible in hopelessness, 
But even skulls have their humour, 
An eyeless and sardonic mockery: 
And we, 
Sitting with streaming eyes in the acrid smoke, 
That murks our foul, damp billet, 
Chant bitterly, with raucous voices 
As a choir of frogs 
In hideous irony, our patriotic songs.37 
 
Also mocking the patriotism which enticed men into the trenches is Wilfred Owen's 
Dulce Et Decorum Est, one of the best known poems of World War One, which 
concludes a description of the effects of a gas attack on British soldiers thus: 
 
If you could hear, at every jolt, the blood 
Come gargling from the froth-corrupted lungs, 
Obscene as cancer, bitter as the cud 
Of vile, incurable sores on innocent tongues, - 
My friend, you would not tell with such high zest 
To children ardent for some desperate glory, 
The old Lie: Dulce et decorum est 
Pro patria mori.38 
 
 After World War Two, by contrast, much British cinema output recorded the 
glorious British triumph in the war. The Cruel Sea (1953), The Dam Busters (1955), The 
Colditz Story (1955), The Battle of the River Plate (1956) and The Battle of Britain 
(1969) differ in emphases. Some explore themes - such as the nature of masculine roles - 
for which the war provides a useful context but which have significance which transcends 
that context.39 However, if they highlight the destructiveness and madness of the 
phenomenon of war, none supposes that World War Two could have been avoided nor 
that it was mismanaged by the British. 
 
                                                          
37 Frederic Manning, Grotesque, in Jon Silkin, (ed), The Penguin Book of First World War Poetry (London: 
Penguin, 1979), p. 179. Though Australian, Manning moved to Britain when 16 and fought with the British 
army. 
38 Wilfred Owen, Dulce Et Decorum Est, in ibid, p. 183. 
39 See Marcia Landy, British Genres: Cinema and Society 1930-1960 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1991), pp. 171-78. 
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 What is striking also about World War Two and British memories is which events 
linger strongest in the memory. D-Day is remembered, its fiftieth anniversary recently 
celebrated. But Dunkirk and the Blitz are possibly better known and thought more 
significant. On the face of it this is odd, since Dunkirk saw the British Army knocked off 
continental Europe and defeated, even if it lived to fight another day. The Battle of 
Britain and the Blitz were more obviously triumphs for the British, even if achieved in 
part through German strategic errors. It is significant, however, that these events occurred 
when Britain stood alone against Hitler. At Dunkirk, Britain is seen as defying the 
victorious Hitler who has defeated Britain's European allies. 'In defeat, defiance', 
Churchill noted.40 Britain, in dire adversity, thumbed its nose at Hitler. Thus Dunkirk is 
remembered almost as a victory. The joke goes: 'we didn't win at Dunkirk by running 
away'.  
 Many of Churchill's speeches sum up British defiance. The idea that Germany 
would wring Britain's neck like a chicken was countered famously by Churchill with a 
speech concluding: 'some chicken, some neck'.41 Britain would fight them on the beaches 
and anywhere else. Again, during the Battle of Britain and the Blitz, the image is of 
plucky Britain taking on the might of Germany and surviving. This time it is 'the Few' 
who defeat Hitler, yet the Blitz as a whole is remembered as a time when the nation stood 
together under attack. Upper lips were kept stiff and morale never buckled. The Royal 
Family rode it out in London. Everyone mucked in and did their bit. Angus Calder might 
expose this as a myth, but the idea of the nation standing together remains a powerful 
one.42 At Dunkirk also, it had been a united effort, with brave civilians in small boats 
ferrying soldiers to safety. 
 
 So the events best remembered from the 1939-45 conflict centre on the united 
British nation facing the enemy and overcoming it, and doing so alone until eventual, 
                                                          
40 This phrase is part of the 'Moral of the Work' in Winston Churchill, The Second World War (London: 
Cassell, 1948-1954). 
41 Quoted in Rhodes James, p. 6544. 
42 Angus Calder, The Myth of the Blitz (London: Pimlico, 1992). 
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belated US involvement. This war was seen as a worthwhile one to rescue the world from 
fascism. Also, the nation had a sense of unity and purpose, fighting for a fairer, better 
Britain, for domestic social reform. War may have been an evil, but a necessary one, out 
of which good would come.  
 
 Some historical events are remembered clearly, others forgotten. Partly this is due 
to the concerted effort to remember certain events. The two world wars have been seen as 
events which must never be forgotten if they are not to be repeated. After the great war, 
considerable effort was devoted to devising ways of commemorating the sacrifice 
entailed. Village war memorials, remembrance Sunday, Chelsea pensioners and poppies 
have become well-known symbols commemorating the two world wars in particular 
(though it has been argued that the French make even greater efforts at commemoration, 
with VE Day designated a national holiday, and 11 November even now marked by more 
events than in Britain). The theme of such symbols is that 'we will remember them'. What 
is remembered is the sacrifice of soldiers in the pursuit of some just end - the defeat of 
tyranny or the ending of war itself.43 Other events are not commemorated so deliberately, 
and indeed allowed to pass out of the collective memory. This is especially so of less 
glorious historical episodes where the use of force is less justifiable. British colonial 
policy involved the threat and use of force to maintain control of other peoples and to 
exploit them commercially. This was justified on the grounds of ideas of white 
superiority. This is a less celebrated aspect of history in modern times when it seems 
indefensible; in other times it was a source of glory that Britain maintained an empire on 
which the sun never set. By the end of the Second World War such attitudes could still be 
found, and attempts had been made throughout the previous half century to keep the 
Empire alive. Empire too was bound up with ideas of great power status. But with the 
huge contribution of Africans and Asians from the Empire to the war for British freedom, 
it was becoming more difficult to sustain them and to deny freedom to the colonies. 
Closer to home, British intervention 
                                                          
43 Bob Bushaway, 'Name Upon Name: The Great War and Remembrance', in Porter. 
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in Ireland and its consequences are subjects of national amnesia. So history gets written 
by the victors, with the losers' version omitted, and it gets rewritten as attitudes change.  
 
 As a victorious power in the two wars this century, Britain gained little incentive 
for change. Defeated states like Germany had to ask how they had reached that position; 
devastated states had to rebuild from scratch. Britain emerged from World War Two able 
to tell itself that it must have been doing the right things in the realms of foreign and 
defence policy up till then in order to triumph. At home, social change was forced on to 
the agenda by wartime experience. In terms of security policy this was not the case. 
Indeed, however awful the effects of war, it could become later a source of nostalgia in 
that it was a time of national unity and purpose, when people worked and fought together. 
This may be a rose-tinted view. In the immediate aftermath of war people were no doubt 
glad it was over and looking to rebuild and restore prosperity. Later, as the economy 
struggled and social problems emerged, the war could be seen in a different light.  
 
 
Strategic Thinking and Doctrine 
In looking for traditional British approaches to strategy, an interesting starting place is 
with the work of Basil Liddell Hart. Probably Britain's best known writer on military 
affairs, Liddell Hart wrote in 1932 a book on The British Way in Warfare.44 As discussed 
in the Introduction to the thesis, he argued that over three centuries of successful military 
experience there had evolved a 'distinctively British practice of war'.45 The keynotes of 
this policy were mobility and surprise, which were best achieved through the use of sea 
power. Britain, developing into an imperial nation, eschewed land battles on continental 
Europe in favour of the use of the Royal Navy to build an overseas empire. Continental 
powers were fought by intercepting their shipping and disrupting their trade, not by 
directly engaging them in land warfare. 
                                                          
44 Basil H. Liddell Hart, The British Way in Warfare: Adaptability and Mobility (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1935). 
45 Ibid, p. v. 
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 In the Great War, however, this traditional practice was abandoned as Britain 
committed huge forces to the continent and fought an attritional war to very nearly the 
bitter end. 'Shallow thought' and 'slavish imitation of Continental fashions' were to blame 
for this action, the result of which was the catastrophic losses of trench warfare. Britain 
must return, Liddell Hart argued, to its traditional and successful maritime strategy. This 
view is challenged by other historians, notably Michael Howard.46 Howard stresses the 
limitation throughout British history of dependence on sea power alone. Britain's naval 
strength gave it certain options, such as attacking the colonies and trade of others. It 
enabled Britain to survive by retreating behind its moat while continental states were 
overrun, to recoup its strength. But naval power on its own could not bring victory. That 
required taking on enemy land forces. The British had always recognised this: 'a 
commitment of support to a Continental ally in the nearest available theatre, on the largest 
scale that contemporary resources could afford, so far from being alien to traditional 
British strategy, was absolutely central to it', Howard concludes.47 Where Britain had 
relied solely on maritime strength, it was through force of necessity rather than a matter 
of choice. The events of the two world wars were therefore in line with past practice.   
 
 Howard described Liddell Hart's book as 'a piece of brilliant political 
pamphleteering', a polemic backed by selective reference to history and intended to 
influence government policy and public opinion.48 Liddell Hart was typical of his 
generation, shocked by the unprecedented losses of World War One. If modern historians 
see change in the nature of warfare itself as largely responsible for the carnage of the 
trenches, contemporaries tended to blame the errors of political and military leaders. Had 
Britain adhered to its traditional policy victory could have been achieved at much less 
cost.   
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47 Ibid, p. 200. 
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 Howard himself was an advocate of the need for Britain to undertake a continental 
commitment, for 'no continental adversary could be defeated without a military decision 
on the mainland of Europe and Britain could wield no influence either in war or in peace 
unless she was prepared to make a major contribution to that decision'.49 Howard's 
influential book, The Continental Commitment, came out in 1972. In a new edition which 
appeared in 1989, Howard reflected that, just as Liddell Hart's generation had been 
influenced by its experience, so too he had been influenced by events. Liddell Hart, after 
the Great War, came to believe that continental commitments were contrary to tradition 
and to be avoided if that war was not to be repeated. Howard, after World War Two, and 
during the Cold War, sought to show that a commitment to NATO was crucial to prevent 
a recurrence of war.50   
 
 Each writer then was influenced by his own experience, but each was also taking 
part in a long-standing debate, dating back as far as the Elizabethan age. As an island 
'separated from, yet part of, the European land mass', Britain had at least the illusion of 
choice: to enter into European affairs, or to use her sea power to maintain isolation from 
Europe and links elsewhere.51 Around this choice a debate or a dialectic emerged, with 
advocates both of a maritime strategy and a continental commitment. For Walter Raleigh, 
'whosoever commands the sea commands trade; whosoever commands the trade of the 
world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself'.52 Sir Francis 
Knollys meanwhile advised Queen Elizabeth that 'the avoiding of Her Majesty's danger 
doth consist in the preventing of the conquest of the Low Countries'.53 Michael Howard 
believes that this dialectic has been central not only to Britain's strategy but also 'to her 
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50 Ibid. 
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political economy and indeed her culture, throughout her historical experience', and 
indeed remains so today.54  
 
 The issue here is then less whether a continental commitment or a maritime 
strategy is in Britain's best interests, nor whether one or the other is traditional. Indeed, 
the argument of a recent book by historian David French is that no distinctive British way 
in warfare can be discerned. Britain pragmatically adopted what was seen as the best 
approach for any given war, in this account, sometimes favouring maritime operations, 
sometimes land operations.55 Rather the issue is that debates about British strategy have 
often been framed in terms of one versus the other. At different times, different 
experiences may lend greater support to one or the other. But it is the opposition of one to 
the other which characterises British strategic debate. 
 
 It is interesting also that the notion of a distinctive British way in warfare has been 
current since the beginning of the century when Julian Corbett distinguished the British, 
maritime strategy from the Continental or German approach.56 So the idea that there is a 
distinct British way in war or strategic culture has been self-consciously debated for some 
time, even if there is disagreement about what constitutes it. That something close to a 
British strategic culture has been discussed for a hundred years is an interesting part of 
the strategic culture. Moreover, that it has been used in the advocacy of future policies is 
noteworthy also: the view that tradition should be maintained, that because a policy is 
traditional and long adhered to it still holds good. As Howard notes, much British 
historical writing over the past century makes reference to the Elizabethan age.57 Finding 
support for in history for your policies seems to be seen as an important means of 
advocacy.  
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 For much of Britain's strategic history, its island status resulted in relative British 
invulnerability to attack, and a debate about whether strategic interests could best be 
advanced through sea power or land forces; through a maritime strategy or a continental 
commitment. In the early years of the twentieth century, however, the development of a 
new technology brought new meaning to Britain's geographical setting. Air power 
threatened to bypass both sea and land forces and to strike at the heart of a state's industry 
and population. This was a threat to all states, but particularly to one which had hitherto 
been able to avoid the worst effects of warfare.  
 
 The threat of air attack was seen between the wars as a very real and frightening 
one. It was imagined that the damage done by bombing to people and property, and to 
morale, would be awesome and on a scale never before faced by Britain. Moreover, little 
or nothing could be done in the face of this threat, for the bomber would always get 
through, as Baldwin put it in his famous speech to the House of Commons on 10 
November 1932. The fear of the bomber arguably deterred the British from undertaking 
firmer action against the Axis states in the late 1930s. It seems to have been in 
Chamberlain’s mind when negotiating with Hitler at Munich, for example.58 Harold 
Macmillan later commented that 'we thought of air warfare in 1938 rather as people think 
of nuclear warfare today'.59 
 
 Bomber aircraft posed new threats to Britain, but simultaneously offered new 
opportunities. At the same time as being open to bomber attack, of course, Britain could 
itself bomb others. The Royal Air Force did indeed develop between the wars a strategic 
bombing policy of its own.60  There was much debate at the time on how air power should 
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be used. As a new technology allowing military action against the heart of the enemy, and 
promising, in some accounts, more or less instant and horrific damage in war, various 
matters had to be faced. Against which targets should attacks be directed - military only, 
cities, or industry? Should pre-emptive attack be launched, given the damage a state 
would face in an initial attack? For the British, it was considered wrong to strike a first 
blow.61 Was defence against air attack feasible?   
 
 After debating such issues, the British had in place by the outbreak of the Second 
World War a strategic bombing doctrine which was then put into practice. This doctrine 
involved taking the war directly to the enemy population and industry, its war-making 
potential. During the war Britain favoured area bombing attacks aimed at destroying 
enemy morale. Debate continues on the effectiveness of the policy in practice, on its 
contribution to the end of the conflict. Certainly air power did not have the immediate and 
devastating effect which many had attributed to it, and the limitations of the technology 
available affected the policy. Many airmen did nevertheless emerge from World War two 
convinced that strategic air power could have a decisive impact in war.62  
 
 Did air power then revolutionise British strategic thinking? Did it require a new 
debate in place of the continental commitment against the maritime strategy? It has been 
argued that air power could be fitted in to this debate. As a power traditionally weak in 
land forces, Britain had placed much reliance on sea power. Now it could rely on air 
power, both as a defence against attack and as a means of carrying the war to the enemy. 
Instead of indirect blockade and attacks on enemy colonies aimed at weakening an enemy 
economically, the British could, through the application of air power, attack enemy 
industry directly. As Freedman writes, 'it demanded no great conceptual leap to suggest 
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that bombers might achieve through direct assault what the Navy could only achieve 
through an indirect squeeze'.63 The British preference for targeting civilians rather than 
industry weakens this case, however. 
 
 Three final points are worth making in this section. First, with regard to wider 
influences on British strategic thinking, it might be asked how influential foreign 
strategists were, and in particular Clausewitz. Recent scholarship shows how difficult it is 
to identify the influence of Clausewitz in Britain.64 For one thing, his influence is often 
denied. The self-conscious British distaste for theory, discussed below, leads many to rule 
out the possibility that the philosophical work On War could have been read widely in 
Britain.65 Indeed, little military theory was produced in Britain, though much military 
history was, until this century. In the aftermath of the Boer War and then the First World 
War more attention was paid to this subject, with Liddell Hart and J.F.C. Fuller emerging 
and writing their numerous books on military theory. Another reason to doubt the 
influence of Clausewitz was that, as a German as well as a philosopher, he was doubly 
suspect. Especially at times of competition between Germany and Britain, his 'Teutonic 
philosophizing' was viewed with disdain.66 After World War One, Liddell Hart tended to 
blame Clausewitz for British military failings in the conflict, and Clausewitz was also 
sometimes seen as encouraging that war and in favour of war in general.67  
 
 That the British tend to deny Clausewitz's influence is interesting, but does not 
mean he was uninfluential. If not studied self-consciously, his ideas could still percolate 
into British thinking where it might be used unwittingly or rationalised as common sense. 
There is evidence of some writers deliberately adopting Clausewitz. Julian Corbett, for 
instance, writing on sea power, did more than Mahan to emphasise that land forces were 
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also important, that Britain needed to wage limited, defensive wars on land as well as 
exercise sea power. In this he drew on Clausewitz.68 Others who drew on Clausewitz 
tended to be reformers, using the German's ideas to lend weight to their views.69  
 
 Looking at other military theorists in the first half of the twentieth century, a 
similar story emerges of the influence of foreign thinkers being denied. According to Sir 
John Slessor, a post-war Chief of the Air Staff and close aide of Sir Hugh Trenchard, the 
'Father of the RAF', it was Trenchard who inspired British air power theory.70 Slessor is 
always at pains to discount the influence which the famous Italian air power theorist 
Douhet is supposed by some analysts to have exerted on British air power thinking in the 
interwar period, pointing out that he had himself never read Douhet, nor had the Italian 
been mentioned while he was at Staff College, and complaining that writers such as 
Liddell Hart and J.F.C. Fuller hugely exaggerated the influence of the Italian air power 
proponent.71 This argument is disputed by Bernard Brodie, who sees the RAF as having 
been won over by the ideas of Douhet, even though he concedes that it had 'already 
anticipated his views'.72 However, there is little direct evidence that Douhet exerted any 
great influence on the RAF as a whole: various works on British wartime bombing policy 
devote little space to Douhet, while Robin Higham goes out of his way to deny that 
Douhet was influential.73 Though similarities exist between the two sets of ideas, it is 
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hard to trace influence, especially when it is denied by those who express dislike for any 
theory.  
 
 The second point regarding strategic thinking concerns technology. It is often said 
that technology is seen in the United States as a panacea, that a technological quick-fix 
can solve all problems. In Britain, technology has also been important. Britain has led the 
way in naval technology, with for example the Dreadnought race, trying to stay ahead of 
Germany technologically (and quantitatively). Britain also developed armour between the 
wars and tried to develop the best aircraft. In World War Two, the Maud Committee 
which met to consider whether the attempt should be made to develop atomic weapons 
concluded that if such weapons could be constructed, then no great power would wish to 
be without them.74 To compete with other great powers, then, and to maintain great power 
status, Britain had to possess the most up-to-date weapons.75 At the same time, it was 
considered necessary for Britain to lead other states quantitatively - under the two power 
standard, Britain sought naval strength equal to the combined strength of her two nearest 
rivals. So quantity too was needed, greater strength than other states being necessary for 
security and maintenance of great power status. 
 
  
Conduct of foreign policy 
For most of the last three centuries, Britain has been a 'Great Power', which a capital 'G' 
and a capital 'P'. That is to say, in military, naval and economic terms Britain was among 
the small group of European states which were clearly stronger than all the rest. The 
defining characteristic of great power status was the ability to use force, or threaten its 
use, in order to further your own interests; more crudely, to be able to wage war on a 
massive scale whenever necessary, against any state. Great power status was quite self-
consciously held. The great powers endeavoured to maintain the small inner circle of 
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great powers, to keep others out and to keep members in. With great power status came 
both rights and obligations in the international arena; the right to take what you wanted 
from smaller, weaker states, but also the obligation to protect these other states. The great 
power, then, was the father of the family, commanding obedience, granting favours, and 
using force where necessary to maintain order and his own position of authority.76  
 
 Britain's great power status had been achieved partly through war and 
colonisation. Weak in raw materials, Britain had acquired colonies, often during wars, 
which could make good its own deficiencies. The empire provided raw materials which 
were turned into manufactured goods in Britain and then traded as Britain led Europe into 
the Industrial Revolution. The wealth which this process generated was necessary to wage 
war. War, colonisation, economic prosperity and great power status were therefore all 
closely intertwined. As British economic strength began to decline relative to other 
European states which began to industrialise later, it became correspondingly more 
difficult for Britain to retain great power status. This led, Paul Kennedy argues, to the 
adoption in the mid-nineteenth century, of a policy of appeasement. For Kennedy, 
appeasement meant not 'cowardly surrender' - the meaning attached to the term during the 
late 1930s - but the practice of 'settling international...quarrels by admitting and satisfying 
grievances through rational negotiation and compromise, thereby avoiding the resort to an 
armed conflict which would be expensive, bloody and possibly very dangerous'. For a 
state in relative economic decline with world-wide responsibilities, this was a sensible, 
and even a 'natural' policy.77 
 
 Although great power status required the ability to wage war, the British were 
therefore for much of this period seeking to avoid conflict. This was also the case after 
the Napoleonic Wars, when the great powers, weary of war, formed the Concert of 
Europe, a 'security regime' under which all states showed restraint, sought co-operation 
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rather than conflict, met regularly to discuss problems and defined their interests in 
broader and longer terms.78 The nineteenth century witnessed fewer great power wars than 
the eighteenth, partly through changed attitudes to war and different conceptions of 
security. Following World War One also the desire to avoid future wars was strong, 
though this time the preferred method was to set up a collective security organisation. In 
this the support of great powers was crucial. These states had to live up to their 
obligations to protect others through the threat and if necessary the use of force in the 
League of Nations. So notions of great power status remained, in the twentieth century, 
but in a changed form. Great powers were to use their strength more for the benefit of the 
international community as a whole, and aggressive use of force was outlawed. The 
failure of the great powers to meet their obligations led to the failure of the League. The 
policy of appeasement prevailed and culminated in Munich, a word with huge 
emblematic power. Failure to confront Hitler in 1938, and the belief that he might be 
appeased, led to the fall of Czechoslovakia to Germany. Appeasement became a 
discredited policy and a pejorative term, and war became inevitable.  
 
 Another feature of British foreign policy was the emphasis given to the balance of 
power. Again, this was based upon viewing states in terms of calculations of their 
military and economic strength. The British policy was to balance the power of rival 
states on the continent of Europe. The aim was to prevent any state or alliance from 
becoming powerful enough to dominate the continent. Britain, the neutral balancer, 
would side with the weaker coalition to balance the power of the stronger, waging war if 
necessary to cut stronger powers down to size. More than this, some commentators have 
noted that the British tended to see themselves as saving Europe from itself. By acting as 
the balancer, Britain could maintain order and stability and prevent Europe from 
descending into war and chaos. Britain's role was a special one, and indeed Britain had an 
obligation to maintain the balance. These views were committed to paper by the Foreign 
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Office mandarin Sir Eyre Crowe in his famous 'Memorandum on the present state of 
relations with France and Germany', written in January 1907 and described by Zara 
Steiner as 'perhaps the only Foreign Office memorandum to have become a classic state 
paper'.79  
 
 Such a policy required that Britain had no fixed allies, but was free to put its 
weight behind the weaker states. Continental allies of some kind were essential, however, 
to the conduct British foreign policy. A debate in British foreign policy which echoes that 
of the continental commitment versus the maritime strategy can be found here. As an 
island, it was argued by some that Britain did not need allies, for it could retreat from 
involvement in the continent. During the last years of the nineteenth century, when 
Britain lacked allies, some proposed that this was no problem but in fact traditional 
British policy. Isolation came to be described as 'splendid' at that time, regarded as a 
source of strength and glory. Other commentators saw allies as necessary throughout 
British history, however, if not permanent allies.80 Whatever the 'reality' of British history, 
it is significant that the debate was conducted in terms of isolation or allies, and not a 
mixed picture. Following World War One, views changed somewhat, with allies seen as 
likely to drag you into conflict you had every reason to avoid, and so fixed alliances were 
avoided.81 With the Second World War underway, further change occurred: allies were 
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3. Political culture and defence organisation 
Many writers of text-books on British politics include a discussion of political culture, or 
the legacy of the past, Britain's political heritage, or some such formulation.82 There does 
seem to be a belief then that the past development of British politics is important in 
explaining current events. This belief that tradition and the past are important for 
understanding contemporary politics may itself be an important part of the political 
culture.  
 
 The factor most often singled out by writers on British political history is the 
continuity between past and present. Partly as a consequence perhaps of its isolated and 
insulated island status, Britain has experienced few sharp breaks with the past over the 
last three hundred years or so. If the modern British state was formed in 1707 with the 
political Union between Scotland and Wales and England, since then there have been no 
revolutions or major political upheavals, as is the case with other European countries. 
Henry VIII had secularised England in the sixteenth century. During the seventeenth 
century there was civil war in England. Charles I was beheaded in 1649, but with the 
Restoration in 1660 Britain returned to the past, reinstalling the monarchy. In 1688 the 
Glorious Revolution bloodlessly dealt with the relationship of crown and parliament. That 
relationship has been changed gradually ever since. Three centuries later, the monarchy 
remains in place, symbolising continuity with the past even if stripped of power. So by 
1707 relations between crown, parliament, and the church had been sorted out. 
 
 During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries parliament was reformed, with the 
franchise extended to more men and eventually to women also. The party system was 
established and an effective, neutral civil service bureaucracy put in place. Change of 
huge significance has occurred, but it has done so gradually, by evolution not revolution. 
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That the main institutions of government have survived fosters a sense of continuity, and 
can disguise the extent to which their functions have altered.  
 
 One of the main consequences of Britain's unbroken past is that it has no written 
constitution, which sets it apart from most other European states. Other countries where 
revolutions have taken place have had to start from scratch to design a political system in 
line with new ideals. In Britain change has occurred within the existing set-up. There has 
been no urgent need to set down in writing how the system should operate. The 
constitution is a mix of statutes and conventions set by precedent. Many important 
aspects of the system, such as cabinet government and party organisation, developed 
gradually out of practice over time rather than by conscious design. There is a flexibility 
about the British constitution, which can be altered simply by the setting of new 
precedent or by act of parliament. Whereas in many countries special voting procedures 
are required for constitutional change, in Britain this is not so. Parliament is sovereign, 
and change is relatively easy. The flexibility of the constitution also means that it can 
more simply be circumvented.  
 
  This means that the British rely on restraint on the part of politicians to protect 
their rights, rather than firm constitutional safeguards. Current pressure, represented by 
Charter 88, for constitutional reform suggests that many people are increasingly ill-at-
ease with this situation. One need only mention the Scott Report into Arms to Iraq and 
the Nolan Committee on Public Standards to highlight recent fears that politicians are not 
to be trusted.83 However, political culture studies from the 1960s identified attitudes 
among the population of deference and allegiance which support the system.84 People 
have generally accepted that politicians are trustworthy and believed that the system 
serves their interests.  
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 The conclusion drawn by many writers from examining British political history is 
that continuity and tradition are valued characteristics. Sudden dramatic change is to be 
avoided, gradual reform preferred. Appeals to tradition and the past, to well-practised 
ways of doing things, are popular. Old institutions should be adapted to meet new 
circumstances and demands. Moreover, blue-prints, theories and written agreements are 
less popular than conventions, understandings and gentleman's agreements. The former 
are seen as inflexible. Better to proceed empirically and gradually, to be guided by 
common sense rather than grand theory. The British approach to politics is therefore 
characterised often as one of pragmatism and muddling through. 
 
 Does this make Britain distinctive? Some writers on decision-making theory argue 
that all governments tend to proceed by a process of 'disjointed incrementalism', taking 
small decisions which deviate only slightly from past practice rather than generating fresh 
policy with reference to overall strategic goals. All governments, in this view, utilise the 
'science of muddling through'.85 Is Britain therefore a case where distinctiveness is 
imagined rather than real? It is certainly possible to find examples of the British avoiding 
binding commitments and explicit statements of policy. The resistance to the provision of 
a bill of rights is a case in point. For the Thatcher government, however, underlying 
principles dictated much policy, for example on privatisation of services. Yet this was 
perhaps an exception. There does seem to be a conscious perception that in the British 
case that this is a proper way to proceed, that pragmatism and muddling through are a 
point of principle and not mere bureaucratic convenience, that binding commitments and 
overarching frameworks should be avoided where possible. Other nations may muddle 
through by necessity, but the British do it deliberately, and without explicit frameworks to 
guide decision-making. That at least is an influential perception.  
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 Britain's experience of war has also played an important role in the formation of 
its political system and culture. 'War made the state as much as the state made war', 
Dillon writes, citing as an example the significance of the two world wars this century in 
the building of collectivism in Britain, as the sense of communal sacrifice during war led 
to consensus on the need in peacetime also for united action by and for the community.86 
Linda Colley has argued similarly that British experience of war crucially moulded the 
British state. From its formation in modern form in 1707 through to the beginning of 
Victoria's reign in 1837, Britain waged war most frequently. In the course of these wars 
British national identity was forged.87 Often war was waged against the French, and 
'Britain' was defined in opposition to 'France': Britain was Protestant while France was 
Catholic, the British were down to earth and honest where the French were intellectual 
and vain. This British character finds expression in the shape of John Bull, the honest, 
plain, blunt, doughty common man. The British dislike of theories and preference for 
muddling through may then also be explained as a means of distinguishing Britons from 
other Europeans, and particularly the 'intellectual' French.88 War has therefore been 
significant in determining what it is to be British and what sort of state Britain is. War has 
also given legitimacy to the state of Britain, has given the state one of its major purposes. 
Britain itself, an 'imagined political community', imposed on top of older loyalties, has 
been shaped and given cohesion through war.89 It is a culture 'used to fighting, which has 
defined itself through it'.90 Force has therefore become an ingrained part of British identity 
and culture. 
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 Despite this, the armed forces have not occupied an especially prominent place in 
society. For most of its history Britain has relied upon the Royal Navy for its first line of 
defence. At sea, or based in a few harbour towns, this force has not been widely visible. 
Generally Britain has possessed only a small professional army, and not a large, national 
conscript force. Society has not been dominated by martial values. The armed forces have 
also been largely non-political, and have not intervened in the political process. Civilian 
control over the armed forces has been accepted by both civil and military authorities. 
There has been and remains widespread trust and respect of the armed forces within 
society. They are neither feared or perceived as a threat to civil society. The habit of 
dressing small children in sailor suits is a measure of the esteem in which the Royal Navy 
has been held.91 
 
 As a society increasingly during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries informed 
by liberal democratic ideals, and governed by an increasingly democratic system, has 
Britain become more peaceful? There is debate in the literature on the causes of wars over 
whether democratic states are less likely to wage war. The neo-realist position that the 
anarchical logic of the structure of the international system determines the behaviour of 
states irrespective of their internal composition is challenged by Michael Doyle, who 
argues that liberal democracies do not fight, at least against each other.92 Similarly, Paul 
Kennedy argues that a more democratic Britain, in which account had increasingly to be 
taken of public opinion, came to favour peaceful means of resolving international 
disputes. Below it was noted that according to Kennedy a policy of appeasement was 
practised by Britain not merely in the 1930s, the period with which the term is now most 
closely associated, but since the middle of the nineteenth century. One of the other factors 
underlying this policy was the moral belief that disputes ought to be resolved without 
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force but through negotiation, and the desire of the public for social rather than defence 
spending. In general, the British sought to apply the tenets of internal democratic 
government - the rule of law, for example - to their international relations.93 
 
 Britain still did use force during this period, and maintained an empire by means 
at least of the threat of force. And of course wars were fought. Yet the use of force may 
well have become a less welcome option, and one which required greater justification. 
Although there were still those who saw war as bringing glory, many were inclined to 
regard it as wrong, and governments in Europe as a whole had to explain their use of 
force if they were to find popular support for it. The initial enthusiasm for World War 
One demonstrates that democracies could certainly still prosecute war, and their peoples 
accepted that in some circumstances war was inevitable or justifiable. Changed views on 
the legitimacy of force and new preferences for negotiation did not therefore rule out 
force in all circumstances. If the government and people were becoming less inclined to 
use force, and more inclined to see the use of force as a last resort, still it could be used, 
and used to the hilt in 1914-18.  
 
 Nevertheless, efforts were made at the peaceful settlement of disputes and at 
managing international disputes through international organisations. After the First World 
War in particular, there was hope that war might be avoided through the operations of the 
League of Nations, with the great powers backing a collective security system to deter 
(and if necessary deal with) aggression. Britain intended to play its part in that, fulfilling 
its great power responsibilities. Efforts were made at disarmament and at arms control, 
with some success - there would be no use of chemical or biological weapons in World 
War Two as there had been in World War One. No control of bombing was achieved, 
however, and general disarmament plans came to little. By the early to mid 1930s, the 
prospects of using international agreements as a means of furthering national security 
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were receding and recognition dawning that the provision of strong armed forces to deter 
aggression was a more sensible policy.  
 
 As an ostensibly Christian country Britain was also influenced by Western 'just 
war' theory, which regarded the use of force as morally acceptable in certain 
circumstances and if conducted in certain ways. It should be a last resort, and it should be 
governed by discrimination, where military and not civilian targets were attacked, and 
proportionality, where its use was in proportion to the force being reacted to. If not 
always upheld, such thinking was influential. The use of force did need to be justified. 
The First World War, however, posed problems for this theory as total war eroded 
divisions between combatants and non-combatants. British cities were bombed then, and 
the threat of city-bombing was ever-present between the wars and caused considerable 
fear. In World War Two extensive attacks on cities were carried out, and if the forecast 
devastation did not occur, the idea that civilians should not be targets was dealt a severe 
blow.94 In an age of total war of societies against societies, many came to accept that 
civilians were fair game, though some still protested against strategic bombing.95 There 
had always been those who were opposed to all war, of course, and though pacifism was a 
difficult position to sustain during World War One, it was to a great extent vindicated by 
it.96 
 
Defence decision-making machinery 
The same incremental, pragmatic style of decision-making often identified in discussions 
of the broader British political process is also considered to obtain in the case of defence, 
and foreign policy, decision-making. Kenneth Waltz writes of 'the ingrained British habit 
of proceeding empirically, of eschewing scientific analysis and criticism on intellectual or 
                                                          
94 On just war theory and the effect upon it of strategic bombing during World War Two, see Ruston, 
chapters one and three. 
95 One well-known protestor against strategic bombing during the war was the Right Reverend George Bell, 
the Bishop of Chicester, later involved in the nuclear debate. See David Curtis Skaggs, 'Between the Hawks 
and the Doves: Alastair Buchan and the Institute for Strategic Studies', Conflict, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1987), p. 81.  
96 On this point Mueller, p. 55. 
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theoretical grounds, of preferring common sense to abstract reasoning'.97 The British 
defence decision-maker is characterised by Waltz as an empiric who 'leans on precedent, 
carefully digests past experience, and cautiously takes one step at a time'.98 The British 
approach to foreign policy, according to Waltz, is 
 
to proceed by a sidling movement rather than to move directly toward an object, 
to underplay one's hand, to dampen conflicts and depreciate dangers, to balance 
parties against each other, to compromise rather than fight, to postpone decisions, 
to obscure issues rather than confront them, to move as it were by elision from 
one position of policy to another; such habits, anciently engendered and long 
crystallized, form the style of British foreign policy.99 
 
By way of contrast, Waltz argues that it is characteristic of the US style 
 
to dramatize differences in order to clarify issues, to confront problems in order to 
solve them, to assume burdens in order to be able to say that duties have been 
discharged, to exaggerate dangers in order to justify action, and to draw policies out 
of a series of collisions between ideas in opposition.100 
      
Waltz's view of British decision-makers would probably find much support, possibly 
among the decision-makers themselves. Another analyst observes the British 'distrust of 
the abstract' leading to an 'empirical approach which tends to leave unstated and 
unexamined a great many assumptions about the environment of strategy and the national 
aims which, however, applicable they may once have been, in time outlive their validity'. 
In support of this he quotes Oliver Franks, the Foreign Office mandarin: 'We prefer to 
deal with events as they arise and not be committed by answering hypothetical 
questions'.101  
 Theories receive short shrift, change comes about by increments, compromise and 
consensus are preferred to conflict, indirect approaches to frontal assaults. This British 
                                                          
97 Kenneth N. Waltz, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience 
(Longmans: London, 1968), p. 157. 
98 Ibid.  
99 Ibid, pp. 7-8. 
100 Ibid, p. 8. 
101 DeWitt Clinton Armstrong III, The Changing Strategy of British Bases (PhD Thesis, Princeton 
University, 1960; facsimile copy from University Microfilms, Michigan, 1970), p. 32. 
209 
decision-making style forms an important part of the strategic culture. In the absence of 
conscious theories or blueprints, the less conscious beliefs which comprise the strategic 
culture, or which constitute the 'common sense' to which Waltz refers, containing implicit 
national strategic objectives, become more important.  
 
 Another feature of foreign and defence policy making is secrecy. More than other 
areas of government activity, these have been bound up with national security, which has 
been used to justify secrecy. It has been the responsibility of governments to devise policy 
in this area, and neither public nor parliament has had much say. By keeping secret much 
relevant information the government can control debate in some areas. Public opinion has 
come to count for more, but can still be shut out.  
 
 Although, as noted above, civilian authority over the armed forces has been 
accepted, much debate has centred on the issue of central direction of the armed forces, 
and many reforms in the post-war period have been intended to address this issue. The 
traditional organisation of defence decision-making had separate ministries for the Royal 
Navy and the Army, and latterly the Royal Air Force. Each of these ministries accounted 
separately to Parliament for its funding, conferring a degree of independence upon them. 
This independence permitted rivalry between the services which posed problems for the 
formulation of cohesive policy. The post-war reforms sought to impose greater central 
control on the armed forces and to provide this cohesion. Nevertheless, a feature of 
British defence policy making prior to 1945 was this lack of central control. The 
institution of the Ministry of Defence after World War Two was intended to increase co-
ordination of the activities of the services. 
 
 Government has therefore experienced problems in getting the services to 
cooperage fully. Central co-ordination of defence policy also involves various other 
departments of state. As the nature of warfare has changed, more and more departments 
have an interest in defence policy, and greater bureaucracy is required to manage defence 
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policy. Most notably the Treasury and the Foreign Office have always been interested in 
defence. These and the defence departments all have interests in security policy, but from 
quite different perspectives. Obviously the Treasury's interest is in keeping defence 
spending within acceptable limits. The Foreign Office is concerned with understanding 
the policies and outlooks of foreign countries and maintaining good relations with them. 
The defence ministries more narrowly are charged with identifying threats to national 
security and countering them. Such a division of labour may be necessary and common to 
other states, but can have the effect of producing a narrow outlook in the defence 
ministries themselves. Without the need and the resources to try to understand other 
states, without the overseas embassies and the area specialists which the Foreign Office 
maintains, defence ministries tend to measure threats according to the capabilities of 
potential enemies more than according to their estimated intentions. Without the picture 
of the needs of the overall economy which the Treasury possesses, defence ministries may 
regard as necessary for security the provision of higher levels of resources than the 
economy can bear. Defence decision-makers will likely therefore hold a more conflictual 
view of the world than decision-makers from other departments, and call for greater 
defence efforts.  
 
 The task of the government, and particularly the Cabinet, is to reconcile different 
departmental outlooks. This was done in the first half of the twentieth century through a 
network of committees: 'Defence by committee' is the phrase often used to describe the 
co-ordination of British defence policy.102 Committees tend to operate by searching for 
consensus and promoting compromise, which also supports a style of decision-making 
which avoids tough decisions and proceeds by increment.  
 It is interesting to note that the literature on British foreign and defence policy 
reflects the division of responsibilities at the level of government. Writing on foreign 
policy is largely based upon Foreign Office records, writing on defence policy on records 
                                                          
102 This phrase also forms the title of Franklyn Arthur Johnson's book, Defence by Committee: The British 
Committee of Imperial Defence 1885-1959 (London: Oxford University Press, 1960). 
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from the service and defence ministries. Neither generally pays much attention to 
Treasury records. This perhaps hints at the problem of co-ordination faced by 
government, as experts in their own area ignore other concerns. To reconcile differing 
views and standpoints becomes the challenge for the Cabinet, and this is an important 
feature of British defence decision-making.  
 
 
Traditional British strategic culture 
From the foregoing sections we can summarise the beliefs and values pertaining to the 
use of force which have traditionally been held in Britain. To begin with, the following 
core beliefs and values existed. 
 
1. The nature of war 
Beliefs on this subject have changed over time. By the end of World War Two, there was 
little room for portraying war as a glorious adventure wherein men might prove their 
manhood. War was certainly regarded as dreadful - though the experience of victory and 
the sense of unity and national purpose of World War Two meant Britons took a slightly 
rosier view of war than other Europeans - and peace as far preferable. But experience 
showed that war was a feature of international politics. It might be possible to prevent it, 
but it would remain a possibility. Moreover, Munich showed that a policy of avoiding 
war at any cost was unacceptable. There were times when it might be necessary to use 
force, for the result of failing to do so could well be worse than war itself. The British did 
not see themselves as a warlike people, but experience also suggested and national myths 
confirmed that if put to the test of war they could acquit themselves well. The use of force 
then was an option to be kept in mind, which could achieve the objectives of preserving 
independence and sovereignty and defeating evil. In this sense it retained a certain 
Clausewitzian utility.  
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 If this was so with regard to major war against other great powers, what was the 
case with regard to minor uses of force? An imperial history of intervention and policing 
left Britain with many outstanding territories and commitments, and a tradition of using 
force or its threat to maintain and protect them. This was to some degree discredited, the 
use of force being seen now as legitimate mainly as a defensive measure, and the colonial 
contribution to the war effort in the cause of world freedom having staked a claim for 
their own freedom. Nevertheless this use of force retained some legitimacy. 
 
 As to the relationship between war, politics and strategy, the Second World War 
saw strong civilian control of the use of force. The First World War may have been left to 
the generals to prosecute, but Churchill kept a tight rein on grand strategy. Military force 
was married to political objectives much more than in the previous conflict. But the 
tradition was of civilian control of the army in any case. That had been extended now to 
grand strategic matters also, rather than the army being left to decide how to achieve 
objectives. 
 
2. The nature of history 
History is important to the British, who have a long, successful, prosperous past on which 
to look back. History and tradition are therefore sources of pride, and can be seen as 
successful enough to argue against radical change. 'If it ain't broke, don't fix it', is the rule, 
and if the traditional ways have served Britain well, why break with them? Continuity is 
therefore privileged, and change regarded with suspicion. If there has to be change, better 
to take it easy, one step at a time, to wait and see what happens. As a prosperous state, 
Britain supports the status quo. In advocating a course of action, an appeal to tradition 
seems an influential tool. So Liddell Hart points to the traditional British way in warfare 
from which deviation brings disaster, and so splendid isolation is cast as traditional 
British policy. These may be 'invented traditions', but the urge to maintain traditions is 
nonetheless strong for that.  
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 British history is written and understood mostly as political, diplomatic and 
military history, underscoring the importance of these spheres. It is littered with wars, 
which seem not exceptional but normal aspects of the past. And British history is often 
written in isolation from European history, which both reflects and reinforces ideas of 
British exceptionalism and difference from the rest of Europe. So the way history is 
conceived in Britain provides an important source of beliefs.  
 
3. The nature of international politics 
International politics is understood traditionally in terms of power. The British have seen 
themselves as a great power, and ranked other states carefully in terms of their economic, 
military and naval strength. Considerable importance has been attached to maintaining 
this status and competing with others. Within Europe the balance of power has been a 
crucial principle, and British policy has been concerned with maintaining that balance by 
siding against stronger states or coalitions. Conflict and competition, as noted above, are 
unavoidable aspects of international politics, though they may be avoided through the 
balance of power, through compromise and co-operation, even appeasement, or through 
the collaboration of great powers in regimes or international organisations. But in the 
final analysis states must be able to defend themselves militarily, and must have sufficient 
power to do so. Great powers in particular must be able to fight their own battles and 
wars, while second rate states may look to great power protectors. To be able to do this, it 
is necessary to have more power than others.  
 
4. The role of alliances 
As the balancer state, and lacking substantial land forces, Britain had to have allies at 
times at least in order to take on potentially hegemonic states. But these allies might shift 
with the balance of power, so that permanent allies or adversaries are few. France, 
however, against which British identity was defined, has the status of a traditional foe 
even after the wars this century. Germany, once an ally, has been the enemy most recently 
in war and some of that feeling lingers. In 1945, preventing a recurrence of German 
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aggression was a crucial consideration. As a colonial power, Britain expected support and 
loyalty from the Empire. As a great power, Britain was a member of a select club, which 
in the Concert of Europe and the League of Nations was one of the states on whom 
security and stability in the system rested. So the belief that Britain should participate in 
international institutions at the highest level is an important one. Nevertheless, neutrality 
and freedom of action have been prized. World War One underscored the problems of 
fixed alliances. Independence was crucial. During World War Two, Britain fought for the 
freedom and independence of the threatened states. By the time of that conflict, however, 
British ability to wage major war alone was compromised, and reliance upon allies 
essential for victory. 
5. The nature of security 
As a state which has escaped invasion for several hundred years, and has a sea channel for 
protection, the British have not developed - as the Russians arguably did - a paranoia 
about security. The threat of invasion has been taken seriously, and sea power has been 
maintained at a high level to guard against it. The development of air power brought 
however a new threat to a traditionally secure state which led to (unrealised) fears and 
considerable insecurity. Following Munich security has been seen to require a resolute 
foreign policy and standing up to dictators, but always the possession of substantial 
military power has been the bottom line of security. National security for the British is 
understood largely in terms of the military security of the state, its territory and 
sovereignty, against external threats. These threats have been defined in terms of 
capabilities more than intentions. The two power standard showed that Britain wanted the 
naval strength to cope with any threats. With no fixed enemies, and all those with much 
military power potential enemies, a range of threats had to be insured against. 
 
 As an island dependent on trade, it has also been necessary to maintain links with 
other parts of the world, and the main threats to Britain have come from blockade. 
Economic security has therefore also been seen as vital, and having sufficient funds to 
finance wars and pay mercenaries is likewise important. Where possible, as suggested 
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above, independence has been sought in security terms, and having to rely on others for 
security disliked. Security of the British Empire as a whole is also crucial to British 
thinking, as a colonial power has responsibilities to protect its colonies. British spheres of 
interest also had to be secured: the notion that as a great power Britain had the right to 
interfere in certain areas where it had a presence, and prevent the interference of others, 
was another important belief. 
 
6. Morality and human nature 
As a Christian country, notions of evil existed and ideas of 'just war' were accepted. 
Britain ruled out between the wars striking a pre-emptive air attack, as this was seen as 
morally wrong. For some, all use of force was wrong. For most, the use of force could in 
certain circumstances be justified, and then had to be conducted within certain rules. 
Attitudes on this changed, but by the twentieth century this was the common view, and 
the British thought of themselves as fair and abiding by the rules. 
 
7. Self-image 
Many aspects of the British self-image are subsumed within other sections. It is worth 
noting here, however, that the British did see themselves as exceptional. If they were part 
of a Western or a European tradition, they were still in many respects unique. A country 
with a glorious past seeking to uphold tradition, a great power seeking to conduct itself 
fairly and responsibly in the international realm, a people not warlike but able to give a 
good account of themselves in war if necessary, as it sometimes was, a strong country 
willing and able to defend itself. 
 
8. War and the state 
The links between war and the state were strong. The state had responsibility for waging 
war and protecting its citizens, and had often done so in British history. This gave 
legitimacy to the state, and in the waging of war British national identity was forged. 
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Social change has come about through war, but war has also been used to manage social 





1. Armed forces and society 
The armed forces in Britain have traditionally been respected and not feared. They are not 
expected and do not expect themselves to interfere in politics, and indeed there is little 
crossover between politics and the military, with some exceptions such as Wellington, 
and the influx of former soldiers to parliament after the wars of this century. The Royal 
Navy in particular has been respected traditionally as the guarantor of national security, 
though the Royal Air Force, the few to whom so much was owed by so many, took over 
that role to some extent after 1940. In spite of the importance of war in British history, 
however, and in defining the culture, it is a less martial culture than pre-war Germany or 
Japan, because, perhaps, the army has been small and the Navy and Air Force distant 
from the population as a whole.  
 
2. Strategy 
Grand strategy in Britain has been characterised by the debate between the continental 
commitment and the maritime strategy. Should Britain concentrate on naval forces and 
sea power and an indirect or peripheral strategy, or must it take on continental powers in 
land battles? Even if an 'objective' understanding of history suggests a pragmatic mix of 
the two, it is significant that the debate operates along such lines, with different schools 
advocating each approach and claiming it is best for a state in Britain's position or it is in 
fact Britain's traditional strategy. For the maritime school, indirect means, attacks on 
commerce rather than military forces, and a long war have been preferred. For the 
continentalists, a decisive battle against the strongest continental force is preferred. Air 
power can be seen as a continuation of sea power by other means, trying to destroy the 
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enemy war-making capacity rather than its armed forces. Or it could be seen as seeking a 
decisive knock-out blow.  
 
3. International agreements and institutions 
A growing role has been seen for international institutions in the realms of peace and 
security, and Britain has been a key actor in those. Britain has been part of grand alliances 
in war and collective security institutions, and has placed hope in these bodies for the 
prosecution of war and the maintenance of peace. Support has been offered for these 
bodies and Britain sees itself as an important member of them. Agreements and treaties 
have been frequent in British history, as Britain was a founder of modern diplomacy. 
Arms control agreements such as those on naval affairs have been seen as reasonable 
means of providing security in this century. Britain, as a status quo power, has generally 
supported international law and honoured agreements. The rule of law is respected and 
states expected to abide by it. 
 
4. Technology 
Britain has led other nations in industrial development and technological terms. In naval 
matters Britain has sought the most up-to-date equipment, like the Dreadnoughts, 
between the wars it had significant armoured forces and led the way in their development 
and in that of aircraft technology. The Maud Commission, considering devising atomic 
weapons, crucially linked them to great power status - great powers had to have the most 
powerful and modern weapons going. So technology has been important, rather than size 
of armed forces in men. The sheer size of the Royal Navy relative to others has also been 
important, however, so that quality is not always seen as more important than quantity. In 
tactics, other states have probably been more innovative, Britain more conservative. No 





5. Power projection 
To be able to put forces into the field anywhere, to attack enemy colonies and trade and 
protect its own, it has been important for Britain to be able to project force all over the 
world. There is a tradition of showing the flag and sending gunboats, of intervening.  
 
6. Defence spending 
Without conscription and a large army, the main defence spending has traditionally been 
on the Royal Navy. In peace and in war a large naval force has been the guarantor of 
military security. In peacetime, little other spending may be necessary, and wars often 
were opportunities to steal colonies and intercept shipping, thereby paying for 
themselves. Island status also allows time when war breaks out to retreat to the safe haven 
and develop forces there. More recently, however, there has been a need for forces at a 
state of readiness in peacetime to wage immediate war and prevent continental allies 




There is no tradition of British brinkmanship. Under an appeasement policy Britain 
sought to avoid conflict and compromise in crisis, which was seen as a time of danger 
which could spill into war. The Munich crisis was a shock which changed view of crises, 
seeing them as times of danger requiring resolution and firmness. 
 
 
8. Decision-making style 
A pragmatic, conservative decision-making style has been apparent, in which change is 
incremental if it occurs at all and compromise and consensus favoured. Secrecy is the 
norm in the defence field, with the ordinary public and Parliament denied much say or 
knowledge. Civilian control has been established over the military. 
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9. Interservice rivalry 
The traditions of the separate services have allowed competition between them and 
increasing concern to establish central control over them. The Royal Navy, traditionally 
the senior service, has seen its size and reputation shrink, while the Royal Air Force has 




This is necessarily a somewhat impressionistic analysis of traditional British strategic 
culture, based largely on secondary accounts and not easy to prove. It is impossible to rule 
out the influence of contemporary concerns on the beliefs and values on which attention 
has been focused. That the author knows what comes after 1945, and the issues that need 
explaining, must be borne in mind when considering the treatment of the pre-1945 period. 
It could be that, just as history is written for someone and some purpose, so notions of 
strategic culture are conceived in order to make sense of the present. We have seen how 
constructions of a traditional British way in warfare were used to influence contemporary 
debates in the 1930s. So too may strategic culture be constructed in a way that makes 
sense of later events. These are dangers inherent in this approach. Yet it is impossible to 
empty one's mind of knowledge of the recent past when examining the more distant past. 
To be aware of the problems of this approach and to try to guard against them is the best 
that can be done.  
 
 There are no doubt omissions in the above analysis. Scholars of gender could 
point to the distinct experiences of war which women have had, and identify women as 
constituting sub-cultures differing in significant respects from the dominant, masculine 
culture. The beliefs identified here belong most clearly to the dominant culture, the elite. 
Many of them will, however, have been shared by the bulk of the population. Indeed, it is 
assumed that dramatic events will often touch entire populations. For example, anti-war 
sentiment provoked by the horror of the First World War would be spread widely 
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throughout the population. Other sub-cultures are hinted at. The continental commitment 
and maritime strategy schools could also be characterised as sub-cultures grouped around 
certain issues. The three armed services can be seen as sub-cultures based on roles. The 
pacifist tradition in Britain might be another sub-culture. But the aim here has been to 
pinpoint the general beliefs of the elite rather than to identify sub-cultures. 
 
 The analysis has been more methodologically eclectic than that of, say, Alastair 
Johnston.103 However, there being no one obvious source of British strategic culture, as 
there is in the Chinese case, the net needs to be cast wider. Poetry and films, documents 
and works of history, have been used as sources from which beliefs and values have been 
inferred and as evidence for the existence of beliefs. Symbolic events and names - such as 
Dunkirk and the Blitz - have been identified which reveal meanings and imply the 
existence of beliefs. Patterns of behaviour have also been used to infer strategic beliefs 
and values. Inevitably all these sources need to be interpreted, and the dangers already 
described below lie in wait. Nevertheless, the attempt has been made to provide a 
thorough study of traditional British strategic culture. The attempt was not made, 
however, to identify a rigid ranked set of preferences, as Alastair Johnston does. A looser 
set of beliefs is indicated here, arrived at in a more interpretive fashion.  
 
 A number of other issues arose in applying the research framework. First, in 
dealing with geography and resources, what matters is how the implications of these 
factors have been interpreted over time. There was therefore little to be said about them 
on their own, but rather their implications were considered in the section on history and 
experiences. The second issue concerns that section. Dealing with history, and with myth, 
posed difficulties as past and present interact with each other. If the past influences 
beliefs in the present, so too do readings of the past change over time and as 
circumstances change. A related issue is that, in undertaking the analysis, sensitivity to 
change was borne in mind. Changing attitudes to war were described as new experiences 
                                                          
103 See Johnston, Cultural Realism. 
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occurred. The shock of World War One in particular affected thinking. On the whole, 
however, the continuity in British strategic thinking is striking. Change tends to be very 
gradual, and few dramatic events demanding change were identified.  
 
 Another issue is that not all sections of the framework were found to apply to 
Britain. The profile therefore does not mirror the framework exactly. Given the 
assumption of national variation which underpins the strategic culture approach, however, 
it is to be expected that profiles of different states will differ in their emphases and the 
framework will not fit all.  
 
 Earlier chapters posed the question of how political culture and strategic culture 
are related. With regard to this issue, in the British case, styles of foreign and defence 
policy-making mirror the broader political style: secrecy is a hallmark of government, in 
strategic matters at least as much as in other departments. The tendency to 'muddle 
through', and to favour pragmatic approaches over grand designs, can be seen in foreign 
and defence-policy making as in the rest of government.   
 
 A final issue which should be broached here is what this sketch of traditional 
British strategic culture implies for the validity of neo-realist thinking. It was argued 
earlier that examining strategic beliefs across time and cultures had the potential to 
challenge neo-realism. If beliefs which are claimed by neo-realists to be imposed by the 
nature of the international system can be shown to vary over time and places, then the 
neo-realist position becomes more exposed. With regard to the British case, neo-realists 
might claim that their views are upheld. Conflict, sometimes leading to war, is regarded 
as inevitable by the British. Power needs to be balanced and maximised. Against this, 
however, it has to be said that the British case would be expected to yield such findings. 
Realist and neo-realist thinking emerged in large measure from the academic research 
communities of the United Kingdom and the United States. British historical experience 
can be expected therefore to have influenced the development of neo-realist thinking 
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itself. Even so, the case can be made that attitudes to war have changed over time in 
Britain, and that reluctance to use force has increased. In this sense there is support also 
for the position taken by writers like John Mueller. Mueller sees war as 'merely an idea - 
an institution, like dueling or slavery, that has been grafted onto human existence'. It can, 
like dueling, disappear, and it can do so without changes in human nature or the 
international system.104 Continue change in attitudes on war could see this happen. Yet the 
evidence here is not conclusive. Further comparative studies are needed to clear up this 
issue.    
 
 The profile could no doubt be challenged in many respects. Further studies in the 
future could refine it and focus on certain aspects in more depth. For the moment, 
attention will turn in the next chapter to whether and in what ways it assists our 
understanding of the 1945-1952 period. How influential were traditional beliefs and 
values in the debates and decisions of this period? 
                                                          





Chapter Six:  
Strategic Culture and British Grand Strategy 1945-52 
 
 
In the previous chapter, the first sections of the framework developed in Chapter Four 
were applied to the United Kingdom. A thorough profile was assembled of the key 
elements of British strategic culture up to around 1945. The second section of the 
framework considered the utility of strategic culture, and it is to that question that we now 
turn. As Chapter Five argued, choices were made by the Attlee government during the 
years between 1945 and 1952 continue to influence British defence posture down  the 
present day. This chapter asks to what extent the decisions taken after 1945 on British 
defence policy, and the manner in which they were taken, reflect the key strategic beliefs 
and values identified in the profile, or to what extent the new circumstances after 1945 
led to new reasoning. The aim is to show where strategic culture can aid understanding of 
British behaviour and decisions taken, in what ways it can operate and how important it 
can be. The aim is not to come to incontrovertible conclusions regarding the utility of 
strategic culture. That requires more comprehensive and probably comparative studies. 
Questions will remain unanswered, therefore, but this chapter nevertheless hopes 
demonstrate the actual and the potential utility of the strategic culture approach. 
 
 Attention will be focused on two main aspects of Britain's post-war grand 
strategic policy. First to be considered will be the British decision to acquire nuclear 
weapons, taken in January 1947. Why was this decision taken, and how was it reached? 
Next the development of a deterrent strategy based mainly on nuclear but also 
conventional weapons will be examined. The analysis will concentrate on the level of 
grand strategy, discussing major decisions about whether to have nuclear weapons and 
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how to integrate them into overall strategy rather than lower level considerations, such as 
how many nuclear capable aircraft to acquire. That is not to say that these are not 
important questions, or that they do not reveal the existence of distinct strategic sub-
cultures within governments. However, it is to be expected that on the level of decisions 
of broad principles the effect of strategic culture will be seen more clearly than such 




The significance of the year 1945 for Britain, and indeed the world, was enormous. World 
War Two came to an end with Britain on the victorious side. The final act of the six year 
conflict was the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If the death toll 
from these two bombs was small in relation to the total number of casualties in the war as 
a whole, it was nevertheless achieved with a speed and an economy of effort which 
ensured that its political shock waves continue to be felt today. In 1945, a new era of 
warfare began, and a new era of politics and international politics also. A new Labour 
government was elected handsomely, for however well Churchill had managed the war 
effort, he was not seen as the right leader to govern in peacetime.  
 
 Before turning to the issues identified above, it is worthwhile making a few 
preliminary points about the situation facing British policy-makers and how they saw it. It 
is important first of all to note that, although 1945 is commonly taken as the first year of 
the nuclear age, a series of gradual steps took the world into the new era. In 1945, only 
atomic weapons had been tested. Much more powerful than existing weapons, these were 
much less so than the thermonuclear weapons which were first tested in 1952. Moreover, 
there were in the late 1940s and early 1950s few atomic weapons relative to the numbers 
deployed in the late 1950s and subsequently. And not until the late 1950s were guided 
missiles beginning to complement the manned bomber as the vehicle for delivery of 
nuclear weapons, (though World War Two V-weapons foreshadowed their existence). 
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Also, the United States enjoyed an atomic monopoly until 1949 and considerable 
superiority over the Soviet Union until long thereafter.  
 If 1945 is in retrospect a convenient date for separating the pre-nuclear and post-
nuclear eras, therefore, it did not necessarily appear to everyone at the time that an old era 
had ended and a new one begun. Clement Attlee did, however, see it in those terms. He 
believed that the arrival of the atomic bomb had brought about 'not a quantitative but a 
qualitative change in the nature of warfare'. Moreover, Attlee believed that worse was still 
to come. Even in September 1945 he was alert to the probability that in the future bombs 
would be of much greater power, would be delivered by rocket and would be deployed by 
an increasing number of states.1 Churchill, on the other hand, would later comment that 
'the atomic bomb, with all its terror, did not carry us outside the scope of human control 
or manageable events in thought or action, in peace and war'. It was the advent of the 
hydrogen bomb with which, Churchill believed, 'the entire foundation of human affairs 
was revolutionised'.2 
 Churchill's judgement was a retrospective one. Some more immediate reactions to 
the atomic bomb were however much less dramatic and tended to see it as merely a 
'bigger and better bomb' rather than a revolutionary development. Andrew Pierre 
speculates that this may have been typical of the British military at that time.3 It has also 
been argued that many British military planners of the early post-war period, men 
hardened to massive destruction by their wartime experiences, were likely to take a 
sanguine view of the advent of the atomic bomb and assign little importance to it.4 And 
there were other unsensational analyses of the effectiveness of atomic weapons, such as 
that put forward by the  
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Nobel prize winning physicist and strategic commentator P.M.S. Blackett, in whose 
opinion atomic weapons would not alone be decisive in a war fought between the Great 
Powers.5 There was, therefore, a tension between the view that weapons had been created 
which transformed strategy, and the belief that these weapons possessed unprecedented 
but not revolutionary power. Could they therefore be fitted easily into existing strategic 
ideas, or were wholly new ones necessary?  
 
 Diplomatically also 1945 can be seen from the perspective of the 1990s as the 
break between hot war and cold war, but again the transition was not immediate. The 
alliance which had successfully taken on the Axis powers in the Second World War did 
gradually break up, and its members became adversaries in a Cold War confrontation 
marked by much greater instability and urgency than has been the case since the early 
1960s. Events such as the Berlin blockade and the Korean War illustrated the build up of 
tension and the probing of resolve which were taking place in the late 1940s and early 
1950s. Not long after the end of the Second World War, the prospect of another conflict 
appeared, with the Soviet Union ranged against its wartime allies, Britain and the United 
States. Relations between the latter, so intimate and important during the war, were for a 
time afterwards strained. In the first two years after the end of the war the United States 
toyed with isolationism. During this time certain areas of difficulty emerged, notable 
among them the ending of atomic energy collaboration between the two states. This was 
achieved through the 1946 US Atomic Energy Act, and collaboration was not fully 
restored until 1958. This dismayed the British, whose constant efforts to obtain a return to 
the wartime British-US atomic energy partnership were so often dashed during the late 
1940s and early 1950s.6 With the signing in 1949 of the North Atlantic Treaty the United 
States formally committed itself to the defence of Western Europe, however.  
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 Against this background of doubt and changing circumstances, British planners 
had to determine atomic policy. But of one thing there was no doubt: the parlous 
economic situation in which Britain found itself as a result of the war. The costs of 
victory continued to be paid long after hostilities had ceased, and the defence budget was 
continually pressured by the need to avert economic disaster. However, although by the 
start of the 1950s it would exert considerable pressure on the deliberations of the Chiefs 
of Staff across the board in defence planning, the necessity for retrenchment did not 
immediately affect policy on atomic weapons as much as on conventional arms.  
 
 These points provide important aspects of the situational context for post-war 
defence decision-making in Britain. The decision-makers faced an uncertain world and 
perceived numerous constraints on their actions. However, even Kenneth Waltz, a 
structural realist for whom the nature of the international system determines in large 
measure the behaviour of its units, believes that the British still had plenty of room for 
choice. They did not have to opt for a major power defence policy, with nuclear weapons 
and large scale forces. For Waltz, the choices made were not necessarily the best. Britain 
would have needed to put far more resources into defence in order appreciably to improve 
its position, and could have invested far less without substantially weakening it.7 The 
question arises, what then shaped the choices which were made? Consideration will now 
be given to this question, beginning with the process which led to a decision actually 
being taken in January 1947 to manufacture a British atomic weapon.        
 
 
The atomic bomb decision 
In January 1947 the GEN 163 committee, a small, ad hoc committee of the Cabinet, 
decided that it would be the policy of the British government in the post-war era 
independently to develop and produce atomic weapons.8 In taking the decision, the 
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committee was not starting from scratch. The British had already decided during the war 
to attempt to construct an atomic weapon, and had spent many years, some in association 
with the United States, working to build a weapon which would harness the power of 
atomic energy. British scientists had played their part in the Manhattan Project, ensuring 
that such a weapon was perfected before the war's end. Obviously, the possibility that the 
Germans might build an atomic bomb had provided the primary motivation for the British 
atomic energy programme. By the time the Axis powers had been defeated, however, the 
British, who had extensive knowledge of the secrets of the atomic bomb but no weapon 
of their own, faced a question which the US administration did not: should they carry on 
in peacetime their quest for the new weapon?  
 
 Given that the British had already taken a decision to develop an atomic weapon 
during the war, and that their scientists had been heavily involved in atomic energy 
research, there was considerable momentum behind carrying on with a military atomic 
energy project. As Groom notes, the scientific instincts of those involved would have 
rebelled at the prospect of abandoning the project before its completion.9 Had the British 
faced a decision to begin an atomic energy programme from scratch, the burden of proof 
would have rested with those in favour. They would have needed to make the case for 
devoting scarce resources to such a programme. A decision to continue existing work was 
a different matter. Here the burden of proof lay with those who would abandon atomic 
energy development. It is striking that not only was a decision to abstain from nuclear 
development not reached, but nobody in government expected that it would be. It was 
widely believed that Britain would produce atomic bombs. The GEN 163 committee was 
simply making official and explicit a policy that had hitherto been generally assumed, if 
not formally acknowledged.  
 
 Evidence for this interpretation comes from a number of key decisions taken after 
1945. These were premised on the tacit belief that Britain would produce its own atomic 
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weapons. The RAF, for example, had in the middle of 1946 requisitioned a long range 
bomber. Although no direct reference was made to the A-bomb, this aircraft was 
presumably intended to be its carrier.10 Also, the Chief of the Air Staff had in August 
1946 ordered an atomic weapon from the Ministry of Supply, which had itself shortly 
thereafter included a figure for the development of the weapon in its budget.11 Within the 
atomic energy programme itself, decisions were taken with the eventual production of 
weapons in mind. Where the production of fissile material was concerned, the 
government had opted for plutonium rather than uranium on the grounds that this would 
be best for bomb making purposes, although it was also quite suitable for the industrial 
side of the atomic energy programme.12 Thus the various sections of the administration 
operated on the assumption that bombs would in time be produced despite the fact that 
the formal decision to that effect was not taken before 1947.      
 
 The prevailing feeling, then, was that atomic bombs would be produced, and few 
questioned the wisdom of such a step or put forward an alternative. Nevertheless, a 
choice had to be made, and it could have been to forgo a bomb project. A government 
facing major economic difficulties and with a large programme of social reform could 
have decided to opt out of the atomic energy business, to leave it to its ally the United 
States. The major questions which must therefore be addressed are, how and why was this 
decision reached? What issues were raised, and what process followed?  
 
 An initial point here is that there is little documentary evidence on which to draw, 
for the decision was taken by a cabinet sub-committee, the minutes of which reveal little 
discussion. Nor was there lengthy consideration in other committees prior to the decision, 
or preparation of papers on the subject. There is little to guide the traditional historian or 
the rational choice analyst in reconstructing the goals of the decision-makers and the 
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options considered. It might be expected that these would be articulated at points where 
the wisdom of continuing down the road to nuclear development was questioned. There 
were two such points.   
 
 The first expression of doubt was contained in a paper circulated by the 
government scientist P.M.S. Blackett in November 1945.13 Blackett argued that it should 
not be a 'foregone conclusion' that Britain should build its own bomb. The decision, if 
taken, should be based upon 'detailed analysis'. Blackett, seemingly alone among those in 
government, attempted to consider the case both for and against a British bomb in 
practical, military security terms. He weighed such factors as the numbers of bombs that 
each of the wartime 'Big Three' might be expected to produce over the course of the next 
few years, the international political situation, and the position of Britain within it. He 
considered the probable circumstances in which the British would want to use the bomb, 
and the possibility that Britain might end up with a stock of bombs which was too small 
to be effective in war but could invite atomic attack. Blackett concluded that for Britain to 
make a bomb 'would tend to decrease rather than to increase our long-term security'. 
Instead Britain should announce that it would not make bombs for 5-10 years, nor ask the 
USA for any, but that it would press on with atomic energy research for peaceful 
purposes.  
  
 Blackett's paper was therefore a serious appreciation of the question of whether 
bomb production would benefit British security, and it was the only paper of its kind 
within government. If his calculations were wrong, they nevertheless deserved 
consideration. Yet Attlee and the Chiefs of Staff rejected the paper almost out of hand. 
The Chiefs expressed their 'complete disagreement' with the recommendation that Britain 
should undertake publicly not to produce atomic weapons, while Attlee characterised 
Blackett as a 'typical scientist' writing 'on political and military problems on which he is a 
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layman'.14 Blackett, who served with the Royal Navy during the Battle of Jutland and 
worked extensively on operational research during the Second World War, might be 
considered no more a layman than Attlee himself. His argument was put forward in a 
language recognised during the war as rational. In Gowing's opinion, it 'merited an 
answer on the same plane'.15 But it was not answered in kind.  
 
 A later objection to the British bomb appears to have made a greater impact. At a 
cabinet committee meeting in October 1946, the Chancellor, Hugh Dalton, and the 
President of the Board of Trade, Sir Stafford Cripps, opposed the construction of a 
gaseous diffusion plant as part of the atomic energy programme, urging 
  
that we must consider seriously whether we could afford to divert from civilian 
consumption and the restoration of our balance of payments, the economic 
resources required for a project on this scale.16 
 
Here too, a rational objection to atomic bomb production, this time on economic grounds, 
was being raised. According to Sir Michael Perrin, Portal's assistant, Dalton and Cripps 
were winning the argument when Bevin, arriving late, turned the tables.17 His reasoning 
will be considered later, but it did not, as far as the records show, address directly the 
question of the opportunity cost of the bomb. Whether or not Dalton and Cripps would 
have carried the day without Bevin's intervention is questionable. However, at the 
meeting in January when the decision was taken to manufacture the bomb, Dalton and 
Cripps were notable absentees, not invited presumably in order to prevent a repeat of 
events at the October meeting. Dissension and debate were, it appears, not welcome, and 
rational arguments were to be sidelined rather than countered rationally.  
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 Thus, while it may not have been official policy to develop a British bomb until 
1947, the voices of Blackett and Dalton and Cripps were the only ones raised against that 
course. With those voices all but ignored, any decision other than that eventually taken 
always seemed unlikely. Attlee's and the Chiefs of Staff's responses to Blackett's paper 
showed that it would take a great deal of arm-twisting to force the government to 
renounce production. Blackett had argued in his paper that atomic bomb production 
should be the subject of detailed analysis and must not be regarded as a 'foregone 
conclusion', but the reaction to his paper suggests that in this at least he was mistaken. 
The decision to build the bomb surely was a foregone conclusion.    
 
 The questions remain, what made the conclusion foregone? On what reasoning 
and assumptions was it based? With so little documentary evidence to inspect, it is not 
easy to answer these questions. And if the conclusion was foregone, why was the decision 
taken only in January 1947 rather than at any earlier stage?  
 
 To begin with the latter question, government reticence was in part a response to 
external circumstances. A decision to develop atomic weapons had wider than domestic 
ramifications at a time of uncertain international circumstances. For one thing, the British 
had initially hoped that their close wartime atomic energy relationship with the United 
States could be carried over into the post-war era. Indeed, according to Margaret Gowing, 
Whitehall believed that if this was not the case then the British could not continue in the 
atomic energy field.18 However, it took some time for the fate of British-US collaboration 
to be decided. Attlee rejected an early call by officials to issue a directive for the 
manufacture of bombs, preferring to wait at least until he had discussed the future with 
the US leaders during a meeting in November 1945.19 But the November talks were 
inconclusive, and throughout the first half of 1946 the US position on co-operation with 
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Britain was not made clear. Until that position could be ascertained the British may have 
thought it inappropriate firmly to commit themselves to any course of action, and found 
long-term planning more than a little awkward. In any case, while they could have taken a 
decision in principle to build a bomb at any time, it was not until the United States had 
closed the door to co-operation in mid-1946 that the British were forced to choose 
between a wholly independent project or no project at all.  
 
 Another possible complication for British policy makers was that international 
control of atomic energy was at this time being placed on the agenda of world politics. 
Given the British vulnerability to atomic assault, there was at first some support for 
international control within the government.20 There is here a parallel with the interwar 
years, when the British had become obsessed by 'a pervasive fear of a knock-out blow by 
aerial bombardment'.21 This fear arose, according to Uri Bialer, once the Germans had in 
1917 made their first daylight raids on London.22 From then on the traditional British 
immunity to attack was compromised, and civilians found themselves potentially in the 
front line. Although the threat was exaggerated, it still led the government to seek an air 
disarmament agreement as one route to security.23 So too after the war the British 
considered international agreements as one means to remove the new and even more 
powerful threat of atomic air attack.  
 
 But the government was only too aware of the manifold difficulties which would 
necessarily accompany any international control scheme. The problem most often singled 
out was that of establishing adequate safeguards to ensure compliance. The Chiefs of 
Staff were adamant that no international control scheme could be contemplated which did 
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not provide for unequivocal rights of inspection.24 Ministers recognised that much 
depended upon the Soviet attitude, and initially there was some hope that the USSR could 
be brought into a workable scheme.25 However, this became less and less likely as the 
Cold War intensified, and hopes for, and belief in,  international control flagged. By 1947 
the Chiefs of Staff were arguing that an international control agreement would in any case 
be to the disadvantage of the British, suggesting that even with 'unequivocal rights of 
inspection' they would not welcome it; and by 1949 the Vice Chiefs of Staff would 
contend  that as long as the British held a lead over the USSR in atomic weapon 
technology - as it was still supposed they did - they should keep a free hand. Also, should 
the Soviet government propose a Convention to prohibit the use of atomic weapons, 
insistence on inspection rights would be a useful tactic to thwart their ambitions.26 
 
 Even in 1945 and 1946, however, when the government was sympathetic to the 
cause of international control, it did not consider suspending its efforts to develop an 
indigenous atomic energy programme. It was for instance argued within the Advisory 
Committee on Atomic Energy in September 1945 that  
 
while we should certainly do everything in our power to reach a satisfactory 
agreement, we should not rely for security upon this alone, but should take all 
possible steps to strengthen our own position.27  
Similarly, the Chiefs of Staff had advised that 'to delay production pending the outcome 
of negotiations regarding international control might well prove fatal to the security of the 
British Commonwealth'.28      
 
 Attlee himself, though a supporter of efforts to secure an international control  
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agreement, was nevertheless intent upon securing as strong as possible a position for the 
British programme, both domestically and with regard to co-operation with the USA, 
even if this compromised the chances of obtaining an international agreement.29 So the 
issue of international control of atomic energy does not appear significantly to have 
diverted the British from their intention of developing their own atomic weapons. In any 
case, it was felt that any international control scheme would have to focus on prohibiting 
the use, rather  than the production, of atomic weapons, so that the British were not put in 
the position of having to choose between national production or international control of 
atomic weapons.30 
  
 The question of international control did, however, add to an atmosphere in which 
the best policy was to avoid taking formal decisions. There was little to be gained, and 
much to be lost (not least in terms of public image) by making a clear commitment to 
bomb production while simultaneously pressing for an international control regime. But 
another factor, and perhaps the most significant, is that in 1945 it was simply not 
necessary to make a positive commitment to build a bomb, as the atomic energy 
programme was in its infancy. The early steps being taken did not require a firm decision 
on whether the focus was to be on military or commercial uses of the atom. 
Procrastination was therefore possible, and, because of the sensitivity of the matter, 
hardly surprising. Why take such a momentous decision before it was unavoidable?  
 
 As well as there being no need for a decision to be taken before 1947, there was 
little pressure for one. Only two recommendations were made to the government between 
the end of the war and the close of 1946 that production of atomic bombs should begin. 
Both came in 1945, one from the Chiefs of Staff and the other from a committee of 
officials. The message from the Chiefs in October 1945 was that they considered it 
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'essential that British production of atomic weapons should start as soon as possible', and 
this was echoed the same month by the recommendation of the committee of officials that 
the government 'should issue a directive laying it down that priority is to be given' to 
'production of bombs on a large scale for our own defence as soon as possible'.31 Both, 
however, were brushed aside by the government, and neither appears to have been 
followed up. By late 1946, on the other hand, scientists had to begin to plan for the 
development of the ordnance side of an atomic weapon and realised that no mandate 
existed for bomb production. It was then that Lord Portal, the Controller of Production, 
Atomic Energy, within the Ministry of Supply, decided to raise with Attlee the matter of a 
formal decision to build an atomic bomb.  
 
 There were reasons, therefore, not to take a decision prior to 1947. The process by 
which the decision was reached, however, recalls Waltz's description of the British style 
of policy, mentioned in the previous chapter: 
 
To proceed by a sidling movement rather than move directly toward an object, to 
underplay one's hand, to dampen conflicts and depreciate dangers, to balance parties 
off against each other, to compromise rather than fight, to postpone decisions, to 
obscure issues rather than confront them, to move as it were by elision from one 
position of policy to another; such habits, anciently engendered and long 
crystallized, form the style of British foreign policy.32 
   
In Britain, the decision to produce atomic weapons was postponed for as long as possible, 
and even then not much was decided. In his analysis of the decision by the Truman 
administration to develop the hydrogen bomb, Warner Schilling points to the minimalist 
nature of that decision.33 A similar situation prevailed in the case of the British atomic 
bomb decision. All that was decided was that Britain would produce atomic bombs. On 
crucial questions of detail, no decisions were made. How many bombs would it make? 
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How many would be required to be effective militarily? In what time scale could that 
number be produced? In what circumstances would they be used, and against whom? If 
the Soviet Union was assumed to be the enemy, would it in fact benefit Britain to possess 
and/or to employ atomic weapons? Most of these questions were not even raised, except 
by Blackett, whose thoughtful analysis was never debated.  
 
 There were many other matters which were not discussed, or in some cases raised 
at all.  How were the atomic bombs once built to be delivered to their targets? If bombs 
were wanted, was it essential that steps be taken to ensure that a bomber force would be 
ready to carry them? And what about questions of cost? How much would it cost to 
produce the atomic force? Could the nation afford the cost, at a time of profound 
economic crisis? What would be the opportunity cost in terms of defence spending? How 
would the atomic force be integrated into the armed forces as a whole?   
 
 Attlee's response to Dalton and Cripps's broaching of the subject of the cost of the 
atomic energy programme was to remove them from the decision making process 
altogether, while Blackett was marginalised. There was therefore little inclination to 
confront the issues raised or to resolve them. Certainly there was no inclination to do so 
publicly. When finally a decision had to be taken, secrecy was maintained. Only a few 
ministers were involved. There was no debate, no attempt on the lines of the Blackett 
paper to consider the practical questions posed by the decision to build a bomb. The 
January 1947 decision was a minimalist one indeed, a 'course of action which would 
close off the least number of future alternatives, one which would avoid the most 
choice'.34 
 The decision-making process does therefore appear consistent with traditional 
British practice, as expressed by Waltz. The uncertainty of the international environment 
provided grounds for delaying decisions, and the British decision-making style was well-
suited to such delay. To determine whether, in the absence of such international 
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pressures, the decision would have been taken in the same fashion, remains a speculative 
counterfactual issue. However, traditional style can be argued to have pre-disposed the 
British towards this decision-making process, and made it 'natural' to proceed in this way. 
 
 What about the reasons why that decision was taken? Because of the way in which 
the decision was taken, it is not easy to be sure. The desire not to confront the issues, in 
the way Blackett tried to do, means there was no detailed analysis and discussion of the 
pros and cons of bomb production. The GEN 163 committee was, it would appear, 
convened in order to put the official seal on bomb production rather than to debate the 
matter. Lord Portal had originally asked Attlee whether a formal decision should now be 
taken to build a bomb, or whether work should proceed on the existing informal basis.35 
If a formal decision was now to be taken, Portal offered three options, which were put 
before the committee. (i) Not to proceed with the development of the bomb, (ii) to 
proceed with it through the normal channels or (iii) to do so in secret. With minimal 
discussion and no dissent, the ministerial committee approved the third option.36 Without 
Dalton and Cripps, consensus on the decision was easy to achieve. With this consensus, 
and given that it had long been assumed that bombs would be produced, it doubtless 
seemed unnecessary to consider systematically the various economic, technical, scientific, 
political and military factors involved in the decision. The paucity of debate hinders 
attempts to determine what rationales underlay the decision and how they ranked in 
importance. It seems, however, that various rationales were able to coexist among and 
within different people. It was rarely necessary, if at all, openly to articulate and to justify 
these rationales or to subject them to close scrutiny. As Gowing argues, 'the British 
decision to make an atomic bomb had "emerged" from a body of general assumptions'.37 
 What were these assumptions? One had been expressed by the famous Maud 
Committee, set up during the Second World War to consider whether Britain should 
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pursue research aimed at developing an atomic weapon. In recommending in 1941 that 
Britain should attempt to develop a bomb, committee members obviously had in mind the 
threat that Germany might develop such a weapon first. They also observed, however, 
that 'even if the war should end before the bombs are ready the effort would not be 
wasted, since no nation would care to risk being caught without a weapon of such 
decisive possibilities'.38 This statement surely reflected core beliefs about the nature of 
international politics, and the need for states to act to secure themselves from attack. If 
one state could develop atomic bombs, it could not be trusted not to use them, so others 
would need to have them to defend themselves or deter attack.  
 
 More specific to Britain was a belief articulated by Bevin at the meeting of the 
atomic energy committee in October 1946. Then, the economic ministers opposed the 
building of the gaseous diffusion plant, arguing that economic stringency was required. 
Ernest Bevin determinedly opposed cost-cutting which could affect the production of a 
bomb. He did not advance economic arguments in support of this position. Instead he 
voiced his anger at the manner of his treatment by the Americans, and in particular by 
Secretary of State Byrnes. Possession of atomic weapons would help to guarantee equal 
status and fair treatment. Bevin reportedly told the committee: 'We've got to have this 
thing over here whatever it costs. We've got to have a bloody Union Jack on top of it'.39  
 
 Bevin won the argument, in part no doubt due to the force of his personality and 
standing in the government, and in part through advancing an argument which, though it 
did not directly tackle the point raised, seems laden with meaning. Britain was a Great 
Power and should be treated as such. It was not to be condescended to by other states, 
even other Great Powers. Since Great Powers possessed the most up-to-date and effective 
weaponry, and had to be able to wage war against any other state, Britain must have its 
own atomic weapons if it was to be treated as a Great Power. Many have seen the British 
                                                          
38 Cited in Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy 1939-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1964), p. 395. 
39 Peter Hennessy and Caroline Anstey, 'Birth of the British Bomb', The Independent, 12 May 1988. 
240 
decision to acquire atomic bombs as a means of compensating for decline from Great 
Power status. Clark and Wheeler make the point that this may be anachronistic.40 Yet the 
argument is less that the British government consciously regarded Britain as declining in 
power and sought compensation, than simply that as a state with a Great Power tradition, 
it was 'natural' for Britain to acquire these weapons. Bevin's was an argument, it appears, 
which Dalton and Cripps could not trump. 
 
 As with so many aspects of British foreign policy at this time and since, the 
relationship with the USA was a prominent consideration. When the decision on the 
bomb was finally taken in January 1947, the only substantive argument advanced in 
favour of the bomb was Bevin's statement - upon which he did not enlarge, according to 
the minutes of the meeting - that 'we could not afford to acquiesce in a US monopoly of 
this new development'.41 In the absence of an international control agreement, the Foreign 
Secretary argued, Britain must possess its own atomic weapons. Again, a sovereign Great 
Power had to remain capable of independent action. It was a feature of British security 
policy that Britain must have the United States as an ally, but also that it must be able to 
influence US policy and retain the maximum freedom for manoeuvre.  
 There was arguably therefore a central belief in the government, as Gowing puts 
it, 'that Britain as a great power must acquire all major new weapons', and that the A-
bomb 'was manifestly the new passport to first-class military rank'.42 During the stormy 
meeting of October 1946, it had been noted that 'Our prestige in the world...would...suffer 
if we did not exploit to the full a discovery in which we had played a leading part at the 
outset'.43 This sometimes remained an instinct rather than a reasoned argument, so it is 
hard to assess its exact weight. But at that time and on subsequent occasions it was 
openly expressed. In 1950, the Chiefs of Staff recalled that the British had been moved to 
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pursue a determined atomic bomb programme by 'the need to exploit an invention of 
immense political and economic significance so that we could exert the proper influence 
of a Great Power in world affairs, both in peace and in any future war'.44 Most publicly, 
Ernest Bevin told the House of Commons in May 1947 that the government did not 
accept 
that we have ceased to be a Great Power...We regard ourselves as one of the 
powers most vital to the peace of the world and we still have our historic part to 
play. The very fact that we have fought so hard for liberty, and paid such a price, 
warrants our retaining this position; and indeed it places a duty upon us to 
continue to retain it. I am not aware of any suggestion, seriously advanced, that by 
a sudden stroke of fate, as it were, we have overnight ceased to be a Great 
Power.45 
 
 Practical, realist security concerns also supported this position. Attlee declared 
later that the decision was founded on the need to insure against US isolationism. The 
decision was taken before the USA had made any commitment to European defence. The 
British could not safely rely on the Americans to come to their aid. Moreover, British 
faith in the Americans had been shaken by events in 1945 and 1946: the abrupt ending of 
Lend-Lease, for instance, and the severance of atomic energy collaboration by the 
McMahon Act. Thus for Attlee and his Foreign Secretary the decision to produce an 
atomic bomb was strongly influenced by considerations of British-US relations. 
Possession of atomic weapons would be a means of gaining influence over and respect 
from the USA if it was to be an ally, and a means of independent defence if not. 
 
 Political considerations therefore loomed large in the decision to produce the 
bomb. Military rationales, on the other hand, were accorded only the most superficial 
hearing during the January 1947 meeting of the GEN 163 committee. Portal informed the 
committee that he had spoken to the Chiefs of Staff - none of whom was present - and 
learned that they 'were naturally anxious that we should not be without this weapon if 
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others possessed it'.46 Perhaps, like much else, the military rationale for producing a bomb 
simply went without saying. It was so obvious that it seemed unnecessary to articulate it. 
Again, this makes it awkward to judge its relative importance. What then of the military 
aspects of the atomic bomb question? Long before the decision was taken to build a bomb 
- and this is further evidence that no one doubted that it would be built - the Chiefs of 
Staff were thinking about how to use it. Once the decision had been taken, and whatever 
the justifications for that decision, a strategy had to be worked out for the weapon. The 
ideas of the COS for the employment of the bomb are considered below.  
 
 To conclude, the British decision to go nuclear has received considerable attention 
in the literature, with various explanations advanced. Though not using the term strategic 
culture, some of these are in tune with the spirit of that approach. Margaret Gowing, in 
arguing that the atomic bomb decision just emerged from a body of assumptions, makes 
the case that beliefs about the international system and Britain's place in it, rather than 
reasoned analysis of British security objectives and options, shaped the decision. So an 
initial conclusion which can be drawn is that the analysis of British strategy is indeed 
sensitive to national peculiarities. Culture is certainly not ignored.   
 
 However, strategic culture is not drawn on explicitly nor applied systematically by 
existing accounts. There is a danger, noted in the political culture literature, that culture 
can become a residual variable, turned to when no other explanation suggests itself.47 
Those who turn implicitly to cultural arguments may be falling victim to this danger. 
Without hard documentary evidence of the reasons behind the atomic bomb decision, 
there may be a tendency to overstress cultural explanations, to use culture as an 
explanation of last resort. It can fill in the gaps in the documentary evidence by using 
inferred beliefs of decision-makers to explain their actions.  
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 While it is unsatisfactory to use culture only in such circumstances, as a last 
resort, it is still be instructive to look at its operation in this case. The thesis applies 
strategic culture more systematically to the 1947 decision than has been done hitherto. 
Other writers do not explicitly relate cultural arguments to possible alternative arguments. 
The thesis tries to do so. Waltz's point that the structure of the international system did 
not require a decision to acquire nuclear weapons weakens the case for structural causes. 
On two occasions, 'rational' arguments were put forward as to why Britain should not go 
ahead with its nuclear weapons programme. Blackett, Cripps and Dalton, 'rational men', 
were accorded short shrift. External constraints did act upon the British government, but 
internal beliefs about the nature of international politics and about Britain's Great Power 
status within it, did seem to inform government thinking and contribute significantly to 
the atomic bomb decision.  
 
 Strategic culture, it can be claimed, acted to close off other possible courses of 
action. The burden of proof lay with opponents of the decision. They struggled to make 
their voices heard when confronted with the powerful arguments of Ernest Bevin and 
others. Reference to Britain's Great Power status, to wrapping the atomic bomb in a 
Union Jack, conveyed strong meanings within the British elite. Overall, a strong case can 
be made that while strategic culture was not the cause of the decision, it did set a 
preference and make other options seem unattractive. Such debate as there was did not 
show the force of the best argument coming to the fore, as rational choice theory would 
suggest. Rather, arguments which struck a chord within British strategic culture carried 
most weight. In these ways strategic culture was significant. Moreover, the traditional 
British decision-making style also underlay the process by which the decision was taken. 
If it is not possible to quantify the importance of cultural factors in the 1947 decision, any 





The great deterrent 
It was Sir John Slessor who gave currency to the phrase 'the great deterrent', a reference to 
the atomic weapon.48 Slessor, as Chief of the Air Staff between 1950 and 1952, is usually 
credited with having been the driving force behind the famous Global Strategy Paper, a 
report by the British Chiefs of Staff on Defence Policy and Global Strategy submitted to 
the government in 1952. This is one of the most famous documents of post-war British 
defence policy, ironically achieving its fame, as is often the case, in part through having 
been censored. The more the government insisted that it should not be made public, the 
more important it was assumed to be. Finally, however, the Paper was released under the 
Waldegrave Initiative on open government. The 1952 Paper is credited with having given 
clear and explicit articulation to a strategy which had nuclear deterrence at its heart.49 
Along with the Overall Strategic Plan of 1947 and the Global Strategy Paper of 1950, 
also recently released, the evolution of this strategy can be traced.50 That will be done 
before an attempt is made to examine the extent to which the strategy can be understood 
in terms of traditional British strategic culture.  
 
 The 1952 Paper must be understood within the context of the strategic situation as 
seen by the government in 1952. Returned to office in October 1951, Winston Churchill 
believed that defence policy needed to be reviewed. This was the case first of all because 
Britain's economic position had deteriorated to the point where savings in the defence 
budget were thought necessary. The rearmament programme initiated two years 
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previously by the Attlee government during the emergency of the Korean War now 
represented too great a drain on resources.51 At the same time, Churchill felt that 
insufficient account was being taken in British and Western defence policy of the value of 
nuclear weapons.52 The Chiefs of Staff were therefore instructed to review British 
strategy. The 1952 Global Strategy Paper was the result of their deliberations.  
 
 In the 1952 Paper, the Chiefs of Staff stressed the need for a strategy which was 
sustainable economically, for a bankrupt Western Europe would offer the Soviet Union, 
identified as an implacable enemy, the chance of a 'bloodless victory'.53 NATO, 
meanwhile, had agreed at Lisbon in February 1952 to increase substantially its 
conventional forces. The Chiefs saw this as financially unrealistic and were concerned 
that NATO was simultaneously paying comparatively little attention to nuclear forces. 
Their view was that 'the existence of the great atomic deterrent is of vital importance to 
humanity'.54 More account had to be taken of this deterrent in British and NATO 
planning, for what would prevent war was 'the knowledge on the part of the Kremlin that 
any aggression on their part will involve immediate and crushing retaliation by the long-
range Air Striking Force with the atomic weapon'.55 The 'first essential' of allied policy 
had to be to establish and maintain this deterrent.56  
 
 This theme had been present in the thinking of the British defence establishment 
for some time. As Margaret Gowing writes, it became clear early in the atomic age to 
defence planners that 'the supreme object of British policy must be to prevent war, in 
particular by deterring aggression which might lead to war'.57 In October 1945 the Chiefs 
of Staff expressed the view that, unless international control of atomic energy could be 
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secured with 'the most unequivocal and comprehensive rights of inspection', then 
'possession of atomic weapons of our own would be vital to our security'. The best 
method of defence against the new weapon is likely to be the deterrent effect that the 
possession of the means of retaliation would have on a potential aggressor'.58 
Subsequently, many similar formulations of this deterrent position were expressed by 
British military planners. Thus in January 1947 the Chiefs agreed that 'the only effective 
deterrent to a potential aggressor is tangible evidence of our intention and ability to 
withstand attack and to retaliate immediately'.59 The 1947 Overall Strategic Plan, in 
which the Chiefs of Staff sought to bring together their defence thinking, similarly 
proposed a strategy not for fighting a war against the Soviet Union, but for preventing 
it.60 Again, in June 1948, the Joint Planning Staff can be found arguing that 'the existence 
of a strong bomber force armed with weapons of mass destruction is...the most effective 
deterrent to war'.61  
 
 The British did not then possess any atomic weapons of their own, however, nor 
would they test their first device until 1952. But it was assumed that they would have the 
bomb soon, and before the Soviet Union. The Soviets proved that assumption wrong in 
1949, testing their own bomb, and causing a certain amount of soul-searching in Britain. 
Just before the Soviet bomb test was known about, in September 1949, the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, Sir William Slim, suggested that the time had come to send the 
1947 Overall Strategic Plan back to the Joint Planning Staff for redrafting.62 Though not 
responsible for this redrafting exercise, out of which came the 1950 Global Strategy 
Paper, the Soviet atomic test cast a long shadow over it. What Margaret Gowing 
describes as 'the most shattering moment of truth for Britain in the early post-war years', 
followed within a few months by the unmasking of the atomic spy Klaus Fuchs, led the  
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Chiefs of Staff to question seriously the place of atomic weapons in their strategy.63  
 
 The prospect of the Soviets deploying atomic weapons long before the British fed 
into a debate on the relative priority of defence research and development, and that for 
atomic energy. In May 1949 the Chiefs of Staff had concluded that it remained essential 
that production of atomic energy and weapons should have overriding priority. Research 
and development of the bomb and of its means of delivery on the other hand had to be 
considered alongside other vital research and development projects, but the needs of the 
bomb were to be met unless the other projects were gravely imperilled.64 In February 
1950, in the wake of the Fuchs arrest, the Chiefs of Staff again considered their position 
on atomic weapons production.65 Thus the background to the 1950 defence review was 
marked by a crisis of British confidence in atomic weapons and their place in defence 
policy, and the Paper reflected that. Although it set great store by the importance of the 
Western atomic deterrent, it also emphasised the need for an efficient air defence system 
to protect a Britain made vulnerable to Soviet atomic attack unexpectedly early. The 
Chiefs also warned that atomic weapons could not be seen as an 'easy short cut to 
victory'.66 In the 1952 Paper, defence against atomic attack was not considered realistic, 
and deterrence was re-emphasised.67 The 1950 Paper therefore appears as a slightly less 
confident statement of belief on deterrence from that seen earlier and later. But the 
importance of an atomic deterrent was asserted by British military planners from 1945 
onwards.  
  What led Britain to adopt this great deterrent strategy? A number of aspects of the 
British historical experience can be identified which arguably shaped British thinking on 
the matter. 
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(1) Strategic Air Power 
In his book The Great War and Modern Memory, Paul Fussell notes that the engagements 
at Verdun, the Somme and elsewhere were termed 'battles' 'by subsequent historiography 
in the interest of neatness and the assumption of something like a rational causality'. 
These were not battles in the same sense as Blenheim or Waterloo: decisive set-piece 
engagements of troops. To characterise them as such 'was to imply an understandable 
continuity with earlier British history and to imply that the war makes sense in a 
traditional way'. It was also 'to try to suggest that these events parallel Blenheim and 
Waterloo not only in glory but in structure and meaning'.68 Continuity in military 
language therefore masks changes in the nature and meaning of warfare and suggests that 
it can be understood and prosecuted as before. 
 
 Similarly, to talk of atomic 'bombs' and nuclear 'weapons' is to imply continuity 
with the past and suggest that these devices can be rational policy instruments in the same 
way as traditional arms, and that they can be fitted into existing strategies. Many modern 
analysts see nuclear strategy and nuclear weapons as contradictions, believing that there 
can be no rational use of nuclear devices in the Clausewitzian sense. But while some 
talked of the revolutionary change brought about by nuclear weapons, others could still 
conceive of them in traditional terms. The obvious frame of reference within which 
atomic bombs could be conceived was strategic air power. The history of thinking on this 
subject was one of a number of factors which combined to shape the military policy 
devised by the British Chiefs of Staff with regard to the atomic bomb.  
 
 The British took strategic air power very seriously. Thinking about it had been 
influential in the interwar period, and strategic bombing had been extensively practised 
during the war. If air power in the Second World War had not proved to be the decisive 
weapon that had at first been feared, it seemed set to fulfil its promise once it had been 
allied to the atomic bomb. An atomic air offensive looked certain to be a truly devastating 
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form of attack, and was always likely to assume a central position in British defence 
planning since, as Mark Venables contends, Britain was better suited than any other 
nation to embrace it: British air power theory was the most refined and influential, and 
stressed the primacy of the independent bomber formation, a central feature of the atomic 
air strike.69  
 
 The atomic air offensive was all the more important because the most likely 
enemy which Britain would face was the Soviet Union. Addressing the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs in 1953, Sir John Slessor spelled out the options open to Britain in a 
war with the Soviets. A land invasion of the USSR would be an impossible undertaking, 
and the traditional British policy of naval blockade would be ineffective. Against such a 
vast, autarkic land power as the Soviet Union, 'it would be the bomber alone that would 
bring pressure to bear upon the enemy'.70 But the bomber would have great difficulty in 
bringing significant pressure to bear on the Soviet Union unless used in conjunction with 
the atomic bomb. The new weapon would permit a markedly smaller attacking force, 
which would be within the means of the United Kingdom. The Joint Planning Staff 
observed in June 1948 that the strategic bomber offensive using weapons of mass 
destruction was 'the best method of bringing early pressure to bear on the enemy'.71  
 
(2) Vulnerability 
A feeling of unique vulnerability gripped British policy makers in the atomic age. That 
Britain was considered peculiarly vulnerable to atomic air attack, much more so than the 
Soviet Union and the United States, is apparent from documents emanating from  the 
Foreign Office, the Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy, the Imperial Defence 
College, the Joint Planning Staff, the Chiefs of Staff and the Prime Minister himself.72 
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Many of these records date from the period shortly after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
explosions and demonstrate a pervasive and strongly held perception within the British 
government that, as a Foreign Office memorandum put it,  
 
the new discovery makes the United Kingdom infinitely more vulnerable than ever 
before, both absolutely and as compared with larger and more centrally placed 
countries.73 
 
This vulnerability was a function both of geography and of demography: Britain was 
closer to the Soviet Union than was the United States, and its industry and population 
were much more highly concentrated than those of the Soviet Union or the United States. 
Moreover, the prospects of an effective defence against an atomic air attack seemed dim. 
It was felt that it required only a few bombs to hit their targets to devastate the United 
Kingdom. 
 
 Mark Venables notes that Britain had been the first great power to face the 
problem of defence against air attack.74 If the British were keenly aware of the damage 
which they could inflict upon others with an atomic air offensive, they were even more 
painfully aware of the damage which could be inflicted upon themselves by the same 
means. Nor did they see any effective defence against atomic attack, given the damage 
which could be caused by only a small number of aircraft armed with atomic weapons. 
The Deputy Chiefs of Staff Committee on Atomic Weapons advised as early as January 
1946 that Britain now 'must count the bombs that get through rather than the aircraft shot 
down'.75 Around 1949-50, they debated giving more stress to defence, but by the time of 
the 1952 Global Strategy Paper they had given up on defending against atomic attack.76 
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Their feeling of acute vulnerability concentrated the minds of British strategists, who felt 
that Britain had its back pushed against the wall. In this respect the British experience 
was significantly different from that of the United States, cushioned by its distance from 
the Soviet Union and not perceiving itself to be vulnerable to atomic attack for several 
years to come. Right from the start of the post-war era the British were very well aware of 
the weakness of their position, and this awareness was perhaps the most significant factor 
in the development of British strategic thinking in the early post-war years.  
 
 That the British should have been so anxious about their vulnerability so early on 
is remarkable. The Soviet Union did not then possess atomic weapons, and was not 
expected to do so in the immediate future (and certainly not before Britain itself). With 
the United States in sole possession of atomic weapons, the British might have been 
expected to take a more positive outlook, and perhaps to see the bomb as a means of 
containing or even pushing back the Soviet Union. Yet instead of focusing on the present 
and looking to make the most of the Western head start, the British planners concentrated 
on a future Soviet threat, and attempted to come up with a strategy to counter Soviet 
atomic weapons and to minimise the threat of Soviet atomic attack. This negative 
thinking may be a measure of the depth of the concern felt by the British about their 
vulnerability to atomic attack, but it is curious that they should be so exercised by what 
was nevertheless only a potential vulnerability. The explanation perhaps lies in British 
strategic culture, for set against a long history of relative invulnerability, the new 
vulnerability of the atomic age was arguably a greater shock to the system than for other 
continental countries. Britons until the early part of the twentieth century could assume 
that the United Kingdom itself would be left untouched by the ravages of war. The advent 
of air power undermined that assumption and caused panic in the 1930s, and during the 
war the British had a taste of what air attack meant. Even though Britain suffered 
relatively little during the war, the damage done was far more extensive than hitherto.  
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 Britain's special vulnerability to atomic attack was a function of geography and 
demography. These are factors particular to the United Kingdom, but not cultural factors. 
As a result of the perception that they stood to lose most from an atomic war, the British 
began to articulate from very early on a policy of deterrence. War prevention was seen as 
crucial. But it could be argued that the novelty of British vulnerability to destruction in 
war gave it particular poignancy.  
 
 
(3) Deterrence versus appeasement 
It is important to make the distinction here between preventing and avoiding war, a 
distinction all too clear to those making policy at this time. For much of the 1930s war 
had been avoided through appeasement, but in the late 1940s the opposite of that policy 
was being considered. The British were intent on preventing war, but without 
surrendering their foreign policy interests to the USSR. A survey by the Imperial Defence 
College observed that 'any attempt at a policy of appeasement to Russia is more likely to 
provoke war'.77 Rather, a firm policy was required. Deterrence, the British realised, was 
as much a matter of foreign policy as of defence or military policy, and could not be 
guaranteed through the mere possession of atomic weapons. It required also a resolute 
foreign policy, the reverse of 1930s style appeasement. 
  
 In the previous chapter, Paul Kennedy's argument that appeasement had been a 
British policy since the middle of the nineteenth century was considered. Avoiding 
conflicts was important for an overstretched power in relative decline. The events of the 
1930s, however, turned appeasement into a discredited policy. Sir John Slessor, architect 
of the 1952 Global Strategy Paper, described the 1938 Munich crisis as the 'worst period 
of my life'.78 For many others who had lived through it also, Munich came to symbolise 
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cowardly and ultimately self-defeating retreat in the face of aggression. It led Slessor to 
distinguish war prevention and war avoidance. Trying to avoid war through appeasement 
would mean sacrificing vital foreign policy interests and would not ultimately halt a 
determined aggressor. Trying to prevent war through a strong foreign policy which made 
clear that Britain was willing to fight rather than jettison important interests would deter 
an enemy and so prevent war.79  
 
 The analogy with Munich is a frequently encountered one, and seems to have 
shaped Cold War thinking and policy in the United States and Britain. In mounting the 
Berlin air lift, the defence of South Korea and other Cold War landmarks, the example of 
Hitler may have been in many minds. Yet there are many difficulties with reasoning by 
analogy, which is often a shorthand approach. Chiefly the question is whether the Soviet 
Union in the 1940s and 1950s presented the same threat as Hitler in the 1930s. If not, 
then the analogy is inappropriate. It does not appear however that very much analysis 
went into determining this. It was easy to assume that Stalin equated with Hitler and that 
he had to be dealt with in much the same way. This may or may not have been correct. 
But the case can be made that the deterrence strategy adopted by Britain was a case of 
fighting the last peace again. The shock of the perceived failure of the interwar policy 
caused a reverse to a much harder line, a climate of thinking in which toughness met with 
approval and suggestions of accommodation would be dismissed, with a reminder of 
what had occurred in the 1930s.  
 
(4) Continental commitment versus maritime strategy 
There was a measure of continuity in British strategy with previous thinking in the 
entrusting of the RAF with primary responsibility for national defence. In the past it had 
been the Royal Navy which had enjoyed this responsibility, as it was required to defend 
Britain from invasion. Only a small army was required, and the same was true after the  
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Second World War, with one service again assuming the main burden.  
 
 The atomic airborne deterrent strategy also fits in to the traditional debate about 
the continental commitment versus the maritime strategy, discussed in the previous 
chapter. In the 1952 Global Strategy Paper the British were protesting against the NATO 
policy of preparing large scale conventional defences, and looking to cut their own 
conventional forces. Reliance on the atomic deterrent allowed the British to maintain low 
levels of conventional forces in the army, as they traditionally had. This time it was the 
Air Force and not the Navy which would bear the brunt of national defence. The armed 
forces of allies could be relied upon to mount the conventional defence of Europe. In war 
too, the airborne atomic offensive has been seen as a small conceptual step from the naval 
blockade - a means of avoiding direct military confrontations between armies on the 
battlefield, by attacking the heart of the enemy. Obviously, however, an atomic air 
offensive offered a more direct and immediate attack on the enemy's economic strength 
than the blockade. 
 
 In conclusion, post-war British strategy embodied strong continuity with the past. 
Even to the extent that atomic weapons were seen as revolutionary, and switching the 
emphasis from defence to deterrence, they were still conceptualised as weapons to be 
integrated into existing strategies. Once again, the strategy developed by the British to 
meet the threats of the nuclear age can be understood not as the obvious response of the 
notional 'rational strategic man', who is not rooted in the history and culture of any 
particular state, but as the response of British decision-makers with a particular strategic 
past. The effect of Munich was strongly felt, and reference to it a powerful argument for a 
deterrent strategy. Previous experience with bomber aircraft and a pre-existing sense of 
peculiar vulnerability gave the deterrent strategy an appeal to decision-makers. It fitted 
into the continental commitment versus maritime strategy dialectic. Defence dilemmas 
continued to be understood in similar terms to the past. A full understanding of British 
grand strategy and post-war defence debates requires comprehension of the past.  
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 Whether our notional 'rational strategic man' would have reached the same 
strategic conclusions and developed a similar strategy, is impossible to say. In their work, 
Clark and Wheeler attempt to argue that British policy differed in important respects from 
that of the United States, reflecting different national experiences and needs.80 In the end, 
however, the similarities seem more striking than the differences. But the United States, 
as a sea-going power with a history of naval then air power, and a debate between 
isolation from and involvement in European security affairs, in many ways resembles 
Britain, or, put differently, the two states are likely to share certain features of strategic 
culture. The comparison with the United States may not be the best to draw, though in the 
time frame being considered the only other state to acquire nuclear weapons was the 
Soviet Union, and that towards the end of the period. More studies are required to make 
possible comparisons with other states. 
 
The complementary deterrent 
The atomic weapon may have had pride of place in the 1952 Global Strategy Paper, but it 
was not seen as the solution to all problems. Land and air forces at a high state of 
readiness in Western Europe would complement the atomic deterrent, it was believed. If 
these forces were at a sufficiently high level the Soviets would see that any advance 
across Western Europe would be slow and difficult. This should deter them from 
aggression and also, should deterrence fail, give time for the atomic air offensive to take 
effect. The emphasis on conventional forces has not been fully acknowledged by 
secondary accounts of the 1952 Paper, but is evident now that it has been declassified. 
NATO conventional forces were not currently adequate, the Chiefs noted, but they had 
little to say on how improvements could be achieved, a particularly poignant omission 
given that Britain was looking in the Paper to cut its own conventional contribution to the 
Alliance.81  
                                                          
80 Clark and Wheeler, especially pp. 3-4. 
81 1952 GSP, paragraphs 39-40. 
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 A debate over the British contribution to continental defence had been going on 
for some years. Indeed, this forms part of a debate which has dominated much of post-
war British politics. Should Britain commit itself to Europe? This debate appears to have 
its roots in British history and obviously geography, as a country detached from mainland 
Europe, with a history of independence and global interests, adjusts to a diminished 
status. It has been argued that a particular understanding of sovereignty, seen in very 
formal terms, gets in the way of British co-operation in Europe.82 So too the debate on 
whether to commit troops to continental defence is therefore not a narrow strategic one, 
but rather a debate deeply rooted in British culture and linked to much broader concerns 
than military effectiveness. It is linked also to the traditional British debate on the 
continental commitment versus a maritime strategy.  
 
 In the early post-war years, the British had not been thinking in terms of 
committing troops to continental defence. The Overall Strategic Plan of 1947 had paid 
little attention to the defence of Western Europe, focusing rather on the defence of the 
Middle East and the United Kingdom itself:  
 
The primary task of the Army, apart from the manning of anti-aircraft defences and 
readiness to aid civil power in the United Kingdom, will be to ensure the security of 
our Middle East base. Despite the possible risk of invasion of United Kingdom by 
air we consider the provision of forces to meet our requirements in the Middle East 
must be given priority over the anti-invasion role in the United Kingdom.83 
  
Middle East defence, the defence of the United Kingdom and its development as an 
offensive base, and the control of essential sea communications, were defined as the three 
pillars of British strategy. The collapse of any one of them would, it was asserted, bring 
down the whole structure of Commonwealth defence.  
 
                                                          
82 See Jim Buller, 'Britain as an Awkward Partner', Politics, Vol. 15, No. 1 (February 1995), pp. 40-41. 
83 1947 OSP, paragraph 47 (e). 
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 By 1948, the defence of Western Europe had gained some ground in COS 
thinking. With the signing of the Brussels Treaty, the Berlin blockade and talks on the 
forming of an Atlantic alliance acting on their minds, the Chiefs had added to their plans 
the need to defend Europe as far east as possible, but thought in terms of committing 
British naval and air, rather than land, forces to this end. In that year, the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, Montgomery, was trying to persuade his fellow chiefs of staff that 
Britain must commit land forces to the defence of Europe: two divisions initially. The 
Navy and Air Force chiefs opposed the expense of resources on this when the navy and 
air force needed first call on funds. For the former, committing troops to the continent 
was also to be opposed as contrary to traditional British strategy. He argued that 
 
It had been our traditional policy in the past to avoid Continental Commitments. 
Twice in the past we had given a guarantee to assist a Continental nation to the limit 
of our power by the provision of land forces. On both occasions we had suffered 
severely, first at Mons and then more recently at Dunkirk.84 
This was not an argument that directly addressed the issue at hand, but one that drew on 
widely shared beliefs about the dangers of continental commitments. The emotive terms 
Dunkirk and Mons were brought in to add strength to the position, though whether the 
situation during the First and Second World Wars was analogous to the post-war situation 
was not tested.  
 
 This was a debate which rumbled on over the following years without any clear 
resolution. By the early part of 1950, the Chiefs of Staff were again deliberating on the 
sort of contribution that the United Kingdom should make to the conventional defence of 
Western Europe. The Joint Planning Staff had argued that a solid commitment of ground 
forces should be made to continental defence, on the grounds that  
 
It had become of vital importance for the survival of the United Kingdom that the 
enemy should be held no further west that the line of the Rhine.85 
                                                          
84 PRO, DEFE 4/10, COS (48) 18th meeting, 4 February 1948. 
85 PRO, DEFE 4/29, Confidential Annex to COS (50) 37th, 8 March 1950. 
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 Before going on to examine the decision actually taken by the Chiefs of Staff on 
this question in their 1950 review of strategy, it is worth considering what had brought 
about this new evaluation of the importance of the defence of Western Europe. The JPS 
pointed to one source with their assertion that  
 
The lead possessed by the United States in stockpiling atomic bombs would, on 
account of the early possession of this weapon by the Russians, lose much of its 
deterrent effect sooner than had been anticipated.86 
  
So again it was the Soviet atomic test which was at the centre of rethinking on defence 
policy. The JPS exhibited some loss of faith in deterrence in the light of the ending of the 
US atomic monopoly. And, if deterrence had been weakened, then war was now more 
likely, and in the event of the Soviet Union overrunning Europe, 
 
there was now no reason to suppose that the United Kingdom could survive for long 
the weight of attack that could be brought to bear by the Russians in possession of 
the Channel coast.87 
 
Presumably, though it is not stated clearly, the JPS was motivated by the fear that the 
Soviets would be able now to deliver atomic weapons by short range rocket from across 
the Channel, against which defence would be close to impossible. Thus the Soviet atomic 
explosion affected the Chiefs of Staff's thinking on European defence as well as on the 
place on atomic weapons in British strategy. 
 
 The Chiefs of Staff accepted this argument. It became a central part of their 
defence review. The new CIGS, Slim, observed in May 1950 that while there had been no 
fundamental change in defence policy, a most important move had been made on the 
relative importance of Western Europe and the Middle East.  





In the past we have been prepared to contemplate the overrunning of Western 
Europe on the grounds that it would be possible for Britain and the United States to 
fight back from bases in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. The Chiefs of Staff 
now considered that the defence of Western Europe must form part of the defence 
of the United Kingdom.88 
 
Yet even though the British here assigned new priority to the defence of Western Europe, 
by 1952 they were looking to limit their commitment. This sort of half-hearted, reluctant 
commitment reflects a history of seeking to avoid commitment, and can be seen in 
modern times when, even although Britain commits itself to various aspects of European 
integration, it so often manages to convey an impression of reluctance which leaves no 
Europeans convinced of its intentions. 
 
 To conclude, in looking at the place of conventional forces in British post-war 
strategy, we see a continuation of past debates, and a tendency also to frame arguments in 
terms of historical practice and debates. Reluctance on the part of many to countenance a 
continental commitment of forces persisted, while for others it was essential. As 
mentioned before, in the recent revised edition of his well-known book on the subject, 
The Continental Commitment, Michael Howard observed that, with hindsight, his 
advocacy of a commitment of forces to continental Europe was more influenced by the 
experiences of his own generation than he realised at the time. Having lived through the 
interwar years he felt that such a commitment was necessary to prevent a recurrence of 
the events of the 1930s and appeasement. For earlier generations, such as that of Liddell 
Hart, importance was attached to avoiding continental commitments which were seen as 
leading to the disaster of the First World War. New generations may see the debate in 
different lights, but both continued to see it in terms of an either/or situation: a 
continental commitment versus a maritime (or airborne) strategy.89 
 
                                                          
88 PRO, DEFE 4/31, COS (50) 74th, 11 May 1950. 
89 Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment: The dilemma of British defence Policy in the era of the 
two world wars (London: Ashfield Press, 1989: first published 1972), p. 8.  
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Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter has not been to prove conclusively the importance of strategic 
culture, to demonstrate how it operates in all circumstances, or to measure precisely its 
explanatory strength. To do so, if indeed it is possible at all, would require far more 
extensive and comparative case studies. Rather, the aim has been to suggest how 
consideration of strategic cultural factors in some key areas of post-war British defence 
policy can further our understanding of that policy and the debates which produced it. 
Accounts which left out the cultural factors discussed here would be far less rich and 
would miss much of what was going on. 
 
 With regard the decision taken by the British government to acquire its own 
atomic weapons, the argument here is that it was not made inevitable by the nature of the 
international system nor by the international circumstances in which British decision-
makers found themselves at the time the decision was taken. Other options were possible 
and reasoned cases against the decision were advanced on at least two occasions. 
However, there was little debate and 'rational' consideration of the crucial political, 
military and economic issues. Those who sought to initiate debate from a critical point of 
view were not met head on but dismissed and isolated from the decision-making process. 
Documents here provide little guidance as to the thoughts of the decision-makers and 
rational analysis of the goals they wanted to attain and the policy options for attaining 
them. Understanding of British strategic culture here can help to fill in the blanks of the 
documentary record and to grasp the meaning of those documents. The danger does exist 
that strategic culture becomes in these circumstances an explanatory tool of the last 
resort. However, were all the documents available, strategic culture could still be 
important, to draw out the meaning of the documents.  
 
 In the atomic bomb decision at least, strategic culture surely has a part. The lack 
of open, rational analysis of the military value of the bomb and of its affordability 
suggests that the decision was rooted in deeper beliefs and assumptions. Gowing 
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describes the decision as an 'instinctive response' and a 'reflex action' to underline this 
argument.90 The British self-perception as a Great Power does seem to have been an 
important factor in the atomic bomb decision, rendering the option of forgoing the 
acquisition of the bomb unpalatable and placing the burden of proof on those who would 
relinquish atomic power rather than those would obtain it. The preferred option, 
suggested by the strategic culture, was to join the atomic club. Writers such as Clark and 
Wheeler are right to draw attention to the effort made within the defence establishment to 
develop strategic rationales for the bomb from 1945 onwards.91 Yet the driving force 
behind the decision appears to be rooted more in the British self-image as a Great Power 
than in reasoned strategic responses to perceived threats. 
 
 The strategic culture approach thus leads to conclusions similar to those reached 
by Gowing, Groom and Pierre.92 However, by linking these conclusions to the detailed 
profile of British strategic culture, it gives more substance to their insights through the 
fuller exposition of British historical experience. Also, by relating the cultural 
explanation to other possibilities, the above analysis draws more attention to the relative 
role of culture. Finally, it is important to make clear the ways in which strategic culture 
functioned. Recalling the possibilities discussed in Chapter Four, strategic culture set 
preferences for decision-makers. It also had an instrumental role, for reference to key 
cultural beliefs served to produce a powerful argument. Finally, the strategic culture 
approach shows the meaning which this action had to decision-makers. If human beings 
are suspended in webs of meaning they themselves have spun, understanding of British 
strategic culture gives access to that meaning.  
 At another level, perceptions of the external environment as a threatening one in 
which all states need to take measures to ensure their own security also cautioned against 
abstaining from acquiring a weapon which other might subsequently decide to deploy, 
                                                          
90 Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, pp. 63 and 209-10. 
91 Clark and Wheeler, p. 5. 
92 Ibid, p. 184; Groom, p. 23; and Pierre, p. 303. 
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though, as Waltz warns, it need not necessarily have led Britain to developing its own 
bomb. This perception could be explained through a neo-realist analysis of the nature of 
the international system. However, the strategic culture approach offers a rival 
explanation. It roots this perception in Britain's long historical experience of conflict and 
war. Neo-realists might argue that all states operate according to the dictates of the self-
help system of international anarchy, and Britain is not unusual. Nevertheless, it is worth 
historicising this perception, and stressing the effect of national experience in creating it. 
This opens up the possibility at least that different national experience could give rise to a 
different view than neo-realism provides. On the basis of the analysis here, this must 
remain a speculative point, however.   
 
 In terms of decision-making styles, it can be argued that the process by which the 
British government reached their decision to acquire an atomic weapon was consistent 
with traditional practices. International circumstances also dovetailed neatly with the 
traditional style, suggesting the need to avoid immediate and irrevocable public 
commitments. There were many reasons to take the atomic bomb decision in secret, and 
to put off for as long as possible a decision at all. Explanations of the decision employing 
models of decision-making which do not look at these traditional practices lack the 
dimension of national specifity.93 
 
 The British deterrent policy similarly has roots in British history and experience. 
The development of strategic air power, the experience of Munich, the traditional debate 
between the continental commitment and the maritime strategy and the novelty of British 
vulnerability to attack provide the context in which the deterrent strategy was developed. 
These factors, along with the above noted perceptions of the external environment, 
created predispositions toward a strategic air offensive as a deterrent. Whether alone they 
would have been sufficient to determine policy is a difficult question to answer. The 
                                                          
93 For a decision-making analysis which has little to say on British particularity, see Peter James Anderson,  
The Consolidation of Selected Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy: A theoretical and empirical 
analysis (PhD Thesis, University of Southampton, 1987). 
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power of atomic weapons does perhaps have implications which cross national 
boundaries, suggesting that deterrence rather than defence is the best strategy. Yet 
strategic culture can be argued to have underlain the deterrent policy. 
 
 The debate over whether Britain needed to commit itself to continental defence 
was also conducted in familiar terms. The question of whether Britain should opt for a 
continental commitment or a maritime strategy was a traditional one, often seen in 
either/or terms. Contemporary circumstances and the experiences of different generations 
could affect which way the debate went at any particular time, but the same question was 
posed. The debate can be better understood in the context of the Britain strategic 
traditions, and these traditions, or versions of them, could be brought into the debate. 
Asserting that one or other option was the traditional strategy was a strong means of 
arguing the case. Tradition then could be manipulated as part of the debate. The fact that 
Britain committed itself to the defence of continental Europe can be explained perhaps by 
strategic circumstances; the reluctance with which it did so can best be understood in the 
light of British strategic culture. Effective argument must be based not just on being 
'right', but on mastery of the relevant 'language game', as Dillon, drawing on Wittgenstein, 
puts it.94   
 
 This chapter does not offer a revolutionary account of British strategic choices in 
the immediate post-war period. However, it has sought to show that strategic culture 
analysis can in many respects enrich our understanding of British strategic policy. Many 
writers on British strategic policy after the war, among them Gowing, and Clark and 
Wheeler, implicitly have recourse to strategic cultural arguments. Strategic culture so far 
has rarely been mentioned explicitly.95 The phrase 'strategic culture' itself arose in a 
particular environment, within the strategic studies community in the United States 
                                                          
94 G. M. Dillon, 'Britain', in Dillon, Defence Policy Making: A Comparative Analysis (Leicester: Leicester 
University Press, 1988), p. 40.  
95 The exception is John Baylis, in Ambiguity and Deterrence; and in British Defence Policy: Striking the 
Right Balance (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989). 
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during the Cold War. It was a reaction against an acultural and ahistorical style of 
analysis which assumed a universal strategic rationality. In the United Kingdom, 
however, there has been less of a tendency to make this assumption. More attention has 
been paid to national particularities. One commentator notes that US nuclear strategy had 
a timeless feel to it. If now that the Cold War has ended it seems that, to the contrary, US 
strategic analysis was deeply rooted in a particular time and place, nevertheless it did aim 
for timelessness and universal applicability. British thinking about nuclear weapons, 
however, seems to have had in mind the particular British situation.96 It is common to 
read analyses of British defence policy in this period which make reference to the legacy 
of the past, to history and tradition as important factors in shaping policy. Though not 
self-consciously strategic culture analysis, this draws on the same themes. Frequent 
reference to the past is indeed part of British culture. What British strategic writing needs 
is perhaps less to be made aware of strategic cultural factors, than to discuss them more 
reflexively. In the British context, strategic culture does not explain or enhance our 
understanding of everything. No one would expect it to do so. However, it is surely too 
important to ignore. 
                                                          
96 John C. Garnett, 'British Strategic Thought', in John Baylis, (ed), British Defence Policy in a Changing 











Culture is a difficult word. It has been described as 'one of the two or three most 
complicated words in the English language'.1 However, unlike other words denoting 
complicated concepts, for instance ontology, culture is not the restricted preserve of 
academic experts. It is a word everyone encounters frequently and employs often. Fazed 
by unfamiliar foreign customs, tourists pronounce themselves 'culture shocked'. Justifying 
state funding for money-losing avant garde operas and ancient dramas, artists present 
them as cultural events which must be sustained. Defending practices such as female 
circumcision which many people regard as torture, the practitioners call them culture.2 
From C.P. Snow's The Two Cultures to Robert Hughes' The Culture of Complaint, 
commentators on modes of thinking and contemporary climates of opinion have recourse 
to this multi-purpose word.3 
 
 Culture has proved to be a very useful word indeed. Its elasticity underpins its 
seductive appeal, for it can be stretched to include all sorts of phenomena. Field Marshal 
Lord Raglan observed that culture is 'roughly everything that humans do and monkeys 
                                                          
1 R.B.J. Walker, 'The Concept of Culture in the Theory of International Relations', in Jongsuk Chay, (ed), 
Culture and International Relations (New York, Westport CONN and London: Praeger, 1990), p. 4. 
2 On culture as an excuse for torture, see Ken Booth, 'Dare not to Know: International Relations Theory 
versus the Future', in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, (eds), International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: 
Polity, 1995), p. 342.  
3 C.P. Snow, The Two Cultures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964); and Robert Hughes, The 
Culture of Complaint: The Fraying of America (London: HarperCollins, revised edition, 1994). 
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don't'.4 It gives licence to explore phenomena which do not fit into other explanatory 
schemes. For example, it opens up for investigation what Michael Howard refers to as the 
'shadowy regions' of strategy. As noted in the 'Introduction' to the thesis, Howard argues 
that  
 
it is in those shadowy regions of human understanding based on our knowledge of 
social development, cultural diversity and patterns of behaviour that we have to 
look for the answers.5 
 
 Culture is also an exasperating word. Defining it is like nailing jelly to a wall. To 
invoke this term is to open a Pandora's box of methodological conundrums. The 
'Introduction' ended by quoting Clifford Geertz, the anthropologist who has done much to 
popularise the study of culture beyond his own discipline. Even for Geertz, this remains a 
frustrating field of study: 
 
Cultural analysis is intrinsically incomplete. And, worse than that, the more 
deeply it goes the less complete it is. It is a strange science whose most telling 
assertions are its most tremulously based, in which to get somewhere with the 
matter at hand is to intensify the suspicion, both your own and that of others, that 
you are not quite getting it right.6  
 
Culture tends not to offer neat, Newtonian connections between actions and reactions, 
causes and effects. For some, however, the world does not operate in a Newtonian 
fashion, and therefore means of studying it should not presume that it does. The simplest 
possible theory may be our aim, as William McGuire puts it, 'if we are seeking to describe 
a pretzel-shaped reality, we must be allowed to use pretzel-shaped hypotheses'.7  
 
                                                          
4 Cited in Patrick Mileham, Ethos: British Army Officership 1962-1992 (The Strategic and Combat Studies 
Institute, Occasional Paper No. 19, 1996), p. 29. 
5 Michael Howard, 'The Future of Deterrence', Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, Vol. 131, No. 
2 (June 1986), p. 10. 
6 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (London: Fontana, 1993), p. 29. 
7 Cited in Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 23. 
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 Culture is, for others, a dangerous word. 'When I hear the word "culture" I slip 
back the safety catch of my revolver', as Hermann Göring is often believed to have said. 
For different reasons, many others would agree. Culture, they would argue, can be drafted 
in to lend weight and authority to the commonplace and intellectual credibility to the 
spurious. It is hard to build cumulative, falsifiable knowledge on cultural foundations. 
While it may be an acceptable concept for everyday use and journalistic commentaries, it 
has no place in the more rigorous academic discourse. For Jack Snyder, whose coinage of 
the term 'strategic culture' has spawned a small academic literature, culture is a last resort 
turned to where more direct, satisfying linkages of cause and effect cannot be found.8 
 
 Cultural analysis is problematic. It has its adherents who believe that, for all the 
problems, it remains important because it taps into a significant aspect of human life. 
Searching the 'shadowy regions' may be more awkward than looking where there is light, 
but the potential rewards are greater and worth pursuing even if there is more chance of 
losing your way or failing to find what you are looking for. If we ignore culture, 'we are 
no more than top-of-the-water adventurers who limit our opinions of the icebergs to what 
we can see'.9 On the other hand, there will also be detractors who believe that the game is 
not worth the candle. The time and effort required to search the 'shadowy regions' or to 
move beyond the tip of the iceberg, will not, for them, justify the possible results. It is 
better to comment with certainty on a limited range of phenomena than to offer less 
secure opinions on more tricky phenomena. 
  
 It is in this context that the conclusions of this thesis should be judged. It does not 
resolve all the problems which bedevil cultural analysis. Far from it: this sort of analysis 
has inherent difficulties of which we must be aware and which can be mitigated, but these 
difficulties cannot completely be overcome. However, the thesis tries to make the case for 
studying strategic culture in spite of the difficulties involved. In the 'Introduction', a 
                                                          
8 Jack Snyder, 'The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor', in Carl G. Jacobsen, (ed), Strategic 
Power: USA/USSR (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), p. 4. 
9 John Irving, Trying to Save Piggy Sneed (London: Corgi, 1994), p. 152. 
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number of purposes were laid out. The intention was to survey the small but growing 
literature on strategic culture; to gather together and describe as much as possible of that 
literature; to identify some of its main strengths and weaknesses; and to locate it within 
the field of strategic studies. That done, the aim was to add some 'theoretical shine' to the 
concept by examining a related literature to which some reference is made in strategic 
culture writing: the political culture literature. That literature, it was hoped, would be of 
assistance in identifying the dangers and opportunities of cultural analysis, and 
determining how best to proceed with the study of strategic culture. The next part of the 
project involved adding 'empirical flesh' to strategic culture studies by first drawing up a 
profile of the salient features of British strategic culture and then asking to what extent 
this could aid our comprehension of some crucial choices in British grand strategy 
between 1945 and 1952, an important period in British strategic history. This 'conclusion' 
will proceed by summarising the findings of the thesis. It will finally offer some thoughts 
on what needs to be done to develop further the concept of strategic culture. One 
suggestion will be that it needs to be opened up to the wider realm of ideas in 
International Politics and beyond.10 The thesis has considered strategic culture from the 
point of view of a strategic studies specialist. It turned to the political culture literature for 
assistance. However, it will be argued that by opening the subject up to ideas about 
culture or related concepts currently being developed in the social sciences, much more 
progress may be made. 
 
Strategic culture   
On the basis of Chapters One to Four, what conclusions can be drawn about the concept 
of strategic culture? Chapters One and Two together constitute a sociology of knowledge, 
charting the origins and growth of the concept of strategic culture in the spirit of the 
maxim of Descartes that it is easier to understand something when you have watched it 
grow than when you look on it fully formed. The term 'strategic culture' itself was coined 
                                                          
10 I will use the capitalized form, International Politics, to refer to the academic subject or discipline rather 
than to relations between states. 
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because of a perceived neglect of historical and cultural factors in the strategic studies 
literature produced largely in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s. However, Chapter 
One made the point that this neglect did not characterise all writing about strategy. It is 
possible to find many writers on strategy who speak to cultural concerns, even if they do 
not use the term 'strategic culture' itself. Indeed, some have overemphasised the 
distinctiveness of national strategic cultures or ways in warfare. At times culture has been 
overlooked, then, and at times overdrawn. At times also it has been done badly, 
distinguished by reliance upon crude stereotypes. Nevertheless, many academics and 
journalists have taken the view that national particularities exist and play an important 
role in making sense of strategic behaviour. There is an intuitive appeal to the concept, 
which, if it does not automatically confer academic respectability upon it, at least 
suggests that it warrants further investigation. 
 
 The body of writing focused explicitly upon strategic culture seeks to conduct this 
investigation. Chapter Two set out to compile as up-to-date as possible a survey of the 
literature explicitly dealing with strategic culture. The chapter also sought to convey the 
flavour of the concept and to illustrate the uses to which it has been put. Finally the 
intention was to make an initial assessment of the literature. It was argued that although 
united by the belief that cultural factors are important, in other respects it is divided. 
Some writers might as well not have used the term at all. They make no effort to locate it 
within the existing literature on strategic culture nor to elaborate on what they understand 
it to mean, and might indeed have employed other language to make the same points. 
Others, however, attempt to develop the concept. Differences emerge on why strategic 
culture should be studied, and on how it should be studied. Regarding the purpose of 
studying strategic culture, the minimalists like Colin Gray and Yitzhak Klein find it 
possible to study culture broadly within the traditional realist paradigm of strategic 
studies, the how-to-do-it guide. They continue to regard conflict in the international 
system as inevitable, as a result of human nature or the anarchic international system. 
Therefore states must rely on their own strength for security against the range of possible 
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military threats. This can better be achieved if state leaders understand their own strategic 
cultural biases as well as those of potential enemies. If these writers would dispute the 
crude realist view that states are functionally undifferentiated units, the behaviour of 
which does not depend significantly on their internal organisation and historical 
experience, they nevertheless writers do not see strategic culture as posing a fundamental 
challenge to most of the central tenets of neo-realist thinking. 
 
 Strategic culture minimalists-plus and maximalists beg to differ. For minimalists-
plus, improved, mutual cultural understanding may avert wars resulting from 
misperception. It may facilitate the peaceful settlement of disputes. It may offer greater 
chances to mitigate the security dilemma and to construct security regimes. For 
maximalists, the potential for cultural change is crucial. Studying strategic culture can 
show that particular beliefs about the use of force are not natural or inevitable, but the 
product of specific times, places and circumstances. If some cultures have managed to 
live more peacefully than others, then lessons could be learned from them. If people are 
alerted to the possibility that their core values about the use of force derive from 
particular historical experiences, then change, in more peaceful directions, can become 
conceivable. Strategic culture here does not shore up the realist project, it undermines it. 
Progress may be facilitated from strategic cultures, understood here as mindsets in which 
war is seen as inevitable and force as a legitimate instrument of policy, to pacific cultures, 
understood as mindsets in which force has no legitimacy. War is seen as a cultural 
phenomenon, one which is learned and therefore which can be unlearned.11  
 
 As to how strategic culture is to be studied, many writers tackle the 
methodological issues by ignoring them. Those who consider them are divided except in 
the admission that cultural analysis is never simple. Examination of the political culture 
and belief systems literatures testify to the problems involved in the study of ideational 
                                                          
11 On war as a cultural phenomenon, see Ken Booth, 'War, Security and Strategy: towards a doctrine for 
stable peace', in Ken Booth, (ed), New Thinking About Strategy and International Security (London: 
HarperCollins, 1991), pp. 354-55.  
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variables. The main issue is whether a strict, positivist approach, seeking to generate 
falsifiable propositions and test them empirically, to link directly cause and effect, and to 
build knowledge cumulatively, can pin down the elusive influence of culture. Those who 
initiated the study of political culture did so partly because modern research methods 
promised to provide quantifiable data on beliefs and values. This promise was not 
fulfilled, and the more recent resurgence in political culture studies has taken place in a 
more interpretive vein. Alastair Johnston attempts, however, to devise a positivist method 
to study strategic culture. Others settle for a more interpretive approach.  
 
 This thesis belongs to the latter category. It argues that culture is simply not 
susceptible to such methods. One reason for this is that culture is in constant flux. Change 
is a crucial issue in cultural analysis, for if beliefs and values are readily jettisoned and 
replaced, and not sustained over time, then their use for explaining and understanding 
behaviour is limited. They must have some persistence. At the same time, however, they 
do change. The group under study is always changing, as new generations arise. Beliefs 
and values must be transmitted to these new generations. Continuity of beliefs is not 
unproblematic. It needs to be explained. And there may be constant adjustment of some 
beliefs as events occur which challenge them. As Heraclitus observes, 'You cannot step 
into the same river twice, for fresh water is always flowing past you'. Moreover, the same 
beliefs and values will never be shared by all members of the group. There will always be 
inconsistencies in any statement about a group's strategic culture, therefore. Any snapshot 
of it will not fit everyone's beliefs at that time and will not be precisely valid at all times.   
 
 A second reason is that since beliefs and values cannot be directly observed, their 
existence needs to be inferred from 'valid indicators'. As earlier chapters show, there are 
difficulties with each of the possible sources from which beliefs may be derived. In 
different cases, which sources are available will vary. Ultimately, it is necessary to 
interpret the sources in order to infer beliefs. Those who initiated political culture studies 
did so partly through the belief that modern survey methods would provide hard data on 
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values and beliefs, but these methods did not deliver. The recent resurgence in political 
culture has occurred as part of a more interpretive movement.12 Similarly, establishing 
firm links between beliefs and historical experiences, and present and even more so future 
behaviour, is highly problematic. Proof that would satisfy a strict positivist is unlikely to 
be obtainable. Earlier chapters highlighted the difficulties involved. 
 
 A more hermeneutic approach is therefore called for; or, 'if that word frightens, 
conjuring up images of biblical zealots, literary humbugs, and Teutonic professors', a 
more interpretive approach.13 Such an approach acknowledges the impossibility of 
obtaining hard evidence for the existence and effect of a soft concept like culture, and so 
rejects 'behaviouralist standards of verification in favour of a criterion of plausibility'.14 It 
runs the twin risks of 'overinterpretation and underinterpretation, reading more into things 
than reason permits and less into them than it demands'.15 Strategic culture, as with other 
forms of cultural analysis, can be done badly (though of course this is also the case with 
all  forms of analysis). Analysts may only see what is necessary to support their particular 
views, and may be guilty of 'evincing galaxies of significance from atoms of meaning'.16 
Equally, however, the importance of symbols and values can be overlooked.  
 
 Each case will differ in available sources from which the culture may be inferred, 
and also in sources from which it has originated. There can be no rigid model for the 
study of a group's strategic culture. The intended value of the framework in Chapter Four 
is to offer a rough guide through these relatively uncharted waters. It suggests what sorts 
of geographical features, interacting with historical experience and political culture, 
might shape thinking about different aspects of the use of force. Working with whatever 
                                                          
12 On this point see Stephen Welch, The Concept of Political Culture (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 
1-11. 
13 Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (London: Fontana, 
1993), p. 21. 
14 Welch, p. 4. 
15 Geertz, Local Knowledge, p. 16. 
16 William McIlvanney, These Words: Weddings and After (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 1984), p. 21. 
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sources are available and appropriate to the particular group, and interpreting them as 
seems fit, the challenge is to identify what seem to the most important beliefs of a group.  
 
 The aim then is to examine the ways in which strategic cultures impinge upon 
behaviour. The more interpretive form of explanation tries to connect 'action to its sense 
rather than behaviour to its determinants'.17 How do people understand their environment, 
how do they perceive the meaning of events and actions? But other uses of strategic 
culture are possible, and this thesis has shown these also. There is a role in explaining 
particular choices, for culture can set preferences and make certain cases harder or easier 
to argue. There is a possible instrumental role also for culture, for beliefs can be 
manipulated in debate to support certain policies. Exactly how culture operates may well 
vary from case to case. 
 
  Looking to the future, more case studies taking in more countries would be of use 
in developing strategic culture. In particular, more comparative assessments adhering as 
close as possible to a common framework would be beneficial for factoring out different 
factors from the analysis. Little work has been done on Central and South America, 
making that fertile ground for enquiry. We might ask, for instance, about the success of 
regimes aimed at halting nuclear proliferation in Latin America. Is there a cultural basis 
for the success there, in contrast with the situation between India and Pakistan? 
Interesting work might also be done on Germany and Japan, two states whose recent 
military experience might be expected to have wrought change in thinking about force. 
Have ingrained cultures changed? Or do old attitudes still exist at some levels? There are 
numerous interesting questions to be asked about these states. Most importantly, perhaps, 
future strategic culture studies might open themselves up to new ideas from other areas. 
This will be discussed shortly, but first, what can be said about British strategic culture? 
 
 
                                                          
17 Geertz, Local Knowledge, p. 34. 
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British strategic culture 
Chapters Five and Six take up this challenge as they turn to the case study on British 
strategic culture. It is an interesting time to do so. 1995 was marked by extensive 50th 
anniversary commemorations of various events of 1945, especially VE-Day. These 
formed the culmination of a series of acts of remembrance of major events of World War 
Two, including notably D-Day, reflecting a conscious attempt to keep the war alive in the 
popular memory. While all political parties in Britain, and most people, seemed to agree 
that such acts of remembrance should take place, there was debate about the form which 
they should take and the meaning which was and should be attached to them. Should 
there be an emphasis on victory, or would that lead to a focus on war and even perhaps 
glorification of it, when the importance of peace should be promoted and the view that in 
war everyone loses stressed? Was it appropriate to celebrate the successful prosecution of 
the war by the British 'nation', or should a more international view be taken? Was there a 
distastefully jingoistic aspect to the proceedings, or a respectable national pride often 
missing today? Was it vitally necessary to honour the memory of the dead if global war is 
not to be repeated? Was there a dangerous nostalgia for a glorious past when Britain 
should have been looking forward for prosperity, not backward? Inevitably also, the 
events of 1945 must have different meanings for those who lived through them and those 
who did not.  
 
 Whether these events should be celebrated or commemorated, how and whether 
they should be remembered, whether victory in the war ultimately benefited or damaged 
British interests, are all open to debate. In any case, the debate reflects the continued 
importance of the war in shaping our thinking today, and the desire to utilise past 
experience in arguing particular points of view. The case study chapters attempted to 
employ some aspects of the framework to make sense of British strategic decisions in the 
key 1945-52 period in terms of past experience. Chapter Five sketched a profile of British 
strategic culture. This was a first cut at this enterprise. No doubt many more points could 
be made, and others may wish to take these up. The process illustrated some of the 
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difficulties involved. What should the starting period be? How can history and myth be 
disentangled, if at all? How can past events be linked to current beliefs? There are no glib 
answers to such questions. 
 
 Chapter Six attempted to explain some British strategic decisions in terms of the 
cultural baggage identified. If the structure of the situation in which Britain found itself 
did not demand the acquisition of nuclear weapons, why should the British have gone 
down that road? If 'rational strategic man' might have taken the view that Britain could 
not produce an effective nuclear force, and that the opportunity costs of attempting to do 
so were too high, why did 'national strategic man' proceed with the atomic project? 
Pervasive conceptions of Britain, rooted in British history, as a 'Great Power', appear to 
have rendered any other course of action unthinkable to most decision-makers. 
Arguments which made reference to British history seemed to carry more weight than 
those resting on economic or military logic. 
 
 A deterrent strategy to employ the nuclear weapons, once constructed, similarly 
made sense in the context of British air power experience and of interwar appeasement. 
The analogy with Munich provided a powerful rationale for a deterrent policy which 
involved demonstrating military strength and resolve. Decision-making conformed to a 
particular British style. The strategic culture approach does add richness to our 
understanding of which decisions were taken, the manner in which they were taken, and 
how cases were argued. Others have perhaps made similar points. However, the tendency 
is for cultural analysis to be implicit. The danger here is that it is applied 
idiosyncratically, and with no systematic effort to measure its weight relative to other 
factors. Use of a common framework, and the attempt to search systematically for 
evidence of the role of strategic culture, should prevent it becoming a residual variable, 
turned to when no other explanation presents itself.  
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 What directions could future studies of British strategic culture take? Some were 
suggested at the close of Chapter Five. In profiling British strategic culture, there is scope 
to search for evidence of all sorts of sub-cultures. Are there variations in strategic 
thinking in Ireland, Wales, England and Scotland? Are there difference across gender? 
Also some aspects of the profile could no doubt have been investigated in more depth. 
And of course various other periods of British strategic history could be explored with a 
view to assessing the importance of culture.  
 
  Does Britain's Great Power legacy, for instance, continue to have an effect on 
British strategic behaviour? Anthony Eden remarked that 'we were a global power or we 
were nothing'.18 The sense that Britain was a Great Power with global interests and 
responsibilities arguably informed the decision taken by Eden, when prime minister, to 
embark upon the ill-fated Suez operation. This would make an interesting topic for 
further research into British strategic culture. Such research could consider the extent to 
which a strategic cultural belief in Britain's global role and responsibilities led to the 
decision to use force. Britain’s forced abandonment, under pressure from the 
superpowers, of that operation, could also be examined to see if it constitutes one of the 
dramatic events, discussed earlier, which confront decision-makers with the 
inappropriateness of core strategic beliefs and lead to change. For Oliver Franks, the 
former British Ambassador to the United States, Suez 
 
was like a flash of lightening [sic] on a dark night. What it did was to light up an 
unfamiliar landscape. It was a landscape in which the two superpowers and 
principally the United States had told us to stop and we'd had to stop...This was 
not being a world power. This was being told by a world power what the limits 
were and I thought that everything was different from then on. If you like, illusion 
stripped away...19 
 
                                                          
18 Cited in Peter Hennessy and Caroline Anstey, Moneybags and Brains: The Anglo-American 'Special 
Relationship' Since 1945, Strathclyde Papers On Government and Politics No. 1 (Glasgow: University of 
Strathclyde, 1990), p. 10. 
19 Ibid. 
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 Or does the illusion linger on in some form? Michael Quinlan, Permanent 
Secretary at the Ministry of Defence until his retirement in 1992, concludes that 'we have 
a certain sense of ourselves, borne of history which does mean that we view what we 
might do rather differently from some of our partners'.20 Italy, a state with similar wealth 
and population, and facing no more obvious external threats, spends half of what Britain 
does on defence. This suggests a future research topic.  
 
 The 'special relationship' is another fertile area for research. Is Britain's so-called 
special relationship with the United States an 'invented tradition', nurtured by the British 
government in the 1940s and 1950s when close alliance with the United States was 
perceived to be essential? Does this invented special relationship today hinder a clear-
sighted appreciation of Britain's role in Europe? Or have close relations between these 
two states been founded on close cultural understanding and shared cultural, and even 
strategic cultural, backgrounds?  
 
 An interesting research project would be to compare the strategic cultures of 
European states. Comparison of Britain and France, states of similar sizes and with 
parallel histories in certain respects, would be useful. If significant differences in strategic 
outlook can be discerned which cannot be traced to situation or structure, then the 
importance of culture might be asserted. Comparison with Germany also would be 
interesting. How has the rather different experience of war of Germany affected its 
attitudes towards the use of force? A comparative project could ask which attitudes are 





                                                          
20 Cited in Peter Hennessy and Zareer Masani, Out of the Midday Sun? Britain and the Great Power 
Impulse, Strathclyde Papers On Government and Politics No. 14 (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 
1992), p. 3. 
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Culture and International Politics 
Above it was observed that strategic culture might benefit from opening up further to new 
ideas. The approach taken by this thesis was to begin within strategic studies and spread 
out. In asking where strategic culture should go from here, the conclusion will cast the net 
wider still. To study this subject is to open up all sorts of possibilities that go well beyond 
traditional strategic analysis. Are there other subjects from which insight might be drawn? 
Strategic culture could act as a Trojan horse, smuggling these ideas back into strategic 
studies.  
 
 In fact, in many other areas of International Politics, it is possible to detect a 
growing attention to culture. Strategic studies is not the only academic approach to the 
study of conflict. The subject of conflict resolution is concerned with similar phenomena, 
but stems from a quite different tradition.21 These approaches to conflict had little to say 
to each other during the Cold War. Now that the Cold War is over, more contact 7 being 
made and a debate is underway about the place of each within the broader field of 
security studies. There is evidence of some coming together of the two approaches.22 In 
this context it is interesting to note that culture is being identified within both the conflict 
resolution and strategic studies literatures as an important issue. Indeed, only a few 
months before the August 1994 conference on strategic culture in the Asia-Pacific region, 
mentioned earlier, which took place on the Malaysian island of Langkawi, another 
conference had been held on Penang, another island off the west coast of peninsular 
Malaysia. That conference brought together conflict resolution experts to discuss 'Conflict 
and Conflict Resolution in the Asia Pacific Region: Culture, Problem-Solving and 
Peacemaking'.23 Culture could even form a meeting point on which the two sub-fields 
could converge and move forward together. 
                                                          
21 On the different traditions in the study of conflict see A.J.R. Groom, 'Paradigms in Conflict: the 
Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher', Review of International Studies, Vol. 14, No. 
2 (April 1988), pp. 97-115; and David J. Dunn, 'Peace Research versus Strategic Studies', in Booth, New 
Thinking About Strategy and International Security. 
22 See Dunn, p. 69.  
23 Some of the papers are reproduced in a special issue of the journal Pacifica Review, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1994). 
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 Within the field of conflict resolution, among those who have done most to bring 
culture to the fore are Avruch and Black. These cultural anthropologists reject the views 
that people everywhere behave in the same way in conflict situations, and that they 
behave in wholly idiosyncratic fashions. Rather they focus on middle range explanations 
of human conflict behaviour, looking for regularity of conflict behaviour among groups 
short of all humanity. For Avruch and Black 'the culture question' is 'among the two or 
three most important questions facing conflict resolution theory'.24 
 
 Their point is that conflict occurs everywhere, but there is considerable variation 
between different cultures on how much occurs and how it is coped with. Cultural 
differences play a part in explaining this. The culture of a group 'consists of both explicit 
rules, beliefs, values and symbols, and implicit, unrecognised sets of meanings, 
metaphors, stories, and discourses through which experience is interpreted and which are 
unconsciously reproduced as part of social life'.25 Within Conflict Resolution the referent 
group may be a pre-industrial society or a modern nation or ethnic group, and its rules, 
beliefs, values and so on regarding conflict are of importance in understanding and 
resolving it. Groups develop their own understandings of and assign their own meaning to 
conflict, and they develop different negotiating and bargaining styles and approaches to 
resolving conflict. Some cultures have developed more effective means of dealing with 
conflict, such as the Norwegians, who are said to seek to avoid conflict situations or 
develop non-violent responses to conflict. Those with less effective means of handling 
conflict could well learn from studying them.26  
 
                                                          
24 Kevin Avruch and Peter W. Black, 'The Culture Question and Conflict Resolution', Peace and Change, 
Vol. 16, No. 1 (January 1991), pp. 22-26. 
25 Cited in Tamara Duffey, 'A Theoretical Examination of the Role of Culture in Conflict Resolution with 
Special Reference to Japan: Implication for Practice and Training', Paper prepared for a conference on 
Conflict Resolution in the Asia-Pacific Region: Culture, Problem Solving and Peacemaking, Penang, 
Malaysia, 1994, p 4. 
26 On this point see Marc Howard Ross, The Culture of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in 
Comparative Perspective (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993), especially pp. xi-xii and 
161-64. 
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 Cross-cultural learning is therefore one reason to study conflict within different 
cultures. Another reason is that conflict between groups who hold different views of what 
it means may be particularly intractable, especially as ways of resolving conflict, perhaps 
based on understandings of it, may also differ. In his work on the Egyptian-Israeli 
conflict, Raymond Cohen argues that a mutual lack of cultural understanding prolonged 
the conflict between these states and hindered the search for solutions.27 Therefore those 
who would intervene to resolve conflicts will need to try to see the conflict as the parties 
involved do if they are to promote its resolution. They cannot simply apply theories of 
resolution assumed to have universal validity. Very often, as with strategic theories, 
supposedly universal theories turn out to be rooted in particular Western beliefs and 
values, for Conflict Resolution has in common with Strategic Studies its 'Western' 
intellectual origins.28 
 
 Cultural analysis has a number of adherents, but as in strategic studies, it has yet 
to establish itself firmly within conflict resolution. Avruch and Black comment of 
Conflict Resolution that 'there are strong indications in the still-sparse literature that 
culture matters in some way that has yet to be precisely determined', echoing Colin Gray's 
remark that scholars of strategic culture know it is important, 'but they are not sure how 
important'.29 Within conflict resolution as within strategic studies, there is an awareness 
among scholars working on cultural analysis of its inherent complexities and 
difficulties.30 Within each there are passionate critiques of cultural analysis.31 But within 
each, there is also a sense among advocates that it is too important to be ignored.  
 
                                                          
27 Raymond Cohen, Culture and Conflict in Egyptian-Israeli Relations: A Dialogue of the Deaf 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990). 
28 See Duffey, p. 1. 
29 Avruch and Black, 'The Culture Question and Conflict Resolution', p. 26; and Colin S. Gray, Nuclear 
Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986), p. xii. 
30 See for example Avruch and Black, 'The Culture Question and Conflict Resolution', pp. 41-42; and Gray, 
p. 35. 
31 For instance, Snyder, 'The Concept of Strategic Culture'; and I. William Zartman, 'A Skeptic's View', in 
Guy Olivier Faure and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, (eds), Culture and Negotiation: The Resolution of Water Disputes 
(London: Sage, 1993). 
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 In the field of military history also, culture appears to be achieving greater 
prominence. John Keegan, the military historian, recently represented the Gulf War as 'a 
clash of two quite different military cultures'. Each of these cultures has deep historical 
roots and is shaped by the broader cultural setting in which it has developed. The West, 
drawing on Clausewitz, emphasised directness in the attainment through military means 
of political objectives. In doing so it believed that it had thoroughly defeated Saddam 
Hussein. Saddam, however, did not accept this. Through 'recourse to a familiar Islamic 
rhetoric', he denied that he had been defeated in spirit, thus robbing the West of the 
political point of its 'victory'. For Keegan this was 'a striking exemplification of the 
inutility of the "Western way of warfare" when confronted by an opponent who refuses to 
share its cultural assumptions'.32 
 
 Keegan focuses on civilisations and argues that they possess distinct beliefs and 
values with regard to the use of force. He looks at how the West's military instrument was 
blunted against the different set of meanings given to the use of force by the enemy. The 
effective use of military force, he argues, requires that each party involved understands 
the messages being sent. Groups with different 'military cultures', as with different 
languages, may struggle to understand each other. Whatever the merit of the argument in 
this particular case, it is an argument which is increasingly being aired by those who study 
military history. This point finds support in a 1993 article by John Shy in the Journal of 
Military History. Shy writes that a number of recent works have, in ambitious and 
stimulating fashion, examined 'the cultural dimension of war'. They may not all have 
referred explicitly to culture, and they have not introduced the term with a fanfare, but 
Shy believes that he can reasonably assert that 'there is something fairly new afoot within 
our field of study, with traditional questions about how wars are waged being approached 
in a way that can fairly be called cultural'.33 This includes, for example, investigation of 
                                                          
32 John Keegan, A History of Warfare (London: Pimlico, 1994), p. xi. 
33 John Shy, 'The Cultural Approach to the History of War', Journal of Military History, Vol. 57, No. 5 
(October 1993), pp. 13-26. 
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'motivating belief-systems as disparate as American and Japanese racism' and their effect 
on war-making.34 
 
 In the study of foreign policies also, signs of attention to culture can be found. In 
his book The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs, 
published in 1983, Robert Dallek complained that by the 1970s, the study of US foreign 
policy had begun to ignore 'nonrational influences' on and the 'hidden side of' US foreign 
policy.35 He set out to rekindle debate about 'those subjective influences that makers and 
backers of foreign policy barely glimpse themselves'. His book was a study of 
'undercurrents, of mood, tone or milieu, of a climate of feeling that almost imperceptibly 
insinuates itself into concrete ideas and actions'.36 This was a matter of culture and of the 
style of US foreign policy. 'Like the atmosphere', Dallek admitted, 'these matters are not 
easily described. Yet they are there'.37 Studying them would be difficult and his book 
would tread uncharted ground. However, he argued that 'if we are going to carry the study 
of American foreign policy beyond the confines of where we have been', this was a 
necessary step.38 It is a step which has been taken by others: Arthur Schlesinger when he 
examined 'national peculiarities' and foreign policy; and Michael Vlahos looking at 
culture and foreign policy.39 
 
 The work of a number of international historians has also tried to develop notions 
similar to strategic culture. These historians, who have been described as 'lumpers' (as 
distinct from the 'splitters' who try to tell the story through the documents), attempt to 
                                                          
34 Ibid, p. 25. 
35 Robert Dallek, The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), p. xii. Prior to the 1970s, Stanley Hoffmann examined American foreign policy 
style in Gulliver's Troubles, Or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968. 
36 Dallek, p. xiii. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid, pp. xiv and xx. 
39 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., 'Foreign Policy and the American Character', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 1 (Fall 
1983), p. 1; and Michael Vlahos, 'Culture and Foreign Policy', Foreign Policy, No. 82 (Spring 1991), pp. 
59-78. 
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stress the continuity of security policies over long time scales.40 Paul Kennedy has written 
that 'the history, geography, and culture of each country on our planet are unique'.41 As 
noted earlier, he has examined British external policy over a couple of centuries, with 
emphasis on geographical and economic as well as diplomatic and political factors.42 John 
Lewis Gaddis has also sought to discern patterns in US post-war national security policy, 
developing the idea of 'geopolitical codes' from Alexander George's work on operational 
codes.43 Gaddis argues that these codes represent the assumptions of US leaders about US 
interests in the world, about potential threats to these interests and about feasible 
responses to them. He identifies various different codes which have operated since the 
beginning of the Cold War.  
 
 Gaddis and Kennedy both in different ways look to underlying beliefs and 
assumptions which give meaning to the actions of decision-makers. So too does James 
Joll, to whom reference was also made earlier. Joll underlined the importance for 
documentary historians of seeking to comprehend the 'unspoken assumptions' of decision-
makers which never make their way into the documents.44 On the subject of German war 
aims in 1914, Joll notes that the famous September memorandum tells only part of the 
story: 
 
our assessment of the significance of the September memorandum of war aims 
depends on our general view of the mentality, the Weltanschauung, of the German 
leaders as much as on the document itself.45 
 
 
                                                          
40 See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National 
Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. vii. 
41 Paul Kennedy, 'Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition', in Paul Kennedy, (ed), 
Grand Strategy in War and Peace (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 6. 
42 See Paul Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945 (London: Fontana, 1984), pp. 13-18. 
43 Gaddis, pp. vii-ix. 
44 James Joll, '1914: The Unspoken Assumptions', in H.W. Koch, (ed), The Origins of the First World War: 
Great Power Rivalry and German War Aims (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 309-12. 
45 Ibid, p. 310. 
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If Joll is vague on how the mentality of leaders can be accessed, Deborah Larson has 
more recently undertaken a more examination of the 'development of the American Cold 
War belief system'.46 Given that the Cold War was waged with the intention of winning 
over the 'minds of men', she reasons, it is appropriate to focus on the perceptions of 
decision-makers. This will provide insight into the available documentary evidence. 
 
 Larson’s work suggests another body of literature which ought to be of use to 
scholars of strategic culture. The need to try to view the world in the same way as 
decision-makers in order to make sense of their actions also underlies the literature on 
belief systems in international relations. Steve Smith has identified various distinct 
approaches which can be grouped under the heading of belief systems.47 What unites them 
is that they concern the links between the operational and psychological environments of 
actors. In order to make sense of their complex world, it is held, actors need to produce 
simplified pictures of it - just as social scientists produce theories which simplify the 
social sphere in order to explain actions within it. This leads to the existence of various 
different world views, or 'perceptual lenses' or 'prisms', through which new information is 
filtered. The behaviour of states is affected by the belief systems of their decision-makers. 
In many respects this approach resembles strategic culture. The belief systems literature 
should therefore be a further source of conceptual enlightenment. 
 
 Within strategic studies, conflict resolution, military history, and foreign policy 
studies, history and International Politics, therefore, the study of culture and beliefs 
appears recently to have attained a higher profile. The works quoted could be straws in 
the wind, of course, signifying little more than an occasional interest in culture and 
visible only because we are looking for them. Yet there are enough straws to allow us to 
build some bricks, especially when we turn to the discipline of International Politics as a 
whole. Culture, hitherto a byword within the subject of International Politics, is indeed 
                                                          
46 Larson, p. ix.  
47 Steve Smith, 'Belief Systems and International Relations', in Richard Little and Steve Smith, (eds), Belief 
Systems and International Relations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), pp. 18-27. 
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fast becoming a buzzword there also, at least as the subject is studied in the United States 
and the United Kingdom. Its progress from a 'forgotten' to a conspicuous variable is 
indicated by the increasing frequency with which reference is made to it in the literature 
of, and conferences on, International Politics.48 N.J. Rengger notes that until recently 
culture was largely absent from the indexes of major International Politics textbooks, but 
more recent texts make greater reference to it.49 Both the International Studies 
Association and the British International Studies Association annual conferences in recent 
years have devoted panels to culture and international relations, and a conference 
involving young scholars of international relations, held at the University of Keele in 
1993, identified culture as one important 'new direction' in International Politics. From 
the first mentioned conference panel there emerged a book on Culture and International 
Relations, while the journal Millennium has also recently devoted a special issue to the 
same subject.50 If there is not sufficient evidence here to demonstrate that culture is 
becoming a key variable in the discipline, there are more than just straws in the wind. It is 
possible to suggest without too much exaggeration that we are seeing at least the 
beginnings of a cultural turn in International Politics. 
  
 Moreover, in the human sciences more broadly, observers have also detected a 
'turn to culture' taking place.51 This implies a movement towards regarding human 
behaviour as shaped by the belief systems of local cultural units rather than human nature 
coded into people's genes or the structures in which people operate. This movement is 
seen as being bound up with the condition of postmodernity.52 Postmodern attitudes 
                                                          
48 Culture is characterised as a forgotten variable by Jean-Marie Bonthous in 'Understanding Intelligence 
Across Cultures', International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Fall 1994), 
p. 278.  
49 Nick Rengger, 'Culture, Society and Order in World Politics', in John Baylis and N.J. Rengger, Dilemmas 
of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), pp. 94-95. That 
book and Booth and Smith, International Relations Theory Today, devote more space to culture.  
50 See Chay; and Millennium, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1993). There is also an earlier work with a similar 
title, R.P. Anand, Cultural Factors in International Relations (New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1981). 
51 For instance, see David Chaney, The Cultural Turn: Scene-setting Essays on Contemporary Cultural 
History (London and New York: Routledge, 1994); and Roland Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory 
and Global Culture (London: Sage, 1992). 
52 See Chaney, p. 182; and Robertson, p. 32. 
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which stress plurality and particularities as opposed to universalities encourage the 
celebration of differences in the beliefs and values of local cultural units rather than the 
pursuit of universal genetic traits. (On the other hand, postmodern suspicion of grand 
narratives such as the evolution of cultural systems counterbalances this view.) 
 
 The cultural turn in the human sciences as a whole can be expected to affect 
International Politics, for intellectual developments in other areas of social science tend to 
come to International Politics, though sometimes belatedly. As well as, and linked to, 
postmodernity, various other intellectual currents affecting the human sciences and 
International Politics have helped to turn the tide in the favour of culture. Difficult to 
define and to operationalise, culture is a nebulous concept representing 'everything that 
good, positivistically trained international relations scholars should hate'.53 However, as 
part of the post-positivist debate which is currently taking place, positivistically trained 
scholars find themselves and their theoretical assumptions under challenge.54 Critics 
question the need for rigorous standards of proof modelled on the natural sciences. It is 
easier in this context for International Politics scholars to free themselves from these 
assumptions and to gain additional purchase on the slippery concept of culture, the 
importance of which defies objective measurement.  
 
 Traditional realists and neo-realists too are increasingly under fire. Critics argue 
that to see human behaviour as the product respectively of an essentialised view of human 
nature or the nature of the international system is misguided and simplistic. Cultural 
analysis is consistent with these critiques, opposing the black-boxing of states and 
endorsing investigation of how their internal workings affect their external relations, 
rejecting the view that human nature determines behaviour and looking at how the 
cultural environment shapes it. Similar reasons, incidentally, underlay the growth of 
                                                          
53 Rengger, p. 85. 
54 On post-positivism and International Politics see Josef Lapid, 'The Third Debate: On the Prospects of 
International Theory in a Post-Positivistic Era', International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3 (September 
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interest in belief systems in international relations. That subject was for much of its 
history reluctant to embrace the study of belief systems. This was partly because neo-
realists, dominant in the subject, focused their analyses of international politics on the 
level of the international system, openly denying explanatory power to psychological 
approaches which focused on the level of the individual. Increasing interest in belief 
systems was, Smith argues, the result of growing dissatisfaction with realism within 
International Politics. From this dissatisfaction arose the academic subject of Foreign 
Policy Analysis, which emphasised the importance of the perceptions held by actors of 
their situation rather than human nature and the nature of the international system.55  
 
 The weakening of barriers between disciplines within the human sciences has also 
allowed culture to come more to the fore within International Politics. It has been argued, 
for instance, that in the past the division of labour between International Politics and 
Sociology led to the 'neglect of national cultures, identities and traditions' in the former.56 
As that situation changes, and international relations scholars take more notice of the 
concerns of Sociology and other disciplines, and they take more notice of International 
Politics, so culture makes its way deeper into International Politics. Ideas about the 
socialisation of new generations into the beliefs of society come from Sociology. 
Psychology, the insights of which have been neglected by International Politics, is also 
now paid greater heed, so that the belief systems of different people and groups, related to 
culture, receive more attention. From Anthropology, in which culture has long been a 
central variable, come many other ideas. This 'blurring of genres' is both evidenced and 
furthered by the writings of Clifford Geertz, whose phrase that is.57 That Geertz and his 
ideas on culture and thick description have become so well known beyond his own 
discipline indicates the readiness of scholars to look beyond their own patch for insight, 
and this, with his well-written and accessible work, he encourages.58  
                                                          
55 Richard Little and Steve Smith, 'Introduction', in Little and Smith, pp. 15-16. 
56 Robertson, p. 5. 
57 Geertz, Local Knowledge, p. 19.  
58 See also Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures. 
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 Indeed, if some anthropologists complain that culture, their key concept, has been 
'imperialized by other disciplines', Geertz welcomes this.59 In 1983 he wrote that ten years 
ago,   
 
the proposal that cultural phenomena should be treated as significant social 
systems posing expositive questions was a much more alarming one for social 
scientists - allergic, as they tend to be, to anything literary of inexact - than it is 
now. In part, it is a result of the growing recognition that the established approach 
to treating such phenomena, laws-and-causes social physics, was not producing 
the triumphs of prediction, control, and testability that had been for so long 
promised in its name. And in part, it is a result of intellectual deprovincialization. 
The broader currents of modern thought have finally begun to impinge upon what 
has been, and in some quarters still is, a snug and insular enterprise.60 
 
 Finally, international theory is growing more aware of its own cultural roots and 
biases in Western philosophy, and thus is becoming more sensitive to cultural variation.61 
Recent trends in the realm of international theory are therefore conducive to the study of 
culture. At the same time, changes in the 'empirical realm' of the post-Cold War world 
demand that culture be afforded greater emphasis. The ending of the Cold War presents 
us with a more fragmented world. All sorts of peoples in far away places, about whom we 
previously knew little, have moved from the periphery to the centre-stage in world 
politics, as it is studied in the West at least. The diffusion of power following on from the 
break-down of bipolar confrontation allows Iraq the freedom to act on its own initiative 
where in the past it would have been wary of defying the superpowers. The behaviour of 
Iraqis, Serbs, Kurds, Chechens and a host of others takes on new importance and, for 
some scholars, entails understanding of their culturally moulded values and beliefs. Area 
studies may now assume a more central position within International Politics.62  
   
                                                          
59 See Yosef Lapid, 'Culture’s Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory', in Yosef 
Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (London and Boulder: 
Rienner, 1996), p. 3. 
60 Geertz, Local Knowledge, p. 3. 
61 See Booth, 'Dare not to Know', p. 333. 
62 That this has not always been so within strategic studies at least is lamented by Booth in Strategy and 
Ethnocentrism, especially pp. 147-52. 
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 Even prior to the end of the Cold War, culture attracted the attention of scholars of 
International Politics who saw Western cultural hegemony in decline. As other cultural 
systems emerged from the shadow of the Western one, profound implications were 
advanced for world politics in general and the maintenance of an international society in 
particular. For some, the diversity and incompatibility of cultural values in the world, and 
the relativist tendency to see all as equally valid, undermines the common values on 
which international society must be based, it can be argued.63 Others welcomed cultural 
diversity, seeing it as bringing opportunities and not just dangers. Walker, for instance, 
called for 'enquiries into ways in which ethnocentrism might be transcended, in which 
cultures might meet in a creative dialogue about future possibilities'.64 Walker noted, 
however, that less optimistic analyses of the future were being advanced. 'Some 
observers', he wrote in 1984, 'have begun to suggest that we are entering an epoch that 
will be characterized increasingly by a clash of civilizations...'.65 In doing so, he 
anticipated a recent article which has done much to push culture onto the centre stage of 
International Politics scholarship: Samuel Huntington's 'The Clash of Civilizations?'.66  
 
 Appearing in Foreign Affairs, probably the most mainstream foreign policy 
journal in the United States, Huntington's article has generated considerable heat and shed 
some light on culture. It takes arguments about the existence of different cultural systems 
in the world  and links them squarely to the likelihood of global conflict: 'the next world 
war, if there is one', Huntington predicts, 'will be a war between civilizations'.67 
Huntington's article outlines a new paradigm to predict and explain conflict in the post-
Cold War world, taking the main unit of analysis to be the civilization: 'the highest 
cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of 
that which distinguishes humans from other species'. Huntington identifies up to eight 
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64 R.B.J. Walker, 'East Wind, West Wind: Civilizations, Hegemonies, and World Orders', in R.B.J. Walker, 
(ed), Culture, Ideology, and World Order (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 2-3. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 
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67 Ibid, pp. 38-39. 
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such groupings in the world, including the Western, Islamic and Confucian civilizations, 
and argues that conflict among them was inevitable due to their fundamental cultural 
differences. The article has attracted much comment, mostly of an unfavourable nature.68 
Critics question whether civilizations are meaningful entities; whether, to the extent that 
they are meaningful, conflict has occurred and must occur among them; and whether such 
conflict as does occur is the result of cultural incompatibilities rather than material 
inequalities. They also point to the dangers inherent in Huntington's essentially 
pessimistic outlook, fearing that if it is replicated within governments, states and 
civilizations will begin to undertake preparations to secure themselves in the inevitable 
clash of civilizations, creating security dilemmas and thereby helping to bring about the 
very clash of civilizations which they seek to avoid. 
 
 Culture is, in various ways, on the agenda of International Politics. Many of the 
approaches to the subject which challenge mainstream views have long recognised the 
value and indeed 'derived much of their energy' from the study of culture and identity.69 
So constructivists such as Alexander Wendt discuss the idea that, far from there being 
one inevitable logic of anarchy to which all states must respond, various different logics 
of anarchy are possible. Anarchy is, he writes famously, 'what states make of it'. Our ideas 
about anarchy have been socially constructed through a lengthy process of interaction 
between states. There is potential for change.70 The famously nebulous nature of this term 
means that some caution is called for: the various writers using the term may well mean 
quite different things by it. Nevertheless, in searching for new ways in which to develop 
the study of strategic culture, there are many areas of writing which may be tapped. All 
                                                          
68 Among the many critiques are Richard E. Rubenstein and Jarle Crocker, 'Challenging Huntington', 
Foreign Policy, No. 96 (Fall 1994), pp. 113-28; Jacinta O'Hagan, 'Civilisational Conflict? Looking for 
Cultural Enemies', Third World Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1995), pp. 5-18; Adam Tarock, 'Civilisational 
Conflict? Fighting the Enemy Under a New Banner', Third World Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1995), pp. 19-
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69 Lapid, 'Culture's Ship’, p. 4.  
70 On this subject see Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of it: the social construction of  
power politics', International Organisation, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425. 
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those scholars in their different areas of International Politics who are working on culture 
in some respect would do well to pool their ideas.  
 
 A recurrent theme in the thesis has been that strategic culture may be studied in a 
positivist manner or in a more interpretive one. The same point has been made about 
political culture. It was observed that the recent resurgence in political culture takes a 
more interpretive turn. Those who wish to pursue further the study of strategic culture 
would do well to investigate the post-positivist and other debates in International Politics. 
The Snyder-Booth debate on strategic culture, discussed below, can be seen as part of that 
wider debate. To clarify the issues raised by the positivist-interpretive divide, strategists 
should venture out into wider academic debates.   
 
 T. E. Huxley wrote that 'it is the customary fate of new truths to begin as heresies 
and end as superstitions'. While strategic culture is not being proposed as a truth, if it 
does become accepted, it could then become a superstition. Clifford Geertz, in his 
seminal work The Interpretation of Cultures, identifies this pitfall. He notes that new 
concepts can get out of control. Suddenly in vogue, they can obscure other approaches, be 
applied widely and inappropriately and expected to solve all problems. Disillusion can set 
in when inevitably they fail to live up to such inflated advance notices. Within 
Anthropology, this seems to have been the case with culture. Now, work done on culture 
is 'concerned to limit, specify, focus and contain'. By cutting culture down to size 
anthropologists are 'actually insuring its continued importance rather than undermining 
it'.71 The same might be said of political culture, itself currently enjoying a resurgence of 
interest. It has gone through a phase of enormous expectations and then their inevitable 
disappointment from which it is only now emerging. To avoid the possibility of setting up 
strategic culture for a similar roller coaster ride of ups and downs, it is important not to 
oversell the concept now, and possibly to narrow it down in the future. The insights of the 
                                                          
71 Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, pp. 3-4. 
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wider realm of thinking about International Politics and the human sciences might offer 
assistance in this regard. 
 
 Strategic culture remains a felicitous phrase. If the ideas which it encompasses are 
not new, it nevertheless gives expression to notions which have often lain implicit in 
analyses, and it promises to serve as an ideological magnet, drawing together work which 
constitutes cultural analysis by other names. Moreover, it has the potential to enthuse 
those who have felt that there was something missing from strategic studies. Strategic 
culture fills the gap and invites further analysis. If Snyder had not invented the term for 
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STRATEGIC CULTURE: FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
 
by Ken Booth and Alan Macmillan  
 
 
Paper prepared for a conference on 'Strategic Culture and Conflict Resolution in the Asia-Pacific 
Region', held on Langkawi Island, Malaysia, 14-17 August 1994. [This paper was circulated to 
participants in advance of the conference. The participants were asked to draw on the framework 
to produce papers on individual countries within the region. They were also circulated with a 





We would like each chapter to begin with an introductory paragraph giving a short statement in 
answer to the question: with respect to the country you have studied, have you identified 
traditional ways of thinking and behaving with respect to the threat and use of force? If so, is the 
idea of a strategic culture strong or weak? If not, briefly indicate why.  
 
SOURCES OF STRATEGIC CULTURE 
While sensitive to the criticism that the three elements below do not exhaust sources of 
explanation of strategic culture, we do think that these are the most significant, and that other 





1. Geography and resources 
Geography is obviously a key factor in any country's thinking about its security. 'Geography is the 
bones of strategy', said Theodore Ropp. How have geographical factors affected the strategic 
culture of your country? (For example: What impact has geography had on patterns of adversity 
and amity - such as traditionally hostile neighbours? Have geographical factors affected the 
relative importance of the different armed services? Have they provided secure, natural borders? 
Have they affected strategic doctrines - predispositions to offensive or defensive strategies?). The 
importance of economic considerations (self-sufficiency in resources, dependence on others, 
economic potential etc) can be considered here. What has been the effect on strategy of the 
presence or absence of strategically-relevant resources?  
 
 
2. History and experience 
How have historical experiences affected communal attitudes to security and insecurity? (Are 
words like 'paranoia' or 'complacency' relevant?). What are the most significant historical 
memories and oversights about war and peace? How is strategic history perceived (which events 
are given most meaning)? Has the country suffered badly at the hands of others (eg has it lost 
national territory)? What generalisations can be made about threat perception? Identify the major 
symbolic events and people for each state, and the myths surrounding them. For Britain, for 
example, 'Hitler', 'Munich', 'Appeasement', 'Dunkirk' and 'Churchill' are words with great 
mythical power.  
 
 
3. Political structure and defence organisation 
What traditionally have been the most important features of the country's political system? Has it 
been liberal-democratic or communist, centralised or decentralised, open or closed, pluralist or 
dominated by narrow elites? Is there a tradition of stability or instability? Has 
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the system undergone any radical change? Has public opinion had much of a role to play in 
policy-making? Have the armed forces involved themselves in politics? Can any generalisations 
be made about the type of polity and its military behaviour?  
 
 In particular, what have been the main features of the country's defence decision-making 
organisation? Who makes defence policy: civilians or the military establishment? Is there much 
crossover between the military and civilian sectors? Within the military establishment, is there 
much interservice rivalry? Is any one service dominant? Has there traditionally been a 
professional or a conscript army? What effect have these factors had on the strategic culture of 
the country?  
 
 
POLITICAL CULTURE AND STRATEGIC CULTURE 
One of the most difficult questions faced by students of strategic culture is its relationship with 
the concept of political culture. How do the two interrelate? Do we regard strategic culture as a 
branch of political culture, or as one of its essential elements? If, as a result of the comparative 
study, we can do something to resolve these issues, then we will have taken an important step 
forward in the development of the concept of strategic culture. In addition to the problems of 
thinking about the general relationship, there are also a series of more specific questions we 
should address, as is suggested below. 
 
 How would you describe the main features of the country's political culture? What are the 
main factors shaping the political culture? How does the political culture shape the making and 
execution of the country's strategic policy? (eg to what extent does ideology affect the pattern of 
allies and enemies?) How are strategic beliefs passed on? Is there an identifiable militarist 
tradition in the society? If so, how does it manifest itself (eg in relation to issues like conscription 
or the use of force)? What are the sources of militarism? What impact do ethical, religious and 
gender factors have on strategic culture? What value do people place on human life, for instance? 
How do they see martyrdom? Do  
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particular societies or groups have exaggerated notions of masculinity and violence? Do such 
attitudes affect the prospects for using force, or working for conflict resolution?  
 
 
TRADITIONAL STRATEGIC CULTURE 
Having made some generalisations about the sources of strategic culture, we want you to draw up 
a profile of the country's traditional strategic culture. The political science literature is divided on 
the issue of whether the concept of political culture should confine itself just to studying attitudes 
('patterns of orientations') or behaviour as well. We appreciate both arguments, but since we 
believe that strategy is ultimately a practical activity, and because we hope to derive policy 
relevant conclusions from this project, we want everybody to consider both attitudes and 
behaviour in strategic culture, and to try and link them together. Consequently, in this essentially 
historical section of each chapter we would like relatively brief surveys of traditional thought and 
behaviour (we are content to be flexible about the dividing line you choose between 'traditional' 
and 'contemporary': for some countries 1945 might be the significant turning point, for others it 
might be the date of national independence or the date of the founding of a new political system).  
 
1. The history of strategic thought 
Who have been the influential sources of strategic thought? Did they come from within or 
outside the country? What did they say? Are their ideas still thought relevant? Have there been 
distinctive strategic sub-cultures (ethnic, class, military etc)?  
 
2. The history of strategic doctrine 
What generalisations can be made about the country's strategic doctrine (its plans and execution 
regarding the threat and use of force)? Is it possible to talk about a distinctive national style? Was 
there any distinctive and repeated behaviour? (eg, a tendency to act unilaterally versus a tendency 
to be 'alliance-prone'? a pattern of military complacency and unpreparedness? a history of 
deference to big neighbours? a readiness to use the military 
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instrument? a predisposition to over-insurance in military terms? etc).  
 
3. Profile of traditional strategic culture 
On the basis of the discussion in the two previous sections, we would like a short profile drawn 
up, summarising the main features of the country's strategic culture. What is distinctive in the 
country's attitudes, decision-making and behaviour with respect to the threat and use of force? As 
an illustration, if one were discussing traditional Russian/Soviet strategic culture, one would 
probably identify the following characteristics as the basis for discussion: a traditional sense of 
insecurity, overinsurance in military terms, the domination of decision-making by military 
professionals, traditionalist attitudes to deterrence and defence (eg 'attack is the best form of 
defence'), society-wide respect for the armed forces, a tendency to equate respect and fear in 
international politics, a history of seeing power in crude material terms (as in the equating of 
security with military strength) etc. This is one possible snapshot of the traditional strategic 
culture of Russia/the Soviet Union. We would like a similar profile for each country in the Asia-
Pacific region. At the same time we would like you to speculate on the following question: to 
what extent are the generalisations that constitute the strategic culture based on myths which 
have been manipulated by historians and politicians?  
 
 
CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC POLICY 
In this section we want a discussion of the country's attitude(s) and policies towards a number of 
major contemporary issues. Insofar as it is possible, and we know that this may be difficult, we 
would like you to draw causal links between the traditional strategic culture identified earlier and 
contemporary policy-making and behaviour. If the links seem tenuous or non-existent, then say 
so: it is no part of this project to make more of strategic culture than the evidence allows. So, if 
there is evidence which goes counter to the idea of links, please say so. These are the areas we 




1. Nuclear strategy 
What are the characteristics of the country's attitude(s) and policies towards nuclear war, nuclear 
deterrence, limited war and escalation, strategic defence and nuclear blackmail and coercion? We 
would like brief comments on 'nuclear strategy', even for countries which do not have nuclear 
weapons themselves (after all, all countries are targetable). Does strategic culture affect attitudes 
towards nuclear matters?  
 
2. Conventional strategy 
Is there anything distinctive about the country's attitude(s) and policies towards conventional 
military strategy? What have been the main characteristics of the doctrines of its armed forces? 
Where, how and why has force been used? What  generalisations can be made about strategy in 
war, the threat of force (Schelling's 'diplomacy of violence') and military intervention? Has there 
been any thinking about non-offensive defence?  
 
3. Disarmament and arms control 
What has been the country's position (as expressed by officials and public opinion) on the major 
questions of disarmament and arms control? Has the country taken any initiatives? Is the 
government content to follow others on these matters? Has there been a 'peace movement'? Has 
any serious thought gone into confidence-building in the region?  
 
4. Unconventional strategy 
Does the country have any distinctive attitudes or policies with respect to revolutionary 
strategies, guerrilla war, or terrorism? What are the origins of these attitudes?  
 
5. Independence/Interdependence  
Does the country believe it can best look after its security interests on its own? What is its 
attitude to associates and alliances? Has there been any thinking about 'common security'?  Is the 




How is security conceived - in a narrow military sense or in a broader sense (as in 
'comprehensive security')? If there is a comprehensive concept of security (as opposed to seeing 
defence and security synonymously) is this related to the strategic culture? How has the 
comprehensive concept been put into practice?  
 
7. Defence decision-making 
Who makes decisions on strategic matters? What is the relative influence of the different 
services? Is there a distinctive 'military' as opposed to 'civilian' set of attitudes on defence? What 
role does public opinion play? What is the status of the military in society? How do economic 
factors impinge on defence thinking? Is there a significant defence industry and lobby? How 
influential are interest groups in shaping defence policy?  
 
8. The new strategic environment 
How has the country reacted to the post-Cold War strategic environment? Can these attitudes and 
policies be related to traditional patterns of thinking and behaviour? Has any 'new thinking' on 
security taken place (comparable with Gorbachev's strategic cultural revolution in the mid-
1980s)?  
 
9. Strategic culture, society and identity 
This is a difficult matter to pin down, but one that may lead to some interesting speculation. Ole 
Waever and his colleagues have recently argued that at least in Europe in the years ahead the 
security question will be less concerned with the traditional problem - defending the sovereignty 
of the state against military threats - than with the emerging problem of defending the identity of 
a society against a range of threats (economic, cultural etc). This is in the book Identity, 
Migration And The New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993). Does this argument 
resonate in the Asia-Pacific region? Within particular countries are there different national, 
ethnic, religious or other identities which have different security outlooks and priorities than the 
decision-making elite? Are there significant divisions in the country? What role does strategic 
300 
culture play in internal conflicts? Do external enemies play an important part in the country's or 
society's cohesion and identity? How important are symbolic/historical military events (like 
'Dunkirk' for the British or 'Leningrad' for the Soviets) in the attempt to create national (and 
other) identities? Is strategic culture itself an important element of nation-building and national 
consciousness?  
 
 This internal dimension of strategic culture is not one that has been explored anywhere, as 
far as we know, but it clearly can be significant (note the strategic culture of the Serbs, and its 
effect on what has happened in former Yugoslavia). The attempt to bring 'culture' into 
international politics in general, including strategic studies, has in part been a reaction against the 
simplicities of so-called realism. But there is a danger when talking about 'a country's strategic 
culture' of committing one of the sins of realism, namely the reification of the unified actor - 
giving a country's culture a coherence that is not matched by reality. We want to open up 'state', 
'society' and 'culture', and not 'blackbox' any of them.  
 
 
CHANGE AND PEACE 
 
1. The sources of change 
If it is possible to talk about a country's distinctive strategic culture is it also possible to identify 
change over time? If there has been change, why? (Have changes been the result of external 
shocks or internal evolution?) In particular, to what extent have strategic cultures changed 
because of the growth or advent of democratic or communist ideologies? At time of great change 
(domestic upheavals, technological revolutions, international events etc) are the developments 
looked at through the lenses of strategic culture, or is there an attempt to look at new problems in 





be interesting in terms of the future prospects of conflict resolution in the region.  
 
2. The prospects for peace 
Questions of peace and conflict resolution have not been addressed by students of strategic 
culture, or even of strategic studies as a whole. One of the contributions of this project, we hope, 
will be to encourage a convergence of thinking on these matters. If possible, we would therefore 
like some comments about the country's traditional attitude(s) to non-military means of 
promoting security (economic integration, multilateral diplomacy etc). Is anybody in the country 
(officials, universities, research institutes) thinking about conflict resolution as an approach to 
security as opposed to military defence? If so, who is supporting such thinking? What are the 
prospects of key groups within the country reconceiving security away from traditional 
assumptions (emphasising state security, military strength and the preservation of the status quo) 
to 'new thinking' emphasising common security, a comprehensive approach, and change 




In terms of the project as a whole it would be helpful if the Conclusion could address two issues:  
 
 
1. Strategic Culture   
Does the study of the country's attitudes and behaviour in the security field support the concept of 
strategic culture (has there been a pattern of attitudes and behaviour in relation to the threat and 
use of force which transcends mere policy)? Or have governments through history simply been 
responding according to some universal strategic logic, or the pulling and pushing of domestic 
politics? Is the spread of modern technology pushing us to increasingly homogenised strategic 




2. Peace and Conflict Resolution  
Is there any prospect of the country's strategic culture being adapted, changed, used etc. to 
promote the delegitimisation of force in international politics? Are traditional strategic cultures 
compatible with peace? What are the prospects for transforming national strategic cultures into 
an international (regional) culture of conflict resolution and peace? 
